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RAGE INSIDE THE MACHINE: DEFENDING THE PLACE OF ANGER IN DEMOCRATIC SPEECH¹

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Abstract. According to an influential objection, which Martha Nussbaum has powerfully restated, expressing anger in democratic public discourse is counterproductive from the standpoint of justice. To resist this challenge, this paper articulates a crucial yet underappreciated sense in which angry discourse is epistemically productive. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, which emphasize the distinctive phenomenology of emotion, I argue that conveying anger to one's listeners is epistemically valuable in two respects: first, it can direct listeners' attention to elusive morally relevant features of the situation; second, it enables them to register injustices that their existing evaluative categories are not yet suited to capturing. Thus, when employed skillfully, angry speech promotes a greater understanding of existing injustices. This epistemic role is indispensable in highly divided societies, where the injustices endured by some groups are often invisible to, or misunderstood by, other groups. Finally, I defuse the most forceful objections to this defense—that anger is likely to be manipulated, that it is epistemically misleading, and that my defense presupposes unrealistic levels of trust—partly by showing that they overlook the systemic character of democratic discourse.

Keywords: Anger; Democratic theory; Deliberative systems; Philosophy of Emotion; Social Epistemology; Martha Nussbaum.

1. Introduction

In the classic novel *Invisible Man*, Ralph Ellison (1952) depicts the perspective of an unnamed black American whose skin color renders him “invisible”: he is persistently ignored, misunderstood, or mistaken for another. In a final moment of introspection, the invisible narrator turns to the reader:

So why do I write, torturing myself to put it down? Because in spite of myself I've learned some things [...] Why should I be the one to dream this nightmare? Why should I be dedicated and set aside—yes, if not to at least *tell* a few people about it? There seems to be no escape. Here I've set out to *throw my anger in the world's face* [...] 'Ah,' I can hear you say, 'He only wanted us to listen to him rave!' But only partially true: Being invisible and without substance, as it were, what else could I do? What else but try to *tell you what was really happening* when your eyes were looking through? And it is this which really frightens me: Who knows but that, on the lower frequencies, I speak for you?

The passage is fascinating, not least for what it suggests about the communication of anger. First, the narrator emphasizes the importance of “throwing [his] anger” at his audience. Further, he seems to do so on epistemic grounds, to make visible what had previously been invisible, by foregrounding his nightmarish experiences. Relatedly, perhaps, he claims that in expressing his anger, he speaks for the audience.

Interestingly, the invisible narrator is not alone in voicing such thoughts. His suggestions resonate strongly with the poet and activist Audre Lorde's (1997: 278) assertion that “my anger and your attendant fears, perhaps, are spotlights that can be used for your growth, [...] for corrective surgery”. Or consider, similarly, the novelist and civil rights advocate James Baldwin (1961: 205), who once declared that “to be a Negro in [America] and to be relatively conscious, is to be in a rage almost all of the time”, before recommending “control[ing] the rage so that it won't destroy you”, turning it into a productive force. For him, as a novelist, doing so manifests itself in the process of “creat[ing] a person and mak[ing] other persons feel what this person feels”. A pattern emerges.

In this article, I examine the place of anger in democratic public discourse. In doing so, I will try to make sense of the recurrent themes above. How is publicly expressing anger “corrective surgery” for one’s audience? What is it capable of teaching, or making us feel? These themes, I will argue, point to important insights regarding anger’s function and place in democratic discourse—insights, moreover, which extant philosophical discussions of anger have sometimes hinted at, but never precisely captured.

My focus will be on cases where the expressed anger is directed at significant injustices. Imagine, for example, an American civil rights activist in the 1960s, who publicly denounces the fact that blacks are unjustly treated as inferior. And suppose she expresses herself with deep anger. In this context, we can ask: is it morally appropriate that she publicly expresses this anger, when pursuing justice in conditions marked by deep ethical divides and pervasive injustices?

Both historically and in contemporary debates, some philosophers—including, prominently, Martha Nussbaum—have answered this question negatively. Public expressions of anger, they suggest, are morally undesirable. Perhaps one of the most influential arguments for this view, an argument which is sometimes echoed in broader public discourse,² asserts that expressing anger is counterproductive from the standpoint of justice: although it is an aversive reaction to injustice, it is likely to exacerbate existing injustices. Thus, justice would be better served, it is said, by forgiveness (McGary, 1989), love (Nussbaum, 2016), or even meekness (Pettigrove, 2012).

While this argument is powerful, I will supply grounds for resisting it by articulating a key and underappreciated sense in which angry speech, when skillfully channeled, is epistemically productive. My argument proceeds as follows. After offering a working definition of ‘anger’ (Section 2), I provide an overview of the counterproductivity objection, and of the main strategies for addressing it. I contend that even if we grant the non-

consequentialist value of anger, we cannot circumvent the issue of whether anger is productive in terms of its consequences (Section 3). Accordingly, I then examine anger from a consequentialist perspective: drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, which emphasize the distinctive phenomenology of emotional experience, I develop an account of publicly-expressed anger's epistemic productivity that is more precise and difficult to dismiss than traditional accounts have been. Communicating anger to one's listeners can play an indispensable role in directing their attention to elusive morally-relevant features of the situation, and can help them register and understand injustices that their existing evaluative categories are not yet suited to capturing. This epistemic role is crucial in divided societies, where the injustices suffered by some groups are often invisible to, or misunderstood by, others (Section 4). In turn, I consider and defuse the most powerful objections to this defense—that angry speech is likely to be manipulated, that it is epistemically misleading or at least redundant, and that my defense presupposes unrealistic levels of trust—partly by showing that they overlook the systemic character of democratic public discourse (Section 5). I conclude by revisiting Ellison's invisible narrator (Section 6).

Before proceeding, two preliminary observations are in order. The first is about what I am not purporting to show. When exactly the positive consequences of anger are likely to outweigh its negative consequences is in part an empirical question, to be investigated by social scientists. My aim, therefore, is rather to identify and conceptualize a key epistemic benefit of angry speech, which falls out of a philosophical understanding of what anger is. Thus, while I cannot offer a knockout argument against the counterproductivity objection, I can and will develop conceptual resources in light of which we can better resist this objection.

The second observation concerns the implications of my argument for broader debates about democracy. The most influential philosophical theory of democracy of the past three

decades—deliberative democracy—places processes of public deliberation at the center of the democratic ideal. While universal suffrage is essential to democratic decision-making, deliberative theories of democracy insist that exchanging reasons in public is of comparable importance.³

However, classic formulations of the deliberative ideal have been criticized for putting forward an understanding of deliberation that is too restricted, thereby excluding many valuable kinds of contributions from democratic public discourse. Iris Marion Young (1996: 122-125), for instance, famously observes that standard formulations of deliberative democracy require deliberators to engage in a dispassionate exchange of arguments. In doing so, she suggests, these theories overlook the importance of emotionally-charged and unruly forms of political discourse, such as personal narratives expressing anger or indignation.⁴

My argument in the present article should reinforce this critique of exclusionary understandings of democratic public deliberation. While those who defend the place of emotions in public discourse often state or at least imply that this includes anger (e.g., Young 1996: 124; Williams 2000: 146-152; Krause 2008: 119), they seldom focus their attention on anger. As a result, they have typically not tackled the counterproductivity objection head-on. This leaves them vulnerable to the response that although most emotions do have an important role to play in democratic public deliberation, anger does not. By theorizing the distinctive epistemic value of anger in political speech, my argument will help forestall this possible response. In this way, it will strengthen the case for adopting a more inclusive understanding of what constitutes appropriate democratic discourse.

2. Defining Anger

To define our focus more precisely, let us outline some key properties of the emotion I am calling ‘anger’. Like all emotions, and unlike moods, anger is an intentional attitude, in the philosophical sense of the term—an attitude that is directed at a particular object, its content.⁵ Anger, put differently, is about something: A is angry *that B betrayed him*; C is angry *that she was not promoted*.

Secondly, anger is a cognitive attitude: an important part of what anger does is aim accurately to represent certain features of the world. More specifically, as Zac Cogley has argued, anger presents the content it is directed at as involving a moral violation or injustice. “Being angry with someone”, Cogley suggests, “is (in part at least) to appraise her conduct as wrongful”. Because anger has this cognitive dimension, we can assess it as being more or less correctly directed, or *fitting*. That is, since anger presents its object as involving an injustice, objective standards of justice give us a benchmark against which we can evaluate whether particular instances of anger are fitting or unfitting.⁶

In the first place, anger is fitting or correctly directed only if its content actually does involve an injustice or moral wrongdoing. If I am angry that you stole from me, but you did not steal from me, or stealing is not wrong, then my anger is unfitting. However, in his discussion of anger’s fittingness, Cogley rightly observes that this is not a sufficient condition for anger to be fitting.⁷ Anger comes in various degrees of intensity. So, a further condition for anger to be fitting is that its intensity be proportionate to the severity of the injustice it is purporting to represent. Rage is not a fitting response to a minor moral violation, such as your borrowing my favorite pen without permission.

One upshot of this account is that anger’s fittingness, its cognitive accuracy, comes in degrees: anger can be more or less incorrect in presenting its content as involving an injustice or moral wrongdoing. A number of politically salient cases bring this out. At one end, a civil rights activist’s deep anger at racial segregation in 1960s America seems fully fitting, as

racial segregation really did exist and really was deeply unjust. At the other extreme, imagine a white supremacist who experiences rage towards a black family for moving to their neighborhood. Here, the anger seems wholly unfitting: there is intuitively no injustice, let alone a severe injustice, committed by the black family. An intermediate and more complex case might be that of an American automotive worker who is laid off. Let us assume that his employers dismissed him unfairly, and that their decision was unrelated to competition from migrant labor. Assume, furthermore, that the worker feels deep anger at having been fired, which (perhaps as a result of being misled by xenophobic demagogues regarding the cause of his joblessness) he directs at immigrants. The cognitive fittingness of his anger seems mixed: his anger correctly tracks that an injustice is involved in his joblessness. But it incorrectly represents immigrants as blameworthy for this injustice.

The majority of this paper will focus on public expressions of anger that, like the first case, are fitting or correct. While expressions of anger whose fittingness is mixed (like the automotive worker case) also have some epistemic value, cases of fully fitting anger illustrate the epistemic function I will be theorizing more cleanly. Nevertheless, Section 5 will return to the challenges raised by expressions of unfitting or partly-fitting expressions of anger. Such instances of anger are widespread in non-ideal conditions. Importantly, moreover, in actual political contexts, it can be difficult to discern how fitting or unfitting a given expression of anger is. Indeed, correctly identifying which particular instances of anger are tracking a genuine injustice can require complex factual and moral judgments, which might be contested. So, even if I am correct in thinking that expressions of fitting anger have a distinctive and crucial epistemic role to play in public discourse, we will need to consider how the presence of unfitting anger in politics complicates my defense of publicly-expressed anger.

A third key feature of anger is that it is phenomenologically distinctive: there is a distinctive qualitative experience that is involved in being angry at something. This experience is partly characterized by certain bodily feelings, such as an increased heart rate, feeling hot, or trembling. However, and this will prove important, anger's distinctive phenomenology also concerns the content it is directed at. A common observation amongst philosophers of emotion is that although emotions are directed at objects that are already given to us through perception, imagination, memory, or belief, emotions do not leave the representation of these objects unchanged. Instead, they are "distinctive ways of seeing a situation" (Jones, 1996: 11). In Section 4, I will expand on how anger characteristically affects the way we experience its content, and why this matters politically.

Finally, besides having a cognitive dimension, anger has a conative aspect. Not only is anger an attitude which aims to represent something about the world, but it also disposes us to action. For example, A's rage at the unfair treatment of blacks in the criminal justice system may motivate A to retaliate against law enforcement agencies, or to protest for their reform.

With this picture of anger in mind,⁸ we can define this article's focus more precisely. As we will see shortly, Martha Nussbaum (2015) has mounted an influential challenge to anger, which centers on its conative dimension: anger is problematic, she claims, because it often disposes us to retributive or vengeful actions, actions aimed at inflicting payback on the perpetrators of injustice.⁹ But even Nussbaum allows for *some* forms of anger, which she labels "transitional anger", and of which Martin Luther King, Jr. is the paradigmatic illustration.

While transitional anger's most distinctive attribute is that it is not retributive (2015: 54), Nussbaum's discussion of King makes it clear that it has further distinguishing properties. A second characteristic is that although, like anger generally, transitional anger is directed at a

morally deficient object, it swiftly transforms into a forward-looking attitude, which is oriented towards advancing justice. Thus, someone experiencing and expressing transitional anger does not dwell on past injustices (2015: 52-54). Thirdly, although transitional anger sometimes moves individuals to non-retributive violence (for instance, in self-defense), it habitually motivates non-violent actions (2015: 52-54; see also Nussbaum, 2016: 212, 221). Finally, transitional anger has a distinctive tone: its typical expression is not fiery or harsh, but calm and self-controlled (Nussbaum, 2016: 222, 228-230).

In this light, to avoid arguing against a straw man when defending anger's place in democratic discourse, I will only consider non-transitional forms of anger. To this end, this article focuses largely on the public speech of Frederick Douglass (1818-1895), an abolitionist leader who escaped from slavery, and Malcolm X (1925-1965), who famously militated against the oppression of black Americans. Both were heavily involved in the struggle for racial justice, and both were reputed for their intensely angry rhetoric.¹⁰

Crucially, the anger they expressed was seldom transitional anger. First, its conative dimension, or aim, could be retributive. Douglass, for instance, once asserted that slaveholders "deserve to have [their throats] cut" (cited in Oakes, 2007: 100). And even when its aim was not retributive, their anger nonetheless typically differed from transitional anger. It was often agitated and harsh, sometimes shading into rage, it did not shy away from encouraging violence, and it often dwelled on past and current injustices. Consider, for example, Malcolm X's insistent depictions of the "nightmare" constituted by black Americans' daily lives—a rhetoric which contrasted so starkly with King's own forward-looking rhetoric of "dreams" that King repeatedly distanced himself from it.¹¹

Admittedly, focusing on the political speech of Douglass and Malcolm X does mean that my examples will be somewhat US-centric. This is by no means to suggest that the value of publicly-expressing anger is a uniquely American phenomenon. In *Sing the Rage*, for

instance, Sonali Chakravarti (2014) has beautifully chronicled expressions of deep anger within the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Prima facie, the reasons I will introduce for thinking that publicly expressing non-transitional anger is epistemically valuable should also be applicable in non-US contexts such as this one. Here, however, I focus on Douglass and Malcolm X because they illustrate my theoretical argument particularly vividly, and because, given how embedded they are in the struggle for racial justice in the US, they constitute a natural counterpoint to Nussbaum's own running example, Martin Luther King, Jr.

In addition to these dialectical reasons, there are also political reasons for examining the value of such unsanitized anger. Douglass and Malcolm X are interesting orators on which to base a philosophical assessment of angry public discourse partly because they played prominent roles in their respective struggles. What is more, the intensity of their anger echoes that of the three figures we started with. Baldwin, in particular, makes it clear that it is *rage* he and other black Americans need to control and channel. What this suggests is that experiencing non-transitional anger is common in non-ideal political contexts where injustices are widespread. And although expressions of more moderate or transitional anger may be more pervasive in the public sphere than expressions of non-transitional anger—at least in mainstream media outlets—the prominence of public speakers like Douglass or Malcolm X suggests that public expressions of non-transitional anger do nevertheless occupy a substantial place. So, the question of whether or not individuals should publicly express non-transitional anger is a politically salient one. As a result, while political philosophers have given due attention to the rhetoric of more moderate speakers, like Martin Luther King, Jr.,¹² achieving a balanced normative assessment of democratic discourse in non-ideal conditions also requires paying close attention to the more controversial, but nonetheless politically significant, case of real anger.

3. The Counterproductivity Objection: An Overview

3.1. The Counterproductivity Objection

One of the most common charges against publicly expressing non-transitional anger is that doing so is often counterproductive: it is likely to amplify rather than alleviate existing injustices. This view has a distinguished philosophical history. Perhaps most famously, Seneca asserts that anger is radically at odds with humankind's ethical ends: "mankind is born for mutual assistance; anger for mutual ruin" (I.5). Thus, "anger has nothing useful in itself" (I.9). The view that anger and its expression are counterproductive also has prominent contemporary advocates. Glen Pettigrove, for instance, notably suggests that because anger may interfere with interpersonal communication, blind angry individuals, and motivate oppressive actions, "the person who does not grow angry [...] will be better positioned to focus on promoting common goods" (2012: 347, 369-370). In contemporary philosophy, however, the counterproductivity objection owes its most prominent restatement to Martha Nussbaum.¹³

Although Nussbaum is also concerned with anger's intrinsic moral standing, she frequently deplores its bad consequences. Firstly, Nussbaum claims, anger tends to be an irrational waste of energy, which distracts from the pursuit of justice. This is because, for Nussbaum, anger typically motivates individuals to seek payback, even though seeking payback will rarely undo the wrong which prompted the anger. Hence, "if we ponder the futility of the payback wish [...] we quickly discover that non-anger and a generous disposition are far more useful" (2016: 228).

For similar reasons, Nussbaum continues, anger is likely to positively obstruct the pursuit of justice. By "breeding mistrust" and "increas[ing] the anxiety and self-defensiveness" of its

targets, expressing anger undermines interpersonal cooperation. And promoting justice on a wide scale may well require interpersonal cooperation. In the worst cases, by inciting payback and eroding trust, anger risks triggering a “cycle of blood vengeance” (2016: 1, 230-33). This is presumably what Martin Luther King feared when condemning Malcolm X’s violently angry rhetoric, which he claimed could “reap nothing but grief” (cited in Baldwin, 1986: 403). Thus, expressing anger may seem misguided if we care about advancing justice: angry discourse seemingly hurts rather than helps the promotion of justice, and should therefore be condemned, just as King condemns Malcolm X’s fiery rhetoric.

3.2. Consequentialist and Non-Consequentialist Strategies

A direct strategy for responding to this objection consists in arguing that anger is often not counterproductive, as it has more good effects than bad effects. However, to sidestep the thorny issue of whether or not anger is counterproductive, which is intimately bound up with empirical questions, Amia Srinivasan suggests an alternative strategy. According to Srinivasan, the question of whether we should feel and express anger is not fully answered by an assessment of anger’s consequences. Even if we ascertain that overall, we have instrumental reasons not to get angry, there may still be intrinsic reasons to do so, reasons unrelated to its consequences. “For any instance of counterproductive anger we might still ask: [...] Is the anger, however unproductive, nonetheless *apt*?” (Srinivasan, forthcoming: 4).

What makes anger apt? Remember that anger has a cognitive dimension: it is directed at an object which it represents as involving a moral wrongdoing or injustice. Anger is cognitively fitting, recall, only if its object actually involves a moral violation or injustice and only if it is proportionate to that injustice. For Srinivasan, aptness is the intrinsic moral value that accrues to anger in virtue of being a fitting cognitive response to injustice. Srinivasan’s

suggestion is that, just as there is intrinsic aesthetic value in appreciating beauty or the sublime, so too there is intrinsic moral value in anger that correctly appreciates the injustice of a state of affairs (forthcoming: 5-10).

Because anger is apt in virtue of fittingly or correctly registering its object's moral properties, its aptness does not depend on producing good consequences. Thus, even if anger is instrumentally problematic, its intrinsic value suggests that we might yet be able to resist the conclusion that it is all-things-considered morally undesirable.

One worry with this response is that, for Nussbaum (2015: 41-51), anger's tendency to motivate retributive action also makes it morally questionable from a non-consequentialist perspective. On her view, either the desire for payback involves an immoral obsession with the relative status of others, or it displays an irrational disposition to produce futile suffering. Since both traits are vicious, the fact that anger's conative dimension disposes us to retributive action shows it to be intrinsically immoral.

In reply, Srinivasan denies that such a tight connection obtains between anger and retribution. "Anger without the desire for revenge is something many of us know well". When a friend betrays me, Srinivasan suggests, it is perfectly conceivable that my ensuing anger may motivate me simply to seek his recognition that he has wronged me. And this desire for recognition, it seems, has no essential connection to the desire for revenge (forthcoming: 7-8). If this is right, the upshot is that anger is not inherently associated with revenge. Though anger may sometimes cause revenge, it is not itself essentially vindictive. So, even accepting for the sake of argument that retribution is inherently immoral, it would not follow that anger is intrinsically immoral.

But even if Srinivasan is correct, this non-consequentialist strategy does not allow us to circumvent the counterproductivity objection altogether. It is implausible (and I take it Srinivasan is not suggesting) that the non-consequentialist prerogative which permits the

expression of counterproductive anger has absolute force. In other words, the aptness of anger gives us a pro tanto moral reason in favour of publicly expressing apt anger, but this moral reason could in principle be overridden by countervailing moral reasons.

The counterproductivity objection purports to give such countervailing moral reasons: if publicly expressing anger is indeed counterproductive, this gives us pro tanto moral reasons not to do so. And if expressing anger is *highly* counterproductive, it is possible that these consequentialist reasons against expressing anger outweigh the non-consequentialist reasons for expressing anger. To illustrate: if expressing rage really would have caused Abraham Lincoln to fail in his attempt to abolish slavery, and Martin Luther King, Jr. to fail in his leadership of the civil rights movement, then one might plausibly think that, overall, caring about justice required that they refrain from expressing anger. Correspondingly, if expressing anger really is extremely counterproductive, it might seem that enraged orators like Douglass and Malcolm X were overall wrong, from the perspective of justice, to express themselves as they did.

To strengthen the case in favour of publicly expressing anger, then, we should not stop at the claim that anger has non-consequentialist value. We should also challenge the claim that anger is categorically bad from a consequentialist perspective. Hence, although I agree with Srinivasan that apt anger has intrinsic value, the rest of this article tackles the counterproductivity objection more directly, by putting forward an important way in which publicly expressing anger can be epistemically productive. In doing so my aim is not to establish that publicly expressing anger is never counterproductive, or that the all-things-considered tally of moral reasons invariably supports publicly expressing anger. Rather, it is to add an important class of pro tanto moral reasons to the tally board, and thereby reinforce the case for publicly expressing anger.

One might worry that directly challenging the counterproductivity objection's consequentialist claim is essentially an empirical task, which should devolve to social scientists. However, philosophers can also play a significant part. When social scientists investigate the empirical consequences of public anger, they do not look randomly, but instead proceed with some theoretical hypotheses regarding what types of effects might be reliably related to anger. The task of developing such hypotheses is one that philosophers can fruitfully contribute to. By elucidating emotions' phenomenology, intentionality, and relation to epistemic values, philosophical accounts of emotions help illuminate what kinds of consequences we can expect emotions to produce. Accordingly, in what follows, I oppose the counterproductivity objection by identifying and conceptualizing a crucial positive consequence of anger.

4. The Epistemic Benefits of Publicly-Expressed Anger

Opponents of the counterproductivity objection have enumerated various goods that anger can produce. Anger, it is said, motivates others to oppose injustice (Lorde, 1997: 290), helps one retain one's self-respect (Bell, 2009; Borgwald, 2012), and enhances one's perceived competence and social status (Tiedens, 2001). Without rejecting these suggestions, I will specifically investigate the *epistemic* value of communicating one's anger.

The view that anger and its public expression are epistemically valuable is not uncommon. As observed in the introduction, it is popular amongst writers and activists. Recall, for example, the invisible narrator's assertion that his anger aims to make visible what had been overlooked, and Lorde's reference to her anger as a "spotlight". Furthermore, this view has been taken up by philosophers, particularly feminist philosophers, as part of a broader trend towards rehabilitating emotions within epistemology.¹⁴

Nevertheless, the epistemic value of publicly-expressed anger has yet to be articulated adequately. In the first place, some philosophers who discuss anger's epistemic worth are not primarily concerned with the value of *publicly communicating* anger (Jaggar, 1989; Bell, 2009). And most of the defenses that *are* concerned with publicly communicating anger are largely programmatic, rather than precisely developed (Lorde, 1997; Frye, 1983). An exception here is Chakravarti, who has recently explored the value of anger in victim testimony. But Chakravarti (2014: 2) does not avail herself of recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, which—I will argue—are needed to appreciate what is distinctive about publicly-expressed anger's epistemic contribution. These limitations have enabled critics of publicly-expressed anger to acknowledge that it has some epistemic value, while downplaying the relative importance of that value. To pre-empt such replies, I will explore the epistemic value of publicly-expressed anger in a way that makes it clearer why this epistemic role matters, and why it cannot easily be performed without anger.

4.1.The Theoretical Case

Some epistemic benefits of publicly expressing anger are relatively uncontroversial. When public speakers express their demands with sincere anger—either by displaying the conventional physiological and vocal signs of anger, or by explicitly affirming that they are angry—we learn *that they and those they represent are angry*. Given an understanding of what anger is, this is already learning a substantial amount about their psychology. We learn that they are experiencing certain bodily feelings, like tenseness, that they have the sense that something is seriously morally amiss in their situation, and that they might be driven to action (Chakravarti, 2014: 55).

Although providing this information is an important epistemic function, two worries arise. Firstly, one might think that these functions could largely be performed without expressing full-blown anger. Pettigrove (2012: 355), for instance, remarks that refraining from anger did not prevent Abraham Lincoln from expressing his moral opposition to slavery. In a letter to a political opponent, for example, Lincoln (1860: 152) declares: “You think slavery is right and ought to be extended; we think it is wrong and ought to be restricted. For this, neither has any just occasion to be angry with the other”. Similarly, Nussbaum (2016: 6) might again point to transitional anger. The entire cognitive content of transitional anger, she claims, is “How outrageous. Something should be done about that.” Thus, expressing transitional anger, as Martin Luther King, Jr. did, seemingly suffices to communicate the belief that a situation is unjust, and the disposition to act on this basis.

Secondly, remember that we set out trying to illuminate the appealing observations Ellison’s invisible narrator made about anger, observations which Lorde and Baldwin echoed. But the above account of publicly-expressed anger’s epistemic value does not fully capture what they meant. The invisible narrator declares that his anger teaches us something about the world, shining a light on nightmarish features we had overlooked. So far, however, the epistemic function of anger is merely that it teaches us something about the speaker’s psychology, not about the world she is looking at. Nor, moreover, does the present account elucidate Baldwin’s suggestion that useful rage works by making listeners feel what the speaker feels.

We need to isolate a distinctive epistemic function of angry speech, one that is capable of overcoming these concerns. To this purpose, I suggest that angry discourse is epistemically important not just because it tells the audience *that the speaker is angry*, but also because it can help them imaginatively experience *what it is like to be in the speaker’s shoes, how the world appears or feels from where they stand*. Put differently, angry discourse can enable the

audience to empathize more fully with the speaker, where I am taking “empathy” to be synonymous with “imaginatively taking on the perspective of another to grasp how things appear or feel from there”.¹⁵

How does this work? The first thing to notice is that publicly expressing anger can be a means of transmitting anger to one’s audience. Suppose speaker A is describing an unjust state of affairs—say, slavery—in order to denounce it. But instead of simply enumerating facts about slavery, A expresses his intense anger, with the aim of arousing similar emotions in the audience. In doing so, A is making use of the near-universal propensity for human beings to resonate with or “catch” the emotions of others. Hume (2009[1738]: 3.3.1.7) famously observes this general tendency: “as in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to the other”.

This phenomenon is well documented in contemporary psychology, under the heading of “emotional contagion”. Human beings tend to mimic the expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements of others, in a way that leads them to experience the emotions of others. This process is typically automatic, involuntary, and largely unconscious.¹⁶ Importantly, moreover, this effect also holds with anger, specifically. One study, for instance, finds that when speakers raise their voices and accelerate their speech, “this is likely to raise the listener’s blood pressure and feelings of anger” (Siegman et al, 1990: 641).¹⁷ In short—and here we have an echo of Baldwin’s thoughts about rage—given the tendency for emotional contagion, infusing one’s narrative with anger can cause one’s audience to feel that anger.

To illustrate, consider Douglass’s indictment of slavery. Douglass, one historian records, was known for his fiery passion: “when he spoke, he roared, his booming baritone complemented by waving arms”. And the fire was infectious: Douglass deliberately used this anger to “to make people feel—viscerally—the bloody horrors of slavery”, “to provoke his

listeners [...] to furious outrage” (Oakes, 2007: 90-93). Nowhere was this effect so clearly reported as in William Lloyd Garrison’s account of Douglass’s first public speech:

I shall never forget [...] the *extraordinary emotion it excited* in my own mind—the *powerful impression* it created upon a crowded auditory [...] I think I *never hated slavery so intensely* as at that moment; certainly *my perception of the enormous outrage* which is inflicted by it [...] was rendered far more clear than ever (1845: iv, emphases added).

What the quote unambiguously shows is the contagious nature of Douglass’s anger, which spreads not just to Garrison, but to the audience generally.

Publicly expressing anger about *x*, then, can help one’s audience experience anger about *x*. But why does it matter *epistemically*? As I noted earlier, philosophers of emotion commonly argue that emotional deliverances have a distinctive phenomenology, or felt experience. Put differently, they are distinctive ways of seeing the object that they are directed at.¹⁸ Hence, conveying one’s anger to one’s listeners helps them imaginatively undergo a distinctive qualitative experience. More specifically, the audience’s perspective-taking or empathy is rendered more complete by emotional contagion. As the audience tries to adopt speaker A’s perspective, their imaginative reconstruction is altered by the anger they have infectiously gained from A. Not only is Douglass’s audience imagining the facts about slavery he is reporting, but the felt quality of their imaginings is colored by the anger he has transmitted to them. Thus, emotional contagion helps them more fully adopt Douglass’s angry perspective.

For our purposes, the fact that the audience’s imaginative reconstruction of the speaker’s perspective is colored by anger’s distinctive felt quality matters *only if* this felt quality is

epistemically valuable—that is, only if it enriches our understanding of the anger’s object. So the question is: how does the phenomenology of anger yield a better understanding of the anger’s object?

To appreciate how it does so, let us consider two aspects of what philosophers of emotion have argued characterizes the phenomenology of emotional representation. The first relevant feature is that emotions are *sources of salience*: they draw our attention to certain aspects of a situation, and thereby place some properties of that situation into the foreground.¹⁹ Thus, we have a way to understand Lorde’s reference to anger as a “spotlight”. Emotions help us navigate complex environments by selecting features of the environment and highlighting them. In doing so, they “rende[r] previously ignored features and previously unknown patterns salient” (Elgin, 2008: 45).

Which features do emotions call our attention to? Recall that the fittingness of an emotion depends on whether its object involves certain evaluative properties: loss for grief, danger for fear, injustice for anger, and so on. Hence, one intuitive proposal is that a given emotion puts a spotlight on aspects of its object that are liable to ground those evaluative properties. Take the case of fear. If I am walking home at night and am afraid, my fear highlights features of the environment that may make it dangerous: the street’s emptiness, the absence of lighting, and the footsteps behind me (Elgin, 2008: 43-44). By analogy, we should expect anger to highlight patterns of behavior that are liable to ground injustices.

Putting these observations together, we have a first sense in which anger’s phenomenology is epistemically valuable. Anger renders salient properties of our situation that are liable to ground injustices. Because the environments we navigate are extremely complex, we may otherwise have failed to notice these properties. Thus, perceiving a situation with anger can make us notice an injustice that we would otherwise have overlooked. Furthermore, having our attention directed to the properties which ground a

given injustice can help us see *why* something is unjust. Hence, the salience role of anger is epistemically valuable not only because it can yield knowledge that an injustice is taking place, but also because it facilitates a greater understanding of the nature of that injustice.

A second characteristic of emotions' phenomenology suggests that they are epistemically valuable: in virtue of having a quasi-perceptual felt quality, it is commonly argued, emotional representations of objects allow us to register evaluative properties in a way that can be more fine-grained than our evaluative concepts would allow. While this claim is especially at home amongst theories that explicitly identify emotions with perceptions of evaluative properties, even philosophers who reject this identification generally acknowledge that perceptions and emotions have many experiential similarities.²⁰ In particular, Deonna and Teroni (2012: 66-67) clearly expound this second point. In the same way that

we can visually discriminate thousands of shades of color for which we simply lack the corresponding concepts [...] we may surmise that the sensitivity to evaluative properties that [emotions] authorize is more fine-grained than the discriminations that evaluative judgments provide for. The idea would be, for instance, that the intensity of one's fear co-varies with the degree of danger one faces, something our comparatively coarse evaluative judgments may prove unable to capture.

To reformulate, the suggestion is that emotional experience is similar to perceptual experience in the following way: it can involve discriminations of evaluative properties that are more fine-grained than our existing evaluative concepts would allow, just as visual perception allows us to discriminate between more shades of blue than we currently have concepts for.

This claim might seem intuitively true, insofar as it accurately captures our experience of emotion. But there is a further reason to accept it. The fact that emotional experiences can involve such fine-grained evaluative discriminations helps explain why emotions tend to play an essential role in the process of acquiring and mastering evaluative concepts.²¹ Emotions could not play this widely-acknowledged developmental role unless the evaluative nuances offered by emotional experiences could be more subtle than those allowed by our existing concepts. Again, this seems analogous to the case of visual perception. The fact that we can visually discriminate between many shades of blue prior to having access to corresponding concepts is part of what explains how we develop and master numerous color concepts in the first place.

What does this mean for anger? The idea is that our experiences of anger can make us perceive or sense injustices that our pre-existing conceptual frameworks did not allow us to grasp. In turn, this emotional sensitivity facilitates the development of more nuanced moral concepts. As with the salience role of emotions, then, the emotional sensitivity to fine-grained evaluative differences can not only help us first recognize that injustices are occurring, but can also advance our understanding of those injustices, by enriching our conceptual resources for thinking about them.

To clarify, consider the widely-discussed case of Carmita Wood (Fricker, 2007: 149-151). One of Wood's male colleagues continuously subjected her to unwanted sexual advances. Though she felt unable to say why at the time, Wood's deep indignation and bemusement made her sense that she was being treated wrongly. Reflecting on these responses in a consciousness-raising group then enabled her and others to first develop the concept of sexual harassment. Thus, Wood's emotional sensitivity allowed her to recognize that she was being treated wrongly before she could even name the wrong in question. And that in turn helped her acquire the conceptual resources needed to understand its wrongness. Armed with the

concept of sexual harassment, Carmita Wood was better equipped to explain how her colleague had wronged her, and to recognize other wrongdoings of the same type more reliably.

Let us conclude. Examining recent developments in the philosophy of emotion yields a theoretical account of two ways in which publicly expressing anger, by inspiring anger in one's interlocutors, helps them recognize and understand injustices when they would otherwise have struggled to do so: first, by rendering certain morally-relevant properties salient which they had previously overlooked; second, by yielding perceptions of injustice that are more fine-grained than their existing moral concepts would allow. Notice that these two roles can come apart. Someone might already have extremely refined moral concepts, but might fail to apply them correctly because some non-moral properties of their environment are not salient to them. Conversely, someone might be aware of all the relevant non-moral properties but have very crude moral categories, which prevent them from seeing or fully understanding existing injustices.

4.2.Two Historical Illustrations

The foregoing account of anger's epistemic value has been very abstract. To make it more concrete, let us consider two historical examples of political anger. The first focuses on Frederick Douglass's denunciation of slavery. Before considering this example, let me clarify precisely what it is intended to illustrate. We have already seen, in the previous section, how Douglass used his gestures, tones, and rhetoric to express anger and thereby contagiously rouse his audience to anger. This, recall, was vividly reported in William Lloyd Garrison's testimony, where he described the "extraordinary emotion" Douglass's speech excited in his own mind.

What I want to illustrate *now* is how the anger Douglass transmitted to his audience altered their perception of slavery in the epistemically beneficial way outlined in the previous section. Ideally, to do so, we would consider Garrison's own testimony regarding how the anger he had acquired from Douglass modified his moral perception of slavery. But the problem is that Garrison's testimony is not very precise when it comes to describing exactly how the anger Douglass's speech excited in him changed his felt experience of slavery. He merely indicates that this anger made his perception of slavery's wrongness "far more clear". Douglass, on the other hand, reports in extremely rich detail how experiencing anger transformed his own perception of slavery. So, to illustrate my theoretical account of anger's epistemic value, I will focus on Douglass's testimony regarding his own anger. By considering how Douglass's anger affected his perception of slavery, we can hope to learn about how *being roused to anger by Douglass's angry political speech* may similarly have enhanced Garrison's (and other audience members') understanding of slavery's injustice.²²

With this clarification in mind, let us turn to Douglass's (1855:161) account of when, still a slave, he learned to read:

The more I read, the more I was led to abhor and detest slavery, and my enslavers. [...] I loathed them as the meanest and the most wicked of men [...] Liberty! The inestimable birthright of every man had, for me, converted every object into an asserter of this great right. It was heard in every sound, and beheld in every object. It was ever present, to torment me with a sense of my wretched condition. [...] My feelings were not the result of any marked cruelty in the treatment I received; they sprung from the consideration of my being a slave at all. It was slavery—not its mere incidents—that I hated. [...] The feeding and

clothing me well, could not atone for taking my liberty from me. The smiles of my mistress could not remove the deep sorrow that dwelt in my young bosom.

Douglass clearly experiences intense anger: he “abhor[s]”, “detest[s]”, “loath[es]”, and “hate[s]” slavery and slaveholders. But he is not just telling us that he is angry. Instead, he is also reporting his felt experience of anger at slavery, how slavery appears from his angry perspective. Accordingly, he stresses how every object’s appearance was “converted” by his anger, and repeatedly employs perceptual language.

What does this anger-infused perspective teach Douglass about slavery? First, Douglass’s anger draws his attention to how all things, including nonhuman animals, are free and independent in virtue of an “inestimable birthright”. By *rendering salient* the ubiquity of freedom, then, Douglass’s anger highlights his own degraded status.

In turn, this helps him better understand the nature of slavery’s wrongness. The idea is that it is the *status* of slavery that is unjust, the very condition of depending on an arbitrary master, independently of that master’s oppressive actions. In Douglass’s words: it is “slavery—not merely its incidents”—that is wrong. Indeed, as he reports, by the standards he had previously been accustomed to, Douglass’s masters at this time were relatively kind. Thus, the angry perspective helps him perceive more precisely the ground of slavery’s wrongness, which concerns the relative standing or status of slaves. This is quite a fine-grained understanding of the injustice of slavery and of the value of freedom, which arguably anticipates contemporary conceptualizations of freedom as non-domination (e.g., Pettit, 1997), and which Douglass (as well as his audience) may otherwise have been unable to grasp.

Hence, Douglass’s testimony regarding his anger vividly illustrates how anger can both highlight morally-relevant properties of one’s environment (e.g., the comparative

independence of other living beings), and enable a more fine-grained understanding of injustice than may have been allowed by one's prior moral categories (e.g., by making one sense the status-based wrong of slavery, domination). We may surmise that being roused to anger by Douglass's angry political speech had a similarly beneficial phenomenological effect on Douglass's audience. This helps us understand more precisely what Garrison may have been referring to when asserting that the anger gleaned from Douglass's speech made his understanding of slavery's injustice "far more clear".

Nussbaum might object that Douglass's anger here is too close to her transitional anger to have much dialectical force against her. But notice how Douglass's anger in fact differs from the standard case of transitional anger. His reference to loathing, abhorrence, and hatred suggests a harsh and fiery form of anger, rather than a calm and restrained one. Moreover, he focuses on the injustice itself, rather than on the remedy. This difference is crucial: because transitional anger characteristically does not dwell on the injustice itself, it is ill-suited to helping us understand the nature and depth of that injustice. Admittedly, though, Douglass's anger here does seem qualified in some respects. First, his use of the past tense places some distance between his present attitude and that anger. Second, the conative dimension of his anger here does not seem to involve anything like retribution or violence.

Hence, let us turn to Malcolm X for an even more intense expression of rage. In his speech 'The Ballot or the Bullet', Malcolm X (1964) denounces black Americans' lack of economic and political opportunities:

We're trapped, trapped, double-trapped, triple-trapped. Any way we go, we find that we're trapped [...] So today our people are disillusioned. They've become disenchanted. And in 1964 you'll see this young black man, this new generation, asking for the ballot or the bullet. That old Uncle Tom action is outdated. The

young generation don't want to hear anything about "the odds are against us". What do we care about the odds? [...] When we open our eyes today and look at America, we see America not through the eyes of someone who has enjoyed the fruits of Americanism. We see America through the eyes of someone who has been the victim of Americanism. We don't see any American dream. We've experienced only the American nightmare. We haven't benefited from America's democracy. We've only suffered from America's hypocrisy. And the generation that's coming up now can see. And are not afraid to say it. If you go to jail, so what? If you're black, you were born in jail.

Like Douglass, Malcolm X's speech expresses deep anger. And like Douglass, he is reporting what it is like to be enraged at America's racially-discriminatory practices, what one sees when one looks through the eyes of an outraged black American. Unlike Douglass, however, his anger does involve the conative dimension Nussbaum is wary of: it explicitly threatens violence ("the bullet") which might well be retributive, born of a desire simply to retaliate ("what do we care about the odds?"). Let us examine what Malcolm X's expression of deep non-transitional anger tells us about how anger affected his perception of racial injustices in America. As in the Douglass example, doing so will by extension help us learn something about how being contagiously roused to anger by Malcolm X's fiery political speech may have been epistemically beneficial for his audience.

Malcolm X's rage reveals, in place of the American dream, a vision of the "American nightmare". Indeed, just as Douglass's anger draws his attention to the freedom of other beings, so Malcolm X's anger renders salient the pattern of deceit that black Americans have experienced: an economic "dream" that is not genuinely accessible to them, a political

“democracy” that they are effectively excluded from, and a civic freedom that seems no different from “jail”.

By putting a spotlight on this pattern of disappointments, Malcolm X’s rage foregrounds important properties of the injustice black Americans encounter, properties that otherwise may have been obscured by the ideology of the American Dream. Firstly, seeing the pattern suggests that these exclusions are not accidental or isolated but *systemic*, built into the principal political and economic institutions of American society. So the hypocrisy blacks face is a national, American hypocrisy. Moreover, experiencing racial exclusions as patterned and systemic also conveys a sense of their *inescapability* (“we’re trapped”), and, consequently, of hopelessness at the prospect of achieving reform from within the American political system. Thus, via its salience role, Malcolm X’s anger yields a fuller understanding of the injustice at hand.

Rendering these properties salient, finally, arguably helps refine prior evaluative categories: it contributes to adjusting dominant conceptions of what kinds of political agency count as *reasonable*. By highlighting patterns of exclusion, Malcolm X’s anger helps make rational sense of the apparently unreasonable attitude which consists in embracing violent action, even when the odds of success are unfavorable. If reforming the American system from within is hopeless, and if one’s situation is no better than jail, then violence aimed at putting one’s opponents in their place may seem the best option.

In sum, these examples illustrate my theoretical account of how experiencing anger can enhance one’s understanding of existing injustices and of the reactions they elicit. When we put this together with the fact that publicly expressing anger can *transmit* anger to one’s audience by contagion (as happened with Garrison), this indicates how publicly expressing anger can enhance the moral understanding of one’s audience. But the point has not simply been illustrative. The fact that my account of anger’s epistemic value makes sense so

naturally of the language Douglass and Malcolm X use when reporting their anger—in particular, their perceptual language—should increase our confidence in its correctness. With this theoretical and historical defense in place, let us now consider a few objections.

5. Objections to the Epistemic Productivity of Anger

A common objection to giving emotions a significant role in democratic debate is that emotional speech is liable to be misused by demagogues, who appeal to emotions in a way that misleads their audience. Consider how this general concern applies to my defense of anger. I have argued that publicly expressing deep anger plays an important epistemic role in cases where the anger is fitting—that is, cases where anger is directed at genuine injustices and is proportionate to those injustices. But it might seem unclear what this means for angry political speech generally: as we observed in Section 2, much of the anger which characterizes actual politics is not fitting. Accordingly, public speakers often express misdirected anger at immigrants or religious minorities and thereby arouse misguided rage in their listeners. In such cases, publicly expressing deep anger may appear to be epistemically *harmful*, insofar as it induces one's audience to perceive injustices where there are none or to misattribute their source.

In response to this concern, one suggestion is that we should make space for public expressions of fitting anger, but not unfitting anger. However, this recommendation encounters pragmatic difficulties. In actual political contexts, which instances of anger are fitting and which are not is highly disputed. Adjudicating these disputes requires determining which instances of anger are tracking genuine injustices and how significant those injustices are. Not only can this task be challenging, but I have been arguing that expressions of anger sometimes play a necessary role in getting us to register existing injustices. As such, we may

not know which instances of anger are fitting and unfitting until after we have been exposed to public expressions of anger. Thus, the original concern remains: even if angry discourse can be epistemically beneficial when the anger is fitting, making space for anger in the public sphere risks also opening the door to dangerous expressions of unfitting anger.

If we cannot make space for fitting anger without also making space for misdirected anger, does this mean that we should avoid angry discourse altogether? We should resist this suggestion. In the first place, it is important to note that unfitting anger may sometimes have *some* epistemic value. As Section 2 discussed, fittingness comes in degrees. While some instances of anger are wholly unfitting—recall the white supremacist’s rage at having black neighbors—unfitting anger is often only partly so. Some occurrences of anger, for example, might correctly represent a situation as involving injustice while representing the wrong group as blameworthy for this injustice. If the injustice in question is not known or understood by the society at large, expressing this partly-unfitting anger may contribute to advancing our understanding in the way I have theorized. This is brought out powerfully in Arlie Russell Hochschild’s (2016) *Strangers in their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right*, where Hochschild documents the angry narratives of Tea Party supporters in Louisiana. While the anger they express is arguably directed at the wrong agents (e.g., minority groups, the Environmental Protection Agency), Hochschild vividly depicts how listening to their anger rendered salient an underappreciated pattern of hardship (e.g., rising joblessness, pollution-related illnesses, environmental decay, cultural vilification). What is striking is how, notwithstanding their mixed fittingness, these angry narratives effectively bring into view an unjust pattern of broken socioeconomic promises—in a way that, in some respects, echoes Malcolm X’s disillusion with the American Dream. In this way, expressions of partly-misdirected anger can lead us to register and examine a previously-overlooked injustice, whose real source we may then identify at a later point. This is simply to say that

we should not recoil too quickly at the idea of admitting public expressions of unfitting anger: anger that is partly unfitting may retain some of the epistemic value I have theorized.²³

But even insofar as expressions of misdirected anger are epistemically harmful, a more fundamental response is available. Even if making space for epistemically valuable expressions of anger opens the door for epistemically harmful expressions of anger, non-angry and non-emotional forms of discourse encounter similar problems. Indeed, notice that dispassionate argument too can be abused. In conditions where reliable information is scarce or difficult to interpret, one of the most successful forms of sophistry consists in endowing fallacious claims and inferences with the appearance of rationality and scientific expertise. We are all too familiar with how purported experts sometimes weigh in misleadingly to public debates by showering listeners with esoteric formulas, technical jargon, or deceptive statistics. And yet, we standardly do not think that because dispassionate argument can be misused in public discourse, we should forego it altogether. Admittedly, this response is an unhappy one for democratic discourse more generally: it concedes that otherwise useful epistemic practices can be put to bad epistemic ends in non-ideal conditions involving widespread public ignorance. However, this response does suggest 1) that the problem at hand is not a special problem afflicting angry speech and 2) that just as we do not reject norms of argumentative reasoning simply because they can be abused in non-ideal conditions, so too we should not abandon the use of anger in political discourse.

But publicly-expressed anger faces further objections. While the previous worry concerned the possibility that anger might be misdirected, another goes further and interrogates the claim that fittingly-directed anger is epistemically desirable. Perhaps it is true that such anger can render certain facts more salient, namely those that are liable to ground injustices. But, according to Pettigrove, empirical research suggests that anger also *obscures* important facts. “When angry, people are more likely to see what they take to be hostile

stimuli than they are to notice features of their environment they do not take to be hostile” (2012: 363). Relatedly, “people who have become angry are generally less responsive to counterevidence” (2012: 365). So, anger risks yielding a distorted perspective on the world.

An initial reply is that I am not recommending that all public discourse be angry. Rather, I am defending the view that angry discourse should play *an* important role in democratic deliberation. The idea is not that angry discourse should supplant countervailing perspectives that non-angry speech communicates, but that it should complement them. It enriches countervailing perspectives, bringing into view features of the social context that they overlook or struggle to accommodate, but does not replace them altogether.²⁴ When the dominant ideology masks injustices—as, say, when the ideology of the American Dream concealed structural barriers to black Americans’ social mobility—the angry perspective serves as a crucial epistemic corrective, which casts a spotlight on these injustices. But this should ideally be a corrective, not a substitute. Therefore, the fact that anger highlights some otherwise neglected morally relevant facts while obscuring others may be relatively unproblematic, insofar as non-angry speech can communicate those other facts.

Pettigrove might object that this initial response does not fully appreciate the depth of the problem. What my response assumes is that *after* someone has been exposed to angry speech and roused to anger, non-angry speech might complement their angry perspective by illuminating the features of the situation that anger distracts from. Perhaps this is possible in the long run, after the angry person’s episode of anger has ceased. But since we are not talking about Nussbaum’s fleeting transitional anger, it could be a long time before the episode of anger subsides. In fact, Pettigrove (2012: 365) suggests that anger involves a feedback loop, such that anger perpetuates itself: anger focuses our attention on injustices, to the exclusion of other features of the situation, which in turn makes us more angry. This poses a problem for the initial response I put forward: the evidence Pettigrove is pointing to

purports to show that, so long as we are still angry, our anger impedes our ability to register or grasp the countervailing evidence that non-angry speech tries to bring to our attention. Thus, in the short run, at least, it is far from clear that it is possible to balance the perspective yielded by anger through non-angry speech.

As such, the second observation to make in response to Pettigrove's challenge is that even if angry speech does conceal some features of the situation—that is, even if it is *pro tanto* epistemically bad—it may still be epistemically beneficial overall. More precisely, if the injustices highlighted by fitting anger are highly important, and if they were persistently overlooked or obscured by prevailing perspectives, our coming to fixate on them may be the lesser of two epistemic evils. In the non-ideal contexts we have been considering, where a dominant ideology masks grave injustices, it is *prima facie* plausible to think that these conditions are satisfied. When politically empowered white Americans fail to notice or fully understand the moral horrors of slavery, or when the ideology of the American Dream conceals the systematic social, economic, and political barriers that stand in the way of black Americans, the epistemic benefits of anger may well outweigh its costs.

A final pair of objections questions the transmission of anger to the audience. My account of anger's distinctive epistemic contribution rests on the claim that publicly expressing anger can help arouse anger in listeners. One might worry that this transmission is only possible when anger is epistemically redundant. Being angry at *x* involves representing *x* as somehow containing an injustice. But if that is so, wouldn't one need to already believe that *x* involved an injustice in order to get angry at *x*? As a result, how could the transmission of anger ever bring to our attention injustices that we had overlooked?

In fact, the contagious transmission of anger does not require that one already believe that the situation involves an injustice. As explained in 4.1, emotional contagion is a largely unconscious process. What prompts it is the automatic mimicry of other individuals'

expressions and body language, rather than a cognitively-demanding assessment of their claims or of their situation. So, one can acquire anger through a causal mechanism that bypasses one's conscious evaluation of the situation. In turn, when one has become angry, that anger colors the way one perceives or imagines the situation. Now, this is not to deny that there can be other, more cognitive ways of coming to share others' emotions. In some cases, Alvin Goldman (2011) suggests, we first imagine the perspective of another, perhaps judging on this basis that their situation is unjust, and this contributes to generating a relevant emotion. But what matters for my purposes is that emotional contagion—which is the mode of emotional transmission that enjoys the most robust empirical support²⁵—is not cognitively demanding in this way.

Additionally, even if one already believes that a given situation is unjust, we have seen that anger can still draw one's attention to features of the situation that help one better understand the nature of that injustice. This was particularly clear in the Douglass example. Douglass's anger draws his attention to his comparative unfreedom. This highlights his degraded status, and helps him understand more clearly what makes slavery unjust. Accordingly, Garrison, despite already deeming slavery unjust, claimed that he acquired a clearer understanding of its injustice when inflamed by Douglass's angry speech.

Nevertheless, there is a second and more daunting transmission-related worry, which concerns the feasibility of transmitting anger in non-ideal conditions. I have cited evidence which supports the claim that anger can be contagiously transmitted by publicly expressing anger. However, one might object that emotional contagion and the perspective-taking it facilitates have limits, which are particularly salient in the non-ideal conditions I am focusing on. After all, doesn't resonating with the speaker's anger require that the audience identify with, or at least trust, the speaker? If so, doesn't my argument presuppose the absence of the

conditions that give rise to anger in the first place—namely, deep social divisions which generate pervasive injustices?

As it stands, this objection is overstated. Expressing anger is not wholly ineffective in such circumstances. As we have seen, Douglass's rage successfully induced profound anger in Garrison, a white abolitionist. Furthermore, some cases suggest that the transmission of anger is sometimes possible even between individuals with significantly different worldviews and backgrounds. Famously, Republican vice-president Dan Quayle (1992) once declared that he had vicariously gained important insights into what it is like to experience racial injustice from Malcolm X's fiery autobiography: "I can see the hate that was there; I can see the bigotry; I can see it from his perspective".

Nevertheless, once qualified, the objection does have significant strength. There is presumably *some* point at which social divisions and the attending mutual distrust become too great to allow anger to be automatically transmitted. If group A have very low levels of trust towards group B, so that they doubt the sincerity or competence of members of B, it seems unlikely that they will resonate with those members' angry speech. For example, when prejudicial gender stereotypes represent women as epistemically untrustworthy, those who consciously or unconsciously accept those stereotypes typically experience women's anger not as a signal of some serious injustice to be investigated but rather as a symptom of women's supposedly hysterical natures. Instead of resonating with the anger, they experience it as alienating or absurd (Frye, 1983: 90-91).²⁶

What can we say about cases where this required trust is lacking between a speaker and their audience? Firstly, Marilyn Frye notes that historically, distrust has fruitfully been tackled by challenging the demeaning stereotypes that underpin it. In the case of gendered distrust, "the struggles and victories of abolitionists, suffragists, prohibitionists, and other reformers made it relatively safe for women to get angry, publicly, on behalf of great moral

causes” (1983: 98). In this light, taking measures to transform gender roles—for instance, by regulating media representations of women—can continue to reduce the distrust which prevents many women’s anger from being heard.

Secondly, as democratic theorists have recently stressed, public deliberation often takes a systemic or networked form: it involves many different deliberative arenas, which are connected in virtue of the fact that their constituencies overlap (Mansbridge and Parkinson, 2012). As a result, even when distrust persists, the possibility for “networked” angry speech weakens the significance of this distrust. Suppose our society contains three people, A, B, and C. Because C deeply distrusts A, A cannot transmit her anger to C. But B trusts A, and C trusts B. Hence, A can communicate her angry perspective to B. And B, in turn, can *relay* that angry perspective by expressing it to C. Consider, for instance, how Elizabeth Warren, a white US Senator, relayed the message of Black Lives Matter in 2015. Her voice shaking with palpable anger, she declared:

It shouldn’t take a revolution on Youtube to drive a revolution in law enforcement. It shouldn’t take a Hurricane in New Orleans or a massacre in Charleston for Americans to wake up to what is happening to people of color in this country [...] House Republicans may still want to fly the confederate flag [...] but the American people understand that black lives matter (cited in Ferguson, 2015).

By relaying the perspective of a group (here, black left-wing activists) that may be distrusted by other social groups (say, politically-moderate whites), such networked angry speech helps to circumvent the communicative barriers raised by mutual distrust.

Admittedly, these two replies are not entirely satisfactory. Just as the affirmative policies Frye recommends may be slow in producing their intended effects, so relaying angry speech is liable to be an arduous task. Contrary to the simple schema I outlined above, the chain of networked angry speech can be very long. In part, this is because those who relay the angry perspective risk losing the trust of agents who currently trust them unless they communicate that perspective to listeners who are ideologically relatively close to them. Suppose Garrison tried to relay Douglass's rage. Though Garrison was presumably less distrusted by slaveholders than Douglass, it seems unlikely that they trusted him enough to resonate with *his* angry speech. And slightly more progressive politicians, who trust Garrison enough, might come to distrust him because of his association with Douglass's message. Hence, Garrison might have to try to convey the angry perspective to listeners who are even closer ideologically. Progress could be excruciatingly slow.

Still, this qualification should not obscure the fact that over the long haul, publicly-expressed anger can be epistemically productive. Moreover, the systemic view of public deliberation also helps appreciate how, in the meantime, publicly-expressed anger might be epistemically productive in a more *indirect* way. In a system involving many different deliberative venues, some of which involve angry speech and others not, angry and non-angry speech might play complementary roles. More specifically, the presence of angry speech can sometimes help non-angry speakers acquire the trust of wary listeners, thereby enabling them to convey a message that they otherwise could not have communicated.

Suppose that listeners do not trust a given angry speaker enough to resonate with their anger, because they accept prejudicial stereotypes which associate the anger of the speaker's social group with unreason. In such circumstances, the *contrast* between angry and non-angry speech can make non-angry speakers appear more reasonable, and worth engaging with. Malcolm X explicitly acknowledged this: "if the white people realize what the alternative is,

perhaps they will be more willing to listen to Dr. King” (cited in Baldwin, 1986: 398). And indeed, without the contrast with Malcolm X’s violent rage, many whites may have deemed King’s vision of interracial love too extreme to be worth listening to. Thus, by altering prevailing norms of what counts as reasonable, angry speech can help non-angry perspectives gain uptake. Hence, even when there are still low levels of antecedent trust, and when angry speech has not yet been relayed in the way described above, angry speech can still be indirectly epistemically productive. The more general lesson here, which Nussbaum’s attack on anger obscures and the systemic perspective brings into view, is that non-angry approaches to the promotion of justice often depend for their successful communication on others articulating apt anger.

6. Conclusion

In defense of the view that expressing anger has a key role to play in democratic public discourse, I have argued that advocates of the counterproductivity objection typically overlook anger’s distinctive epistemic contribution. And while defenders of political anger often allude to its epistemic value, they generally do not avail themselves of the philosophical resources needed to articulate it precisely. As contemporary philosophical research on emotion indicates, experiencing anger helps render morally significant facts salient and contributes to enriching our moral concepts. Therefore, insofar as it induces listeners to imaginatively experience anger, expressing anger enables them to register previously overlooked injustices, and to develop a finer understanding of those injustices. In this, we have a systematization of the intuitively compelling suggestion with which we started: that expressing anger is there to teach the audience something, by casting a spotlight on “what [is] really happening”. Furthermore, although this defense encounters several objections—that

angry speech is easily misapplied, that it is epistemically unsound or redundant, and that its value would require unrealistic levels of trust—these objections are not decisive, particularly once we conceive of public deliberation as occurring within a system composed of interlocking deliberative spheres.

Finally, the foregoing philosophical defense should help guide empirical research on anger's productivity, in two ways. First, offering a theoretical account of what makes public anger epistemically valuable signals a new kind of consequence that social scientists should look for when exploring anger's productivity. More specifically, they should investigate under what exact conditions publicly expressing anger tends to rouse listeners to anger. Second, the systemic approach to deliberation reminds us that we cannot conclude too much from empirical evidence regarding the effects angry speech has in isolation. Consequently, empirical research should study more fully the complementary relations that obtain between angry and non-angry speech. In the meantime, by considering the anger of Frederick Douglass and Malcolm X, I hope to have given a preliminary sense of how, when skillfully channeled, rage inside the democratic machine can play a crucial part in combatting injustice.

Notes

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² For numerous vivid examples of the counterproductivity objection in political discourse, see Srinivasan (forthcoming: 1-3). I also illustrate this in Section 3.1, when citing Martin Luther King, Jr.'s response to Malcolm X.

³ For early statements, see Manin (1987), Cohen (1989), Habermas (1996) and Elster (1997).

⁴ For political philosophers besides Young who emphasise the importance of emotions in democratic public discourse, see, e.g., Williams (2000: 146-152), Krause (2008), Chambers (2009), and Dryzek (2010: ch.4). For instances where accounts of democratic deliberation privilege dispassionate argument, see, e.g., Elster (1998: 109) and Spragens (1990: 128).

⁵ On emotions' intentionality, see Deonna and Teroni (2012: 3–6), Brun et al (2008: 11–12), Nussbaum (2015: 42–43).

⁶ Cogley (2014: 201-203). See also Chakravarti (2014: 3–6), Jaggar (1989: 165), Nussbaum (2015: 42-43), Callard (forthcoming). According to Srinivasan (forthcoming: 6n21), it is arguable that some species of anger aim to represent their object as involving non-moral normative violations (for instance, the anger of a football fan at a player's poor athletic performance). Alongside the political and moral philosophers cited above, however, I will focus on the species of anger that purports to represent *moral* violations.

⁷ Cogley (2014: 202-203). I am grateful to a reviewer for pressing me on this point.

⁸ This picture of anger is compatible with many theories of the emotions, including the perceptual theory (e.g., Döring (2007: 363–94)), and the attitudinal theory (e.g., Deonna and Teroni (2012)). And although, as I discuss later, it is unclear whether the evaluative judgment theory (e.g., Nussbaum (2015)) can accommodate anger's distinctive phenomenology, its advocates typically acknowledge that emotions are phenomenologically distinctive, and try to show that their framework can account for this phenomenology. For discussion, see note 18.

⁹ For evidence linking anger to retributive desires, see Lazarus (1991). Nussbaum actually makes the stronger claim that normal, non-transitional anger *inherently* aims for retribution.

We should reject this claim. First, some of the evidence Nussbaum herself cites suggests that anger commonly seeks control or justice, which are both conceptually distinct from vengeance. E.g., Tavris (1982: 153-55). See also Srinivasan (forthcoming: 7) for a critique of this claim.

¹⁰ Bell (2009) also discusses Douglass, but primarily considers the *virtue* of anger, rather than its *public expression*. Note that, as the introduction explained, I am concerned with cases where anger is fittingly directed—that is, cases involving genuine injustices. Therefore, I focus on instances where Douglass’s and Malcolm X’s anger seems fitting, because it targets clearly unjust practices.

¹¹ See Baldwin (1986).

¹² E.g., Dryzek (2010), Rawls (1997).

¹³ Historical critics of anger, and notably of its counterproductivity, include Seneca, Joseph Butler, and Adam Smith. Seneca, who is quoted above, holds that anger, in virtue of recklessly seeking vengeance, is at odds with man’s nature (I.6), is inconsistent with reason (I.9), and risks resulting in destruction for both targets of anger and those experiencing anger (I.1). As for Smith, he holds that anger, “more than almost any other passions, can’t become graceful and agreeable unless it is humbled down below the pitch to which it would naturally rise” (I.ii.ch.3). Unless anger is tempered thus, “it renders a person the object of universal dread and abhorrence, who, like a wild beast, ought [...] to be hunted out of all civil society” (I.ii.ch.4). Thus, although Smith does not categorically reject anger, he *does* seem to view the intense non-transitional anger with which we are concerned as counterproductive, because it endangers social bonds. For discussion of Smith on anger, see Chakravarti (2014: 106-108). Butler, like Smith, does not wholly condemn all forms of anger. Although anger is “in every instance absolutely an evil in itself; because it implies producing misery” (XIX.7), anger might be a necessary evil insofar as it helps enforce useful social norms. However, Butler

does condemn anger when it takes on a form that strives for revenge (VIII.3-4). Hence, it seems that he too accepts anger only if it takes on a non-vengeful form, akin to Nussbaum's transitional anger.

Contemporary critics of anger include Nussbaum (2015; 2016) and Pettigrove (2012: 347, 369-370), both of whom are discussed above, as well as Daniel Silvermint. For Silvermint, addressing agents of injustice with "hardened" or "unsympathetic" forms of anger risks being counterproductive. Doing so "might [...] just perpetuate cycles of oppressive mistreatment" (2017: 10) and therefore constitutes an "unnecessary risk" (2017: 3).

¹⁴ E.g., Frye (1983), Jaggar (1989), Bell (2009), Chakravarti (2014, ch.5).

¹⁵ See Matravers (2017: 1–2) for this identification. Some theorists define empathy more narrowly, making perspective-taking necessary but not sufficient for empathy. E.g., Coplan (2011). Others suggest that empathy is essentially about experiencing the same affect as another being, and do not make imaginative perspective-taking a necessary condition. E.g., Goldman (2011).

¹⁶ For summaries in the philosophical and psychological literatures, respectively, see Coplan (2011) and Barsade (2002).

¹⁷ For tentative evidence of contagion from angry facial expressions, see Blairy et al (1999: 35), Hess and Blairy (2001: 138–39), Friedman and Riggio (1981: 102–3).

¹⁸ Nussbaum and Pettigrove are quick to dismiss the distinctive epistemic value of anger in part because they overlook this phenomenology. It is widely held that the distinctive phenomenology of emotion is irreducible to the phenomenology of a judgment, or even of a judgment/desire pairing. E.g., Deonna and Teroni, (2012: 66–71), Goldie (2002: 73–74). But both Nussbaum (2015: 42-45) and Pettigrove (2012: 357-358) broadly take anger about *x* to be reducible to a judgment/desire pairing, involving roughly a judgment that *x* involves some moral violation, and a desire to retaliate against its perpetrators. Now, Nussbaum (2001) does

try, elsewhere, to accommodate the rich phenomenology of emotions within her judgment theory of emotions. However, Ben Ze-Ev (2004) and Deonna and Teroni (2012: ch.5) forcefully rebut this attempt. Further, even if her account could accommodate emotional experience's complexity, the problem remains that Nussbaum's brief discussion of anger's epistemic value does not integrate these insights. She simply stresses that anger signals the judgments that something is morally amiss, and that something should be done about it (2015: 55-56).

¹⁹ On the salience role, see Brun et al (2008: 18), Elgin (2008: 43–46), Deonna and Teroni (2012: 122), Brady (2013: 16–25), Jaggar (1989: 160).

²⁰ For perceptual theories of emotions, see, e.g., Döring (2007). For other theories that acknowledge these phenomenological resemblances, see Deonna and Teroni (2012: 66–67), Elgin (2008: 36-37), Brun et al (2008: 15). Nussbaum (2001: 65), in her general analysis of emotion, also uses language which reflects this analogy.

²¹ On the role of emotions in conceptual development, see Deonna and Teroni (2012: 84), Brun et al (2008: 20-21), Tappolet (2011: 126–27), Jaggar (1989: 166–68).

²² I am grateful to a reviewer for pushing me to clarify how exactly these examples are supposed to work.

²³ In her influential theoretical discussion of the relation between narrative and objectivity, Iris Marion Young (2000: ch.3) also suggests that narratives expressing views and emotions that are partly incorrect may nevertheless have some epistemic value. For Young, because “all positionings are partial with respect to the inquiry [...] [t]he explicit voicing of the plurality of positions and their confirming or criticizing one another is necessary for objectivity” (2000: 114-115). In saying this, Young affirms that expressions of partly incorrect perspectives can enhance our understanding: while these outlooks may distort some features of the world, they may also help correct the distortions of other partial outlooks.

²⁴ As Pettigrove himself concedes in a footnote (2012: 373n71), one study by Young et al (2011: 16) finds that the way anger selects information can serve to counteract confirmation bias—the bias towards information which supports one’s existing beliefs and hypotheses. This tendency, the authors conclude, “may actually provide angry individuals with the cognitive benefit of getting a fuller, more balanced perspective”. This conclusion tentatively supports the epistemic role I am suggesting here for angry public discourse, as a *complement* which renders neglected dimensions of the world visible, and thereby enriches the dominant worldview without replacing it altogether.

²⁵ See Coplan (2011: 8).

²⁶ For evidence that emotional contagion across social groups is more difficult, see Bourgeois and Hess (2008).

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