Great power escalation dynamics: political communication and deterrence from competition to nuclear crisis

O'Mahoney, J. P. A. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6316-1771, (2026) Great power escalation dynamics: political communication and deterrence from competition to nuclear crisis. Report. NATO Open Publications pp24.

Abstract/Summary

This paper analyzes the theory and practice of deterrence between nuclear-armed powers, examining how states attempt to prevent aggression through threats while managing the inherent risks of escalation to nuclear war. Deterrence involves persuading adversaries that the costs of aggressive action outweigh potential benefits, either by denying them military success or threatening punishment in retaliation. However, the credibility of deterrent threats remains fundamentally problematic, particularly with nuclear weapons whose use carries such extreme consequences that adversaries may doubt they would ever actually be employed. Nuclear-armed states, therefore, in some circumstances use a strategy of brinkmanship. This means taking actions, such as mobilizing forces, issuing threats, or curtailing negotiations, that increase the risk a crisis might escalate uncontrollably to nuclear war, and betting that the opponent will retreat rather than accept that risk. This paper demonstrates that escalation is imperfectly controllable and identifies multiple pathways through which miscalculation and psychological processes can lead to unintended war, highlighting significant implications favoring cautious policy approaches.