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ARTICLE

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Harmony in Political Discourse? The Impact of High-Quality Listening on Speakers' Perceptions Following Political Conversations

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Abstract

Conversations with people who hold opposite partisan attitudes can elicit defensiveness, reinforce extreme attitudes, and undermine relationships with those with opposing views. However, this might not be the case when speakers experience high-quality (attentive, understanding, and non-judgmental) listening from their conversation partners. We hypothesized that high-quality listening would increase speakers' positive views toward, and their willingness to further interact with, others who hold politically opposed attitudes, and that these effects would be mediated by greater state openness. We conducted three experiments using different modalities to manipulate listening. In Study 1 (N = 379), participants recalled a conversation with an opposing political party member, with listening quality described as high-quality, low-quality, or control. Study 2 (N = 269) used imagined interactions, with participants reading vignettes describing either high-quality listening or a control condition. In Study 3 (preregistered; N = 741), participants watched a video of a listener modeling high-quality or moderate-quality listening and imagined themselves engaging in a similar interaction. Across studies, we found that high-quality listening consistently increased speakers' state openness to politically opposed others but did not change political attitudes. We found inconsistent evidence for speakers' increased willingness to engage in future interactions (meta-analytic effect: $\overline{d}$ = 0.20, p = 0.015). However, we observed a consistent indirect effect of listening on positive attitudes and willingness for future interactions through increased openness.

Keywords

defensiveness; disagreements; high-quality listening; openness; polarization; political conversations

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1. Introduction

For democracies to thrive, diverse groups need to constructively engage with each other to find common ground. However, in many countries, polarization is rampant (Boxell et al., 2024), with people not only disagreeing with political outgroups but also holding often negative beliefs and emotions about those groups and their members (Matsumoto et al., 2015). These beliefs lead people to a reduced willingness to engage with those they disagree with (Teeny & Petty, 2022). The poor quality of interpersonal contact that results can exacerbate division (Paolini et al., 2024) and lead to avoidance of future contact (Meleady & Forder, 2018).

Although these negative outcomes reflect the consequences of polarization, the nature of this polarization has deepened into affective polarization, where partisan divides are more emotionally charged. In recent years, polarization in democratic societies has moved beyond mere ideological disagreement and evolved into affective polarization—a deep-seated hostility between partisan groups. Unlike ideological polarization, which concerns policy preferences, affective polarization is rooted in identity and emotions, leading individuals to view political opponents as fundamentally different (Iyengar et al., 2012). Affective polarization has negative consequences on social relationships, hiring decisions, and even willingness to engage with opposing viewpoints (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015).

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) provides a framework for understanding how individuals' political identities influence their interactions with members of opposing groups. According to this theory, people categorize themselves and others into social groups, such as political parties, which become central to their self-concept. This categorization fosters in-group favoritism, where individuals favor members of their own group, and out-group discrimination, where they develop negative perceptions of those outside their group. Political identity, deeply tied to these group affiliations, becomes a powerful driver of affective polarization. When individuals see their political opponents not just as people with different opinions but as threats to their group's values and identity, hostility and mistrust increase (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Simply exposing individuals to opposing viewpoints may not be sufficient to reduce polarization. Increasing exposure to opposing viewpoints might seem like an intuitive solution, as exposure mainly to like-minded opinions leads individuals to seek social approval and make initial attitudes more extreme (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). Exposure to opposing viewpoints has been argued to reduce participation, as individuals exposed to widespread disagreement in their networks may experience social discomfort in political discussions (Mutz, 2006). However, later research shows that these effects apply mainly to cases of complete network-wide disagreement, a rare occurrence (Bello & Rolfe, 2014). Partial exposure to differing views tends to maintain or even enhance participation (Bello & Rolfe, 2014). Additionally, disagreement within political discussion networks can stabilize democratic orientations and foster continued engagement instead of withdrawal (Nir, 2011).

The relationship between cross-cutting exposure and polarization is curvilinear, with moderate exposure reducing polarization but extreme exposure often backfiring (Lin et al., 2025). Brief, structured exposure to opposing views reduces affective polarization when interactions are non-confrontational (Levendusky, 2023), while unmoderated exposure, particularly on social media, may reinforce biases and deepen divides (Bail, 2022). These findings highlight that simply increasing exposure is insufficient; the manner and context of exposure are critical for mitigating polarization.

Against this backdrop, we suggest that listening-based interventions could serve as a promising approach to reducing polarization. Unlike debates, which often encourage confrontation, listening-based interventions prioritize understanding over persuasion. By fostering empathetic engagement without the pressure to respond or defend a position, these methods can help reduce partisan animosity and identity-driven resistance. In the present research, we suggest that cross-partisan conversations can be improved through high-quality listening. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that receiving *high-quality listening* from a political outgroup member will increase willingness to engage with the other side and reduce partisan animosity.

To further understand why high-quality listening may be effective in mitigating conflict during political conversations, it is important to situate them within the broader framework of reciprocity in democratic discourse. Reciprocity involves not only sharing one's own perspectives but also genuinely considering and responding to others' views, creating a foundation of mutual respect and understanding (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In deliberative settings, reciprocity enhances the quality of engagement by encouraging participants to approach discussions with openness and a readiness to adjust their views (Cohen, 1997). By fostering an environment where individuals feel heard and respected, high-quality listening aligns with the principle of reciprocity, helping to bridge affective divides and promote constructive dialogue (Mansbridge, 2003). High-quality listening embodies this form of reciprocity by signaling respect and openness (Kluger et al., 2021), which should create a democratic practice that underpins constructive political dialogue (Eveland et al., 2023).

1.1. The Impacts of Listening When Discussing Disagreements

Dyadic conversations are mutually shaped by the quality of speaking and listening that takes place (T. Moin et al., 2024). If one partner is in the speaking role, the very nature of their contributions to the conversation is shaped by their listener (Bavelas et al., 2000). Within political conversations, the level of agreement between conversing partners deeply influences the nature of the conversation, and disagreeing partners may struggle to connect when discussing their attitudes (McLaughlin et al., 2013). However, the quality of conversants' listening may also be important and may mitigate the relational costs of disagreeing.

Our conceptualization of high-quality listening and its effects follows from the foundational work of Carl Rogers (e.g., Rogers & Roethlisberger, 1952/1991). According to this view, a person is engaging in high-quality listening if they are attending carefully to their partner, attempting to clearly and accurately understand them, and holding positive intentions toward them. Perceptions of high-quality listening are generally holistic in nature (Kluger & Itzchakov, 2022) and can vary in their accuracy (Collins et al., 2024). Regardless of accuracy, it appears to be the perception of high-quality listening that is most critical to conversational outcomes (Kluger et al., 2024).

People who perceive high-quality listening from an interaction partner experience psychological safety (Castro et al., 2016)—the sense that they can express themselves freely without fear of rejection or other negative consequences (Edmondson & Bransby, 2023). Feeling psychologically safe in a conversation facilitates further self-disclosure (Weinstein et al., 2021), self-reflection (Itzchakov et al., 2018), and consideration of conflicting views (Itzchakov et al., 2016). In short, it encourages greater open-mindedness about their own and others' views (Itzchakov & DeMarree, 2022; see also Itzchakov et al., 2020; Minson & Chen, 2022). Ultimately, receiving high-quality listening leads people to hold less extreme views

(Itzchakov et al., 2016) and increases people's willingness to interact with those they disagree with (Itzchakov et al., 2024).

1.2. Listening During Politically Charged Conversations

Although high-quality listening has demonstrated broad benefits in interpersonal contexts, its application to politically charged conversations, where the stakes are higher and emotions more intense, requires further exploration. Political identities are among the most central identities in modern society, making disagreements in political conversations particularly challenging (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). When individuals engage with members of an out-party, these interactions can threaten multiple aspects of their psychological well-being, including acceptance, self-integrity, and autonomy. Self-integrity, or the sense of being a competent and morally adequate person, can be challenged when one's deeply held political beliefs are questioned (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Such threats often trigger defensive responses, where individuals dismiss opposing views or double down on pre-existing beliefs to preserve their self-concept (Kruglanski et al., 2006). Additionally, threats to autonomy—where individuals perceive pressure to change their beliefs—can provoke reactance, leading to resistance against persuasion (Worchel & Brehm, 1970). These threats create a socially, psychologically, and emotionally charged environment that fosters defensiveness and hinders open dialogue (Itzchakov & DeMarree, 2022).

High-quality listening to politically charged interactions has the potential to foster understanding and reduce polarization (Eveland et al., 2023). Beyond simple exposure to differing perspectives, effective listening requires genuine engagement with a non-judgmental approach toward alternative viewpoints (Itzchakov et al., 2022), which is essential for addressing deeply rooted ideological divides. This process can help alleviate the psychological and emotional threats inherent in conversations with political outgroup members and improve democracy by creating an environment of respect and understanding (Eveland et al., 2023).

Despite the importance of the context, there are no guarantees that the positive impacts of high-quality listening can extend to conversations with political outgroup members. The closest available evidence comes from research examining listening quality in the context of disagreements (Itzchakov et al., 2024; F. K. T. Moin et al., 2025). This research finds that when people perceive that a person who disagrees with them is listening to them well (versus moderately or poorly), they report less polarized attitudes toward the topic of disagreement and a greater willingness to have another conversation with their conversation partner. Critical to the present article, these effects are mediated in part by the impact the conversation has on self-insight—participants' curious and open reflection on their own attitude. Although the listener in Itzchakov et al. (2024) was not an outgroup member and only briefly expressed disagreement, this article provides initial evidence that the effects of listening might extend to more threatening contexts. However, it is important to keep in mind that deep-seated ideological divides cannot be easily bridged. In some cases, exposure to opposing viewpoints, even in a respectful context, can reinforce pre-existing attitudes rather than promote openness (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010).

For listening to facilitate willingness to interact with a member of the opposite political party and improve outgroup attitudes, it has to improve open-mindedness. Because conversations with members of opposing partisan groups often elicit defensiveness, they challenge core aspects of identity and belief systems (Argyle & Freeze, 2024). This defensiveness can manifest as resistance to new information, reinforcement of

preexisting attitudes, or avoidance of engagement altogether (Kunda, 1990). Thus, listening-induced openness is key because it allows individuals to engage with differing perspectives without immediately dismissing or rejecting them (Itzchakov et al., 2016, 2022). State openness refers to a temporary state in which individuals exhibit a heightened willingness to consider alternative perspectives, adjust their viewpoints, and engage in intellectual exploration (DeYoung, 2015). This openness should enable participants to reinterpret the conversation as an opportunity for learning and understanding rather than a threat, ultimately reducing avoidance from future interactions and fostering more positive attitudes toward outgroup members (Kalla & Broockman, 2020). Although social networks and political ecosystems significantly influence political discourse (Yarchi et al., 2021), this research specifically focuses on listening within a dyadic conversation, as this area of listening is the most well-established in existing literature.

In the present research, we tested the following hypotheses:

> H1: As compared to lower-quality listening, experiencing high-quality listening will predict greater speakers' state openness toward the other partisan group.
>
> H2a: As compared to lower-quality listening, experiencing high-quality listening will predict greater speakers' willingness to engage in future interaction with members of the other partisan group.
>
> H2b: The effect of the listening manipulation on speakers' willingness to engage in future interaction with members of the other partisan group will be mediated by greater state openness.
>
> H3a: As compared to lower-quality listening, experiencing high-quality listening will predict more positive speaker attitudes toward the opposite partisan group.
>
> H3b: The effect of the listening manipulation on speakers' attitudes toward members of the other partisan group will be mediated by greater state openness.

2. Overview of Studies

We tested these predictions across three studies using recalled (Study 1, $N = 379$) or imagined (Studies 2 and 3, $Ns = 269, 742$) conversations with a political outgroup member. Listening quality was manipulated via instructions. Study 1 examined real past conversations, providing ecological validity but risking memory biases. Study 2 used vignettes for greater internal validity but lower realism. Study 3, a preregistered study, combined video-based listening manipulations with imagined scenarios, balancing realism and control. In line with open science, all data, materials, and code are available at: https://osf.io/zu6s2/?view_only=ead9434d2984428c823f94ea8ffcf15d

3. Study 1

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Participants

We recruited 450 participants (M_{age} = 28.93, *SD* = 6.98) residing in the US through Prolific Academic, an online research platform with a participant pool of over 250,000 individuals. Of these participants, 42.7% were female, 56.4% male, and 0.9% non-binary. We instructed the system to select only participants living in the US and participants were invited to take part in the study through Prolific's system, which ensures ethical recruitment practices. As compensation for their time, each participant received £0.80, in line with the platform's fair pay guidelines. We did not exclude any participants. Sensitivity analysis indicated that the smallest effect size that this sample size can detect with a power of 80% and $\alpha = 0.05$ in a design that includes three independent groups is Cohen's $f = 0.15$, which is considered a small effect size.

3.1.2. Procedure

After completing the consent form, participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: high-quality listening, low-quality listening, and control (no information about listening). Participants in the high-quality listening condition (n = 130) received the following instructions:

> Please recall a conversation you had with a listener on an **opposite** political party than yours that is **as close as possible** to the following description: When you shared your beliefs about social, economic, or political issues, the listener maintained constant eye contact when you spoke and was attentive to you and what you had to say. During the conversation, the listener asked questions and reflected on what you said to ensure that they understood your position, even if they didn't agree. The listener was non-judgmental towards you or what you had to say.

Participants in the low-quality (n = 163) listening condition received the following instructions:

> Please recall a conversation you had with a listener who is from an **opposite** political party than yours that is **as close as possible** to the following description: When you shared your beliefs about social, economic, or political issues, the listener did not maintain constant eye contact when you spoke and was inattentive to you and what you had to say. During the conversation, the listener did not ask questions and did not reflect on what you said to ensure understanding. The listener was judgmental towards you and what you had to say.

Participants in the control group (n = 163) received the following instructions:

> Please recall a conversation you had with a listener who is from an opposite political party than yours.

After reading the instructions, participants wrote a brief essay describing the conversations. Afterward, participants completed the dependent variables and demographics and were compensated.

3.1.3. Measures

Before the listening manipulation, we asked participants about their political preferences on a scale of 1 (*strong Democrat*) to 7 (*strong Republican*).

Recall difficulty was assessed by asking participants how difficult or easy it was for them to recall the conversation with the person of the opposite party. The responses were anchored on a Likert-type scale from 1 (*extremely difficult*) to 5 (*extremely easy*).

To check the manipulation, we used five items from the constructive listening scale (Kluger & Bouskila-Yam, 2018), items ranged on a 9-point scale (1—*not at all* to 9—*very much*). Example items were: "The listener in the conversation tried hard to understand what I was saying" and "the listener in the conversation paid close attention to what I said" ($\alpha = 0.93$).

To test state openness, following Hotchin and West (2021), we asked participants to rate how they felt in the conversation with nine adjectives representing open-mindedness (e.g., "intellectual," "curious," and "creative"; $\alpha = 0.86$).

Willingness for future interactions was measured with seven items from Fuertes et al. (2000) and adapted to fit the context of political attitudes. For example: "I would be interested in participating in activities involving people with opposite partisan attitudes than mine" and "I am interested in knowing people who have opposite partisan attitudes than mine." ($\alpha = 0.88$).

To test outgroup attitude favorability, we asked participants: "How do you feel about people who hold an opposite partisan belief than yours (if you are a Democrat how do you feel about Republicans, if you are a Republican, how do you feel about Democrats)?," with a scale that ranged from 1 (*extremely negative*) to 7 (*extremely positive*).

3.2. Preliminary Results

The distribution of political attitudes was somewhat skewed toward the left, as 9.8% identified as strong Democrats, 27.1% as Democrats, 18.7% as lean Democrats, 31.6% as neither Democrats nor Republicans, 6.9% as lean Republicans, 4.1% as Republicans, and 1.1% as strong Republicans. We decided not to exclude participants who identified as neither Democrat nor Republican because they wrote about conversations involving politically related attitudes that differed from their listeners, consistent with the instructions. Similar results were obtained when excluding these participants (see the supplementary materials for these analyses across all studies). Additionally, individuals who do not generally identify as Democrats or Republicans may still have politically related beliefs that lean toward a specific side.

We did not find differences between conditions on recall difficulty: $F(2,247) = 1.32$, $p = 0.267$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.06$, Cohen's $f = 0.25$; thus, this potential confound was not a concern.

3.2.1. Main Effects

Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations by group. Table 2 presents the overall descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables.

The listening manipulation had a strong and significant main effect on participants' listening perception: $F(2,247) = 119.65$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.35$, Cohen's $f = 0.73$. Post-hoc LSD test indicated significant differences between the groups. Specifically, participants in the high-quality listening condition recalled receiving greater listening than participants in the control condition ($p < 0.001$, 95% CI [2.16, 3.05]) and in the low-quality listening condition ($p < 0.001$, 95% CI [2.88, 3.75]). Participants in the control condition recall receiving greater listening than participants in the low-quality listening condition ($p < 0.001$, 95% CI [0.29, 1.23]). These results suggest that the listening manipulation was effective.

The listening manipulation had a significant main effect on state openness: $F(2,247) = 40.16$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.15$, Cohen's $f = 0.42$. Specifically, participants in the high-quality listening condition reported greater state openness than participants in the control condition ($p < 0.001$, 95% CI difference [1.02, 1.68]09 and in the low-quality listening condition ($p < 0.001$, 95% CI [0.96, 1.61]). Participants in the control condition did not differ in state openness from participants in the low-quality listening condition ($p = 0.678$, 95% CI [−0.38, 0.25]).

The listening manipulation did not have an effect on willingness for future interactions with a partisan outgroup member: $F(2,247) = 1.80$, $p = 0.167$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.08$, Cohen's $f = 0.30$.

The listening manipulation did not have an effect on participants' attitudes toward their partisan outgroup: $F(2,247) = 0.46$, $p = 0.632$, $\eta|_p^2 = 0.02$, $f = 0.14$. There were no differences in pairwise comparisons between the groups ($p \geq 0.352$).

Table 1. Means and *SD*s by experimental groups of Study 1.

	High-quality listening		Control		Low-quality listening	
	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*
Recall difficulty	3.04	1.12	2.93	1.21	3.15	1.23
Listening perception	6.38	2.25	3.77	1.75	3.06	1.68
State openness	5.77	1.40	4.41	1.44	4.48	1.41
Outgroup attitude favorability	3.62	1.14	3.50	1.08	3.53	1.04
Willingness for future interactions	5.31	1.63	4.95	1.62	5.06	1.69

Note: Different letters in a given row indicate significant differences between means based on an LSD post-hoc test.

Table 2. Study 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations between study variables.

	Mean	*SD*	Range	1	2	3	4	5
1. Recall difficulty	3.04	1.19	1–5					
2. Listening perception	4.27	2.33	1–9	–0.01				
3. State openness	4.83	1.54	1–9	0.08	0.53**			
4. Outgroup attitude favorability	3.54	1.08	1–9	–0.06	0.17**	0.15**		
5. Future Interactions	5.09	1.65	1–9	0.06	0.10*	0.27**	0.40**	
6. Political attitude[a]	3.18	1.35	1–7	–0.04	0.08	0	0.26**	0.07

Notes: ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; [a] = higher values indicate a more conservative attitude.

3.2.2. Mediation Analyses

Although we did not obtain significant main effects on the dependent variables, significant indirect effects are still possible (Rucker et al., 2011). We therefore conducted a simple mediation analysis treating the independent variable as multicategorical (Hayes, 2017). We did not assume linearity between the experimental groups (poor quality, control, high quality) and created two dummy-coded variables: one comparing the high-quality listening condition to the control condition, and the other comparing the low-quality listening condition to the control condition.

When predicting outgroup attitude favorability, the indirect effect comparing high-quality listening to the control condition through state-openness was significant (indirect = 0.14, *SE* = 0.06, 95% CI [0.04, 0.26]), though the direct effect was not significant (direct = –0.02, *SE* = 0.14, 95% CI [–0.29, 0.24]). In contrast, the indirect effect comparing the control condition to the low-quality listening condition was not significant (indirect = 0.007, *SE* = 0.02, 95% CI [–0.04, 0.03]). The direct effect also failed to reach significance (*direct* = –0.02, *SE* = 0.12, 95% CI [–0.26, 0.21]).

When predicting willingness for future interactions, the indirect effect comparing high-quality listening to the control condition through state-openness was significant (indirect = 0.41, *SE* = 0.09, 95% CI [0.24, 0.61]), while the direct effect was not significant (direct = –0.04, *SE* = 0.20, 95% CI [–0.44, 0.35]). Neither the indirect nor direct effects comparing the control condition to the low-quality listening condition were significant (indirect = –0.02, *SE* = 0.05, 95% CI [–0.12, 0.08]; direct = –0.09, *SE* = 0.18, 95% CI [–0.44, 0.26].

3.2.3. Auxiliary analysis

Because of the large proportion of independents in our sample (31.4%)—individuals who marked the mid-point of the scale (4—*neither Democrat nor Republican*), we created a new dummy variable named partisanship from the political preference measure. Participants who marked 4 were labeled as independents and coded 0. Participants who marked 3 or 5 (*lean Democrat*, *lean Republican*, respectively) were labeled as leaners and coded 1. Participants who marked 1, 2, 6, or 7 (*strong Democrat*, *Democrat*, *Republican*, *Strong Republican*, respectively) were labeled as partisans and coded 2 (see Eveland & Gee, 2024).

We conducted ANOVA with the experimental group and partisanship as fixed factors predicting outgroup attitude favorability. We did not find a main effect for the experimental group ($F(2,441) = 0.273$, $p = 0.761$) nor a Group X Partisanship interaction ($F(2,441) = 0.143$, $p = 0.966$). We did find a main effect for partisanship ($F(2,441) = 23.191$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.095$, $f = 0.32$). Post-hoc LSD analysis indicated that partisans had less favorable outgroup attitudes than leaners ($M_{difference} = -0.39$, $SE = 0.12$, $p = 0.002$), and when compared to independents ($M_{difference} = -0.790$, $SE = 0.12$, $p = 0.001$). Leaners had less favorable outgroup attitudes than independents ($M_{difference} = -0.401$, $SE = 0.13$, $p = 0.002$).

ANOVA with willingness for future interactions as the dependent variable showed a similar pattern with only partisanship as a significant predictor ($F(2,441) = 4.62$, $p = 0.010$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$, $f = 0.15$). Post-hoc analysis indicated that partisans had significantly less interest in interacting with the outgroup than leaners ($M_{difference} = -0.59$, $SE = 0.20$, $p = 0.003$) but not independents ($M_{difference} = -0.30$, $SE = 0.12$, $p = 0.11$). Leaners and independents did not differ ($M_{difference} = 0.29$, $SE = 0.21$, $p = 0.158$).

3.3. Discussion

Study 1 provided mixed support for the conceptual model, supporting H1 but not H2a or H3a. H2b and H3b were supported in the high-quality listening compared with the control condition. No interaction emerged between initial political attitudes and outgroup attitude favorability or willingness for future interactions. Using a recall-based manipulation, participants described a past conversation with a political outgroup member where listening was good, poor, or unspecified. While this method enhanced external validity, it risked systematic differences (e.g., recalling closer relationships or less morally charged topics in high-quality listening). To improve internal validity, Study 2 used a more carefully controlled manipulation.

4. Study 2

The goal of Study 2 was to test the hypotheses using a complementary method to Study 1: namely, vignettes. Participants were asked to imagine, rather than recall, a conversation. The instructions for the imagination task can isolate listening from other aspects of the imagined conversation, offering greater internal validity (Kluger & Itzchakov, 2022). In Study 2, we compared high-quality listening to a description that did not include information about listening quality ("you are sharing your beliefs about social, economic, or political issues with a listener who holds an opposite partisan attitude than yours"), assuming this would offer a reasonable comparison to the control condition in Study 1, and would offer meaningful information about whether receiving high-quality listening would produce improvement beyond participants' default expectations about conversations like these.

4.1. Method

4.1.1. Participants

We recruited 269 participants from the US through Prolific Academic ($M_{age} = 27.38$, $SD = 9.95$; 75.8% female, 20.8% male, 3.3% non-binary or other gender). As in Study 1, we did not exclude participants, and each participant was paid the same amount as in Study 1. Participants from Study 1 were not allowed to take part in Study 2. This sample size has a power of above 95% to detect the average effect size on the two

dependent variables obtained in Study 1, Cohen's $d = 0.56$ (converted from Cohen's $f = 0.23$) in a between-subject design with two groups with an α of 5%.

4.1.2. Procedure and Measures

After completing the consent form, participants were randomly assigned to high-quality listening or control conditions. Participants in the high-quality listening condition ($n = 130$) received the following instructions:

> **Please read the following description twice.**
>
> **Imagine you are involved in the following conversation:**
>
> You are sharing your beliefs about social, economic, or political issues with a listener who holds an opposite partisan attitude than yours. The listener maintained constant eye contact during the conversation when you spoke and expressed non-verbal behaviors that conveyed interest and curiosity. The listener was attentive to you and what you had to say. During the conversation, the listener asked questions and reflected on what you said to ensure a genuine understanding of your experience. The listener was non-judgmental towards you or what you had to say and created a positive atmosphere to share your perspective freely.

Participants in the control condition received the following instructions:

> **Please read the following description twice.**
>
> **Imagine you are involved in the following conversation:**
>
> You are sharing your beliefs about social, economic, or political issues with a listener who holds an opposite partisan attitude than yours.

The rationale for instructing participants to read the vignettes twice was to ensure thorough understanding and engagement with the scenario, as the information provided could be challenging to absorb in a single read.

Participants in both conditions were then instructed to write how they would feel expressing their attitude in such a conversation. Subsequently, participants completed the measure and were compensated.

The measures were identical to Study 1. We measured political attitudes (before manipulation), listening perception ($\alpha = 0.96$), state openness ($\alpha = 0.89$), willingness for future interactions ($\alpha = 0.88$), and outgroup attitude favorability.

4.2. Results

4.2.1. Preliminary Results

The distribution of political attitudes was skewed toward the left: 24.9% identified as strong Democrats, 25.3% as Democrats, 17.5% as lean Democrats, 18.2% as neither Democrats nor Republicans, 9.7% as lean Republicans, 3.3% identified as Republicans, and 1.1% as strong Republicans.

4.2.2. Main Effects

Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations by group. Table 4 presents the overall descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables.

The listening manipulation had a strong main effect on participants' listening perception ($t(267) = 21.94$, $p < 0.001$, Cohen's $d = 2.68$). Participants in the high-quality listening condition recalled receiving greater listening than those in the control condition, suggesting that the listening manipulation was effective.

Participants in the high-quality listening condition reported higher state openness than those in the control condition ($t(267) = 8.66$, $p < 0.001$, Cohen's $d = 1.06$). The same participants also reported greater willingness for future interactions with outgroup partisan members than participants in the control condition ($t(267) = 2.32$, $p = 0.021$, Cohen's $d = 0.28$). No difference emerged between participants in the two groups ($t(267) = 0.63$, $p = 0.528$, Cohen's $d = 0.08$).

Table 3. Means and SDs by experimental groups of Study 2.

	High-quality listening		Control	
	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*
Listening perception	8.25	0.90	4.31	1.35
State openness	6.46	1.27	5.01	1.48
Willingness for future interactions	4.91	1.94	4.40	1.66
Outgroup attitude favorability	3.13	1.14	3.04	1.28

Table 4. Study 2's descriptive statistics and correlations between study variables.

	Mean	*SD*	Range	1	2	3	4
1. Listening perception	6.21	2.46	1–9				
2. State openness	5.71	1.56	1–9	0.59**			
3. Outgroup attitude favorability	3.08	1.13	1–9	0.20**	0.17**		
4. Future Interactions	4.65	1.82	1–9	0.29**	0.40**	0.52**	
5. Political attitude[a]	2.77	1.50	1–7	0.07	−0.05	0.47*	0.15*

Notes: ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; [a] = higher values indicate a more conservative attitude.

4.2.3. Mediation Analyses

We conducted mediation analyses using Model 4 in PROCESS (Hayes, 2017) with 5000 bootstrapped samples.

The indirect effect from the listening manipulation to outgroup attitude favorability through state-openness was significant (indirect = 0.21, *SE* = 0.08, 95% CI [0.05, 0.38]), while the direct effect was not significant (direct = −0.12, *SE* = 0.15, 95% CI [−0.43, 0.18]).

The indirect effect of the listening manipulation on willingness for future interactions through state-openness was significant (indirect = 0.78, *SE* = 0.13, 95% CI [0.49, 0.99]). The direct effect was not significant (direct = −0.22, *SE* = 0.23, 95% CI [−0.67, 0.23]).

4.2.4. Auxiliary Analysis

We used the same approach as in Study 1 to test the effect of partisanship and computed the partisanship variable in the same way. ANOVA with an experimental group and partisanship as fixed factors predicting outgroup attitude favorability revealed no main effect of the experimental group ($F(1, 263) = 0.503$, $p = 0.479$), and there was no group × partisanship interaction ($F(2, 263) = 0.259$, $p = 0.772$). As in Study 1, there was a significant main effect of partisanship ($F(2, 263) = 36.62$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.218$, $f = 0.53$). Post-hoc LSD comparisons showed that partisans reported significantly less favorable outgroup attitudes than both leaners ($M_{\text{difference}} = 1.02$, $SE = 0.15$, $p < 0.001$) and independents ($M_{\text{difference}} = 1.11$, $SE = 0.17$, $p < 0.001$). Independents and leaners did not differ significantly ($M_{\text{difference}} = 0.09$, $SE = 0.19$, $p = 0.635$).

Regarding willingness for future interactions, only partisanship was a significant predictor ($F(2, 263) = 3.92$, $p = 0.021$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.030$, $f = 0.17$). Post-hoc LSD comparisons showed that partisans reported significantly lower willingness for future interactions than leaners ($M_{\text{difference}} = 0.70$, $SE = 0.25$, $p = 0.008$), while the comparisons between partisans and independents ($p = 0.463$) and between leaners and independents were not significant ($p = 0.132$).

4.3. Discussion

Study 2 supported H1 and the mediation hypotheses (H2b and H3b). Notably, unlike Study 1, it also supported H2a, indicating that high-quality listening increased speakers' willingness for future interactions. However, the findings did not support H3a concerning speakers' outgroup attitudes or political attitudes. The scenario-based design improved control but reduced external validity. Auxiliary analyses showed that partisans sometimes reported less favorable outgroup attitudes than leaners, though partisanship did not interact with the manipulation for either outcome, suggesting that listening quality effects held across partisan groups. Additionally, imagined conversation partners may have varied by listening condition (e.g., picturing a woman in high-quality listening), which is notable given that 75% of participants were women.

5. Study 3

Study 3 relied on a new listening manipulation that incorporates the methodological strengths of both prior studies. Specifically, we sought to combine the ecological validity of Study 1 with the internal validity of

Study 2, while overcoming their respective limitations—namely, the memory bias inherent in Study 1 and the lack of ecological validity in Study 2. The Study 3 scenario method used a standardized video of a listener from the perspective of the speaker to allow participants to more easily imagine receiving the assigned level of listening. A second goal of Study 3 was to conduct a highly powered, preregistered experiment as a confirmatory test of our hypotheses (https://aspredicted.org/xmqg-5x8x.pdf).

Because this study focuses on intergroup attitudes (i.e., attitudes toward the outgroup political party), we have used an openness measure commonly employed in the intergroup literature (Hotchin & West, 2021). However, this measure has not been widely used in research on listening. In listening studies, high-quality listening has consistently been shown to foster a general open-minded self-reflection (Itzchakov et al., 2020). Although we believe that openness and self-insight share similarities and may overlap in intergroup contexts like this, they are conceptually distinct. Specifically, the openness measure captures receptiveness to perspectives and ideas originating outside the self (Hotchin & West, 2021; Saucier, 1994), whereas self-insight reflects an openness to new understandings of one's internal experiences (Itzchakov et al., 2020).

5.1. Method

5.1.1. Participants

We used the average effect of condition on the dependent variables tested in Study 2 (Cohen's $d = 0.18$) as a benchmark for calculating the target sample size. Because we had a priori hypotheses, we pre-registered that we would base conclusions on one-tailed significance tests. A power analysis indicated that a sample size of 688 participants was necessary to achieve 80% power with an $\alpha = 0.05$ for one-tailed tests (Faul et al., 2007). We added 10% for potential exclusions, resulting in a target sample size of $N = 763$. All participants were from the US. Following pre-registered plans, we excluded 21 participants who failed to answer the multiple-choice awareness question correctly, which asked: "What did the speaker describe in the video?" Therefore, the final sample size was $N = 742$ ($M_{age} = 40.60$, $SD = 12.87$; 61.3% female, 37% male, 1.2% non-binary or other gender, 0.5% prefer not to say).

5.1.2. Procedure

After completing the consent form, participants were randomly assigned to watch a video depicting either a high or moderate-quality listening interaction. In all videos, the same female speaker shared an identical uncomfortable experience (similar in tone to an uncomfortable political conversation) with the listener. The speaker's story did not involve politics directly, to avoid participants disagreeing with the content of the manipulation or viewing it as irrelevant to their own political views. To increase generalizability, two actors (one male, one female) played the listener role, each appearing in both the high- and moderate-quality conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to watch one of the videos. Unlike Study 2, where participants imagined their conversation, Study 3 controlled for gender by showing either a male or female speaker. All videos were about five minutes long and conveyed the same story. To make it easier for participants to imagine themselves as speakers in the next phase of the study, only the listener was visible in the video, while the speaker was audible but not seen.

The listener engaged in either high-quality or moderate-quality listening. In the high-quality listening video, the listener exhibited good listening behaviors (Itzchakov & Weinstein, 2021) such as constant eye contact, facial expressions that convey interest and curiosity, asking good questions, and reflecting on the speakers' content. In the moderate-quality listening video, the listener was mostly silent and did not interrupt the speaker. The listener maintained non-verbal behavior that was neither too engaged nor destructive. To validate the manipulation, we asked 42 listening experts to watch the videos, blind to condition, and asked them to rate the quality of the listening displayed from 1 (*poor*) to 9 (*high*).

After watching the video, the participants received the following instructions:

> Imagine you were having a conversation about politics with someone you disagree with on politics. In this conversation, the other person acted much like the listener in the video you just watched. In the space below, briefly describe how you think that conversation would go.

We excluded political content in the videos of Study 3 to isolate the effects of listening quality without political bias. A non-political story captured relevant emotional dynamics, ensuring participants could relate to the speaker while focusing on how listening influenced openness and future engagement.

Afterward, participants completed the study's measures and were compensated.

5.1.3. Measures

We used the same measures for political attitude, listening perception ($\alpha = 0.96$), state openness ($\alpha = 0.91$), willingness for future interactions ($\alpha = 0.92$), and outgroup attitude favorability as in the previous studies. In addition to these, the five-item scale used by Itzchakov et al. (2020) was included as an additional measure of state openness. The preface read: "To what extent did the conversation you imagined made you experience the following?" Example items were: "Helped you discover new insights about yourself," and "made you think more deeply about the topic" ($\alpha = 0.96$). Study 3 included a measure of self-reported attitude change (Itzchakov et al., 2024), which, while distinct from attitude favorability, provided insight into participants' subjective experiences. Prior research links listening to changes in this measure. In this study, perceived attitude change correlated moderately with intergroup attitudes ($r = 0.34$), and participants in the high-quality listening condition reported greater change than those in the control ($t(740) = 3.24$, $p < 0.001$, Cohen's $d = 0.24$).

5.2. Results

5.2.1. Preliminary Results

The distribution of political attitudes was once again skewed toward the left, though to a lesser extent than in Studies 1 and 2. Of the participants, 17.9% identified as strong Democrats, 19.9% as Democrats, 16.7% as lean Democrats, 17.8% as neither Democrats nor Republicans, 11.3% as lean Republicans, 9.6% identified as Republicans, and 6.7% as strong Republicans.

5.2.2. Main Effects

The listening manipulation had a strong and significant main effect on participants' listening perception ($t(740) = 24.21$, $p < 0.001$, Cohen's $d = 1.78$). Participants in the high-quality listening condition imagined receiving greater listening than participants in the control condition, indicating an effective listening manipulation.

Participants in the high-quality listening condition reported higher state openness than participants in the control condition ($t(740) = 11.10$, $p < 0.001$, Cohen's $d = 0.82$).

Participants in the high-quality listening condition reported higher self-insight than participants in the control condition ($t(739) = 9.44$, $p < 0.001$, Cohen's $d = 0.69$). Self-insight was strongly associated with state openness ($r = 0.76$), suggesting it serves as an indicator of state openness, at least in the current context.

Contrary to our hypothesis, participants in the high-quality listening condition were not more willing to engage in future interactions than participants in the control condition ($t(740) = 0.92$, $p = 0.178$, Cohen's $d = 0.07$).

As in Studies 1 and 2, no difference emerged between participants in the two groups ($t(740) = -0.98$, $p = 0.163$, Cohen's $d = -0.07$). Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations by group. Table 6 presents the overall descriptive statistics and correlations between study variables.

Table 5. Means and SDs by experimental groups of Study 3.

	High-quality listening		Control	
	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*
Listening perception	7.49	1.68	3.79	2.41
State openness	5.40	1.62	3.95	1.92
Self-insight	5.24	2.30	3.62	2.38
Outgroup attitude favorability	3.41	1.33	3.51	1.40
Willingness for future interactions	4.77	1.97	4.63	2.03

Table 6. Study 3's descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables.

	Mean	*SD*	Range	1	2	3	4	5
1. Listening perception	5.60	2.69	1–9					
2. State openness	4.66	1.92	1–9	0.61**				
3. Self-insight	4.41	2.48	1–9	0.55**	0.76**			
4. Outgroup attitude favorability	3.08	1.13	1–7	0.10**	0.17**	0.23**		
5. Future Interactions	4.70	2	1–9	0.14**	0.31**	0.38**	0.49**	
6. Political attitude[a]	3.40	1.82	1–7	0	0.02	0.02	0.08*	0.04

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$; [a] = higher values indicate a more conservative attitude.

5.2.3. Mediation Analyses

We conducted mediation analyses using the same bootstrapping approach as before (Hayes, 2017). New to this study, we conducted additional mediation analyses, including self-insight as an additional mediator.

The indirect effect of the listening manipulation on outgroup attitude favorability through state-openness was significant (indirect = 0.23, $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI [0.13, 0.32]). The direct effect was also significant (direct = −0.32, $SE = 0.11$, 95% CI [−0.53, −0.12]). The indirect effect of the listening manipulation on outgroup attitude favorability through self-insight was significant (indirect = 0.24, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.16, 0.34]). The direct effect was also significant (direct = −0.33, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [−0.53, −0.13]).

The indirect effect of the listening manipulation on willingness for future interactions through state-openness was significant (indirect = 0.52, $SE = 0.07$, 95% CI [0.38, 0.67]). The direct effect was not significant (direct = −0.38, $SE = 0.15$, 95% CI [−0.68, −0.09]). The indirect effect of the listening manipulation through self-insight was also significant (indirect = 0.55, $SE = 0.08$, 95% CI [0.40, 0.70]). The direct effect was in the opposite direction of H2a (direct = −0.40, $SE = 0.14$, 95% CI [−0.68, −0.12]).

5.2.4. Auxiliary Analysis

We found a main effect on outgroup attitudes for partisanship but not for listening ($F(2,736) = 26.84$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.07$, $f = 0.27$). Post-hoc LSD analysis indicated that partisans had significantly less favorable outgroup attitudes than leaners ($M_{difference} = -0.62$, $SE = 0.11$, $p < 0.001$) and than independents ($M_{difference} = -0.82$, $SE = 0.13$, $p < 0.001$). Leaners and independents did not differ ($M_{difference} = -0.20$, $SE = 0.15$, $p = 0.174$).

Similar results were observed predicting willingness for future interactions. Partisanship but not listening was a significant predictor ($F(2,736) = 6.01$, $p = 0.003$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$, $f = 0.17$). Post hoc analyses showed that partisans had less favorable outgroup attitudes than leaners ($M_{difference} = -0.57$, $SE = 0.17$, $p < 0.001$). None of the other pairwise comparisons were significant ($ps = 0.087, 0.291$), respectively.

5.3. Discussion

Study 3 provided mixed support for the hypotheses. H1 was supported using both the original and additional openness measures. Mediation hypotheses (H2b and H3b) were replicated, but H2a (listening increasing willingness for future interactions) was not. As in prior studies, H3a (listening increasing outgroup attitude favorability) was unsupported, with no interactions of partisanship or its extremity. Indirect effects remained significant, but direct effects, after accounting for mediation, were in the opposite direction of predictions. This pattern suggests that when controlling for openness, the relationship between listening and outcomes may change in unexpected ways. Since our theory does not justify a suppression effect (MacKinnon et al., 2000), future research should explore this pattern further.

6. Mini Meta-Analysis

A mini-meta-analysis synthesizes findings across the three experiments, each using different methodologies to test the same core hypotheses. By aggregating results, the mini-meta increases statistical power and provides a more robust assessment of the overall effects (Goh et al., 2016).

When computing the effect size for Study 3, we converted Cohen's *f* to Cohen's *d*. As can be seen in Table 7, the effect size for state openness, which included the self-insight measure from Study 3, was also large, with high heterogeneity and considerable variability between the studies. Outgroup attitude favorability showed a negligible and non-significant overall effect size, with moderate heterogeneity and low between-study variance, suggesting that high-quality listening did not affect attitudes toward political outgroups. The second dependent measure, willingness for future interactions with political outgroup members, had a small but significant effect size, with moderate heterogeneity and low between-study variance, suggesting relatively consistent effects across the studies.

Table 7. Meta-analysis of the experiment (N = 1,390).

	d	*SE*	*Z*	*P*(*Z*)	τ^2	I^2	*Q*	*P*(Q)
State openness	0.74	0.13	5.88	<0.001	0.86	86.43%	16.99	<0.001
Outgroup attitude favorability	0.03	0.07	0.44	=0.660	0.01	38.98%	3.10	=0.212
Willingness for future interactions	0.20	0.08	2.41	=0.015	0.01	52.49%	4.23	=0.120

7. General Discussion

Three experiments using varied methods to manipulate listening during political conversations provided partial support for the hypotheses. High-quality listening consistently increased speakers' state openness, supporting H1. Effects on willingness for future interactions were mixed, but a small yet significant meta-analytic effect (d = 0.20) partially supported H2a. No direct effects emerged for outgroup attitude favorability, failing to support H3a. However, mediation analyses showed that increased state openness explained the effects of listening on both willingness for future interactions and outgroup attitude favorability, supporting H2b and H3b.

Our findings suggest that high-quality listening fosters state openness and willingness to engage with politically opposed others without necessarily shifting attitudes or reducing outgroup animosity. This pattern may reflect the complex nature of attitude change, which often requires prolonged exposure, repeated interactions, or additional cognitive and emotional processing beyond a single conversational context (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). High-quality listening may not immediately reduce polarization but could serve as a critical first step by creating a psychologically safe environment where open-mindedness and dialogue are more likely to occur. Increased openness, even without immediate attitude change, might reduce conversational avoidance and encourage future interactions with those holding opposing views. These incremental changes in conversational dynamics could, over time, contribute to a more constructive and less polarized political discourse.

The present work makes several theoretical contributions to understanding the nature and outcomes of political conversations. First, it suggests that, although there was no evidence that high-quality listening improved attitudes toward partisan outgroups relative to lower-quality listening, listening effectively increased speakers' intention to interact with outgroup members. This finding is particularly important given the current sociopolitical climate, where individuals from opposing political parties often avoid engaging in dialogue due to the perception that conversations will be unproductive, emotionally taxing, or conflict-inducing (Gidron et al., 2023; McCoy et al., 2018). Encouraging behavioral intentions to interact with outgroup members is a crucial step toward reducing polarization, as repeated positive interactions can foster trust and decrease intergroup biases over time (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

Second, the finding that high-quality listening increases state openness is conceptually important because openness facilitates critical cognitive and emotional processes necessary for effective social interaction. Increased openness allows individuals to engage more deeply with the perspectives and experiences of others (Kruglanski et al., 2006). This finding contributes to the literature by demonstrating that listening is not merely a passive act but an active mechanism that influences the speaker's cognitive and emotional state, enabling greater receptivity to dialogue. Moreover, this underscores the role of high-quality listening as a catalyst for cognitive flexibility, which is foundational for navigating complex interpersonal and societal issues (Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005).

High-quality listening increased willingness to engage with outgroup members but did not affect outgroup attitudes. Notably, willingness for future interactions correlated positively with more favorable outgroup attitudes (*r*s for Studies 1–3 = 0.40, 0.52, 0.43, respectively), suggesting openness to dialogue rather than a desire to argue or persuade. While no direct effects on outgroup attitudes emerged, increased willingness for contact may shape intergroup attitudes over time if interactions are positive. Since negative expectations can deter contact (Fazio et al., 2004), initial openness to engagement may lead to more favorable attitudes in the long run (Wald et al., 2024).

Further, the consistent indirect effect of state openness on outgroup attitude favorability and willingness for future interactions with outgroup members of opposite partisan groups highlights the theoretical importance of this construct in facilitating positive intergroup outcomes. Although direct attitude shifts may be difficult to achieve in political contexts due to increased psychological reactance (Rosenberg & Siegel, 2018), the mediation findings suggested that state openness functions as a key mechanism through which high-quality listening exerts its effects. This underscores the role of openness as a psychological bridge within political conversations, enabling speakers to approach intergroup interactions with relative curiosity and flexibility rather than defensiveness. More broadly, such findings expand understanding of how interpersonal communication can shape key mediators like openness to foster constructive relational outcomes, even in contentious settings.

Our studies relied on self-reports, recall, and imagination, which are common methods for examining subjective experiences such as openness and political attitudes (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Although there are inherent methodological limitations associated with self-reports, they remain widely accepted in this type of research (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). In Studies 1 and 2, recall and imagination prompts were specifically structured to target particular aspects of the conversation, thereby reducing cognitive load and recall bias. Furthermore, the use of multiple modalities, namely recall, imagination, and video-guided imagination, across

studies strengthens the validity of our findings. Moreover, the preregistration of Study 3 further enhanced the robustness of the conclusions. To validate these findings in more ecologically valid settings, future research should incorporate live conversations.

8. Limitations and Future Research

This research should be considered alongside several limitations. First, samples, especially in Study 2, were skewed toward left-leaning participants, which may limit generalizability. High-quality listening effects could vary by political orientation, as conservatives and liberals differ in openness to outgroup perspectives and responses to interpersonal interventions (Jost et al., 2018).

An additional notable limitation is the absence of a live conversation within the current studies. The most robust listening manipulation used in previous research relies on trained research assistants to manipulate listening (Itzchakov et al., 2023; Weinstein & Itzchakov, 2025). Although the listening manipulation requires extensive training, time, and money, it lets participants experience rather than imagine listening.

Our sample's age distribution varied, with Studies 1 and 2 skewing younger than the median age of our target population (United States Census Bureau, 2025). Although age can influence interpersonal communication (Hupet et al., 1993), we expect the effects of listening to generalize across age groups as listening comprehension remains relatively unchanged until ages 65–70 (Sommers et al., 2011). The sample was also skewed toward females. Although women are perceived to be better listeners than men (Kluger et al., 2024), we are not aware of any research that tested whether gender moderates the effects of being listened to during political conversations. Additionally, we did not collect race or ethnicity data, thus, we cannot assess its impact. Given that the Study 3 video featured only White listeners, racial dynamics might have influenced responses, as prior research suggests that racial identity can shape the reciprocity of self-disclosure (Wetzel & Wright-Buckley, 1988).

Random assignment balanced preexisting attitudes, ideological strength, and trust across conditions. Future research could explore how these traits affect receptivity to listening interventions and identify subgroups that benefit most. Future research should explore listening quality and its effects in dyadic interactions where both parties alternate between speaking and listening. In challenging conversations, individuals are more likely to listen effectively when they perceive attentive listening from their partner (Coduto & Eveland, 2022). Such reciprocity may enhance interpersonal dynamics, fostering mutual engagement and reducing defensiveness during disagreements.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article is available online here: https://osf.io/zu6s2/?view_only=ead9434d2984428c823f94ea8ffcf15d

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