

‘It Can Point to the World’: A
Close Analysis of Representation in
(Children’s) Literary Criticism,
Psychology and Pedagogy

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May 2024

Declaration

I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

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Abstract

In line with theoretical approaches proposed by Jacques Derrida in *Of Grammatology* and ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am’ (1976; 2002), Jacqueline Rose in *The Case of Peter Pan* (1984), Dana Erin Phillips in ‘Ecocriticism, Literary Theory and the Truth of Ecology’ (1999) and Donna Jeanne Haraway’s *A Cyborg Manifesto* (1985), my thesis analyses and critiques the claims of ‘representation’ made in the discourses of (children’s) literature and its criticism, psychology and pedagogy in interdisciplinary research. The engagement with the question of what it means to ‘represent’ derives from seeing that the child and the animal are discussed *differently* but that they are all claimed to be able to be retrieved self-evidently as such, thus leading me to think further about what are the investments and implications of knowing the child and the animal on the grounds of, for example, experience, memory, observation, and testing. This includes considering questions of whether a child can comprehend irony concerning ‘extinct’ birds in the picture book *Aviary Wonders Inc.* by Kate Samworth (2014), how the child is positioned in *A Guide to Eco-Anxiety* by Anouchka Grose (2020), in what way literature should be read and taught in the context of ‘climate change’ in Roman Bartosch’s *Literature, Pedagogy and Climate Change* (2019), the implications of constituting ‘a psychological individual’ in Julian Henriques and others’ *Changing the Subject* (1984) and ideas of gender and childhood in Rhiannon Grant and Ruth Wainman’s ‘Representation in Plastic and Marketing’ (2017). The thesis does not aim to provide answers to how to judge and recognise ‘true’ representations, as that would align it with what it is trying to question. Instead, the thesis reads in what perspectives the represented or the representer are constructed as the ‘represented’ or the ‘representer’ and what is at stake in such claims.

Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have been carried out without the generous support of many of the institutions involved, although most of them I have never met and had no opportunity to thank in person. I am deeply thankful to the members of the Great Britain-China Educational Trust, for granting me the Chinese Students Award and supporting me with financial assistance, which has enabled me to accomplish my Ph.D. in the minimum time. I am also grateful to the School of Humanities for funding my attendance at the conference at the University of Cambridge. My sincere appreciation also goes to the Doctoral and Researcher College and the librarians of the University Library and Bodleian Libraries for providing rich resources and a comfortable academic environment where to conduct this research.

I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor Karín Lesnik-Oberstein for her unwavering support and help in guiding me in every aspect of conducting research, teaching, publishing papers, writing scholarship and funding applications, etc.. Her expertise, rigorous and thorough academic attitude, and constant concern for students are my role models and inspire me to be a wonderful teacher. Thank you again for all the precious time you have spent with me and for all the care and love you have given me.

I would like to thank Neil Cocks and Sue Walsh for their continued encouragement and constructive feedback. Even though I have graduated, I still love to sit in on CIRCL seminars and never tire of reading and thinking together. They are a veritable feast. I also wish to thank the CIRCL members, especially Tingfang Yeh, Natthavimol Wangsittikul, and Natalie England, for their camaraderie.

Special thanks go to Sue Wallace, Colin Baker, and Peter Randall for offering me campus jobs as a hall mentor working with the Welfare & Pastoral Team and as an invigilator for Special Venues, respectively. I am thankful to all the colleagues I have worked with, in particular, Kaio Santos Nogueira and Rahul Kumar, who have

been not only the best working partners but also the best bakers.

I am indebted to my family for their unwavering love. Despite having had concerns about my ‘unusual’ life plans, they have always supported my decisions and choices with respect and open-mindedness, helping me to march forward courageously with ‘a light pack’.

I thank my friends, even though most of us are in different time zones around the world, for always having a way to be there for each other and share the joys and frustrations. We have been growing together along the way, and becoming better versions of ourselves.

I thank my laptop. It is ten years old this year, but still great and tough.

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Introduction:

In line with theoretical approaches proposed by Jacques Derrida in *Of Grammatology*¹ and ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am’,² Jacqueline Rose in *The Case of Peter Pan*,³ Dana Erin Phillips in ‘Ecocriticism, Literary Theory and the Truth of Ecology’⁴ and Donna Jeanne Haraway’s *A Cyborg Manifesto*,⁵ my thesis analyses and critiques the claims of ‘representation’ made in the discourses of (children’s) literature and its criticism, psychology and pedagogy in interdisciplinary research. The engagement with the question of what it means to ‘represent’ derives from seeing that the child and the animal are discussed *differently* but that they are all claimed to be able to be retrieved self-evidently as such, thus leading me to think further about what are the investments and implications of knowing the child and the animal on the grounds of, for example, experience, memory, observation, and testing.

For instance, in the ‘Research’ section of Microsoft’s website, there is a publication⁶ about the development of a mobile application called ‘Pocket Skills’⁷ by a group of experts working in an interdisciplinary area. They conclude at the end of the article:

Participants reported that Pocket Skills helped them *engage* both in the app

¹ Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

² Jacques Derrida, ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, *Critical Inquiry*, 28.2 (2002), pp. 369-418, doi: 10.1086/449046.

³ Jacqueline Rose, *The Case of Peter Pan, or, The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993).

⁴ Dana Erin Phillips, ‘Ecocriticism, Literary Theory, and the Truth of Ecology’, *New Literary History*, 30 (1999), pp. 577-602.

⁵ Donna J. Haraway, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century’, in *Manifestly Haraway* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), pp. 3-90.


⁶ Jessica Schroeder and others, ‘Pocket Skills: A Conversational Mobile Web App to Support Dialectical Behavioral Therapy’, *In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’18)*, 398 (2018), pp.1-15, doi: 10.1145/3173574.3173972.

⁷ ‘We created Pocket Skills, a mobile web app designed to support Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT). Pocket Skills guides people through DBT education and skills practice via *eMarsha*, a conversational agent modeled on Marsha Linehan, the developer of DBT. We conducted[sic] a 4-week field study of 73 participants to test the feasibility of using Pocket Skills to support DBT. After the study, all participants showed significant improvement in depression, anxiety, and DBT skills use’ (Schroeder and others 2018, 10).

and in DBT [Dialectical Behavioral Therapy] in general. This engagement helped them *learn* the principles and *practice* the skills in context, helping them *implement* those skills in their everyday lives. Participants were therefore able to see the *concrete results* of implementing their DBT skills and improve their *self-efficacy*.⁸

While celebrating the efficacy of the app which ‘helped’ ‘[p]articipants’, I begin to think about the ideas of ‘concrete’ and ‘self’: how to understand ‘the concrete’? Are they the same concreteness for ‘[p]articipants’ to ‘engage’ with ‘the app’, the ‘DBT’, the ‘context’, and ‘everyday lives’? If it is possible, why not just support ‘them’ *concretely* ‘in their everyday lives’? I am not arguing whether ‘the app’ has limitations in the face of ‘their everyday lives’, nor do I prioritize the ways for people to receive mental health treatments: through ‘the app’ or in person, or question the number and scope of ‘[p]articipants’ for investigation in relation to the idea of ‘concrete’. But in what way are ‘everyday lives’ known as such for instance? How are ‘[p]articipant(s)’ or ‘self’ defined and employed in this ‘engagement’?

Perhaps the following figure of user interfaces that I quote will help to further consider the implications:



(Figure 1)⁹

⁸ Schroeder and others, p. 10.

⁹ Ibid., ‘Pocket Skills’, p. 3.

First, how ‘Pocket Skills’ operates is based on the very idea of ‘engagement’. And ‘people’ are known to be able to ‘engage’ in it, as long as they are ‘encourage[d]’ to do so. What ‘they want to explore’ is already known before they come to ‘choose’, which explains more of how ‘encourag[ing]’ it is. Second, ‘the content’ might be thought of as not being ‘concrete’ enough for ‘people’ to ‘engage’ with, thus the related ‘videos’ are added to ‘help explain’ more. And it is one of ‘the invent[ors]’ who ‘build[s] eMarsha’s persona’ doing the ‘explain[ation]’, which implies the ideas of authority, concreteness, directness, and immediacy. But, is there a difference between ‘Marsha Linehan’ and ‘eMarsha’ at this point? Third, it seems that, again, the ‘comprehension’ needs to be ‘foster[ed]’. However, ‘people’ are already knowable, for example, as to how to ‘walk through the content’. As is in the case of ‘[t]he conversational interface’, the knowledge and the corresponding ‘skills’ of ‘What is the threat?’ are already framed before ‘people’ ask for it, which also determines what ‘everyday lives’ mean.

Looking briefly at this example of ‘a mobile web app’ in relation to mental health treatment leaves me with the question of what they rely on when they make assumptions regarding, for instance, ‘people’, ‘self’, and ‘everyday lives’, which arouses my interest in the thesis to think further about the idea of representation¹⁰ in the discourses of (children’s) literature and its criticism, psychology and pedagogy, in particular in reading the child and the animal or anything seen to be *an object*.

Jacques Derrida states the notion of ‘supplementarity’ in *Of Grammatology*:

The history of man *calling himself* man is the articulation of *all* these limits among themselves. All concepts determining a non-supplementarity (nature, animality, primitivism, childhood, madness, divinity, etc.) have evidently no truth-value. They belong — moreover, with the idea of truth itself — to an epoch of supplementarity. They have meaning only within a closure of the

¹⁰ There are other names for both the representer and the represented: for example, to ‘describe’, ‘symbolize’, ‘signify’, ‘illustrate’, ‘reify’, ‘visualize’, or ‘refer’ to a ‘thing’ as well as ‘truth’, the ‘real’, the ‘original’, ‘source’, ‘presence’, the ‘own’, ‘self’ or a ‘thing’ that can be ‘retrieved’, so on and so forth as I read throughout the thesis.

game.¹¹

By claiming to ‘these limits among themselves’, Derrida does not mean that ‘man’ cannot ‘call himself’ anything other than ‘man’, nor that ‘man’ is privileged in comparison with ‘articulat[ing]’ ‘nature, animality, primitivism, childhood, madness, divinity, etc.’. But this ‘man’ *himself* is already split in making the ‘articulation’, including ‘*calling*’. That is, the idea of ‘man’ being ‘call[ed]’ can only be understood ‘within a closure of the game’: from the perspective of another, even though this is ‘*calling himself*’. Similarly, the idea of ‘*all*’ is known to be ‘*all*’ within ‘the articulation’ that defines it. In order to be ‘truth-value[d]’, ‘the idea of truth itself’ will be claimed from elsewhere, which after all disrupts the idea of ‘itself’. This is also how ‘nature, animality, primitivism, childhood, madness, divinity, etc.’ are constructed: they ‘have evidently’ ‘truth-value’ only because of the ‘supplementarity’ which frames them as such.

In her essay ‘The Case of “The Case of Peter Pan or the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction”: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, Childhood, Animality’, Karín Lesnik-Oberstein also suggests:

[P]sychoanalysis is for Freud and Rose centrally interested in how childhood, but also any ‘identity’, is about how we are seen and defined in differing, shifting, perspectives in which *how* we see what we see is determined by our own interests, beliefs and investments [...] we cannot know our own perspective as a ‘choice’, but instead these perspectives constitute who we are both to ourselves and others.¹²

¹¹ Jacques Derrida, ‘Genesis and Structure of the Essay on the Origin of Languages’, in *Of Grammatology*, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 244-45.

¹² Karín Lesnik-Oberstein, ‘The case of “The Case of Peter Pan or the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction”: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, Childhood, Animality’, *Oxford Literary Review*, 41.2 (2019), pp. 238-57 (p. 239), doi: 10.3366/olr.2019.0281.

Moreover, Geoffrey Bennington points out ‘the problem with historicism’ and with ‘post-theory’ with reference to ‘the Derridean term “transcendental contraband”’ in ‘Inter’:

[C]laiming to operate a radical detranscendentalisation, historicism puts up a transcendental term (History), which its own premises prevent it ever from understanding. The last thing historicism can understand is History (and this is true more generally of all ‘-isms’: -isms smuggle into a transcendental position the term that gives them their name, and it’s the one thing that in principle they cannot understand, while it is the one thing they suggest it is crucially important to understand, because it is the principle according to which all the rest can be understood).¹³

My thesis will not take any ‘-isms’ or ‘truth’ for granted, but read ‘in differing, shifting, perspectives’, for example, as to how and why the idea of ‘-isms’ claims to know ‘the rest’ within ‘the principle[s]’ established, and on what grounds the assumptions of ‘calling’ and/or ‘nam[ing]’, for example, the child and the animal, are made within different ‘closure[s] of the game’.

Before introducing why I embarked on these chapters, I now turn to read more of Jacqueline Rose’s discussion of ‘own’ and ‘voice’, which is also associated with Derrida’s notion of ‘supplementarity’.

Child’s Own?

In the chapter ‘Peter Pan and Literature for the Child’, Rose discusses the problem of ‘a fully literary demand for a cohesion of writing’¹⁴ and takes the ‘passages’ written by ‘Enid Blyton’ as a counter-example to show ‘a possible confusion of tongues’

¹³ Geoffrey Bennington, ‘Inter’, in *Post-Theory: New Directions in Criticism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), pp. 103-20 (p. 106).

¹⁴ Jacqueline Rose, ‘Peter Pan and Literature for the Child’, in *The Case of Peter Pan, or, The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), pp. 66-86 (p. 70).

against '[t]he ethics of literature'.¹⁵ The different readings and understandings of, for instance, the claims to 'own' and to 'the difference of this passage from the first two' can be drawn from her analysis of 'the criticism'¹⁶ in terms of 'Enid Blyton's' work:

But this device – of sharing in the feelings of her characters – is a basic narrative convention which Enid Blyton often employs: 'Anne went to the little room she shared with George. How good it was to be back again at Kirrin! What fun they would have these holidays with George and dear old Timmy!'. The passage moves from the external description of Anne to the child's own excitement of pleasure, but the difference of this passage from the first two is that the transition is smooth since the more child-like comment is given in the form of what can be read as Anne's own reflections. In the other examples, the change from one voice to another jars and calls attention to itself. It is this jarring which draws the epithet 'irrational' and, with it, the criticism of the values expressed. What characterises the two passages singled out for criticism from Enid Blyton's writing, therefore, is something which appears as a momentary loss of narrative *control*.¹⁷

By making a claim to 'a basic narrative convention which Enid Blyton often employs', 'this device' is known to relate 'this passage' to 'the first two', although there may be 'the difference' between 'this passage' and 'the first two' according to Rose's reading of 'the criticism'. Meanwhile, 'sharing in the feelings of her characters' differs from what 'the criticism' thinks of 'Enid Blyton's writing'. '[T]he external description of Anne' can either be read as related to 'Anne went to the little room she shared with George' or '[h]ow good it was to be back again at Kirrin!', just as how 'they' are 'descri[bed]' as '[w]hat fun they would have these holidays with George and dear old Timmy!'. Put another way, this is a perspective on 'Anne' shifting to a perspective on 'Anne's' 'be[ing] back', then on 'they' which include 'Anne' and 'George and dear

¹⁵ Rose, p. 70.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 69-70.

old Timmy' claiming to know not only '[h]ow good it was to be back again at Kirrin!' but also '[w]hat fun they would have these holidays', which is, after all, the other 'external description of Anne' or of 'they' instead of 'the child's own excitement of pleasure' – the latter is known as a possible reading 'for criticism'.

This is the way that the 'excitement of pleasure' is claimed to be relevant to 'Anne', through which the 'excitement of pleasure' is also not being 'narrat[ed]' to be 'child's (Anne's) own', nor even to be 'child's' claim (for instance, going like: 'Anne' thinks: 'How good it was to be back again at Kirrin! What fun' I 'would have these holidays with George and dear old Timmy'!), although it can be seen as 'sharing in the feelings of her character', to some extent, by virtue of the knowledge of how 'Anne' 'feel[s]' on 'be[ing] back again at Kirrin!'. That said, 'sharing in the feelings of her characters' already implies a separation between 'Enid Blyton' and 'her characters' for Rose, which cannot guarantee the very idea of 'child's own' 'feeling'. At the same time, there can be no complete 'external' 'description of' 'characters'. They are, instead, always 'descri[bed]' in the shifting perspectives.

The problematic claim to 'own' can also be seen in relation to 'Anne's own reflections', according to Rose's assumption about the reading of 'the criticism', whereas the 'comment' is known to be 'more child-like' for her. The 'comment' of 'child-like' is different from that of 'child', although the latter is also 'given' from a position other to a 'child', for example, 'in the form of what can be read as Anne's' 'reflections', namely, a perspective on 'Anne's' perspective (here can be understood to be on 'Anne's reflections'), as with an example I gave above. It would seem, however, that, for 'the criticism', 'the more child-like comment' is more inclined to 'child' rather than 'like', when the idea of 'own' is thought of as such.

That is to say, the reason for ignoring both the difference between 'child-like comment' (for instance, '[h]ow good it was to be back again at Kirrin!') and 'child's (own)' 'comment', and the impossibility of 'child's own excitement of pleasure' or 'reflections' can be seen from how Rose thinks that 'the criticism' 'characterises' and

‘differen[tiate]’ ‘this passage from the first two’. As for ‘the first two’, one of them,¹⁸ for example, is known as that ‘[t]he “silly” has spread across from Julian’s response onto the narrator’s “external” description of Edgar – hence Enid Blyton as “abandoned in her irrationality as a child” ’, thus probably leading to a different reading between ‘this passage’ – the ‘smooth’ ‘transition’ (the idea of ‘child’s own’ here concerning ‘a rule which states that the adult’ can and need to ‘speak in the voice of a child’¹⁹ in a ‘rational’ way) and ‘the first two’ – the ‘jarring’ ‘change from one voice to another’ (concerning the idea of ‘the epithet “irrational” ’).

It can, however, be read to be a repetition ‘of this passage from the first two’: ‘[T]his passage’ is about a ‘transition’ from an ‘external description of Anne (child)’ to another ‘external description of Anne (child)’ from which this time it can be read as a more ‘Anne’ ‘like comment’, though. The parallel, also known as ‘this device’ – ‘a basic narrative convention which Enid Blyton often employs’ is ‘from Julian’s response onto the narrator’s “external” description of Edgar’. The claim to ‘external’ in double quotation marks can be seen as twofold, one is that this is understood to be ‘Hildick’s’²⁰ reading of ‘Blyton’, and the other is that, for Rose, ‘Julian’s response’ is also a ‘narrator’s external description’. This ‘external description’ does not only apply to how the ‘narrator’ descri[bes] ‘Edgar’. In other words, ‘from one voice to another’ can be regarded as ‘from’ the ‘narrator’s external description’ of ‘Julian’s response’ towards ‘Edgar’ to that of ‘Edgar’, which, to some degree, makes the ‘change’ less ‘jarring’ and the relationship between ‘this passage’ and ‘the first two’ similar to each other, namely, ‘the external description’ either about a perspective on ‘character’ (‘Anne’ or ‘Edgar’ or ‘they’) or a perspective on ‘character’s’ perspective (or on ‘Julian’s response’).

The reason why the ‘example’ of ‘Julian’ is known to be relevant to the ‘jarring’ ‘change’ whereas the ‘example’ of ‘Anne’ seems to be ‘differen[t]’ is because ‘the transition is’ too ‘smooth’ to be ‘singled out’ for ‘the criticism’ in Rose’s reading. But

¹⁸ ‘Julian called out to Edgar. “You shut up! You’re not funny, only jolly silly!” “Georgie-porgie,” began Edgar again, a silly smile on his wide red face’ (Rose 1993, 69).

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 69.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 69.

is there another reading of this ‘smooth[ness]’ and what is at stake in claiming the knowledge of ‘form’? In other words, if this is ‘the more’ ‘Anne’ ‘like comment’ rather than ‘Anne’s’ ‘comment’ which is similar to how ‘Julian’s response’ is framed, then for the same reason there cannot be the ‘child’s own excitement of pleasure’, nor ‘Anne’s own reflections’. It can be said that the idea of ‘smooth’ can be drawn from different ‘transition[s]’ or ‘change[s]’ between ‘the external description[s]’, which does not make that much of ‘the difference of this passage from the first two’ and, meanwhile, undermines the idea of ‘jarring’.

Further, ‘this passage’ can also ‘call attention to’ *itself*: ‘since the more child-like comment’ for Rose is part of ‘a possible confusion of tongues’, even if what ‘form’ should be ‘given’ and ‘read’, according to ‘[t]he ethics of literature’, is already known by ‘the criticism’ as such. What ‘attention’ it is about and why there is an ‘attention’ in need of being ‘call[ed]’ is, therefore, something that ‘this passage’ and ‘the other examples’ share in common rather than only the latter being ‘singled out for criticism from Enid Blyton’s writing’, namely, the ‘characteris[tics]’: they can be ‘characterise[d]’ due to ‘the epithet “irrational”’ – whether or not ‘abandoned in her irrationality as a child’ and to ‘something which appears as a momentary loss of narrative *control*’. The separation between ‘the criticism’ and ‘the values expressed’ lies in the different understandings of the relationship between ‘Enid Blyton’ and ‘her characters’ for Rose and her reading of ‘the criticism’.

Meanwhile, both ideas of ‘criticism’ and ‘form’ can be read to rely on ‘a more subtle rule’²¹ claimed earlier in the same chapter in which it is the appeal to ‘absolutely no equivocation’ and/or to the ‘knowledge to hold the two instances [the narrator be adult or child] safely apart on the page’ that produce both the notion of ‘irrationality’ and ‘a momentary loss of narrative *control*’. However, this is not about whether or not there was ‘a momentary loss’ but why and how the ‘narrative’ is defined in relation to the ‘control’ in which the ‘rationality’ needs to be there as ‘a

²¹ ‘[W]hich demands that the narrator be adult or child, one or the other. It does not really matter, provided that it knows, with absolutely no equivocation, which it is, and that it uses that knowledge to hold the two instances safely apart on the page’ (Rose 1993, 69).

rule'. The italic implies that, for Rose, the investment to a 'control' has been called into question.

When it comes to the 'same voice', though appearing to be different from the claim to 'the change from one voice to another' I analysed above, 'a possible confusion of tongues' and the similar reading to the idea of 'smooth[ness]' can also be seen from an example in relation to the 'sequence of the children's return'²² in Rose's discussion of 'Barrie's 1911 *Peter and Wendy*':

In this sequence of the children's return, that voice declares itself as the onlooker who, like Peter Pan, is excluded from the scene which he watches from outside. But by the end of the chapter, this same voice has pulled itself together, and has reconstituted itself as a narrator in the conventional sense of the term, that is, as a narrator who can sagely comment on the place of the outsider as the unique and exceptional dilemma of Peter Pan.²³

By 'declar[ing] itself as the onlooker', this 'voice' needs to be more than 'the onlooker', thus shaking the very 'like' idea between 'it' and 'Peter Pan' who can be understood as someone being 'excluded from the scene which he watches from outside' but not being 'like' this 'voice' which can 'declare itself as the onlooker' '[i]n this sequence of the children's return'. In other words, 'Peter Pan' does not 'declare itself' but is 'narrat[ed]' 'as the onlooker'. Although 'itself' can also be 'declare[d] as' such, there has to be always a perspective on this 'itself' 'watching from outside' of 'Peter Pan' and knowing what 'Peter Pan' is 'watching from outside', namely, 'the onlooker' of 'the onlooker', which disrupts the very idea of being 'excluded' in a sense.

The claim to 'same' knows not only to what extent and condition the idea of 'like[ness]' can be there but also the difference between 'that voice' and 'Peter Pan' – the '[un]like[ness]'. In addition to this, 'itself' can be multiple and different, for

²² Ibid., p. 74.

²³ Ibid., p. 74.

instance, either being ‘declare[d]’ or ‘pulled’ ‘together’, or ‘reconstituted’, while the ‘voice’ is always the ‘same’ in the sense from a perspective both on and of ‘Peter Pan’ – ‘on’ and in ‘the place of the outsider’. This is also the difference between ‘that voice’ and ‘a narrator in the conventional sense of the term’. The former is in excess of the latter. That is, ‘that voice’ can also be ‘a narrator in the’ non-‘conventional sense of the term’. The irony of ‘sagely’ is that the knowledge of ‘the unique and exceptional dilemma of Peter Pan’ does not have to be claimed from a ‘comment on the place of the outsider’. The ‘voice’, as I analysed above, when it is ‘a narrator in the’ non-‘conventional sense of the term’, can also be ‘sage’ to some extent in being both ‘the onlooker’ with and on ‘Peter Pan’.

The parallel can be seen in Rose’s reading of Barrie on the page before this quotation: ‘[A]s we are here we may as well stay and look on. That is all we are, lookers-on. Nobody really wants us’.²⁴ The non-‘conventional sense’ in which ‘a narrator’ cannot do ‘sagely’ but the ‘voice’ can is about how both ‘we’ and the relationship between ‘[n]obody’ and ‘us’ are mobilised. ‘[L]ike Peter Pan’, there has to be a perspective both on and of this ‘we’ in order to know, for instance, ‘[t]hat is all we are, lookers-on’. The ‘voice’ is more than just a ‘itself’ being ‘we’ but also the one knowing the ‘[n]obody’ who is different from ‘us’. Therefore, the very ‘same[ness]’ of ‘voice’ can be understood to be based on the shifting and split perspectives. That is, to know ‘voice’ as the ‘same’ is to know there will be always such ‘same[ness]’ of differences, whereas ‘a narrator in the conventional sense of the term’, for example, cannot remain the ‘same’ *sameness*.

The discussion revolving around the ideas of ‘own’ and ‘voice’ can be further seen as follows:

As a mode of writing, the new ‘realism’ can be seen to take its most important step when the child is given his or her own story to tell [...] This is an infantilising of the narrative voice, but paradoxically it means that children’s writing has grown up - to the point where there is as small a gap as possible

²⁴ Ibid., p. 73.

between the narrator and the protagonist of the story.²⁵

Before being ‘given’, ‘the child’ is not someone who knows that ‘h[e]’ ‘or she’ has ‘his or her own story’. In order to be ‘t[old]’ in a way of ‘the new “realism” ’ which ‘can be seen to take its most important step’, the very ‘own story’ is ‘writ[ten]’ from a position other to ‘the child’ and needs to be ‘given’ to ‘the child’ as ‘his or her own story’. And ‘the child’ is already known to be able ‘to tell’ before being ‘given’ in this ‘mode of writing’. This is how the idea of ‘own’ is claimed on the grounds of knowing that there is a gap between ‘the child’ and ‘his or her own story’, which also implies how ‘new’ ‘realism’ is. That is to say, as for other kinds of ‘realism’, ‘the child’ might not get to be ‘given his or her own story to tell’. It could be another ‘to tell’ that ‘the child’ has ‘his or her own story’. In comparison with this situation, it is the ‘most important step’ to be ‘take[n]’. The ‘realism’ in quotation marks, however, claims to know that in terms of ‘a mode of writing’, it might not be that ‘new’ when the gap always remains, although the ‘most important step’ being ‘take[n]’ this time is that ‘the child’ instead of the other will ‘tell’ ‘his or her’ *own* ‘story’.

The ‘narrative voice’ can be made to be ‘infantil[e]’, according to Rose’s reading of the relation of Dickens’s ‘Holiday Romance’ to ‘E. Nesbit’s’²⁶ work, to imply how other critics of ‘children’s writing[s]’ think of ‘a mode of writing’. The transfer can be understood to be the reason for ‘the new “realism” ’, though the ‘form’²⁷ here in relation to Dickens’s work is seen as ‘presaged’. In other words, the ‘form’ under the frame of this ‘new “realism” ’ may be thought of by other critics of ‘children’s writing[s]’ to be able to decide what ‘narrative voice’ should and could be – for instance, being ‘infantil[e]’ or ‘grown-up’. The difficulty is not where the ‘paradox’ lies in, as this very dynamic idea of ‘infantalising’ can be seen as a way of ‘grow[ing] up’ in ‘children’s writing’ – ‘a mode of writing’, but the attempts behind the ‘infantilis[ation]’ to make ‘a gap’ ‘between the narrator and the protagonist of the story’ ‘as small’ ‘as possible’ through changing the ‘narrative voice’, without

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 82-83.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 82.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 82.

knowing that the ‘gap’ can never be closed, as is the case in realizing the idea of ‘own’. Since the claim to ‘infantalising’ already implies the distinction ‘between’ the two. The ‘gap’ is always there, similar to how ‘the child’ is constituted with ‘his or her own story’.

A/The Point of Departure?

As Derrida also proposes:

Following the appearances of the word ‘supplement’ and of the corresponding concept or concepts, we traverse a certain path within Rousseau’s text. To be sure, this particular path will assure us the economy of a synopsis. But are other paths not possible? And as long as the totality of paths is not effectively exhausted, how shall we justify this one?²⁸

and

We must begin *wherever we are* and the thought of the trace, which cannot not take the scent into account, has already taught us that it was impossible to justify a point of departure absolutely. *Wherever we are*: in a text where we already believe ourselves to be.²⁹

In reading ‘Rousseau’s text’, ‘a’ ‘path’ can be ‘certain[ly]’ ‘traverse[d]’ by ‘us’. How ‘certain’ it is is further claimed to be related to the idea of ‘un/particular’: one of the many possible ‘synops[es]’ is known to have ‘the economy’ in relation to ‘assur[ing] us’. ‘But’ the ‘possib[ility]’ of ‘travers[ing]’ and ‘assur[ing]’ is also seen on ‘other paths’ both ‘within Rousseau’s’ and others’ ‘text’: as, for Derrida, the idea of ‘assur[ing]’ is not based on ‘effectively exhaust[ing]’ or not ‘exhaust[ing]’ ‘the

²⁸ Jacques Derrida, ‘ “. . . That Dangerous Supplement . . . ” ’, in *Of Grammatology*, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 161.

²⁹ Derrida, p. 162.

totality of paths'. Instead, how and why any 'path' is 'traverse[d]' and 'justified' (for instance, including the idea of 'totality') need to be considered when reading a 'text'.

The 'possib[ility]' is about not only 'travers[ing]' any 'path' to read in what way a 'text' is claimed concerning the idea of 'supplement' with which the knowledge of 'appearances' already implies the 'possib[ility]' of 'possib[ility]' – 'other paths' associated with 'the word "supplement"' and of the corresponding concept or concepts', but also where '[w]e' 'begin'. In other words, to 'begin' a reading, to 'traverse' one of many possible 'path[s]' hinges on where 'we are' 'in a text': how 'ourselves' is 'believe[d]' 'to be' 'in a text'. Thus it can be any 'point of departure' whenever '[w]e' 'begin' to read 'a text', which, in turn, can be the 'point of departure' of my thesis: instead of setting up and 'justify[ing]' a point of departure absolutely which implies the 'impossib[ility]' of 'exhaust[ing]' the right sequence between 'the trace' and 'the scent' – in relation to one of 'appearances of the word "supplement"' read 'within Rousseau's text'. I will follow Derrida's argument of the 'possib[ility]' of 'begin[ing]' wherever we are' and 'travers[ing]' any 'path' to examine the different ideas of 'representation' – in relation to one of 'appearances of the word "supplement"' different from his reading of 'Rousseau's text', alongside with reading a range of texts throughout the course of the thesis.

At the same time, the claim to '*wherever we are*' can be read as an irony for Derrida that hints further at how a/the 'point of departure' can flip over into each other when one is held to distinguish from the other. This is not to say that 'we' cannot 'begin *wherever we are*'. Instead, the 'possib[ility]' of 'a point of departure' will be set up and seen as the 'point of departure' in retrospection after 'we' 'begin', for instance, to write the thesis, as with the idea of 'un/particular' I discussed above. The 'point of departure', however, will only be as *the* 'point of departure' 'within a closure of the game' of writing the thesis, which turns out to be one of many possible 'point[s] of departure'. In addition, the idea of 'departure' comes up prior to the idea of 'point': in order to claim to know where 'we' 'begin', 'ourselves' needs to be 'believe[d]' 'already' 'in a text'. The deferral between 'we' and 'ourselves' or between I who will write this thesis and how and why it is written in this way is always there, which will

then be understood as an irony of irony in my reading and following of Derrida's arguments revolving around a/the 'point of departure'.

An entire theory of the structural necessity of the abyss will be gradually constituted in our reading; the indefinite process of supplementarity has always already *infiltrated* presence, always already inscribed there the space of repetition and the splitting of the self. Representation in the *abyss* of presence is not an accident of presence; the desire of presence is, on the contrary, born from the abyss (the indefinite multiplication) of representation, from the representation of representation, etc. The supplement itself is quite exorbitant, in every sense of the word.³⁰

The 'indefinite process of supplementarity' is both known and unknown: on the one hand, it implies 'the structural necessity of the abyss' prior to 'our reading'. On the other hand, because of such 'indefinit[y]', '[a]n entire theory of the structural necessity of the abyss will be gradually constituted in our reading'. Both 'the space of repetition and the splitting of the self' are further claimed in relation to what 'the structural necessity of the abyss' means, as this 'self' is already known to be produced within 'the indefinite process of supplementarity', as with the knowledge of an 'infiltrated presence' which hints that this is not a 'presence' thought of by others as something being outside the text but a 'presence' that is, after all, 'constituted in our reading'.

The 'repetition' here is also shifting from '*infiltrated* presence' to 'the *abyss* of presence': as if the *intact* 'presence' can somehow be retrieved before 'infiltrat[ing]' and/or without 'the abyss'. What remains is, however, 'the indefinite process of supplementarity' in which both 'representation' and 'presence' are 'read' as such because of their relation to and against each other, according to the perspective of another: an 'exorbitant' 'supplement' 'in every sense of the word'.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 163.

Each chapter of this thesis will unpack what is at stake in different perspectives that claim to know that there might be a ‘presence’ or ‘representation’ out there, though possibly in the different ‘appearances of the word’: ‘presence’ or ‘representation’, independent of ‘the structural necessity of the abyss’ between ‘presence’ and ‘representation’.

Chapter 1 focuses on reading child and psychology: I will look at the way in which the ‘child’ is claimed in pedagogy in relation to developmental psychology, along with an exploration of how the identity of the ‘teacher’ is also involved in this process. Following the implications of Rose’s argument, this chapter also concerns the idea of parenting as to what it means to be ‘child’s own’ language, and what counts as ‘child’s own’ knowledge, and why, in the context of eco-anxiety and economic psychology, for example. The discussion of the notion of ‘own’ will recur in the following chapters, by reading different texts or objects in perspective and engaging with an effort to (re)consider the problem of representation.

By extending the reading of more ideas of psychologies, Chapter 2 zeros in on claims about the relation between society and the individual, including considering, for instance, how ‘infants’, ‘managers’, and ‘myself’ are constructed and employed, and the limitations of social psychology to explain the idea of ‘prejudice’. This chapter will also explore what is meant by ‘discourse’, ‘the real’, and ‘histories’.

I turn in Chapter 3 to the claims made around LEGO and Eco-anxiety, and examine the ways in which ideas such as ‘attention’, ‘imagination’, and ‘persuasion’ are known to help solve certain problems and enhance abilities. I shall be analysing what it means to ‘illustrate’ in terms of images as well as words, how ‘body’ and ‘brain’ are constructed, and why knowledge of ‘internal’ or ‘external’, and ‘same’ or ‘different’, is not stable.

Issues surrounding gender and feminism are discussed in Chapter 4. By looking at a case of women’s representation in LEGO, I set out to think about what gender stereotyping means and how gender imbalance is handled and perceived by those who know what gender bias is. The notion of gendered subjectivity is also explored before reading what is at stake in the claim of category, how feminisms are claimed to know

what the 'women' is, Judith Butler's questioning of sex, gender, body, self, and how her analysis of, for instance, the relation of experience to language, undermines the stability of arguments which are based on the ideas of, such as interpretation, reification, representation, reality, ontology, and essence.

In Chapter 5, I will read how 'it/self' is positioned and what it means to claim 'its own' in Jacques Derrida's discussion of the animal. Related to this is the exploration of how to understand, for instance, 'seeing', 'interpretation', 'manifestation', 'compassion', and 'autobiography'. I will then take another book regarding the animal as an example to go on to consider the perspective and positioning, which has also involved a focus on the ideas of 'translation', '(mis)representation', 'ownership', and 'empathy'.

Chapter 6 begins by examining how readers and reading comprehension are framed from different perspectives. This also involves thinking about the implications of, for example, claiming to know the reader's and/or listener's understanding of irony. I will then look at a picture book and critical discussions surrounding it to consider: Can the child read and understand satire? What are the differences between real birds and copies, and how are these differences identified? And what constitutes 'realistic'? – an issue to which I shall return in the following chapter.

Chapter 7 sets out to read more about the idea of 'realism' and the way in which the idea of 'representation' constitutes the relation of the text to 'the world', together with a discussion of the notions of, for example, 'adéquation', 'mimesis', 'correspondence', 'equivalence', 'replica', 'impression', and 'stylization'. Within the context of ecology, I shall also be looking at the claim to 'existence' by analysing what it means to be 'seeing' and/or 'memory', and looking at the question, in shifting perspectives, of how 'difference' is defined.

Chapter 1: Child and Psychology

1.1 Object or Subject: Who Needs to be Liberated?

Since its first publication in 1984, *Changing the Subject* has played an increasingly important role in considering subjectivity and identity differently from traditional psychology, as also claimed in a new forward to the 1998 reissue of the book:

The resilience of these paradigms [to reproduce and naturalize the particular rationalist notion of the subject, a subject often referred to as logocentric] in psychology, as much as in the common sense understandings of human behaviour, supports our belief that the book still serves its original purpose of helping to authorize the breaking of a mould.³¹

I am interested in exploring how these differences in relation to subjectivities and identities are elucidated and understood in the book. By reading in perspective, my conclusions in what follows, however, will be drawn differently, for example, in terms of psychoanalytic observational work, pushing forward the consideration of how and why the subject or object is produced.

In the chapter ‘Developmental Psychology and the Child-Centred Pedagogy: The Insertion of Piaget into Early Education’³² of *Changing the Subject*, Valerie Walkerdine discusses ‘the effectivity of Piaget’s work, that is how it is implicated in the child-centred pedagogy’,³³ including considering why it is ‘impossib[le]’ to ‘set the “individual” free’,³⁴ in particular, in the case of ‘educational practices’:³⁵

It is perhaps the supreme irony that the concern for individual freedom and

³¹ Julian Henriques and others, *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. ix-x.

³² Valerie Walkerdine, ‘Developmental Psychology and the Child-Centred Pedagogy: The Insertion of Piaget into Early Education’, in *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 148-222.

³³ Walkerdine, p. 185.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 186.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 186.

the hope of a naturalized rationality that could save mankind should have provided the conditions for the production of a set of apparatuses which would aid in the production of the normalized child.³⁶

For Walkerdine, there are different kinds of ‘iron[ies]’ among which here is ‘the supreme’ one ‘perhaps’, in comparison with other known ‘iron[ies]’. This ‘perhaps the supreme irony’ can be further understood to be twofold: first of all, Walkerdine does not agree with ‘the hope of a naturalized rationality that could save mankind’, nor with the relation of ‘naturaliz[ing]’ to ‘sav[ing]’; secondly, this ‘hope’, together with ‘the concern for individual freedom’, might be thought of by others to be able to ‘provide’ ‘the conditions for the production of a set of apparatuses which would aid in the production of the normalized child’. But the perspective on ‘the conditions’ claims to know that both ‘a set of apparatuses’ and ‘the normalized child’ are ‘production[s]’, in one sense.

In another sense, ‘the production of the normalized child’ might not be necessarily related to and ‘aid[ed]’ by ‘a set of apparatuses’ that might be ‘produc[ed]’ in relation to ‘the concern for individual freedom’ and to ‘the hope of a naturalized rationality’. Therefore, why ‘the child’ needs to be ‘normalized’ and how to ‘normalize’ it are known to be related to something else instead of ‘the concern for individual freedom and the hope of a naturalized rationality’. As this very notion of ‘normaliz[ation]’ cannot be seen to be ‘free’, nor is ‘the production’ of such a ‘child’ or an ‘individual’ ‘free’ or ‘set’ to be ‘free’. It, instead, implies that ‘child/ren’ needs to be ‘normalized’, and ‘rationality’ ‘naturalized’. Both ‘rationality’ and ‘child’ are known not as such.

It is the empirical apparatus of stages of development which of all Piaget’s work has been most utilized in education. It is precisely this, and its insertion into a framework of biologized capacities, which ensures that the child is produced as an object of the scientific and pedagogical gaze by means of the

³⁶ Ibid., p. 186.

very mechanisms which were intended to produce its liberation.³⁷

The perspective on ‘all Piaget’s work’ knows that ‘stages of development’ have ‘apparatus’ that is ‘empirical’. These ‘stages of development’ come up earlier than ‘education’. And there are also other ideas, ‘empirical’ or not, that could be ‘utilized’ in ‘education’. ‘[T]he empirical apparatus of stages of development’ in relation to ‘Piaget’s work’ is known to be not only different from the notion of ‘education’ but also ‘a framework of biologized capacities’. But, at the same time, the perspective also knows that ‘empirical apparatus’ has to be there to ‘ensure’ ‘that the child is produced as an object of the scientific and pedagogical gaze’, which implies that ‘the child’ cannot be ‘produced’ as such without ‘the empirical apparatus of stages of development which of all Piaget’s work’ being ‘utilized’ and ‘insert[ed]’.

This ‘scientific and pedagogical gaze’ is based on the idea of ‘empirical’, as are ‘the very mechanisms’ framed to be relevant to the idea of ‘liberation’. And this ‘intended’ ‘liberation’ of ‘the child’ can be read to be ‘produce[d]’ prior to ‘produc[ing]’ ‘child’ ‘as an object’ for ‘scien[ce]’ and ‘pedagog[y]’ to ‘gaze’. In other words, the ‘means of the very mechanisms’ is also constructed to be related to the ‘empirical apparatus of stages of development’. In this sense, why ‘[i]t is perhaps the supreme irony’ can also be understood in knowing that ‘the production of the normalized child’ shares the same idea of ‘empirical’ with the ‘means’ of ‘the’ ‘mechanisms’ for ‘produc[ing] its liberation’. This is how ‘the normalized child’ is ‘produced’ for the purpose of ‘liberation’ by and in ‘the scientific and pedagogical gaze’.

In this sense then we can understand why Piaget’s work appears in educational practices in such an apparently pragmatic way. If, for example, Piaget had not provided such an extensive and coherent set of empirical evidence and monitoring procedures one might speculate about his insertion into educational practices. It is those procedures which form part of the day-today

³⁷ Ibid., p. 186.

running of classrooms, providing the taken-for granted forms of a pedagogy which teachers frequently do not associate with the name of Piaget, who appears as a dimly remembered figure from college days.³⁸

Here, the perspective on ‘we’ claims to know that this ‘we’ might not think about the relation of ‘Piaget’s work’ to ‘educational practices’ without ‘this sense’. But the perspective knows about ‘Piaget’s work’ which can also not ‘appear’ ‘in such an apparently pragmatic way’. What ‘an apparently pragmatic way’ means in ‘educational practices’ is further explained as ‘an extensive and coherent set of empirical evidence and monitoring procedures’. In this sense, ‘an extensive and coherent set’ is constructed to be the link between ‘Piaget’ and ‘educational practices’ without ‘speculat[ing]’. And these ‘practices’ cannot be there as ‘educational’ ‘pragmatic[ally]’, for instance, ‘part of the day-today[sic] running of classrooms’ being ‘form[ed]’, without the ideas of ‘empirical’ and ‘monitoring’. The perspective, however, knows that ‘forms of a pedagogy’ should not be ‘taken-for granted’, as, for instance, ‘an extensive and coherent set of empirical evidence and monitoring procedures’ is thought of as taking part in and affecting how to ‘produce’ and ‘normalize’ ‘the child’.

For Walkerdine, ‘the name of Piaget’ is not ‘a dimly remembered figure from college days’ but something which could be ‘frequently’ ‘associat[ed]’ with ‘forms of a pedagogy’ in which ‘the day-today[sic] running of classrooms’ is ‘form[ed]’ in relation to ‘those procedures’ which are regarded to be ‘provided’ by ‘Piaget’. This is how ‘an apparently pragmatic way’ regarding ‘Piaget’s work’ comes to be ‘taken-for granted’ in ‘educational practices’.

Besides this, the ‘videotaped sequence’ is discussed to ‘show’ how ‘the teacher’s identity’ is ‘construct[ed]’ in relation to ‘pedagogy’:³⁹

Although I had been at pains to select this teacher because she was well-

³⁸ Ibid., p. 186.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 188.

known to be extremely competent, the teachers watching the videotape always tended to find fault with her, saying that she was not progressive enough: they never challenged the pedagogy itself.⁴⁰

The perspective on ‘this teacher’ knows that ‘she was well-known to be extremely competent’, which implies that this ‘she’ is known as such off ‘the videotape’. But ‘this teacher’ was ‘f[ound]’ ‘with fault’ ‘always’ as ‘not progressive enough’ by the perspective on ‘the teachers’ perspective. It is seemingly because of ‘watching the videotape’ which leads to different perspectives on ‘her’ – being both ‘extremely competent’ and ‘not progressive enough’. However, ‘the videotape’ can also be understood as being ‘select[ed]’ ‘at pains’, so are ‘the teachers’ who will be involved in ‘watching’, as Walkerdine does not agree with but has known this notion of ‘fault’ already: ‘not progressive enough’ is constituted to be relevant to ‘the pedagogy itself’ instead of ‘extremely competent’ ‘teacher’ and/or ‘teachers’. If there is something known to be ‘progressive enough’, it should be framed by the perspective as that ‘the pedagogy’ needs to be ‘challenged’. This ‘pedagogy’ is known to produce what ‘this teacher’ and/or ‘teachers’ could and should be, including being ‘progressive enough’ or not.

My reading of this response on the part of the teachers was that they actually recognized only too well teaching which was consonant with their own practice and actually felt threatened. So when I next showed the videotape to a group of teachers, I asked them to imagine that *they* were the class teacher in question and to tell me at the end of the tape how they would feel if Michael was in their class.⁴¹

From the perspective on ‘[m]y’ perspective, ‘the part of the teachers’ is different from ‘the teachers’ who ‘always tended to find fault with her’, as I discussed above. This ‘part’ is ‘the teachers’ who ‘actually recognized only too well teaching which was

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 189.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 189.

consonant with their own practice and actually felt threatened'. This can be read as that 'fault' is still known to be there but in relation to 'teaching which was consonant with their own practice'. In other words, the reason why it is 'actually felt threatened' is because 'their own practice' is thought to be 'not progressive enough' as well, according to the perspective on the perspective of this 'part of the teachers'. For Walkerdine, however, this could be seen as another reason why it is 'the pedagogy itself' that makes this 'consonan[ce]' happen. In this sense, before 'show[ing]' 'the videotape to a group of teachers' and 'ask[ing]' 'them to imagine' who '*they*' 'were', the perspective already knows the answer to the question of 'how they would feel if Michael was in their class'. In other words, how this '*they*' and 'they' come to be in the same position is further analysed below.

Every time that I have used this method with a group of teachers the same thing has happened. The first things which were blurted out were: 'I'd feel I'd failed,' 'I'd feel guilty.' Then the teachers would go on to say what Michael's teacher had said: too far too fast, etc. The normative production of 'good teaching' means that the teacher must experience herself as inadequate, feel guilty, anxious and insecure.⁴²

At this stage, the perspective claims to know that no matter which one of many possible 'group[s]' 'teachers' are from, 'the same thing' will 'happen'. This is what 'this method' 'use[d]' means: 'the same thing' is known to be there. To be more specific, the 'same[ness]' is framed to be with knowing what would be '[t]he first things' and '[t]hen' in which either what 'I'd feel' or 'too far too fast' is already known to be related to that 'the pedagogy' is 'failed' rather than 'I' am, as 'I' is also constructed in this 'pedagogy' with respect to '[t]he normative production of "good teaching"'. This is a 'good teaching' that Walkerdine will not agree with which 'the teacher' 'must experience herself as inadequate, feel guilty, anxious and insecure'. Thus it implies ironically that 'the pedagogy itself' is 'adequate' enough for both 'the

⁴² Ibid., p. 189.

teacher’ and ‘teaching’ to be ‘good’; it is the ‘teacher’s’ problem to ‘experience herself’ as such, according to the perspective on ‘[t]he normative production’. This is how ‘[t]he normative production of good teaching’ defines what ‘the teacher’ could and should be, and, accordingly, why ‘pedagogy itself’ needs to be ‘challenged’.

If the child has failed, by implication the teacher’s gaze has not been total enough, she has not provided enough experience, has committed the ‘sin’ of ‘pushing’ the child. After all, within the parameters of the discursive practice, all children would and could develop correctly if only the teacher were good enough.⁴³

According to the perspective on the ‘implication’, ‘the teacher’ is supposed to be the responsible one when ‘the child has failed’, as ‘[t]he normative production of good teaching’ defines what ought to be ‘total enough’ for ‘the teacher’s gaze’, what ‘experience’ is regarded to be ‘provided enough’ by this ‘teacher’, and there are knowable ‘sin[s]’ that ‘teacher[s]’ are not allowed to ‘commit’, for instance, ‘“pushing” the child’. All of these in this ‘implication’ can be read as the reason why ‘the teachers’ who ‘watch the videotape’ will give the same ‘response’ as ‘Michael’s teacher’ does. Because the perspective knows that this is the ‘implication’ being constituted ‘within the parameters of the discursive practice’ in which ‘all children would and could develop correctly if only the teacher were good enough’. In other words, ‘the parameters of the discursive practice’ not only know that ‘all children’ ‘would and could’ ‘develop correctly’, but also produce ‘correctly’ what ‘good enough’ ‘teacher’ should be. It is this ‘discursive practice’ with regard to ‘pedagogy’ which is known to make ‘teachers’ ‘challenge’ each other and also themselves.

How to avoid ‘repeat[ing] individual-society dualism’, for instance, by taking for granted ‘a psychological’ ‘child’ (either being ‘object’ or ‘subject’) in this chapter, is further argued with how to ‘underst[and]’ ‘[c]hange’:⁴⁴

⁴³ Ibid., p. 189.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 192-93.

Change cannot be understood simply in terms of transformations in the representation of the same object, the same problem. Rather, transformations in the production of knowledges shift what the object is taken to be. Certainly there are continuities which are often minimized in the discursive shifts, but the very productive nature of those shifts assures us that they are not shifts in the representation of an underlying object. If we were talking about shifts in representation we would have to operate as though psychological statements were ideological: an ideology that essentially distorts real relations.⁴⁵

It might be thought of by others that '[c]hange' can 'be understood' 'in terms of transformations in the representation of the same object, the same problem'. Why this 'underst[anding]' is not known as 'simpl[e]' is that, first, 'the representation' is something different from 'object' and/or 'problem'; secondly, for the perspective, there are also 'transformations' in 'the object' instead of that 'object' being all 'the same'. This can be further seen in the claim of 'transformations in the production of knowledges shift what the object is taken to be': the shift of 'transformations' from 'the representation' to 'the production of knowledges' also implies that Walkerdine does not agree about the relation of 'the representation' to 'the object'. Instead, this 'object' is known to be defined by 'the production of knowledges'; when there are 'transformations in the production of knowledges' known to be there, 'the object' 'is taken to be' differently and 'shift[s]' correspondingly.

Even though 'continuities' are known to be 'often minimized', the perspective knows about them 'certainly' and also knows what is 'an underlying object' and 'the representation of' it, based upon the notion of 'assur[ance]': the 'nature of those shifts' is 'very productive'. That is to say, 'us' is constituted to be those who think that 'continuities' are related to 'an underlying object' and who need to be 'assure[d]' by 'the very productive nature of those shifts' to think about 'object' differently, according to the perspective on 'shifts in representation'. But there is no 'same' 'object' 'underl[ied]' the changeable 'representation'. This 'very productive nature'

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 192-93.

constructs many possible ‘object[s]’. The ‘continuities’ are about knowing that ‘the discursive shifts’ will be ‘transformations in the production of knowledges’ anyway, because of ‘the very productive nature’.

Further, the perspective on ‘psychological statements’ knows that they are not ‘ideological’: the notion of ‘ideology’ is claimed to be something that ‘essentially distorts real relations’. Neither does this perspective claim ‘relations’ as ‘real’, which can then be understood similarly to the idea of ‘same object’, as these ‘relations’ can also be produced by and in the ‘psychology statements’. For Walkerdine, ‘shifts in representation’ will be linked with the notion of ‘ideology’ in which ‘relations’ are ‘real’ and cannot be ‘distort[ed]’. The ‘psychological statements’ are, however, known as that this is not about ‘essential’ ‘operat[ion]’ between ‘ideological’ and ‘real’. Rather, these ‘statements’ should be regarded as related to ‘transformations in the production of knowledges’ which ‘shift’ ‘[c]ertainly’.

But psychology operates with a system of practices for producing evidences; it has claims to truth and to the production of fact. It is its very status as a science which is so important in understanding the history which I have signalled. In so far as it constitutes individuals, in this case children, as objects of its gaze it produces them as subjects. In so far as it creates a regime of truth premised upon a psychological individual then it prohibits other formulations which do not repeat individual-society dualism.⁴⁶

The perspective on ‘psychology’ here knows that it cannot ‘produce’ ‘evidences’ directly but can ‘operate’ ‘with a system of practices’ for doing so. No matter whether they are ‘claims to truth’ or ‘to the production of fact’, this ‘psychology’ is known to be different from ‘an ideology’ mentioned above. Although this is ‘for producing evidences’ and connected with ‘truth’ and ‘fact’, ‘psychology’ is not something that goes with the notion of ‘real’ in ‘real relations’. That is to say, instead of making a claim for either ‘real’ or ‘ideological’, Walkerdine disagrees with both of them and

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 193.

suggests that there must be an alternative way of thinking about why and how ‘psychology’ needs to ‘produce’ ‘evidences’ and ‘has claims to truth and to the production of fact’.

The answer to this question is further known in relation to ‘its very status as a science’. This is the reason why this ‘very status’ of ‘psychology’ has to be there ‘as a science’ that is claimed to be ‘so important in understanding the history’. And this notion of ‘history’ is also important for knowing why ‘children’ and/or ‘individuals’ are not ‘the same’ or ‘real’ ‘object’ in understanding the notion of ‘[c]hange’ but can be ‘constitute[d]’ ‘as objects’ firstly and ‘as subjects’ then. This is also how ‘psychology’, regarding ‘transformations in the production of knowledges’, can make ‘children’ either ‘objects’ or ‘subjects’. These two are not about different ‘representation[s] of the same object’, nor the ‘real’ of the ‘real’, but can ‘shift’ into each other through the ‘gaze’ in the naming of ‘science’.

In addition, the perspective knows how ‘a psychological individual’ would ‘operate’ within the ‘individual-society dualism’, according to the ‘shift’ discussed in the preceding quote. That is, it also knows there are ‘other formulations’ which are different from ‘individual-society dualism’ and should not be ‘prohibit[ed]’ to think about why this ‘dualism’ is ‘repeat[ed]’. It is ‘its very status as a science’ that ‘creates a regime of truth’. And this ‘truth’, in turn, needs ‘a psychology individual’ from ‘individual-society dualism’ to be there to ‘produc[e]’ ‘truth’ and ‘fact’ ‘as science’ to consolidate ‘its’ ‘status’. In ‘other formulations’, ‘[c]hange’ would be ‘understood’ ‘in terms of’ ‘transformations in the production of knowledges’ which ‘shift what the object is taken to be’ instead of ‘a psychological individual’ coming from ‘individual-society dualism’ ‘repeat[edly]’ – either as ‘objects’ or ‘subjects’.

1.2 Child and Language

In the chapter ‘Power Relations and the Emergence of Language’⁴⁷ of *Changing the*

⁴⁷ Cathy Urwin, ‘Power Relations and the Emergence of Language’, in *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 262-319.

Subject, Cathy Urwin exemplifies how ‘psychological literature’⁴⁸ and ‘a Piagetian perspective’⁴⁹ account for ‘the child’s use of words’⁵⁰ in different ways. But neither of them is seen to consider the ‘emotional significance’ and ‘the child’s relation to the situation of production, and how this itself may be affected by the use of language’, but only to ‘focus’ on the ‘word’.⁵¹ The following ‘[h]ome observation’ of ‘Jeremy’⁵² explains how his use of words can be read differently from the ‘psychological literature’ and ‘a Piagetian perspective’.

As Urwin mentions earlier in the same section, on the one hand, ‘[t]hrough entering into the common language the specificity of what the child wants is now being made explicit, defining more precisely the response required of the other from within the same terms of reference’; on the other hand, ‘whether the child’s range of application of a particular word is sufficiently like adults’ to justify the claim that they are operating within the “same language” is generally questioned’.⁵³

However, in this observation and explanation, no matter whether ‘the use of language’ ‘distances the child from the pain of separation’ or ‘in taking on board the adult terms of reference, the child marks his or her own control over the experience’,⁵⁴ both of them rely on the ideas of ‘common language’ and/or ‘the same terms of reference’ without questioning in which ‘adult’ is already positioned differently and with priority to both define and, at the same time, be defined by what ‘the language’ means. Therefore, even though the ‘emotional significance’ has been taken into consideration, the perspective goes back to and takes sides with what it disagrees with – the usage of language between a child and an adult is transparent and the same:

Jeremy and his mother are playing with an inset jigsaw which contains five pieces to fit into five spaces. One piece is missing. Jeremy searches obsessively. ‘Gone. Gone.’ ‘Where’s it gone, Jeremy?’ At first the mother

⁴⁸ Urwin, p. 308.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 308.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 308.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 308.

⁵² Ibid., p. 310.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 308.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 309-10.

helps him. ‘Never mind, Jeremy, we can do it as it is.’ ‘Gone. Gone.’ Jeremy persists. ‘It doesn’t matter. Look, Jeremy.’ ‘Gone. Gone.’ Jeremy carries on. Eventually he finds it amongst other toys. Smiling broadly, his tone indicating that he intends to label it, he says ‘Mummy!’ The mother comments, ‘Is that Mummy? Thanks very much! It looks like a pig to me!’⁵⁵

According to the perspective on ‘Jeremy’, ‘search[ing] obsessively’ is different from ‘search[ing]’ when ‘[o]ne piece’ is known as ‘missing’. And how ‘obsessively’ it goes is based on the perspective on mother’s perspective – ‘Never mind, Jeremy, we can do it as it is’ – which also defines what this ‘help’ is supposed to do. More specifically, the perspective on ‘mother’s’ perspective assumes that without this ‘missing’ ‘piece’, ‘we’ can still ‘do it as it is’; ‘playing’ this ‘inset jigsaw’ with ‘[n]ever mind’. In this way, ‘Jeremy’ can be positioned with two implications: one is that ‘Jeremy’ can ‘do’ what ‘we’ ‘do’; ‘missing’ ‘piece’ does not affect ‘us’ being able to ‘play’ the other four ‘pieces’ although ‘we’ is constituted as knowing ‘an inset jigsaw which contains five pieces to fit into five spaces’. The other is that the very idea of ‘persists’ is understood by the perspective as that ‘Jeremy’ ‘mind[s]’ about the ‘missing’ ‘piece’ and ignores the ‘help’ of ‘mother’. It can be seen how the different understandings of ‘playing with an inset jigsaw’ – whether there will be ‘five’ or ‘four’ ‘pieces to fit into five spaces’ – decides which should be ‘matter[ed]’ and where should be ‘[l]ook[ed]’.

Furthermore, when ‘it’ is being ‘f[oun]d’ ‘amongst other toys’, ‘his tone’ becomes something different for both the perspective on ‘he’ and on the ‘mother’s’ perspective. No matter whether it is to claim the knowledge of ‘his’ ‘inten[tion]’ or ‘mother’s’ ‘comments’, however, neither of them regarding ‘Mummy!’ and ‘Gone’ reads ‘[s]miling broadly’ as possibly that ‘he’ ‘[e]ventually finds’ out this ‘missing’ ‘piece’ and telling ‘his’ ‘mother’ for proceeding to ‘play’ together. Even though there is a difference between ‘a pig’ and ‘me’, known by the perspective on ‘mother’s’ perspective, the relation of ‘Mummy’ to ‘[i]t’ has been defined in that very idea of

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 310.

‘label[ing]’ on the ground of knowing what ‘his tone’ could ‘indicat[e]’.

In searching for order, as things should be, this child is also searching for a position from which he may ordain it, and at the same time regulate the mother. By entering into the adult system his relative dependence on her has been displaced. The mother’s comment suggests, perhaps, that she is sensitive to the implications of this shift, revealing her own ambivalences about having left the child, as he makes her presence redundant in the immediate situation.⁵⁶

Here, by claiming to ‘also’, the perspective knows that there is already a possibility for ‘searching’ to take place as ‘things’ are known to be in ‘order’. In this sense, the perspective on ‘Jeremy’s’ perspective knows what ‘an inset jigsaw’ means in relation to ‘order’. But ‘searching for order’ is not enough to be ‘obsessive’. Instead, the reason why it is regarded as ‘obsessive’ is because ‘he’ is known to need such ‘a position’ in order to ‘ordain’ this ‘missing piece’ and the ‘order’ of ‘an inset jigsaw, and to ‘regulate the mother’. This very knowledge of ‘at the same time’, no matter whether ‘ordain’ or ‘regulate’, is, as I analysed above, based on knowing what ‘his tone’ ‘indicat[es]’. And the perspective also claims to know that how ‘the adult system’ operates in which ‘his relative dependence on her’ has to be ‘displaced’ by ‘regulat[ing]’ ‘her’. In other words, to be an ‘adult’, there is a need known to be there for ‘Jeremy’ to meet, which is, a shift from ‘relative dependence on’ his ‘mother’ to ‘regulat[ing]’ her. Therefore, it is this very ‘system’ of ‘adult’ that constructs what ‘Jeremy’ should do and, also, what ‘his tone’ would ‘indicate’ – ‘using language to mark his own control over absence’⁵⁷ (of his ‘mother’).

From the above reading, the perspective on ‘mother’s’ perspective knows that there is a link between this ‘missing’ ‘piece’ and ‘me’ (the ‘mother’) even though it is known as ‘look[ing] like a pig to me’; knowing the difference between this ‘missing’ ‘piece’ and ‘me’ does not stop the two from being linked. Or to say, it might be the

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 310.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 310.

idea of ‘ambivalences about having left the child’ rather than the ‘searching’ of ‘child’ that makes ‘her’ ‘sensitive’ and ‘redundant’. Therefore, whether ‘her presence’ is ‘redundant’ or not, can also be read differently by what it means to say ‘Mummy!’.

1.3 Child and Eco-anxiety

In her book *A Guide to Eco-anxiety: How to Protect the Planet and Your Mental Health*,⁵⁸ Anouchka Grose discusses the idea of parenting, specifically talking to children about the issues surrounding the environment, as follows:

These days, we’re more likely to try to find careful ways to let the truth filter through gradually - but children often jump ahead with questions based on things they’ve seen or heard. In the end, you can’t control kids’ knowledge, but you can be thoughtful about how to present them with painful truths.⁵⁹

The idea of ‘knowledge’ is mobilised differently for ‘children’ and for the ‘we’ who, for Grose, can be understood as the ‘parents’. The ‘we’ is supposed already to know ‘the truth’ before ‘try[ing]’ ‘to find careful ways to let the truth filter through gradually’. While the ‘children’ are known as those who need to know something that can be ‘filter[ed]’ ‘through gradually’ from ‘the truth’. In other words, the ‘children’ are seen to know the different ‘truth’–‘gradually’ ‘filter[ed]’ one–which still has to be *true* at the same time, in comparison with ‘we’ – ‘the truth’ knower and maker. To be specific, the ‘truth’ can be read as, what Grose suggests following this claim in the section of ‘What Can You Say?’, that ‘we may reach irreversible ecological tipping points within the next decade’, which is proposed as a concern for ‘[h]ow much worse must it be for today’s kids to cope with’.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, the truth, for Grose, also includes that ‘children often jump ahead with questions based on things they’ve seen or heard. In the end, you can’t control

⁵⁸ Anouchka Grose, ‘Babies, Parenting and Climate Conversations with Children’, in *A Guide to Eco-anxiety: How to Protect the Planet and Your Mental Health* (London: Watkins, 2020), pp. 101-13.

⁵⁹ Grose, p. 102.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

kids' knowledge'. Although it may seem uncertain and uncontrollable in relation to knowing what 'things' and where 'they've seen or heard', 'kids' knowledge' at this point, in spite of being the possible 'truth' 'we' already know, is not what 'we' want 'kids' to know. By implication, 'we' only want 'kids' to know what they need to know. That is, the 'knowledge' that 'you', who can be regarded as a member of 'we', can 'control' and 'present' to them. Because the 'children' are seen as those who should not feel 'painful' in the face of the 'truths' as 'you' and 'we' do, but need to be protected from these 'truths', by virtue of, for example, 'careful ways' and 'thoughtful' 'present[ation]'.

In doing so, 'kids' knowledge', together with their feelings can still be 'control[led]' to some extent, which is based upon that 'you', as 'parents', should be 'thoughtful' of 'kids'. That is to say, the 'parents' are constructed in need of being capable of 'control[ling]' 'kids' knowledge' and feelings towards it, when the 'parents' themselves might also not have known '[h]ow much worse must it be for' them 'to cope with'.

The certainty of the knowledge of the unknowing 'kids' knowledge' continues to be discussed in the claim to 'well-made explanatory videos online':

if they [your children] have free access to computers they're likely to come across that stuff anyway; in which case, you might as well watch it too so you know what they're seeing and can answer questions about it. It's also helpful to see how other people have found ways to present potentially distressing content in a child-friendly manner, and to get some ideas on how to simplify the information without missing out the important bits.⁶¹

Here 'in which case' can be understood to include the case mentioned earlier in the section that 'there's something problematic about introducing your children to the natural world via the internet'.⁶² So why it can be 'something problematic' is only

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 102-03.

⁶² Ibid., p. 102.

because of the way of ‘introducing’, as, for Grose, ‘the natural world’ and ‘the internet’ are two different things when thinking about ‘your children’. By implication, ‘the natural world’ can and should be *introduced* in other non-‘problematic’ ways, for instance, by ‘you’. At the same time, ‘you’ are known not to be affected by ‘watch[ing] it’; it is not ‘problematic’ to ‘introduce’ ‘you’ ‘to the natural world via the internet’.

In addition, through ‘watch[ing] it’, ‘you’ will ‘know what they’re seeing and can answer questions about it’: in one sense, for Grose, ‘what they’re seeing’ ‘via the internet’ can somehow be identified with what ‘you’ will be ‘seeing’ ‘online’, which can, meanwhile, be paradoxical with the claim that ‘introducing’ ‘the natural world via the internet’ to ‘you’ is known as not the same case to ‘your children’; in another sense, ‘the[ir]’ ‘seeing’ becomes something *transparent* for ‘you’ to see to some extent, even though there is an assumed proposition that ‘what they’re seeing’ can be something simpler for ‘you’ to understand but already ‘potentially distressing’ for them so that the ‘content’ requires ‘a child-friendly manner’. Both the ideas of ‘distressing’ and ‘child-friendly’ are themselves, however, not claimed as their ‘seeing’ but a ‘seeing’ on the ‘seeing’. Moreover, not only is ‘what they’re seeing’ knowable apparently at this stage, but also the ‘questions’ that ‘they’ will be asking are already known to be there: for instance, the ‘questions’ will be related to ‘the natural world’ and based on these ‘videos online’. As is ‘your’ knowledge and ability to ‘answer’ them.

The repetition of the idea of ‘control’ can also be seen at this point when ‘child’ is constituted as those who should not be ‘present[ed]’ with ‘potentially distressing content’. Instead, ‘a child-friendly manner’ needs to function on this ‘content’. How ‘friendly’ it could be is further claimed as ‘simplify[ing] the information without missing out the important bits’. In this way, ‘the information’ can be known to contain both ‘important bits’ and not ‘important’ ones. And these ‘important bits’ are in no need of being ‘miss[ed] out’ when ‘the information’ is being ‘simplified’, even though the former may also be ‘potentially distressing’ for a ‘child’. Therefore the idea of ‘a child-friendly manner’ will seem to be more valued in terms of ‘simplify[ing]’ than of being ‘potentially distressing’.

The implication of ‘potentially’ can be read as that if ‘the information’ has not been ‘simplif[ied]’, ‘a child’, for Grose, might not have gotten to know that the ‘content’ is ‘distressing’. Although there is a ‘potential’ idea of distress, the children are actually constructed as those who need to know, but do not yet know, that the ‘content’ is ‘distressing’. This is how the claim to ‘a child-friendly manner’ turns out to be in the service of ‘present[ing]’ ‘potentially distressing content’ to be ‘distressing’.

To keep things from becoming too distant and conceptual, it can help to focus on a particular type of animal that the child likes – even if it’s one they’ve never seen in real life, for example, penguins or lions. You can explain how penguins need sea ice, or that droughts and floods can make lions sick. Of course, you’d only do this once a child already has lots of questions of their own about climate change. The idea isn’t to traumatize them by telling them that their favourite animal is going to die; it’s to simplify the information so they get a clearer picture of how different things are linked, such as exhaust fumes and icebergs.⁶³

The ‘things’ would not be or be less ‘distant and conceptual’ to ‘the child’, if they were associated with ‘a particular type of animal that the child likes – even if it’s one they’ve never seen in real life, for example, penguins or lions’. In other words, ‘one they’ve never seen in real life’ can be understood as not ‘too distant and conceptual’, as long as it is the ‘one’ ‘that the child likes’, whereas ‘droughts and floods’ are something not in that case and can be seen as the opposite – ‘too distant and conceptual’. This also implies that: first, what ‘the child likes’ is already known as ‘for example, penguins or lions’ rather than ‘droughts’ or ‘floods’; secondly, ‘the child’ is constructed to have already known, for example, ‘a particular type of animal’ in order to ‘like’ it, even though ‘they’ve never seen’ it ‘in real life’. The idea of knowledge can be obtained from somewhere else other than through seeing in one’s

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 103-04.

‘real life’.

Also, the notion of ‘real’ is defined differently from what Grose suggests earlier in the same section: ‘[I]t’s a good idea to try to give children direct experiences of natural environments, and to encourage them to enjoy and respect the natural world’,⁶⁴ but can be realised through, for example, ‘your’ explanation. I am not writing here to conclude that the latter may be less ‘direct’ for ‘children’ to ‘experience’ the ‘natural world’ or to give an answer by comparison as to which way is really *real* and reliable. Whether it has to do with knowing ‘the natural world via the internet’, as I analysed above, or ‘your’ explanation, the ‘children’ and *their* ‘experiences’ are always claimed from a position other to them. This is also why the claim to ‘direct’ is at stake, as these are, again, ‘direct experiences’ that can be ‘give[n]’ to ‘children’.

Further, ‘your’ explanation can only be launched after ‘a child already has lots of questions of their own about climate change’, which can, again, be read as a way of trying to ‘control kids’ knowledge’ that I analysed earlier, though being claimed not to be able to. At the same time, the problem of ‘questions of their own’ is similar to the above claim of knowing ‘what they’re seeing’: the idea of one’s ‘own’ can, somehow, be self-referential and transparent; ‘lots of questions of their own climate change’ are supposed to be the same as ‘yours’ even before ‘your’ very explanation of them.

How to ‘control kids’ knowledge’ is further discussed within ‘[t]he idea’ in which ‘get[ting] a clearer picture of how different things are linked, such as exhaust fumes and icebergs’ is prioritized over the possibility of ‘traumatiz[ing] them by telling them that their favourite animal is going to die’, although the former can be known, for Grose, to be already based on the idea and at the expense of ‘traumatiz[ing]’, which is also similar to what I have read of the idea of ‘potentially distressing’. In this sense, these two ‘idea[s]’ – ‘get[ting] a clearer picture’ and ‘traumatiz[ing]’ – cannot be thought to be something black or white.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 103.

Definitely don't give children the idea that it will be up to their generation to solve the issue. Although this is almost certainly going to turn out to be the case, they don't need to know it when they're three. It's more helpful to tell them about all the things people are already doing to help improve the situation. They needn't feel the enormous burden of responsibility right from the start.⁶⁵

Here, 'it will be up to their generation to solve the issue' is 'the idea' that can be 'give[n]' to 'children'. There is also a time set for when it should be done. For instance, 'they don't need to know it when they're three'. To be more specific, 'their generation' is supposed to 'solve the issue' in terms of that 'certain' 'case', while 'they' are seen as those who 'don't need to know' what 'the issue' means 'when they're three'. In this sense, how to 'solve the issue' becomes both known and unknown, as 'their generation' rather than the 'people' will figure it out someday.

What 'they' do 'need to know' 'when they're three' is, however, related to 'all the things people are already doing to help improve the situation'. The ideas of 'solv[ing]' and 'help[ing]' are assigned to 'their generation' and 'people' respectively and differently. The latter is seen to 'feel the enormous burden of responsibility' already but can only 'help improve the situation'. The 'need' in relation to 'the children', is constituted to rely on this 'enormous burden', although 'they' are framed as 'need[ing]' not 'feel' it 'right from the start'. Therefore, the 'feel[ing]' of 'children', just as the idea of knowledge, *needs* to be controllable from a position other to 'children'.

Of course, children are clever and however brilliant you are at appearing cool, calm and collected, they will inevitably pick up on your anxieties. This isn't because you have failed, but because they are attuned to you. They know perfectly well that you may pretend to be happy when you're sad, or placid when you're angry. So don't be upset if your kids clock you as a worrier –

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 104.

that's just part of being a real parent, rather than one in an advert. Managing your children's climate fears is like any other aspect of parenting – you're bound to fuck it up in places.⁶⁶

This 'you' is known to have 'anxieties' but to 'appear' to be otherwise. It is 'brilliant' for 'you' to do so, as 'you' are constituted to think that the 'children' need a 'cool, calm and collected' 'you' even when 'you' are 'anxi[ous]'. While the 'children' are seen as 'clever' to know whether 'you are' 'cool, calm and collected' or not and to 'inevitably pick up on your anxieties'. In this way, 'you' are not as 'clever' as the 'children' are, as the latter know, by implication, about who 'you are': for example, '[t]hey know perfectly well that you may pretend to be happy when you're sad, or placid when you're angry'.

Also, 'your anxieties' are not known as something in relation to 'fail[ure]' but 'a real parent'. It can be the 'one in an advert' who is constituted to shape a 'brilliant' 'you' and is not allowed to 'fail', while 'a real parent' can have 'anxieties' and be 'a worrier'. Therefore, the 'children' know better than 'you' in terms of what 'a real parent' should be: 'they are attuned to you' when 'you are' 'clock[ed]' 'as a worrier', whereas 'you are' constructed to be 'upset' in being such 'a' 'parent'. Despite this, 'your children's climate fears' are still something that 'you' need to 'manage'. Here 'manag[ement]' is seen as one of the 'aspect[s] of parenting', even though 'you're bound to fuck it up in places'. So the 'children are clever' enough to 'inevitably pick up on' and be 'attuned to' 'your anxieties' but unable to 'manage' their 'climate fears', which are *real* to Grose. That is, the 'children' are real 'children', while 'a' 'parent' can be either 'real' or the 'one in an advert'.

1.4 Child and Economic Psychology

In the chapter 'The Early Years—The Economic Problems of Childhood'⁶⁷ of the

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 104-05.

⁶⁷ Paul Webley and others, 'The Early Years—The Economic Problems of Childhood', in *The Economic Psychology of Everyday Life* (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2001), pp. 20-43.

book *The Economic Psychology of Everyday Life*, Webley et al. raise the question of '[w]hat makes a child develop such loyalty toward a particular brand' by introducing and discussing 'Hite and Hite's findings'.⁶⁸

Unlike other 'developmental psychologists'⁶⁹ who are known to 'tackle' 'the issues and problems' about 'economic socialization through childhood'⁷⁰ with 'general theories of cognitive development',⁷¹ Webley and others' 'approach' is based on the ideas of 'a natural history of childhood'⁷² and 'the essential nature of children'.⁷³ However, in the following reading surrounding the idea of 'brand loyalty', this different 'approach' seems to fall back into the very idea they critique others: 'they [the issues and problems] are approached in certain predictable ways that preclude other methodologies and theories'.⁷⁴

Brand loyalty can be seen as a psychological state involving trust, affection, familiarity and intent to repeat-purchase a brand. Children are risk-averse and if something tastes familiar or provides satisfaction then it is likely to be chosen again. The origins of brand loyalty are found in brand preference and repeat purchase and the evidence from Hite and Hite's findings is that these are in place at a very early age.⁷⁵

When it comes to '[c]hildren', '[b]rand loyalty' is different, although it seems to be also 'seen as a psychological state involving trust, affection, familiarity and intent to repeat-purchase a brand'. First, '[c]hildren' are known as 'risk-averse' which may not be the same as what this 'psychological state' 'involve[s]': for example, the 'intent to

⁶⁸ Webley and others, p. 29.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 21.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 20.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 21.

⁷² Ibid., p. 21.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 22.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 20. The repetition can be seen in this claim: 'Approaching economic socialisation in this way allows the researcher to treat and analyse the children's performance in an economic world on their own terms rather than viewing economic socialisation merely as an interesting testing ground for the theories of mainstream developmental psychology' (Webley and others 2001, 21). Likewise, why it is at stake to claim to know 'children's' 'own terms' can also be seen in their reading of 'Hite and Hite's findings'.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 29.

repeat-purchase a brand' due to 'risk-averse' does not necessarily mean the 'affection' of the 'brand' 'purchase[d]' 'repeat[edly]', if this 'brand' is 'familiari[zed]' to be a non-'risk'. An inconsistency between 'affection' and 'familiarity' can also be seen in the so-called 'evidence from Hite and Hite's findings'⁷⁶ (I will also be discussing later that the 'evidence' undermines 'that these are in place at a very early age').

In addition to regarding something '[un]familiar' or unknown as a 'risk', the idea of 'averse' can also be understood as already knowing what is a 'risk' and what is not. In this way, the 'loyalty' is constituted based on not only a 'trust' to 'a brand' which has been 'purchase[d]' 'repeat[edly]', but also a 'familiarity' of the other 'brand[s]'. That is to say, in order to be 'risk-averse', '[c]hildren' are seen as those who are and need to be 'familiar' with the 'brand[s]' that include but are not limited to the 'brand' being 'chosen' by comparison. As is the case in how 'brand preference' is made.

Second, no matter how a 'risk' and/or 'risk-averse' is defined for these '[c]hildren' 'at a very early age', the shift from 'familiarity' to 'something tastes familiar' makes the knowledge of 'in place' unstable. That is, the difference and impossibility of causality between 'something tastes familiar' and a 'repeat purchase' by a 'familiarity' with the 'brand' can be seen in 'the evidence from Hite and Hite's findings':

These foods [peanut butter and breakfast cereal] were presented in two kinds of package. One was the nationally advertised brand and package and the other was the local store's brand and package, which was not advertised. Half the children were offered the products in the right package and the other half had the products in the wrong package, where the local and national peanut butter and cereal had their packaging swapped about. Samples from the familiar, nationally advertised brand packages were reported by children as

⁷⁶ 'Hite and Hite investigated brand choice and product preference in children as young as 2 years of age. Using an analysis of variance design they investigated whether children would prefer, by rating on a five-point scale from "tastes really good" to "tastes really bad", two kinds of foods, viz. peanut butter and breakfast cereal' (Webley and others 2001, 28-29).

tasting better than samples from less-familiar, unadvertised store-brand packages and were significantly more likely to be chosen. Interestingly, children actually rated the store product as better tasting when tasting blind, a fortuitous result that makes the findings more convincing, since it must be that they were influenced by a memory of preferred taste in the national brand.⁷⁷

It can be seen from this ‘investigat[ion]’ that ‘the local store’s brand and package’ is set up as ‘not advertised’, to ‘children as young as 2 years of age’, against ‘the nationally advertised brand and package’. The corresponding claim to ‘less-familiar’ and ‘familiar’ implies that this ‘age’-group of ‘children’ can be and have already been informed by ‘advertis[ing]’ before being ‘investigated’.

Also, the second implication of being ‘risk-averse’ that I analysed above is not applicable in this case, as ‘children’ are known to be ‘less-familiar’ with ‘samples’ in ‘unadvertised’ ‘local store’s brand[s] and package[s]’. In this way, the ‘peanut butter and breakfast cereal’ ‘in the right’ ‘store-brand packages’ can be regarded as a ‘risk’ to ‘children’. The result of which ‘[s]amples from the familiar, nationally advertised brand packages were reported by children as tasting better than samples from less-familiar, unadvertised store-brand packages and were significantly more likely to be chosen’, at this stage, supports the ‘likel[ihood]’ of ‘something’ or ‘a brand’ being ‘chosen again’ due to its ‘familiar’ ‘taste’ and the ‘risk-averse’ of the other.

To ‘the other half’ of the ‘children’ who ‘were offered’ ‘the products in the wrong package’, however, the ‘result’ may not be so ‘fortuitous’ as to ‘make the findings more convincing’, as these are the ‘children’ who ‘actually rated the store product as better tasting when tasting blind’. To be more specific, what is ‘interesting’ here is that in the situation⁷⁸ ‘where the local and national peanut butter and cereal had their packaging swapped about’ for these ‘children’, ‘something tastes familiar’ cannot be a reason for the ‘repeat purchase’ of ‘it’ – ‘the familiar, nationally advertised brand’ ‘product’, as they, instead, ‘actually rated the store product as better tasting’ with the

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 29.

⁷⁸ This is how Webley et al. read the idea of ‘swapp[ing]’ in ‘Hite and Hite’s findings’ as related to ‘tasting blind’.

‘national’ ‘brand package’.

The choice of ‘a brand’ – ‘the (local) store product’ rather than ‘something’ – the ‘national’ ‘product’ as well as the inconsistency between the ‘product’ of ‘a brand’ (‘the local’) and its ‘packaging’ (the ‘national’), and vice versa, in this ‘finding’ ‘make’ the idea of ‘repeat purchase’ split, although it could be seen as an ‘evidence’ that ‘[t]he origins of brand loyalty are found in brand preference’ in the sense of ‘choos[ing]’ its ‘package’. In other words, they can be regarded as ‘choos[ing]’ the ‘national’ ‘brand package’ ‘again’, but, meanwhile, the ‘product’ of that ‘brand’ ‘tast[ing] familiar’ cannot be met as the reason for the ‘repeat purchase’.

Why the notion of ‘brand loyalty’ turns out to be disrupted by the different ‘purchase[s]’ can be understood by the different definitions of ‘familiarity’ – whether it is ‘advertised’ to be ‘familiar’ or it ‘tastes familiar’. Accordingly, the ‘affection’ of ‘a brand’s’ ‘packaging’ is not due to the ‘familiarity’ in ‘tast[ing]’ the ‘product’ of this ‘brand’, which ‘makes the findings’ less ‘convincing’ to see not only what the ‘brand loyalty’ means but also the knowledge of the ‘risk-averse’ when, for example, ‘children’ are known to ‘actually rate the store product as better tasting’ which is supposed to be a ‘risk’ for ‘the[m]’ to ‘averse’ because of its ‘less-familiar[ity]’.

More ‘[i]nterestingly’, what ‘children actually rated’ ‘as’ ‘preferred taste’ – ‘the store product’ – cannot be counted as ‘a fortuitous result’. Instead, ‘a memory of preferred taste in the national brand’ should be in there, according to the position other to ‘the[m]’. In order to ‘make the findings more convincing’ and be ‘the evidence’ for ‘[t]he origins of brand loyalty’, the ‘result’ seems to be reached already, with the claim to ‘must’, before what is ‘actually’ being ‘found’ out as ‘a’ ‘result’. If ‘they’ are known to have and can be ‘influenced’ ‘by’ ‘a memory of’ which ‘taste’ would be ‘preferred’, then what is the significance of ‘swap[ping] about’ the ‘packaging’ (the implication is that they could and should ‘choose’ ‘the national brand’ anyway, even with the ‘wrong package’) or what the whole ‘investigat[ion]’ is for? In this sense, ‘these are’ *indeed* ‘in place’ for ‘children’, before and regardless of ‘a very early age’ claimed on ‘the[m]’.

Chapter 2: Psychologies

Having read how the ‘child’ is constituted differently in relation to the idea of pedagogy, parenting and psychology, I will then go on to analyse different claims of ‘individual’ in this chapter by reading *Changing the Subject* and to demonstrate how Henriques and others also get caught in the problem of the ‘dualism’ which they are trying to critique when exploring what psychology should and needs do in the face of change and challenge.

2.1 ‘The Individual and Society’

In *Changing the Subject*, ‘*The Integration of a Child into a Social World*’ ‘edited by Martin Richards’ is discussed as ‘something of a landmark’ in ‘the formation of new approaches’⁷⁹ to thinking about ‘the social-individual relation’⁸⁰ and ‘the starting point of development’⁸¹ in developmental psychology:

This extract illustrates well how, once the terms ‘individual’ and ‘social’ are brought into play, the two entities are necessarily thought of as antithetical, as exclusive (though interacting), as separable and even as pulling in opposite directions. It also demonstrates how the individual reduces inevitably to the biological in essence once its opposite number, the social, has been posed to explain the rest. Moreover, it leaves the contribution of the infant to its own development out of account.⁸²

The perspective on ‘once’ claims to know that the ‘necess[ity]’ of how ‘the terms’ are ‘thought of as’, because of ‘the virtual impossibility of thinking outside the terms generated by the dualism’.⁸³ And this ‘thinking outside’ implies the ‘commitment’

⁷⁹ Julian Henriques and others, ‘Introduction to Section 1: From the Individual to the Social—A Bridge Too Far’, in *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 10-23 (p. 13).

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 13.

⁸² Ibid., p. 13.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 13.

of Richards can be seen as a potential ‘possibility’ ‘promise[d]’ by ‘its recognition of the need to cut across the social-individual divide’.⁸⁴ What this ‘recognition’ turns out to be is, however, ‘the virtual impossibility’, as the perspective knows what this very idea of ‘cut[ting] across’ does not know; that is, ‘individual’ and ‘social’ are also ‘generated by the dualism’. In this sense, instead of thinking about how to ‘cut across’ the ‘divide’, the perspective already knows the ‘inevitab[ility]’⁸⁵ of ‘antithetical’, ‘exclusive’, ‘separable’ and ‘opposite directions’ between the two, which is also why ‘illustrat[ion]’ of ‘extract’ is framed as ‘well’, based on the reading of Richards’s claim.

Specifically, the perspective on Richards’s perspective knows ‘the infant’ as ‘not fully social as he is not yet a competent member of a social community’.⁸⁶ ‘S/he is, rather, a biological organism with biological propensities and organisation who becomes social through his encounters with social adults’.⁸⁷ The ‘social’ is known by Richards as something that is not related to ‘the infant’ ‘fully’. And if this infant’s ‘encounter’ is not with ‘social adults’, ‘s/he’ is, then, no more than ‘a biological organism’ in which the ‘social’ could not be there through the very notion of ‘become’. This is how ‘the problem of social information’⁸⁸ – whether ‘s/he’ can ‘become social’ or not – is constituted ‘inevitably’ on the basis of ‘individual-society dualism’. Therefore, the perspective knows that ‘how society socializes the individual’ in Richards’s argument would, after all, be ‘the problem’ in which, for instance, ‘the fundamental human attributes’ are framed as something which can be ‘develop[ed]’, not being there with ‘infants’.⁸⁹ This is similar to the notion of ‘becom[ing] social’ discussed previously; these ‘newborn infants’ are knowable – without ‘fundamental human attributes’ which are constructed to be different from ‘a biological organism with biological propensities and organisation’. So ‘fundamental human attributes’ is something in relation to the idea of ‘social’. The ‘infant’ here, as the perspective on

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 13.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 13.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 13.

‘individual’ claims by reading Richards, ‘could not exist without its opposite number, society’.⁹⁰ And this idea of ‘exist[ence]’ can be regarded as having ‘fundamental human attributes’ and being ‘social’ rather than ‘the biological in essence’ only.

For perspective, nevertheless, ‘the infant’ is known to have a ‘contribution’ ‘to its own development’ which the ‘extract’ has not taken into ‘account’. Firstly, in order to ‘become social’, this ‘infant’ is known to do more than what ‘a biological organism’ is supposed to do, by reading of Richards. Or ‘a biological organism’ itself can be seen as ‘the contribution’ in relation to the idea of ‘social’. Secondly, in terms of ‘development’ of ‘the infant’, the perspective does not agree with what Richards claims. That is to say, the ‘infant’ here is known to ‘exist’ socially earlier than or independently of ‘his encounters with social adults’. And this difference in definitions of what is ‘the biological’ and/or ‘the social’ can be understood in relation to ‘the problem of how to think about the starting point of development’ in developmental psychology.

Shotter’s ‘humanistic approach’ – ‘a personal approach to human affairs’, regarding ‘theorizing the infant’s entry into the social world’, is claimed to be ‘radical in its commitment’:⁹¹

Shotter starts from the position that ‘babies born to us need to grow up to be what we think of as human’. Nor is their development ‘solely a natural process’. Rather, it is ‘partly an intentional one and as such is a product of human thought and deliberation, belief and ideology’.⁹²

Shotter’s ‘humanistic approach’ is known to have ‘start[ing] position’, which implies the ‘position’ might be different afterward as the perspective knows the ‘approach to psychology’ of Shotter as ‘itself changed dramatically’.⁹³ According to the perspective on Shotter’s perspective, ‘babies’ are known to be ‘born to’ ‘us’ who are

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 14.

⁹² Ibid., p. 14.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 14.

non-‘babies’ in relation to the idea of ‘human’. In addition to being ‘born’, ‘grow[ing] up’ is also claimed to be a ‘need’ for ‘babies’ to do in order to ‘be what we think of as human’. So ‘human’ might be thought of differently, in which it is the ‘think[ing]’ of ‘we’ that determines whether or not ‘babies’ are ‘human’ after being ‘born’ and ‘grow[ing] up’. In this sense, this ‘we’ is assumed to be unitary regarding the notion of ‘human’. And born ‘babies’ are knowable as ‘non-human’ already, as ‘grow up’ ‘need[ed]’ has not been done. It can be understood as that if these ‘babies’ ‘grow up to be’ something not ‘what we think of as’, it will, then, not be what ‘we’ ‘need’.

The ‘process’ is what the perspective claims in relation to ‘development’ – the certainty of knowing what and how ‘babies’ will ‘grow up to be’. ‘Nor’ can be seen as that: instead of ‘born to us’ for meeting the ‘need’ and the ‘think[ing]’ of ‘we’, being ‘born’ and even ‘grow[ing] up’ might be thought of by others as ‘a natural process’ ‘solely’. By reading Shotter’s claim, the perspective knows that the ‘process’ is related to the idea of ‘intention’. In other words, it is ‘human thought and deliberation, belief and ideology’ that makes ‘babies’ ‘grow up to be’ what they are supposed to be. So ‘human’ is already constructed as a ‘natural’ being of ‘thought and deliberation, belief and ideology’ to which ‘babies’ are subject. This is how ‘babies’, ‘human’, and ‘we’ are mobilised in Shotter’s formulation regarding ‘the infant’s entry into the social world’ within the perspective.

According to Shotter, infants’ ‘humanity seems to be transmitted to them after birth in an as yet ill-understood negotiation, a transaction between the babies and chiefly, among others, their mothers’. From this the task of developmental psychology becomes one of discovery [sic], or demonstrating how these negotiations contribute to the formation of the infant’s own ‘humanity’.⁹⁴

According to the perspective on Shotter’s perspective, ‘humanity’ can be understood as something that is relevant to ‘what we think of as human’ but can somehow be ‘transmitted’ to ‘infants’ ‘after birth’. And ‘seems’ also implies that there may be a

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 14.

potential period 'after birth' when there is no 'humanity' in 'infants'. Besides this, 'infants' are framed in the 'negotiation' known as 'ill-understood'. But the 'negotiation' is 'understood' to perspective and this 'ill-understood' does not affect the very idea of 'humanity' being 'transmitted' from elsewhere to 'infants'. In other words, the 'negotiation' is constructed on the basis of that 'understood'. Further, this 'ill-understood negotiation' is shifted to 'a transaction' in which 'humanity' is claimed to be 'chiefly' concerned with 'babies' mothers'. So 'mothers' are known to be on the other side of this 'transaction' and already have 'humanity' which can be 'transmitted' to 'babies' 'after' their 'birth'.

'From this' is known by the perspective that 'the task of developmental psychology' used to be something unrelated to 'discovery'. Due to the reading of Shotter, 'the task' 'becomes' 'one of discovery [sic]', which implies 'discover[ies]' are multiple to perspective at this point. And this 'discovery' can be regarded as an alternative to the idea of 'demonstrating'. Specifically, although 'these negotiations' are already framed as 'contribut[ing] to the formation', how they 'contribute to the formation' is still 'the task' that requires 'developmental psychology' to 'demonstrate'. And this is 'the infant's own "humanity"' which can be 'transmitted' from 'others', 'chiefly', 'their mothers', by 'negotiations' known as 'ill understood' for 'infants'. So this is how the idea of not 'own' is constituted to be 'own' outside of 'infants', which 'becomes' 'the task of developmental psychology' to 'demonstrate'. Therefore, it seems that 'the formation of' 'infant' to be 'what we think of as human' is known not to be 'solely a natural process'. For the perspective on 'developmental psychology', however, 'the infant' itself is also a construction.

The question of whether 'the dualistic framework' can 'theorize the individual in a radically social way'⁹⁵ is further discussed with the notion of 'pregiven':

The problem, therefore, is not simply how to make the work 'more social'. It is to show how individuals are constituted through the social domain. Since Shotter approaches this problem by proposing a dichotomy between the social

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 19.

and the individual [...] In order to make his account work, we have to assume a pregiven individual capable of processing the information contained in the interaction, or of ‘internalizing’ the social descriptions of its actions.⁹⁶

According to the perspective on ‘[t]he problem’, ‘the work’ is not something that can be ‘made’ for being ‘social’ or ‘more social’ because ‘the work’ is already known not ‘simply’ as such. And ‘[t]he problem’ is constituted to ‘show how individuals are constituted through the social domain’, which can be read as that ‘to show’ is not ‘simply’ because what ‘the work’ is supposed to do has not been ‘show[n]’ yet within the retrospection. Instead, ‘to show’ itself is known to be involved in ‘this problem’. ‘In order to’ implies that ‘his account’ does not work on the ground of what it has been ‘propos[ed]’ – ‘a dichotomy between the social and the individual’. In other words, this ‘dichotomy’ is known by the perspective on Shotter’s perspective as being capable of ‘show[ing]’ ‘how individuals are constituted through the social domain’. But the perspective on Shotter knows that ‘his account’ fails to ‘work’ in the face of ‘this problem’. This is why the ‘assum[ption]’ of ‘we’ ‘have to’ come out to think how ‘his account’ ‘work[s]’ in which ‘a pregiven individual’ is known as being different from ‘individual’ in that ‘dichotomy’, although both of them can be seen as ‘given’. And ‘pregiven’ implies that ‘capab[ility]’ is not seemingly seen as ‘individual’s’ but ‘pregiven’ to this ‘individual’. To be more specific, this ‘capable of’ can be understood as what Shotter ‘assume[s]’ in ‘his account’ from the perspective on the perspective of ‘we’. In this sense, ‘the infant’, for example, who is ‘capable of processing the information contained in the interaction, or of “internalizing” the social descriptions of its actions’, is not what Shotter claims to be in the above discussion. The ‘dichotomy’ ‘propos[ed]’ becomes a self-paradox rather than an ‘approach’ in the way of ‘show[ing]’ ‘how individuals are constituted through the social domain’.

As a result, this attempt at an account of the social formation of the infant’s

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 15-16.

subjectivity misses its mark, since it both fails to address the social in any form other than the personal, and leaves the infant's contribution untouched and untheorized. In this empty space we are left to assume the existence of a pregiven psychological subject, a rational individual as a starting point in development.⁹⁷

Here, the 'problem' shifts to the 'attempt': 'to show how individuals are constituted through the social domain' is claimed to be related to 'an account of the social formation of the infant's subjectivity'. And the perspective on 'this attempt' knows that it 'misses its mark'. In other words, the 'assum[ption]' of 'a pregiven' 'infant' followed by 'a dichotomy' 'propos[ed]' is known to fail to formulate 'an account of the social formation of the infant's subjectivity'; the 'subjectivity' of 'infant' is not formed by 'the social' but is there before the 'interaction' or 'actions' as this 'infant' is 'pregiven' to be 'capable of processing' and 'internalizing'. This is also why the perspective claims to know that 'this attempt' in relation to 'a dichotomy' could only 'address' 'the social' 'in' 'personal' 'form', which is similar to the perspective on Richards being discussed previously – 'despite its commitment (the need to cut across the social-individual divide), the terms of individual-society dualism are themselves retained in the way in which the problem of social formation is posed'.⁹⁸ Although 'approach[ing]' 'the problem of social formation' here is not going with 'cut[ing] across' the 'divide' but 'proposing a dichotomy', the perspective knows that, whether 'cut[ting] across' or 'proposing', 'the social-individual divide' is already constituted to be there.

The perspective on 'this attempt' claims to know that 'an account' will construct 'the infant's subjectivity' which is formed by 'the social'. That is to say, this 'subjectivity' is known not as something belonging to 'the infant' but as coming from 'the social'. In terms of how this 'subjectivity' is formed as such, the 'assum[ption]' of 'a pregiven' 'infant' 'have to' be there for proceeding the 'social formation', which

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 16.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 13.

is, then, as I analysed above, self-paradoxical to its ‘dichotomy’ ‘propos[ed]’. This is why ‘the infant’s contribution’ is known to be ‘left’ ‘untouched and untheorized’. The perspective knows that it can be and once it is ‘touched’ and ‘theorized’ by that ‘dichotomy’, for instance, ‘to assume a pre-given individual’, ‘how individuals are constituted through the social domain’ cannot be ‘show[n]’. In other words, ‘this problem’ cannot be ‘approach[ed]’, by its known approach, but being consolidated as the ‘problem’.

And in making the claim of ‘space’ as ‘empty’, it can be understood as knowing the paradox and impasse in between ‘both’ – ‘fail[ing] to address the social in any form other than the personal’ and ‘leav[ing] the infant’s contribution untouched and untheorized’ in ‘this attempt’. And ‘the existence of a pre-given psychological subject, a rational individual’ is known to be ‘assume[d]’ upon this paradox by ‘we’ who is claimed to be ‘left’, which implies how ‘a starting point in development’ of developmental psychology is framed as such ironically. The perspective, however, knows that ‘the existence of a pre-given’ could also be ‘assume[d]’ by others, for example, ‘Richards’, ‘Shotter’, ‘Trevarthen’, ‘Mead and Vygotsky’, ‘implicitly’ in ‘[a]ny attempt to resolve the problem’.⁹⁹ But the difference is that, for the perspective that takes part with ‘we’ being ‘left’, ‘the individual and society’ are known to be ‘mutually indispensable to each other’.¹⁰⁰

In the discussion of ‘Allport’s study of prejudice’, ‘its use of a social-attitudes paradigm’ for ‘forming a bridge across the conceptual divide between the individual and society’ is questioned:

The concept of social attitudes is of particular interest here because it is seen as forming a bridge across the conceptual divide between the individual and society [...] The investigation of the formation of attitudes and their corresponding effects on behaviour is supposed to provide insights into the information-processing mechanisms of the individual, so that we might

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

understand how the individual processes inputs about the social world to produce specific, behavioural outputs.¹⁰¹

According to the perspective on Allport, 'the individual' is known to have 'behaviour' in relation to 'information-processing mechanisms'. How these 'mechanisms' work requires the 'investigation' to 'provide insights'. So 'the information-processing mechanisms' are constructed on the ground of knowing 'the formation of attitudes and their corresponding effects on behaviour', which implies that the relationship between 'attitudes' and 'behaviour' is already framed in 'corresponding' 'mechanisms' before the 'investigation'. But how these 'insights' are 'provide[d]' for understanding 'mechanisms' is claimed within a shift from 'supposed' to 'might'. And 'the information-processing' is further framed as that 'the individual processes inputs about the social world to produce specific, behavioural outputs'.

It seems that 'the social world' is seen to be something outside 'the individual' in 'mechanisms' in which 'the individual' is known to 'produce' 'specific' 'behaviour' 'corresponding[ly]' from the inside to the outside. But the perspective on 'the individual' knows that 'the information-processing mechanisms' are constituted to be there 'inside' 'the individual', as is 'the social world' outside 'the individual' due to 'the conceptual divide between the individual and society'. In this sense, it is this known 'divide' which determines how 'the information-processing mechanisms' work on 'the individual' and how 'the individual' 'produce[s]' 'behaviour' towards 'the social world' in which the 'behaviour' is known to be 'determine[d]'¹⁰² by 'social attitudes'. So the 'divide' also defines how 'social attitudes' work on 'the individual'.

That is why the perspective on 'we' claims to know that it is a possibility for 'the information-processing mechanisms' to work. Because this is already claimed as that '[s]ocial attitudes constitute the polarity of these terms and at the same time lock

¹⁰¹ Julian Henriques, 'Social Psychology and the Politics of Racism', in *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 58-87 (p. 69).

¹⁰² Henriques, p. 69.

them together’,¹⁰³ according to the perspective on the ‘concept of social attitudes’. In other words, ‘forming a bridge across the conceptual divide’ itself is constructed on this ‘divide’. Instead of ‘forming a bridge’, ‘social attitudes’ are based on and also consolidate the ‘divide between the individual and society’ through the formulation of ‘information-processing mechanisms’.

How social psychology explains the notion of ‘prejudice’ is discussed further as follows: ‘despite its apparent focus on the prejudiced person, the social-psychological paradigm reflects, reproduces and legitimizes the common-sense racism which blames the victim’.¹⁰⁴ Here ‘the prejudiced person’ is known to be contrasted with ‘the victim’. And ‘the victim’ is not supposed to be ‘blame[d]’ by social psychology. The reason why ‘the social-psychological paradigm reflects, reproduces and legitimizes the common-sense racism’ can be understood as ‘depend[ing]’ ‘on the circulation between social psychology and common sense’.¹⁰⁵ The ‘common sense’ framed within ‘circulation’ can be read as not the same as ‘common-sense’ regarding ‘racism’ seemingly, but as ‘the common-sense view that “there are no real differences between blacks and whites” (the corollary of which is that only a few prejudiced people believe otherwise)’,¹⁰⁶ which, none the less, itself constructs the idea of ‘prejudice’. In other words, the ‘view’ about ‘no real differences’ takes part with what it is claimed to be opposed to – ‘racism’. Since ‘only a few prejudiced people’ here are constructed to distinguish from the others who ‘believe’ ‘there are no real differences’ and are seen as a group that accounts for the majority of the ‘people’. Thus the notion of a minority or majority regarding ‘prejudice’ creates ‘prejudice’ in one sense. That is, no matter what these ‘only a few people’ ‘believe’, ‘the common-sense view’ held by the majority will not be affected.

In another sense, as it claims: ‘[i]n my view the effect of the idea of prejudice as error is to suppress the recognition both of existing differences and of the racism

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 72.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 72.

which takes place in practice on a wide scale'.¹⁰⁷ According to the perspective on 'the effect', 'differences' are already known as 'existing', as is 'the racism which takes place in practice'. It is the idea of 'common sense' in which the 'error' is related to 'only a few' 'people' that 'suppress[es]' 'the recognition'. This implies that if 'the idea of prejudice' is not attributed to 'only a few' 'people' by 'the common-sense view' but the way in which the 'prejudice' is produced, then both 'differences' and how and why 'racism' 'takes place in practice on a wide scale' could be 'focus[ed] on'.

Further, 'the transformation' from 'frustration – aggression – displacement' to 'frustration – aggression' in the 'explanation of prejudice' in social psychology is also constituted as thinking about 'the prejudiced person' differently:

None the less, the concept of displacement fulfils the important function of recognizing and theorizing the way in which an object may have no logical relation to the response it triggers but rather be a displacement which occurs as a defence. The effect of dropping the third term from the explanation [...] is to put the responsibility for prejudiced responses back on the stimulus object.¹⁰⁸

The perspective on 'an object' claims to know that it 'may' be 'a displacement which occurs as a defence', which implies that 'an object' might be thought of by others as 'having' a 'logical relation to the response it triggers'. And 'the concept of displacement' is known to 'fulfil' 'the important function of recognizing and theorizing the way in which' 'a defence' 'occurs' against 'a displacement' instead of 'an object'. In this sense, this 'concept' can be seen to 'put the responsibility for prejudiced responses' on the one to whom 'a defence' 'occurs' towards 'an object' which is framed as already being 'displace[d]'. That is to say, it is this one of many possible 'defence[s]' that are known to be relevant to the idea of 'prejudice'.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 72.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 72.

In ‘the concept of displacement’, ‘an object’ is constructed as something which has already been ‘displace[d]’ rather than ‘trigger[ing]’ ‘the response’. Therefore, the difference between with and without the third term – ‘displacement’ in ‘the explanation’ of ‘prejudice’ is that who should be ‘responsible for’ ‘prejudiced responses’ and be a ‘defen[der]’ – ‘the prejudiced person’ or ‘the stimulus object’. And the perspective on ‘[t]he effect’ knows that ‘stimulus object’ instead of ‘the prejudiced person’ would, after all, be ‘blame[d]’. Correspondingly, ‘the prejudiced person’ will be ‘legitimize[d]’ in ‘the common-sense’ of ‘frustration – aggression’.

2.2 Psychological Assessment

When it comes to ‘[h]umanistic psychology’, how both ‘managers’ and ‘subordinates’ are produced in and for the organisation is discussed in the section ‘Organizing corporate well-being’.¹⁰⁹ One of the influential assumptions is related to ‘McGregor’s typology’, which can be read as problematic:

McGregor’s typology of the differences between ‘theory X’ and ‘theory Y’ assumptions about people summarized these contrasting old and new knowledges, describing them exclusively from the point of view of managers. The crux of the difference between old (theory X) and new humanistic (theory Y) assumptions was whether it was believed that people disliked work—in which case they required direction, control and coercion—or whether ‘the experience of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or rest’ in which case people will be motivated to work and exercise selfresponsibility.¹¹⁰

The perspective on ‘McGregor’s typology’ claims to know that ‘the differences between theory X and theory Y assumptions’ is related to ‘contrasting old and new

¹⁰⁹ Wendy Hollway, ‘Fitting Work: Psychological Assessment in Organizations’, in *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 24-57 (pp. 28-29).

¹¹⁰ Hollway, pp. 29-30.

knowledges'. And these are 'assumptions' 'about people' that are known from 'the point of view of managers'. So the perspective on 'people' knows that 'people' would be 'summarized' and 'describ[ed]' differently from the other 'point of view[s]' in which 'managers' here are seen as those who are different from 'people' and already being there 'exclusively' without 'describing'.

With the perspective on 'the difference' shifting by claiming to the 'crux', 'theory X' is framed as 'believ[ing]' 'that people disliked work'. To be more specific, what constitutes 'disliked' depends on knowing what is 'required' by 'people' – 'direction, control and coercion'. In this sense, 'direction, control and coercion' are something that is known to be outside but could be 'required' to be in place. And 'people' are constructed to 'require' these for 'work[ing]'. Whether this very notion of 'require[ment]' of 'people' works or not in terms of 'work', 'disliked' has been defined already, which also implies that 'managers' are known to be different and doing the 'work' without 'requir[ing]' but by providing 'direction, control and coercion' to 'people'. That is to say, 'managers' in relation to 'work' is left unquestioned. This is how the idea of 'dis/liked' is assumed both on 'people' and 'managers' within 'theory X'.

When it comes to 'theory Y', 'play' and/or 'rest' are known as 'natural' things. And 'the experience' regarding 'work' might be thought of by others, for instance, within the 'assumptions' of 'theory X', as not being 'natural' but under 'direction, control and coercion'. The perspective on 'theory Y', however, knows that it can be 'as natural as play or rest'. And the idea of 'natural' is further discussed as 'people will be motivated to work and exercise selfresponsibility'. The idea of being 'motivated' is still known to be there outside 'people', which implies that without such 'motiv[ation]', people might not tend to 'work and exercise selfresponsibility'. In comparison with 'play or rest', either of them is framed as 'natural' without being 'motivated' to do so.

And this is 'selfresponsibility' that can be 'exercise[d]' after 'motiv[ation]', according to the perspective on 'people'. In other words, 'people' are known as those who are not 'responsib[le]' to themselves and their 'work' unless they are 'motivated'.

Therefore, the perspective on the managers' perspective here claims to know that the idea of 'motiv[ation]' of 'people' could '*natural[ly]*'¹¹¹ come into play for 'work[ing]'. The reason for knowing why 'people' should and need to be 'motivated' implies that 'people' are known to 'work' without 'selfresponsibility' '*natural[ly]*', which would be, then, paradoxical with 'theory Y', bringing into the question the 'difference between theory X and theory Y assumptions' and making 'old and new knowledges' not 'contrasting' to some extent. So whether 'old' or 'new knowledges', the relations of 'managers' to 'people' and 'people' to 'work' are already framed by 'humanistic assumptions', according to the perspective on 'McGregor'.

The essentialism and idealism of this latter position [theory Y] is striking. It does not consider the conditions of work on assembly lines and ask if there is anything 'natural' about such work. It assumes that the core characteristics of a person will be displayed whatever the work and whatever the social relations which control that person's work performance.¹¹²

The perspective on 'this latter position' knows what 'theory Y' 'believe[s]' about 'people' in relation to 'work' is 'striking' in terms of '[t]he essentialism and idealism'. Why it is claimed as 'striking' is further explained as 'not' 'consider[ing]' 'the conditions of work on assembly lines'. So the perspective on 'such work' knows what 'the conditions' are – different from '[t]he essentialism and idealism' – in which 'work on assembly lines' is not 'as natural as play or rest' and 'people' involved will not be 'motivated' as such. And it also knows why 'ask if' might be thought of by others as a certainty of knowledge. That is to say, to the perspective, even though 'a person' is 'assume[d]' to have 'the core characteristics', to what extent these would and could be 'displayed' depends on 'the work' and 'the social relations which control that person's work performance'.

In other words, 'the work' and 'the social relations' are known to influence what

¹¹¹ My italics.

¹¹² Hollway, p. 30.

and how ‘core characteristics of a person’ ‘will be displayed’. For instance, ‘a person’ who ‘work[s]’ ‘on assembly lines’ is known not to ‘display’ ‘core characteristics’ as ‘natural[ly]’ as ‘theory Y’ ‘assumes’ – the capability of being ‘motivated to work and exercise selfresponsibility’. In this sense, ‘the core characteristics’ here can be seen to be related to the ‘selfresponsibility’. As with ‘person’s work performance’, ‘the core characteristics of a person’ are also constructed by ‘the work’ and ‘the social relations’. The perspective claims to both know and not know about this ‘person’, while, to the perspective on ‘this latter position’, ‘the core characteristics’ are already ‘assume[d]’ to be there for ‘a person’ to ‘display’.

In the context of industrial unrest, ‘theory Y’ was taken up as the ‘correct’ view of people and it was assumed that if managers were persuaded that they had been wrong to treat subordinates as if they needed to be controlled, then employee relations would improve. No one asked how managers came to hold ‘theory X’ assumptions in the first place, and no one recognized that it was implicit in their job function and position in the hierarchy.¹¹³

The ‘people’ who are assumed to have ‘the “correct” view’ are different from the ‘people’ who ‘dis/liked work’ mentioned above; these are ‘people’ framed to ‘take up’ ‘theory Y’ ‘correct[ly]’ towards ‘people’ who ‘work’ ‘in’ related ‘case[s]’. The perspective on ‘industrial unrest’ claims to know that this ‘context’ could make ‘theory Y’ be ‘correct’, which implies that ‘theory X’ can seemingly be seen as ‘[in]correct’. This is how ‘theory Y’ in relation to the idea of ‘natural’ can be ‘taken up’ in response to ‘the context of industrial unrest’. Both the ideas of ‘natural’ and ‘correct’ could be produced by and for ‘people’ in a certain ‘context’.

How this ‘ “correct” view’ comes about relates to the ‘assum[ption]’: the ‘improve[ment]’ of ‘employee relations’ is known to hinge on ‘managers’ to a great extent rather than ‘subordinates’. To be specific, firstly, ‘managers’ are known to be those who do not know themselves that they ‘treat subordinates’ ‘wrong[ly]’ without

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 30.

being ‘persuaded’. And ‘then’ can be read as that these are knowable ‘employee relations’ which are constructed to be capable of being ‘improve[d]’ already even before the very action of ‘persuad[ing]’. Secondly, ‘wrong’ is defined as ‘treat[ing] subordinates as if they needed to be controlled’. So the perspective on the ‘assum[ption]’ knows what ‘managers’ do not know or how ‘to treat subordinates’ rightly – ‘they’ did not ‘need’ ‘to be controlled’, which implies that ‘managers’ are seen to take part with ‘theory X’ – ‘they required direction, control and coercion’ – before being ‘persuaded’. In this sense, what is an ‘in/correct’ ‘view’ flips between ‘theory X’ and ‘theory Y’ in which ‘theory Y’ is not ‘contrasting’ with, as I discussed above, but could be based on ‘theory X’ at this stage.

The perspective on ‘theory Y’ already knows ‘how managers came to hold theory X assumptions in the first place’, by claiming it as a ‘“correct” view’ ironically, as it knows no matter it is the idea of ‘in/correct’ or ‘managers’, either of them can be defined by ‘job function and position in the hierarchy’, even though ‘it was implicit’, claimed by the perspective on ‘one’ who can be understood as ‘people’ that ‘take[s] up’ ‘theory Y’ ‘as the “correct” view’ without ‘ask[ing]’ and ‘recogniz[ing]’. And ‘employee relations’ which are also constituted by this ‘hierarchy’ will, in turn, be ‘correct[ly]’ ‘improve[d]’ for the ‘hierarchy’.

It is characteristic of the idealist view that people are seen as the origins of society and social relations and that therefore psychologistic interventions can succeed in changing the organization. Thus when things go wrong, groups of individuals (in this case managers) are identified as being the cause of the problem and also the case for treatment.¹¹⁴

Here ‘the idealist view’ is claimed to have ‘characteristic’ for the perspective, which implies that ‘people’ could and should not be ‘seen as’ such. Or, to put it another way, ‘the origins of society and social relations’ are known to be something other than ‘people’, for instance, in relation to the idea of ‘hierarchy’. And ‘psychologistic

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 30.

interventions’ are known to ‘succeed in changing the organization’, which are framed in this ‘idealist view’. In this sense, ‘interven[ing]’ ‘people’ does not ‘succeed in changing the organization’, as the perspective claims to know better what the relation of ‘people’ to ‘organization’ is than ‘psychologicistic interventions’ do. That is to say, the notion of ‘hierarchy’ is known to be there ‘implicit[ly]’ and to constitute what ‘society’ and social relations’ mean. ‘Thus’ can be read as how ‘psychologicistic interventions’ with respect to the ‘idealist view’ come to be. So the perspective knows, for example, if ‘groups of individuals (in this case managers)’ are not ‘seen as the origins of society and social relations’, they might not be ‘identified as being the cause of the problem and also the case for treatment’ for making ‘things go’ right. In other words, what ‘things’ should go is defined by the knowable ‘society and social relations’.

Even though ‘managers’ are seemingly seen as ‘individuals’, they are, after all, treated as ‘groups’ to be ‘the origins’ under ‘interventions’. To the perspective on ‘psychologicistic interventions’, however, ‘job function and position in the hierarchy’ is not ‘identified as being the cause of the problem and also the case for treatment’ or ‘wrong’. This is how ‘people’ are constructed in ‘society and social relations’ in the sense that they are subject to ‘their job function and position in the hierarchy’.

In the section ‘The “fair” science of occupational assessment’, the construction of ‘fair[ness]’ is discussed on the ground of knowing the relation of ‘science’ to ‘objective’:

The claim of objectivity made for psychological assessment is the basis on which its reputation in occupational psychology rests. That psychology is a science and that psychological assessment is therefore objective is a belief which continues to be fostered in organizations. The importance as far as organizational practices such as personnel selection is concerned is that the method is therefore ‘fair’.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 32-33.

The ‘psychological assessment’ is known to need ‘[t]he claim of objectivity’ being made, which implies that this ‘psychological assessment’ might not be thought of as being ‘objective’ before ‘ma[king]’ this ‘claim’. ‘The claim of objectivity’ has to be ‘made’ as ‘the basis’ for ‘psychological assessment’ to have the ‘reputation in occupational psychology’. So the ‘occupational psychology’ will not be the ‘occupational psychology’ if the ‘reputation’ regarding the ‘objective’ ‘psychological assessment’ is not there. That is to say, this ‘objectivity’ comes up prior to ‘occupational psychology’ in order to have a ‘reputation’ in it. Further, it is not because that ‘psychological assessment’ is known for its ‘objectivity’, which then constructs ‘reputation’ in ‘occupational psychology’ accordingly. Instead, the ‘objectivity’ here can be understood as ‘the claim’ ‘made for’ ‘psychological assessment’, thus making a predictable ‘reputation’ in and for ‘occupational psychology’. In this sense, there is already a deferral between ‘objectivity’ and ‘psychological assessment’. And the gap between ‘objectivity’ and ‘occupational psychology’ cannot be closed.

The relation between ‘psychology’ and ‘psychological assessment’ is known to be linked to the notion of ‘science’. Although this can be one of many possible ‘science[s]’, it is already known as ‘objective’ by claiming to ‘therefore’. And the perspective knows the reason why ‘a science’ will be constructed as ‘objective’ is because of ‘a belief’. So it is ‘a belief’ that makes ‘a science’ ‘objective’, which is similar to what I have mentioned above, ‘the claim of objectivity’ can and needs to be ‘made for psychological assessment’. The perspective claims to know that this ‘belief’ of ‘objectivity’ in relation to ‘a science’ can be and ‘continues to be fostered’ ‘in organizations’, as the ‘importance’ of ‘fair[ness]’ has to be taken into account by ‘organizational practices such as personnel selection’. Thus ‘a belief’ here can be doubled: not only ‘a science’ is ‘belie[ved]’ as ‘objective’, but also to be ‘objective’ is to be ‘fair’, according to the perspective on ‘the method’ which can be regarded as ‘psychological assessment’ on ‘personnel selection’. This is how ‘fair’ can be constituted by and for ‘psychological assessment’ regarding ‘objectivity’ on the basis of ‘a belief’. In other words, to the perspective on ‘fair[ness]’, ‘science’ is not

‘therefore’ self-objective but could be ‘objective’ due to ‘a belief’.

Similarly, it can make ‘psychological assessment’ ‘fair’; to be ‘fair’ is known to be ‘importan[t]’ for ‘organizational practices’. That is why ‘[t]he claim of objectivity’ has to be ‘made for’ this ‘method’ during which ‘a belief’ ‘in organizations’ ‘foster[s]’ ‘psychological assessment’ to be ‘fair’.

As for ‘techniques’ regarding ‘occupational psychology assessment’: ‘Frequently in the literature of occupational psychology assessment techniques are represented in terms of their cost benefits. What is taken up is thus not necessarily related to its “truth” value, nor even to its long-term efficacy’.¹¹⁶ When it comes to ‘the literature of occupational psychology assessment’, one might think of it differently from ‘cost benefits’. But the perspective on ‘techniques’ ‘represented’ knows this happens ‘[f]requently’. These are ‘cost benefits’ known not to take part with the ‘“truth” value’ and ‘long-term efficacy’ but still can be ‘taken up’ ‘necessarily’. So ‘techniques’ in ‘occupational psychology assessment’ is framed to give priority to ‘cost benefits’ rather than ‘“truth” value’ and ‘long-term efficacy’. Even what constitutes ‘truth’ can be questioned, according to the perspective on ‘value’. This is how ‘cost benefits’ are ‘taken up’ and also constructed to be in relation to the ‘objectivity’ in ‘occupational psychology assessment’, which is known to be contrasted with ‘interview’ ‘assessment’ – framed as ‘subjective’ and ‘bastions of prejudice’.¹¹⁷ But the perspective on ‘techniques’ claims to know that these ‘cost benefits’ can also be seen as part of ‘subjectiv[ity]’ and ‘prejudice’, as what could and should be ‘taken up’ has been decided already.

How the ‘scores’ of ‘16PF (16 Personality Factor)’¹¹⁸ are obtained is discussed as follows:

Because of the statistical requirements that all items be filled in, and a satisfactory range of scores be derived, the respondent is strongly encouraged not to use the middle response and must answer all questions. Going over the

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 33-34.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 33.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 43.

test a second time, I did answer all the questions—with suitable distortions, overgeneralizations and simplifications. But in doing so I was representing myself within assumptions about personality which are inconsistent with my experience of myself.¹¹⁹

The ‘16PF’, according to the perspective on ‘Cattell’ (‘the author of the 16PF’), is known to be related to ‘a personality theory based on an essentialist assumption about the individual’.¹²⁰ How to understand this ‘essentialist’ but, simultaneously, ‘assumption’ further is framed by knowing that there are ‘statistical requirements’ on ‘16PF’, which implies that ‘statistical requirements’ are set up prior to ‘the respondent’, who is asked to ‘fill in’ ‘items’ and can be regarded as ‘the individual’ whose ‘personality does not change either over time or according to situation’.¹²¹

And these are ‘all items’ ‘require[d]’ to ‘be filled in’. So it is already known that there could be a possibility in which ‘respondent’ does not ‘fill in’ ‘all items’. But this is not allowed by the knowable ‘statistical requirements’. In this sense, it is not seemingly the ‘respondent’ who answers the ‘items’ to reflect the certain ‘personalit[ies]’. Even in this case, both ‘items’ and ‘personality’ are pregiven and waiting for ‘respondent’ to ‘fill in’. And ‘statistical requirements’ would constitute what ‘respondent’ should be like to a great extent, which is also seen in the claim of ‘a satisfactory range of scores be derived’. Thus there are many ‘range of scores’ known by the perspective, of which only ‘satisfactory’ ones are ‘derived’ in order to comply with these ‘requirements’. Similarly, not only do ‘all items’ have to be ‘filled in’, but also ‘the middle response’ among them is not ‘strongly encouraged to use’, although it is known to be there, according to the perspective on ‘the respondent’. This is how ‘the respondent’ who ‘must answer all questions’ is constructed under the framing of ‘statistical requirements’.

The perspective on ‘I’ claims to know that this ‘test’ needs to be ‘go[ne]’ ‘over’ ‘a second time’ for ‘requirements’, which also implies that at the first time, although

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 45.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 44.

‘I’ is known as ‘could not give an unambivalent response’,¹²² what constitutes ‘un/ambivalent’ is defined differently between this ‘I’ and ‘test’. And for the ‘second time’, the ‘I’ is framed to be subject to the ‘test’ again but differently – ‘did answer all the questions—with suitable distortions, overgeneralizations and simplifications’. So for the ‘test’, ‘answer[ing] all the questions’ with ‘a satisfactory range of scores’ could be seen as ‘unambivalent response’, according to the perspective on ‘statistical requirements’, even though ‘suitable distortions, overgeneralizations and simplifications’ are known to be related to the idea of ‘ambiguities’¹²³ in the perspective on I’s perspective.

How ‘ambiguities’ are produced is further claimed in the ‘doing’ of ‘I’ regarding two different ‘myself’ in which, one is ‘myself’ which is ‘represent[ed]’ ‘within assumptions about personality’. That is, this ‘myself’ can be ‘assum[ed]’ with ‘personality’ in and for the ‘test’. The other ‘myself’ is known to be related to ‘my experience’ and ‘inconsistent with’ ‘assumptions about personality’. So the second ‘myself’ can be understood as ‘consistent with’ ‘my experience’. In this way, who is the ‘unambivalent’ ‘myself’ is already known with certainty by the perspective on ‘my’ perspective, without and before ‘suitable distortions, overgeneralizations and simplifications’. Therefore, although both the ‘personality’ and ‘the individual’ are known to be linked to ‘assumption’, ‘my experience of myself’ is, after all, known to be there, unwittingly taking part with ‘essentialist’ being critiqued.

2.3 (Re)construction and Deconstruction

The idea of ‘reconstruct[ing]’ can be read differently when it comes to the distinction between ‘genealogical approaches’ and ‘traditional histories’:¹²⁴

The field of research for these histories moves outside the internal calculations

¹²² Ibid., p. 44.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 44.

¹²⁴ Julian Henriques and others, ‘Introduction to Section 2: Constructing the subject’, in *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 88-114 (p. 99).

within the subdiscipline of psychometrics or developmental psychology to look for their conditions of possibility in other ‘outside’ practices and considerations. But they are not any possible conditions [...] these conditions are historically specific events and bodies of statements which have had demonstrable effectivity in the development of mental measurement or of the theorization of cognitive development.¹²⁵

The perspective claims to know that the difference between ‘outside’ and “outside” is not so different. The former can be understood as that ‘the internal calculations’ are known to be ‘research[ed]’ by other ‘histories’ but needed to ‘move outside’ by ‘[t]he field of research for these histories’. The latter implies, ironically, that there are many knowable ‘practices and considerations’ “outside” ‘psychometrics or developmental psychology’. That is to say, these ‘conditions of possibility’, at this point, are framed to be seemingly possible for ‘[t]he field of research for these histories’ and different from ‘the internal calculations’. When ‘look[ing]’ for ‘conditions of possibility’, however, the ‘possibility’ is known to be ‘not possible’.

On the one hand, ‘conditions of possibility’ are claimed to be ‘look[ed] for’; on the other hand, the ‘possibility’ is known to be ‘condition[ed]’ by ‘historically specific events and bodies of statements’. In this view, the ‘possibility’ turns out to be ‘not possible’, according to the perspective on ‘these histories’ which knows differently about what ‘these conditions’ are and how they relate to ‘the development of mental measurement or of the theorization of cognitive development’. In other words, ‘events and bodies of statements’ are known to be ‘specific’ in the ‘history’, which is ‘demonstrable’ in their ‘effectivity’.

One can retrace this complex by going back to the archival material and reconstructing a picture of development which seems possible and coherent. Note that internal histories have already covered over these historical traces by constructing an account which founds the coherence of the discipline in

¹²⁵ Henriques and others, p. 100.

the rational calculations interior to it: its system of evidences—the data—its theoretical assumptions and underpinnings, its methodological protocols.¹²⁶

The perspective knows better than '[o]ne' about the very notion of 'retrac[ing]' and knows that 'going back to the archival material and reconstructing a picture of development' is not as 'possible and coherent' as it is thought of by '[o]ne', as 'internal histories' are known to be different from but 'have already covered over' 'these historical traces', which implies that '[o]ne' is constituted as not knowing this 'cover[ing] over' when 'going back to the archival material and reconstructing a picture of development'. In this sense, 'reconstructing' might, to some extent, repeatedly go with 'constructing' by 'trac[ing]' the 'complex' before.

And 'a picture of development', if it is known to be 'possible and coherent', may not be possible to 'look for' how and why 'this complex' is constructed. To be more specific, the perspective knows how 'possible and coherent' comes about. The notion of 'reconstruct' will be influenced by 'internal histories' when 'retrac[ing]' this complex' through which both 'the coherence of the discipline' and 'the rational calculations' are known to have effects on each other. So 'possible and coherent' can be further understood as that 'an account' could be 'construct[ed]' as many other 'account[s]' in which 'system of evidences', 'theoretical assumptions and underpinnings', and 'methodological protocols' are framed to be in the middle of what the very ideas of 'coherence' and 'rational[ity]' mean.

By claiming to know what is 'interior' to 'an account', the perspective also knows how 'these historical traces' can be retrieved and avoided being 'covered over' by 'internal histories'. In other words, to get the knowledge of 'this complex', the notion of 'retrac[ing]' would seemingly bypass 'internal histories' but go back with them. For the perspective, the 'research' should not fall into the dualism between 'internal' and 'outside', and the very actions of 'retrac[ing]' and 'reconstruct[ing]'. However, 'these historical traces' are still known to be there already, as with knowable 'historically specific events and bodies of statements' being claimed,

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 100.

according to the perspective on '[n]ote' – neither in relation to the notions of 'internal' and 'interior', nor 'outside' 'practices and considerations' mentioned above, even though these 'traces' are not structured by 'system of evidences', 'theoretical assumptions and underpinnings', and 'methodological protocols'.

It is for that reason that an initial task is to deconstruct its internal history as it is presented through the scientific articles and texts. The intention here is to show that the plausibility and rationality of any scientific specialism depends on a number of key assumptions and propositions established outside the specialism itself, both in contiguous specialisms and other disciplines and in wider, culturally shared beliefs.¹²⁷

There has to be a 'reason' for doing 'an initial task' differently from 'retrac[ing] this complex', which, again, implies that 'going back to the archival material and reconstructing a picture of development' do not work as they are thought to be. Here 'deconstruct[ing] its internal history' can be seen as a further claim to know what 'historical traces' are. In this sense, 'histor[ies]' are known to be different: it is 'internal' one that is supposed to be 'deconstruct[ed]' rather than 'historical traces', as 'deconstruct[ing]' the former is framed to be a 'reason' and a 'task' for '[un]cover[ing]' the latter. As a result, the very notions of 'internal' and 'outside' are still being there, for example, in [t]he field of research for these histories'. That is to say, 'a variety of calculations' 'consider[ed]' by 'a genealogy'¹²⁸ also falls into the dualism between 'internal' and 'outside' which it disagrees with.

The 'system of evidences', 'theoretical assumptions and underpinnings', and 'methodological protocols' are known to be related to 'scientific articles and texts' that 'present' the 'internal history'. By 'deconstruct[ing]' 'its internal history', the notion of 'scientific' is also taken into consideration. This is the difference between 'reconstruct' and 'deconstruct', which implies that 'a picture of development' in

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 100.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 100.

‘retrac[ing] this complex’ would be based on this very notion of ‘scientific’ ‘which seems possible and coherent’. ‘The intention’ can be read as that ‘the specialism’ regarding the very notion of ‘outside’ has not been yet, but needs to be ‘show[n]’. That is to say, there is a known separation between ‘a number of key assumptions and propositions’ and ‘the specialism itself’.

But there is also a separation between ‘the specialism’ and ‘itself’. So ‘itself’ is not always something stable either. Instead, ‘the plausibility and rationality of any scientific’ claim construct what ‘itself’ could and should be. By making a claim to know where this ‘outside’ lies – ‘both in contiguous specialisms and other disciplines and in wider, culturally shared beliefs’, ‘itself’ could be multiple, which, in turn, breaks down the very distinction between ‘itself’ and ‘other’, or ‘itself’ and ‘contiguous’ ‘other’. Therefore, the implied differences between ‘the specialism itself’ and ‘contiguous specialisms’, and/or ‘contiguous specialisms and other disciplines’, and/or ‘other disciplines’ and ‘culturally shared beliefs’ are deferred.

2.4 ‘Discourse and the Real’

The ‘two main positions’ in ‘the relations of determination between discourses and the real’ are claimed as ‘the problem’.¹²⁹ How these ‘conflicting claims’¹³⁰ collapse into the same position can be read as follows:

One claims that there are irreducible real processes (for example the economy or nature) that determine what may ultimately be asserted in discourse. The claim is often tempered with the proviso that other processes enter into the construction of specific statements, that the determination is not univocal or unmediated and so on. The other position—that of discourse determinism—privileges discourse in attributing to it the sole function of determining knowledge of objects as *its* objects; there can be no appeal to anything outside discourse since that outside can only be specified in some discourse that

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 105.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 106.

always already constructs it in a specific form.¹³¹

The perspective on the perspective of 'real processes' claims to know that they are 'irreducible'. So, 'for example the economy or nature', is known as something that is 'real' without needing to 'assert' and is not 'determine[d]' by the 'discourse' but already there before the 'discourse'. How the notion of 'irreducible real processes' works is further claimed to be 'tempered with' 'the proviso' in which 'processes' are framed to be multiple. The perspective knows what kind of 'processes' will and will not 'construct' 'specific statements' in an 'univocal or unmediated' way.

Therefore, on the one hand, there is a known difference between 'the real' and the 'discourse'. It is in this 'claim' that the former 'irreducibl[y]' 'determine[s]' the latter. On the other hand, 'the determination' is known to be 'not univocal or unmediated'. And the 'other' implies that the idea of 'outside' and/or 'inside' seems to be constituted here to claim the knowledge of 'irreducible' with certainty, within the frame of 'the proviso'. That is to say, without this 'proviso', 'the determination' might be 'reducible' as 'univocal or unmediated' to some extent, even if 'the real' is known to be 'irreducible' as such, which would, then, disrupt the very distinction between 'the real' and the 'discourse'.

When it comes to '[t]he other position', the perspective knows that this is 'discourse determinism' which is different from the 'claim' discussed above. In this 'position', the 'discourse' is known to be 'privilege[d]' in relation to 'the sole function'. The 'sole function' can be 'attribut[ed]' outside 'discourse'. This is how 'discourse determinism' is constructed on the basis of the notions of 'privileg[ing]' and 'attribut[ing]', which is different from but also similar to 'the determination' analysed above regarding 'the proviso'.

And 'knowledge of objects', instead of 'objects', is already known to be there for 'discourse' to 'determine' 'as its objects'. In other words, before being 'objects' to 'discourse', 'objects' are already framed with 'knowledge' that is not 'determine[d]' by 'discourse', in which, in a sense, the 'knowledge' can be regarded as similar as

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 106.

‘irreducible real processes (for example the economy or nature)’. Thus the ‘other position’ can, to some extent, be associated with the claim of ‘the real’ ‘determination’.

Furthermore, the negation of ‘appeal to’ ‘anything outside discourse’ can also be understood as a way of ‘privileg[ing]’ ‘discourse’, with, again, the underlying assumption of ‘outside’ and/or ‘inside’. That is to say, ‘anything outside discourse’ is already knowable as not being ‘outside’ but being ‘specified’ ‘only’ in ‘some discourse’ before the very notion of ‘construction’; ‘anything outside discourse’ would, after all, be ‘in a specific form’. Therefore, whether the idea of ‘outside’ is denied or not, the notion of ‘irreducible’, regarding ‘real processes’ and/or ‘discourse’, makes these ‘two main positions’ not so ‘demarcated’¹³² as they are claimed to be.

The objection to the former position is that it appears to refer to something like the truth, and a truth that can somehow be verified independently of discourse, against which competing claims can be adjudicated. Furthermore it could imply the relative independence both of these primary processes and of discursive processes such that the former are put beyond the effects of discursive claims (and intentions) about them.¹³³

The perspective on ‘[t]he objection to the former position’ claims to know that ‘former position’ cannot ‘refer to something like the truth’, even though it is claimed as ‘something like the truth’ being ‘refer[red]’ under the framing of ‘appears to’. Although this is ‘[t]he objection to the former position’, the ‘former position’ which claims about ‘irreducible real processes (for example the economy or nature) that determine what may ultimately be asserted in discourse’ is, after all, read by ‘[t]he objection’ to be related to ‘something like the truth, and a truth that can somehow be verified independently of discourse’. The claim to ‘appears to’ can also be read as an irony, as the perspective knows the difference between ‘the truth’ and ‘a truth’: in

¹³² Ibid., p. 105.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 106.

order to be ‘the truth’ – ‘the’ ‘irreducible real’ ‘truth’, ‘a truth’ requires to be ‘verified’ ‘somehow’, though with no need of being ‘adjudicated’ as ‘competing claims’ do.

Also, ‘the relative independence’ is here further constituted with the perspective shifting to ‘primary processes’ and ‘discursive processes’, which can be understood as that the ‘independence both of these primary processes and of discursive processes’ cannot make this ‘such that’ happen. It is the notion of ‘relative’ which has to be there as the basis for ‘the former’ to be ‘put beyond the effects of discursive claims (and intentions) about them’. However, the perspective knows that ‘discursive claims (and intentions)’ are ‘about’ ‘primary processes’ and would have ‘the effects’. These ‘effects’ are known to be there on the ‘primary processes’. That is to say, ‘primary processes’ and ‘discursive processes’ are known to define each other rather than being ‘relative independen[t]’. This is how the notion of ‘relative independence’ is claimed with ‘such that’ on the basis of knowing ‘dependence’ on each other.

The objection to the position which privileges discourse is that it is relativist in making the criteria of truth or rationality and adequacy internal to specific discourses; also it falls into idealism when it asserts that the real only exists insofar as there is a discourse which describes it. Thus intelligence would exist only insofar as psychology has constructed it as an object that it can measure and so on.¹³⁴

For the perspective on ‘[t]he objection to the position which privileges discourse’, the very notion of ‘privileges’ by ‘making the criteria of truth or rationality and adequacy internal to specific discourses’ is ‘relativist’ in one sense. In this ‘position’, ‘discourses’ are known not yet but could be ‘privilege[d]’ to have ‘the criteria of truth or rationality and adequacy’; it is ‘the’ ‘criteria’ which needs to be ‘ma[de]’ for ‘discourses’ to be ‘specific’, in the service of what ‘privileges’ means. So without this ‘criteria’, ‘discourses’ cannot be known as such. In another sense, the perspective on ‘relativist’ knows that ‘discourses’ cannot be ‘privilege[d]’ as ‘specific’ as they

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 106.

are by ‘making the criteria of truth or rationality and adequacy internal to’ them. However, what constitutes ‘discourses’ are, after all, based on the same notion of ‘relativist’, even though there may be many different kinds of ‘specific discourses’.

By making a claim to ‘also’, it implies that although ‘idealism’ is framed to be different from ‘relativist’, ‘the position which privileges discourse’ is still constructed in ‘[t]he objection’. If ‘the real only exists insofar as there is a discourse which describes it’, then this ‘position’ is claimed to ‘fall into idealism’. This implies that the perspective on ‘the real’ knows that it could ‘exist’ without being ‘describe[d]’ by ‘a discourse’. Here the very notion of ‘descri[bing]’ by one of many possible ‘discourse[s]’ can be seen as another way of ‘privileges’ besides what have been discussed regarding ‘making the criteria of truth or rationality and adequacy internal to specific discourses’ and the notion of ‘specific’.

But ‘the real’ is still what it is, claimed by the certainty of knowing what is not ‘idealism’ rather than by the ‘relativist’. ‘Thus’ can be read as knowing the relation of ‘intelligence’ to ‘the real’ and ‘psychology’ to ‘a discourse’. So the perspective on ‘intelligence’ knows that without ‘measur[ing]’ and being ‘an object’ by ‘psychology’, ‘intelligence’ could still be ‘the real’ somehow. In other words, ‘intelligence’ is already known to be there before it is ‘constructed’ by ‘psychology’ ‘as an object’ and can be ‘measure[d]’. To the perspective on ‘[t]he objection’, ‘intelligence’ ‘exist[s]’ independently of and prior to ‘a discourse’ such as ‘psychology’.

Now, in discussing these conflicting claims, we need to avoid several blind alleys. For example, it seems reasonable at first to assert that the earth does move around the sun in spite of possible contrary views. But the question of how this claim— relying on the unspoken obviousness of what it asserts— can be established returns us to the problems of assessing particular scientific theories; it thus immediately reintroduces the problem of the relation between

scientific claims and ‘real’ processes.¹³⁵

The ‘position’ either at ‘the former’ (‘irreducible real’) and/or that ‘privileges discourse’ are ‘discuss[ed]’ as ‘conflicting claims’ which are known to be related to ‘several blind alleys’. But the perspective knows that ‘several blind alleys’ can and ‘need to’ be ‘avoid[ed]’ ‘in discussing’ these ‘claims’. For ‘the former position’, ‘blind alley’ can be read as ‘assert[ing] that the earth does move around the sun in spite of possible contrary views’. To be more specific, the reason why it is ‘[un]reasonable’ for the perspective on this ‘example’ is not because that the perspective does not know that ‘the earth does move around the sun’ is known as something that can be ‘assert[ed]’ ‘at first’ while ‘views’ relating to it are known to be ‘possible contrary’. But these ‘views’ are also ‘assert[ed]’ as ‘possible’ and ‘contrary’ within the claim of knowing what ‘does’ means. In other words, it is not because that there is no need to take ‘possible contrary views’ into consideration when ‘assert[ing] that the earth does move around the sun’. It is this very notion of ‘assert[ing]’ also defines that other ‘views’ can only be ‘possible’ and ‘contrary’, which is known to be ‘blind alley’.

How ‘several blind alleys’ can be ‘avoid[ed]’ is further claimed by knowing ‘the problems of assessing particular scientific theories’. That is to say, to know that ‘this claim’ ‘can be established’ because of ‘rel[iance] on the unspoken obviousness of what it asserts’. So it implies that if ‘particular scientific theories’ can be ‘question[ed]’ instead of being ‘assert[ed]’ as ‘unspoken obviousness’ in thinking about how ‘claim’ – for example, ‘the earth move[s] around the sun’ – is ‘established’ when ‘discussing’ ‘the former position’, then those ‘blind’ ‘alleys’ can be ‘avoid[ed]’.

The perspective on ‘us’ claims to know that ‘the question’ could both ‘return’ and ‘reintroduce’ ‘the problems’ regarding ‘several blind alleys’. In this sense, ‘the relation between scientific claims and “real” processes’ has already been known as ‘the problem’ but might not be thought of by others as such or as ‘blind alleys’. Therefore, ‘the question of how’ ‘the relation between scientific claims and “real”

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 106.

processes' is 'established' would be regarded as a 'need' to think about, rather than 'assert[ing]' 'scientific' as something in relation to either 'real processes' and 'the unspoken obviousness' or 'possible contrary views'; the claim to 'avoid[ing] several blind alleys' can be read to 'introduce' 'us' to 'question' why and how 'processes' need to be 'real' in 'claim[ing]' the idea of 'scientific'.

The other unfruitful approach, we think, is that of seeking an answer on the terrain of epistemology, especially when the range of issues above are reduced to the problem of finding the *general* guarantees, conditions and rules for reliable knowledge.¹³⁶

Here the perspective shifts from 'several blind alleys' to the 'unfruitful approach', which implies that it is known to be 'unfruitful' for 'the position which privileges discourse' to 'seeking an answer on the terrain of epistemology'. So the perspective knows that there might be 'an answer' outside 'the terrain of epistemology'. Or 'seeking an answer' itself can be seen as the 'unfruitful approach', as this indicates that the knowable 'answer', for instance, 'on the terrain of epistemology', might be there already before 'seeking'.

How 'an answer' is 's[ought]' 'on the terrain of epistemology' is further discussed by already knowing that 'the range of issues above' would be 'reduced to the problem of finding the *general* guarantees, conditions and rules for reliable knowledge'. So the perspective knows what 'blind alleys' are for this 'position'. First, 'the range of issues above' is not supposed to be 'reduced'. Secondly, 'finding the *general* guarantees, conditions and rules for reliable knowledge' is framed as 'the problem'. It is not because that 'knowledge' is already known to be 'reliable', so 'finding the *general* guarantees, conditions and rules for' it would be 'the problem' as if there is no need for this 'finding' at all. Or 'guarantees, conditions and rules' are known not to be 'general' for 'reliable knowledge'. But, 'reliable knowledge' is already claimed to be problematic before 'the range of issues above' to be

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 106.

‘discuss[ed]’, which implies that there must be ‘an answer’ and/or ‘reliable knowledge’ being there before ‘the range of issues above’ comes about. In this sense, ‘the range of issues above’ cannot be known outside ‘reliable knowledge’, which falls back into ‘blind alleys’.

Chapter 3: Exploring *Right* Solutions

This chapter explores what constitutes ‘world’ as ‘world’, including how to understand the notion of illustration. It also continues to consider what is at stake in the ideas of dualisms, for example, between internal and external, positive and negative, same and difference, in engaging with the texts in which both discussions around LEGO and Eco-anxiety claim to know the right answers.

3.1 LEGO and Formalism

In the chapter ‘LEGO® Formalism in Architecture’ of the book *LEGO and Philosophy: Constructing Reality Brick by Brick*, Saul Fisher discusses ‘LEGO’ in terms of the ‘formalism’ and ‘contextualism, functional beauty’ as follows:¹³⁷

Unlike objects of other artforms such as drawing or sculpture, architectural objects are not representative; they do not usually represent other things in the world. (One sort of exception are objects like The Big 2 Duck of Flanders.) Accordingly, we cannot judge them aesthetically in terms of how they relate to external reality, yet we can appreciate them aesthetically in terms of internal features. In addition, formalists highlight the key role of operations on forms, and relations among forms, in architecture. The architectural design enterprise revolves prominently around the manipulation, aggregation, arrangement, and association of constituent forms, in order to constitute greater forms. Formalists take this to indicate that what we primarily think about aesthetically when we think about architecture is its forms, their relations, and their properties.¹³⁸

The notion of being ‘representative’ can be read as relating to ‘objects of other artforms such as drawing or sculpture’ and ‘objects like The Big 2 Duck of Flanders’

¹³⁷ Saul Fisher, ‘LEGO® Formalism in Architecture’, in *LEGO and Philosophy: Constructing Reality Brick by Brick* (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), pp. 113-22.

¹³⁸ Fisher, p. 30.

which ‘usually represent other things in the world’ and ‘relate to external reality’. This implies that ‘[u]nlike’ ‘architectural objects’, they, ‘such as drawing or sculpture’ and ‘[t]he Big 2 Duck’, have to be ‘judge[d]’ ‘aesthetically’ in combination with ‘other things in the world’ rather than ‘in terms of’, say, ‘the[ir]’ *own* ‘features’. They may also be thought of as having ‘features’ which constitute their ‘realit[ies]’. But these are ‘realit[ies]’ known not to be that ‘real’, ‘aesthetically’ speaking, unless their ‘features’ are ‘judge[d]’ to be ‘relate[d] to external reality’ – ‘other things’ they ‘represent’. They need to be subordinate to and dependent on ‘other things’, even though they are known to be different from the latter but are ‘artforms’, as this is how they and ‘other things’ come to be ‘in’ this ‘world’.

When it comes to ‘architectural objects’, it seems that the very definition of being ‘representative’ or non-‘representative’ separates ‘the[m]’ from the ‘objects of other artforms’. The precarious relationship between what is ‘external’ and what is ‘internal’ remains in knowing what the ‘formalists’ do in relation to ‘architecture’. Firstly, ‘architectural objects’ are seen to have ‘forms’ with respect to ‘internal features’ by which ‘we can appreciate aesthetically’. In other words, ‘they’ cannot be ‘appreciate[d] aesthetically’ ‘in terms of’, say, being ‘architecture’ – a *pure* ‘object’, although ‘they’ are known not to ‘represent’ any ‘other things in the world’. ‘[T]hey’ are, after all, constituted to be ‘internal’ to this ‘world’, though being ‘external’ to ‘other’ ‘realit[ies]’; the knowledge of ‘the world’ takes part in defining, for example, what ‘architecture’ it should be and in what way it can be ‘appreciate[d] aesthetically’, including these very ‘internal features’. In this way, the idea of ‘internal’ may be seen to be similar to that of ‘external’ to some extent, in regard to the way in which the ‘objects of other artforms’ are claimed.

Secondly, this sort of repetition between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ can also be read through the distinction and connection between ‘constituent forms’ and ‘greater forms’. These ‘forms’, for instance, one of the many possible ‘constituent forms’, cannot be the ‘key’ ‘in architecture’ *internally*. Rather, there has to be ‘operations on’ ‘and relations among’ ‘forms’ to play ‘the key role’. Likewise, the very idea of ‘[t]he architectural design enterprise’ already yields how ‘operations’ and what ‘relations’

should be going, for instance: ‘the manipulation, aggregation, arrangement, and association of constituent forms, in order to constitute greater forms’. This is how the ‘reality’ in the same ‘world’ is being structured and structures, such as the idea of ‘formalists’ (also, the relation of ‘forms’ to ‘features’), ‘what we primarily think about aesthetically when we think about architecture’, and the reason for ‘properties’, through which the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ can either flip to or collapse into each other.

LEGO elements have a generally fixed or non-malleable nature [...] As a consequence, architectural design in the original LEGO world, insofar as it models the real world, is an art of approximation. And to the extent that the promise of fidelity is needed for optimal representation, original LEGO architecture can’t aspire to optimal representation but is perfectly suitable as a non-representative medium. At this point, the formalist may insist on a small victory: if architectural objects have representational deficiencies, our appreciation of them best plays to their internal, formal features. Formalism in original LEGO world architecture, on this view, is a byproduct of LEGO architectural objects doing a poor job of representation because of the nature of their constituent elements.¹³⁹

It seems that the claim to ‘insofar as’ knows why ‘architectural design in the original LEGO world’ ‘is an art of approximation’ is because ‘LEGO elements have a generally fixed or non-malleable nature’ instead of the idea of ‘model[ing]’. As if this ‘design’ can be more than ‘an art of approximation’ when ‘model[ing] the real world’, if ‘LEGO elements have a’ ‘malleable nature’. That is, it is this very idea of ‘model[ing]’, rather than the ‘nature’ of ‘LEGO elements’, that determines the difference between ‘architectural design in the original LEGO world’ and ‘in’ ‘the real world’.

This is also the case in ‘the promise of fidelity’ or so-called ‘optimal representation’. Here, ‘representation’ is known to have different ‘extent[s]’ in terms

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 32.

of ‘fidelity’ in comparison with ‘architectural design’ ‘in’ ‘the real world’, among which ‘an art of approximation’ cannot be counted as ‘optimal’ when ‘a generally fixed or non-malleable nature’ is seen as a failure to ‘the promise of fidelity’, although the claim to ‘can’t’ implies a possibility of ‘aspir[ation]’. And this ‘aspir[ation]’ is still there, shifting to and with the knowledge of ‘perfect suitab[ility]’, when ‘original LEGO architecture’ is regarded to be ‘a’ ‘medium’ at this point, thus making the notion of ‘non-representative’ not that ‘non-representative’. Rather, the ‘non-representative’ is constituted on the basis of the ‘representative’, though the two appear to be opposed to one another. The idea of ‘(non-)representative’ can also be read in the claim to ‘representational deficiencies’ and ‘doing a poor job of representation’, which, meanwhile, leads to a very ironically ‘perfect’ ‘suitab[ility]’ for ‘original LEGO architecture’ to be ‘a’ ‘medium’. As a result, the ‘original LEGO architecture’ becomes neither ‘representative’ nor ‘non-representative’.

Further, the implication of ‘insist[ing] on a small victory’ is that, in the first place, ‘the formalist’ is, again, seen to recognize the idea of ‘fidelity’ due to the knowledge of ‘the real world’ anyway. Second, probably ‘a small victory’ does not need to be ‘insist[ed] on’ but always being there by sharing that knowledge, as ‘our appreciation’ is also relevant to a seemingly failed ‘promise of fidelity’, as with the above discussions between ‘representational’ and ‘internal, formal features’ and of what it means to claim ‘the nature of their constituent elements’. In this way, it is not ‘[f]ormalism in original LEGO world architecture’ that ‘is a byproduct of LEGO architectural objects doing a poor job of representation’ but is how ‘LEGO architectural objects’ in this ‘original LEGO world’ can be defined to be both ‘representational’ and have ‘formal features’. Either the idea of ‘[f]ormalism’ or ‘representation’ is, ‘[a]s a consequence’, a ‘product’, when ‘architectural design in the original LEGO world’ ‘models the real world’.

In comparison with ‘formalism’, ‘contextualism’ and ‘functional beauty theory’ are thought of as ‘the most prominent alternative views’ which ‘do not hold’, although

the former is known not to be part of ‘a positive argument’ at the same time:¹⁴⁰

To be sure, neither contextualism nor functional beauty theory is inconsistent with a moderate formalism. The aesthetic judgments we make of a structure in original LEGO world architecture as based on, say, context or function, are triggered because the structure has *forms* particularly fitting to such framing or judgment.¹⁴¹

At this point, ‘formalism’ is known to have different levels, among which it is ‘a moderate’ one, ‘[t]o be sure’, that ‘neither contextualism nor functional beauty theory is inconsistent with’. Also, ‘a moderate formalism’ appears to be different from ‘formalism’ in relation to the *incompatible* relationship between ‘internal, formal features’ and ‘external realit[ies]’ that I have discussed above to be impossible. Then the ‘consisten[cy]’ between ‘contextualism’ or ‘functional beauty theory’ and ‘formalism’ is further claimed as that ‘[t]he aesthetic judgments we make of a structure in original LEGO world architecture as based on, say, context or function, are triggered because the structure has *forms* particularly fitting to such framing or judgment’.

That is to say, the notion of ‘trigger[ing]’ implies that the ‘framing or judgment’ ‘ma[de]’ according to ‘contextualism’ or ‘functional beauty theory’ can only be ‘such’ because of the premise that ‘structure has *forms*’ that are fixed and ready. In this ‘consisten[cy]’, ‘forms’ are already known to, not only, be there somehow (falling back into the problematic claim of ‘internal’ to some extent) rather than being affected and defined by the ‘framing or judgment’ on ‘the structure’, but also to ‘particularly fit to’ ‘[t]he aesthetic judgments we make of a structure in original LEGO world architecture’ ‘based on’ ‘context or function’, even though these ‘aesthetic judgments’ have not been ‘ma[de]’ yet. In other words, ‘a moderate formalism’ determines and

¹⁴⁰ ‘What we have indicated, after all, is only that the most prominent alternative views do not hold. In the absence of a positive argument, we might opt for an agnostic stance’ (Fisher 2017, 34). The knowledge of and against the unknowable, however, is there throughout the chapter.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 33-34.

directs where and how far ‘contextualism’ or ‘functional beauty theory’ can go.

Taking ‘anti-formalists’ who ‘appeal to functional beauty theory’ as an example, they are framed to ‘maintain, formal properties alone don’t determine the aesthetic properties of the structure or our judgments thereof; broader design features are gauged against the prescribed functional needs and the degree to which those needs are met’.¹⁴² These ‘formal properties’ are seen, according to the perspective on ‘anti-formalists’ perspective, as possible but not ‘alone’ to ‘determine the aesthetic properties of the structure or our judgments thereof’, as ‘design features’ are something different and ‘broader’, whereas the perspective on ‘broader design features’ claims to know that ‘the prescribed functional needs and the degree to which those needs are met’ are not only related to but even can only be ‘triggered’ by ‘formal properties’.

The case of ‘a LEGO village’¹⁴³ given subsequently after the claim to these ‘anti-formalists’ – ‘the functional beauty theorist[s]’,¹⁴⁴ however, can be read to disturb the very idea of ‘trigger[ing]’ in the sense that the ‘concept we have of a well-working village’ defines, say, ‘a village’s functions’ to which what kind of ‘structure’ ‘fit[s]’ ‘delightful[ly]’, thus structuring, for example, how ‘circulation paths’ should be done for ‘minifigs’. In this sense, the idea of ‘fit’ implies that ‘structures’ can be built and changed catering to the ‘concept[s]’ and ‘needs’, which makes ‘forms’ less ‘particularly’ stable. That is, the ‘structures’, for instance, in building ‘circulation paths’ in ‘a LEGO village’, will not guarantee that ‘forms’ are there ‘particularly’ for and in advance of the ‘functional beauty theory’.

Further, the instability in relation to ‘forms’ is not paradoxical with the above claim about the ‘LEGO elements’ if they are known to ‘have a generally fixed or non-

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁴³ ‘We find a LEGO village delightful, for example, because it features circulation paths fitting to the functions of its constituent structures, those structures fitting to the basic range of a village’s functions, and all at a scale and in styles fitting to one or another concept we have of a well-working village—in contemporary LEGO worlds, as populated by minifigs’ (Fisher 2017, 33).

¹⁴⁴ ‘The contextualist and functional beauty theorist will protest that, while we might need the forms of our LEGO structure to arrive at such aesthetic judgments, they are not sufficient to producing our delight (for example) in that structure. Conceding the necessity of the forms, though, is a step toward at least a moderate formalism’ (Fisher 2017, 34).

malleable nature'. Rather, it is problematic to claim to know both the ideas of 'trigger[ing]' and 'particularly', when the 'context or function' and 'forms' actually define and rely on one another, upon which the 'aesthetic judgments we make of a structure in original LEGO world architecture' is 'based'. '[T]he necessity of the forms' for '[t]he contextualist and functional beauty theorist', therefore, may neither be seen as '[c]onceding', nor necessarily 'a step toward at least a moderate formalism',¹⁴⁵ but is about how 'forms' and 'formal properties' are needed and generated.

3.2 LEGO and Attention

In the chapter 'Neuroscience—Understanding the Builder's Mind', Per Kristiansen and Robert Rasmussen introduce 'four elements' that 'characterize attention' and how 'attention' can be 'ke[pt]' 'focused' in combination with the 'advantage in the LEGO SERIOUS PLAY method':¹⁴⁶

Spatial orientation: Participants have to *disengage* from what they otherwise do as they get their hands on the LEGO bricks and engage in undisturbed building in response to the facilitator's questions. LEGO SERIOUS PLAY Application Techniques such as shared model building and landscaping also activate spatial orientation. In this situation, participants disengage from a particular model or view of the model(s), move to a different position, and engage again.¹⁴⁷

'Spatial orientation' is claimed earlier than this quote as one of the '[f]our elements help[ing] us keep our attention focused': 'We need to physically move around and directly orient our bodies toward something; researchers specifically cite a three-step

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁴⁶ Per Kristiansen and Robert Rasmussen, 'Neuroscience—Understanding the Builder's Mind', in *Building a Better Business: Using the Lego Serious Play Method* (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), pp. 95-108 (p. 98).

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 99.

process of disengaging, moving, and engaging'.¹⁴⁸ For Kristiansen and Rasmussen, 'mov[ing] around' can be actualized differently. An 'attention' can also be 'move[d] around' when 'disengaging' and 'engaging' something. But to 'keep our attention focused', especially in terms of '[s]patial orientation', there has to be a 'physical mov[ing] around'. That is, 'our bodies' are known as being able to be 'directly orient[ed]' 'toward something', which will have further implications: first, 'we' are already those who have 'bodies' to be 'physically move[d]' and 'directly orient[ed]'. As for others who do not have such 'bodies', on this score, '[s]patial orientation' cannot be acted and operated, nor an 'attention' can be 'ke[pt]' 'focused' among these people. '[K]eep[ing] attention focused' becomes some special ability that only belongs and is related to 'us'.

The idea of 'attention' has something to do with 'body'. The very 'direct[ing]' of the latter implies that it is not always in the same 'orientation' as the former 'toward something', thus consolidating the difference both between 'attention' and 'body', and their respective relation to 'something'. In other words, 'attention' can also be independent of 'body' to 'dis/engaging' 'something'. In this sense, the 'moving' in this 'three-step process' can be an 'attent[ive]' exchange between 'disengaging' and 'engaging', which does not necessarily relate to a 'physical' 'move[ment]' that is seen as how Kristiansen and Rasmussen think of 'moving' in the case of 'LEGO SERIOUS PLAY' and read about 'researchers'.

Second, no matter whether 'disengaging' or 'engaging', 'attention' can be understood in a dynamic movement, even with the very intention of 'keep[ing]' it 'focused'. That is to say, 'focused' 'attention' is built on the ideas of 'dis/engaging' rather than something that seems to be always 'undisturbed'; 'the facilitator's questions' used in 'LEGO SERIOUS PLAY' may help the 'participants' to try to better 'engage' with the 'building'. But this very attempt to be 'undisturbed' already implies the opposite possibility.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 98.

A similar idea can also be seen in the claim to know what '[w]e' 'need to' do 'toward something' in which 'something' is just like 'the LEGO bricks' that are *only* in need of 'engaging' and different from 'what they otherwise do'. However, there can also be a separation between 'engaging in' 'their' 'building' and 'respon[ding]' 'to the facilitator's questions'. That is, the latter can be seen as 'disturb[ing]' the 'engage[ment] in' the 'building'; 'participants have to disengage from what they otherwise do' – for instance, 'building' with 'LEGO bricks', 'as they' need to pay 'attention' 'to the facilitator's questions'.

Likewise, when 'participants disengage from a particular model or view of the model(s)', what would be 'engage[d] again' may or may not be 'Application Techniques', even though there might 'also' be a 'spatial orientation' being 'activate[d]' in 'shared model building and landscaping'. Instead, it could, 'again', be 'a particular model or view of the model(s)' in 'LEGO SERIOUS PLAY' or something else after 'activat[ing]' a 'spatial orientation'. 'In this situation', 'mov[ing] to a different position' may not facilitate and guarantee an 'engage[ment]' but 'disengage[ment]'. The very idea of 'physical' 'bodies' 'move[ment]', or even a 'spatial orientation' within the 'spatial orientation' in the case of 'Application Techniques', can be counterproductive, which implies, again, the possibility of inconsistency between 'attention' and 'body', thus disrupting the very idea of '[s]patial orientation' as an 'element' to 'help us keep our attention focused'.

Novelty detection and reward: Often, the very fact of building with LEGO bricks is in itself a novelty. In addition, the first time a participant uses LEGO SERIOUS PLAY, he or she will always start with his or her 'own' kit. Participants will always get acknowledgment as a reward. We often observe this as participants find new answers to challenges and questions that have been with them or the organization for a long time. We also see this kind of reward as part of building stronger attention density.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 99.

What has been claimed to be '[n]ovelty detection and reward' before this quote is that: 'We sense something is new or can predict that there is some sort of reward':¹⁵⁰ 'something' 'new' is known to be relevant to a 'reward'. The relation of 'something' to a 'reward' is 'predict[able]' prior to the advent of 'some sort of reward' and can be linked through the claim either to 'and' or 'or'. In this sense, 'reward' is already known to be there before the 'detection' of '[n]ovelty' or 'sens[ing]' 'something' as 'new'. Or to say, as long as 'something' 'is new', it will be 'sense[d]' and 'predict[ed]' as a 'reward' by 'us', thus 'keep[ing] our attention focused'.

In combination with this, the 'new[er]' 'something' is or the more 'something' is 'sense[d]' as 'new', the 'stronger attention density' '[w]e' will have. Thus what would also be a 'fact of building with LEGO bricks' is that 'a novelty' and also the resulting 'attention density' might not be there after 'the first time a participant uses LEGO SERIOUS PLAY'.

The difference between 'the first time' and other times for 'a participant' to 'use' can also be seen from the knowledge of 'his or her "own" kit'. The double quotation marks imply that, first, 'own' would not be that 'own' when the 'kit' is defined within certain settings, for instance, under the frame of 'the facilitator's questions', as aforementioned above. Besides that, 'his or her "own" kit' is not their 'own' 'kit' anyway but is regarded as such by the perspective on 'a participant': the idea of 'own' is employed in the service of what '[w]e' want to 'observe' from 'a participant' or 'participants', and what we would adopt and implement in the next step according to and in terms of 'his or her "own" kit', as, for instance, '[p]articipants' who 'build with LEGO bricks' for 'the first time', are seen to 'always' need 'acknowledgment', which is given 'as a reward' from elsewhere. At this point, '[w]e' are also split from those who 'can predict that there is some sort of reward'; 'participants' are being excluded from this '[w]e' and cannot 'predict' the acknowledgment ('a reward') on their own.

Neither is the '[w]e' the same as the 'participants' when doing an 'observ[ation]'. That is, '[w]e' are not those who have 'challenges and questions that have been with

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 98.

them or the organization for a long time' but can help 'them' to 'find new answers' by letting 'them' 'build with LEGO bricks' from the 'kit' of 'LEGO SERIOUS PLAY' for 'the first time'. It seems that the reason why 'new answers' can be 'f[ound]' is because of the idea of 'a novelty' and of 'the first time' of doing so. It is, again, that 'participants' are known by this '[w]e' in need of 'acknowledgment' for and before 'find[ing] new answers'. The 'acknowledgment' is not 'new' for this '[w]e' but needs to be 'new' for 'participants', as the latter is known to never 'get' such in the past. The idea of 'acknowledgment' seems to not only be there 'long' before 'challenges and questions that have been with them or the organization' and waiting for 'the[ir]' 'first time' to 'get', but also to transcend the division somehow between 'building with LEGO bricks' and 'find[ing] new answers to challenges and questions that have been with them or the organization for a long time'.

From this point, 'this kind of reward' can also be 'see[n]' as not 'part of building stronger attention density' but as 'part of' what '[w]e' want 'participants' to 'use', 'get' and 'find'. Accordingly, the 'answers' may not be 'new' to the 'participants'. All they need is 'get[ting] acknowledgment' to be supported to make existing 'answers', that cloud have 'been with them or the organization for a long time', be *new* ones. They are, after all, seen to lack an 'acknowledgment' of 'answers' to be 'answers' instead of a lack of 'answers'.

Executive organization: Workshops always start with a clear framing of how the delivery ties in to the success of the participants' organization and/or their own goals. This makes it clear for the brain to attend to the process, and leads to a release of the neurotransmitter dopamine—something that helps shut out information that would be noise in this case.¹⁵¹

The 'participants' are known to be probably not 'clear' about the relation of 'their own goals' to 'the success of' 'their' 'organization' according to the claim to 'and/or', nor about the relation of 'the delivery' to 'their own goals', even if when the latter is

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 99.

seen as an alternative to ‘the success of the participants’ organization’, which implies why there has to be ‘a clear framing’ being ‘start[ed] with’ in ‘[w]orkshops’ for ‘t[ying]’ the two together. How to ‘tie’ is further discussed in relation to ‘the brain’.

Before being given ‘a clear framing’, ‘the brain’ is supposed to be not able to tell what ‘information’ is ‘noise’ and what is not, thus failing to pay ‘attention’ to the latter or ‘shut out’ the former. And ‘a release of the neurotransmitter dopamine’ would also be ‘clear’ in this very idea of ‘framing’. The implication is then, on the one hand, there might also be no need for ‘attention’ to be ‘ke[pt]’ ‘focused’ or for ‘dis/engaging’ something at this point, as ‘the brain’, with some ‘help’ of ‘a clear framing’, can do what ‘focused’ ‘attention’ is supposed to do – an *undisturbed* ‘engage[ment]’ in ‘the process’ of, for example, ‘building with LEGO bricks’ through *its* ‘attend[ance]’ and ‘release’.

In other words, ‘the brain’ can be ‘fram[ed]’ and mobilised to do so beyond ‘attention’. Thus, before coming to this ‘[w]orkshops’, ‘participants’ and ‘their’ ‘brain[s]’ are known not to be as ‘clear’ and ‘[e]xecutive’ as the ‘organization’ of ‘LEGO SERIOUS PLAY’ thinks of them to be. This ‘organization’ of putting on ‘[w]orkshops’ not only knows how the ‘brain’ can ‘deliver’ ‘a clear framing’ in its *own* ‘delivery’ to ‘participants’, but also knows better and more clearly about ‘participants’ ‘brain[s]’ than ‘participants’ themselves.

On the other hand, it is no longer about exploring how to ‘keep our attention focused’ with the ‘help’ of ‘LEGO SERIOUS PLAY’. That is to say, there is no need to ‘keep’, as ‘attention’ is known with certainty to be ‘focused’ as long as ‘their’ ‘brain[s]’ are given ‘a clear framing’ ‘in this case’.

3.3 LEGO and Imagination

In the chapter ‘Imagination—Seeing What Is Not’, Per Kristiansen and Robert Rasmussen explain ‘how the LEGO SERIOUS PLAY method helps our

imagination’¹⁵² by introducing ‘three kinds of imagination’ and how they ‘interplay’ to be ‘strategic imagination’.¹⁵³ One of these is called ‘descriptive imagination’:

The role of descriptive imagination is to evoke images that describe a complex and confusing world out there. This is the imagination that rearranges data and information, identifies patterns and regularities in the mass of data that rigorous analysis generates, and is informed by judgment based on years of experience.¹⁵⁴

According to Kristiansen and Rasmussen, ‘a’ ‘world’ is already known to be ‘out there’, which is not something that is ‘describe[d]’ as such. It is what it is: ‘complex and confusing’. On the other hand, this ‘world’ needs to be ‘describe[d]’ by ‘images’ as not ‘complex and confusing’, while it is remained ‘out there’. Thus, for those who have ‘images’ to be ‘evoke[d]’, for example, with ‘years of experience’, the ‘world’ is not ‘complex and confusing’ anymore. Likewise, when ‘data and information’ can be ‘rearrange[d]’, ‘data’ is not something just being ‘mass’ but ‘identifie[d]’ to be ‘patterns and regularities’ ‘in the mass’.

Both ‘world’ and ‘data’ can be understood differently: either ‘complex and confusing’ or ‘mass’, they are, nevertheless, temporary to those who have ‘years of experience’ and can ‘apply’¹⁵⁵ their ‘descriptive imagination’ to, for instance, ‘rigorous analysis’ or ‘judgment’. However, for those who do not have such ‘experience’: the ‘world’ is after all ‘complex and confusing’, as no ‘images’ can be ‘evoke[d]’ and no ‘patterns and regularities’ can be ‘identifie[d]’. Therefore, the former group is known to know what ‘a’ ‘world’ would actually be; whereas the latter is known to know how ‘complex and confusing’ ‘a’ ‘world’ is. The idea of ‘world out there’ is split by ‘[t]he role of descriptive imagination’.

¹⁵² Per Kristiansen and Robert Rasmussen, ‘Imagination—Seeing What Is Not’, in *Building a Better Business: Using the Lego Serious Play Method* (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), pp. 117-27 (p. 125).

¹⁵³ Kristiansen and Rasmussen, p. 119.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 119.

The problem of ‘out there’ can also be seen in the claim to the ‘need (and ability) to mirror the world’, although ‘descriptive imagination’ is known to ‘enable us to’ ‘see new possibilities and opportunities’.¹⁵⁶

Using metaphors such as landscapes to describe the world in different ways helps us to expand our descriptive images. This is the way that humans typically deal with confusing or complex information; by adding structure to information, we are effectively using descriptive imagination to focus on repeating patterns, and to see things in a new way.¹⁵⁷

Combined with the above reading, ‘us’ are those who have ‘years of experience’ and who then have ‘descriptive images’ to be ‘expand[ed]’, as only this ‘us’ can ‘[u]s[e] metaphors such as landscapes to describe the world in different ways’ and can be counted as ‘humans’ to be able to ‘typically deal with confusing or complex information’. How ‘typical’ it is is further claimed to be ‘adding structure to information’, which implies not only that ‘structure’ and ‘information’ are distinct from each other, but also that the former seems to be generated either earlier or later than the latter. But where does this ‘structure’ come from?

Like how ‘images’ are deemed to be ‘evoke[d]’ in relation to ‘a’ ‘world’, the ‘structure’ is not something prepared to be there already or independent of ‘information’. Instead, this ‘structure’ can come from a very ‘rigorous analysis’ of the ‘information’ and defines how the ‘information’ can be read to be neither ‘confusing’ nor ‘complex’. Accordingly, when the ‘information’ is ‘rearrange[d]’ by ‘the imagination’, they are not the same ‘information’ anymore but the ‘information’ from which ‘patterns’ can be ‘identifie[d]’ as ‘repeating’.

In this sense, the idea of ‘effectively’ by ‘using descriptive imagination’ does not lie in leading to ‘see things in a new way’ but that ‘things’ are also ‘new[ly]’ constructed in this ‘imagination’, which also contradicts the claim being made later

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 120.

in the article to compare the difference between ‘descriptive imagination’ and ‘creative imagination’: ‘[w]hereas descriptive imagination enables us to see what is there (but in a new way), creative imagination allows us to see what isn’t there (yet)’.¹⁵⁸ Further, this is ‘a new way’, provided that ‘patterns’ can be ‘identifie[d]’ and ‘focus[ed] on’ as such. The implication is that ‘a’ ‘way’ would not be ‘new’, nor would ‘possibilities and opportunities’ come up to be ‘new’, when ‘things’ are not ‘see[n]’ to have ‘repeating patterns’. In neither case, however, does it ‘mirror the’ same ‘world’.

The image in Figure 9.1 is an example of using our descriptive imagination to illustrate the quality of leadership in a team. In this case there is only one correct way of thinking, which is the thinking that is identical to the leader’s thinking.¹⁵⁹




FIGURE 9.1 Using Your Descriptive Imagination to Represent the Uniformity in a Team's Thinking

(Figure 2)¹⁶⁰

‘The image in Figure 9.1 is an example of’ how to ‘use our descriptive imagination’ to ‘describe a complex and confusing world out there’. And this is the ‘world’ concerning ‘the quality of leadership in a team’. Why it is ‘complex and confusing’ to someone who does not include this ‘we’ who are supposed to have ‘years of experience’ is because they are thought to be incapable of ‘indentifi[ng]’ ‘repeating

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 120-21.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 121.

patterns' in 'this case': that is, 'there is only one correct way of thinking, which is the thinking that is identical to the leader's thinking'. This can also be understood as how 'we' 'rearrange' what 'the quality of leadership in a team' means. During this 'rearrange[ment]', the 'world' also shifts from 'the quality of leadership in a team' to 'only one correct way of thinking' in relation to 'the leader's thinking'. By implication, there is also other knowable thinking 'that is' not 'identical to the leader's thinking' 'in a team'. This kind of 'thinking' is not seen as the 'correct way of thinking' and, therefore, does not 'illustrate the quality of leadership'.

Combined with '[t]he image', however, the 'world' can be read to be '[r]epresent[ed]' differently once again. According to these introductory words to the 'image', the idea of '[u]niformity' implies there is a difference between, for example, 'the leader's thinking' and non-'leader's thinking', and they have to be 'identical to' each other, which means that it is not necessary to be the latter 'identical to' the former when, in particular, all their heads can be read to be the same color. Therefore, 'only one correct way of thinking' might not be 'illustrate[d]' correctly as it is thought to be.

Furthermore, the difference between a shorter head and a longer head can be used to differentiate who is 'the leader' and who is not, as 'the leader' is supposed to be '[r]epresent[ed]' as a single figure who happens to be sitting on the higher position against standing figures. For the same reason, however, they are not 'uniform'. A further difference is that 'the leader' is allowed to have and be constituted with its own head, whereas the other three cannot do so, but share a head. And even though these three could be constructed with respective heads of the same size of LEGO bricks as that of 'the leader', to say, in the same color as well in a sense that the idea of '[u]niformity' is '[r]epresent[ed]', who is 'the leader' becomes unclear as they are all individuals in this assumed case.

Nor does it work under the assumption that the four figures share a head: a single piece of LEGO brick, for example, connects the four bodies together. That is to say, although what 'is only one correct way of thinking' is knowable in 'this case' and can be 'identifie[d]' by 'our descriptive imagination' as 'repeating patterns', 'the quality

of leadership in a team' has not been 'illustrated' in this 'example' by 'using our' and/or '[y]our' descriptive imagination', except different readings of how 'a' 'world' could be. Since there is already a split or paradox between 'only one correct way of thinking' and 'the [u]niformity in a [t]eam's [t]hinking'.

In addition to the above analysis of 'a' 'world out there' that reads the idea of 'descriptive imagination' flip over to what 'creative imagination' means for Kristiansen and Rasmussen – 'to see what isn't there', for the same reason in relation to 'years of experience', the idea of 'creative imagination' can be read to be related to 'what is there (but in a new way)' – which is thought of as what 'descriptive imagination' means:

We use this approach to create something really new and totally different. The image in Figure 9.2 illustrates an example of using our creative imagination. It might not be a good idea to have a fourth wheel that is larger than the others, but it is an example of seeing what is not there yet.¹⁶¹



FIGURE 9.2 Using Your Creative Imagination to Show an Idea Not Yet Seen

(Figure 3)¹⁶²

The 'creative imagination' is known as an 'approach' 'to creat[ing] something really new and totally different'. However, what would be 'a good idea' 'might' also 'be' knowable: in the first place, it is 'a fourth wheel' rather than something else that is

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 121.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 122.

needed. Secondly, this ‘fourth wheel’ should not be ‘larger than the others’. In this sense, ‘this approach’ is not about ‘creat[ing] something really new’, although it can be regarded as ‘creat[ing] something’ ‘different’ to some degree – ‘a’ ‘larger’ ‘fourth wheel’. Thus ‘Figure 9.2’ which ‘illustrates an example of using our creative imagination’ can be understood as ‘see[ing] what is’ already ‘there’.

The repetition is further seen in the other ‘example’¹⁶³ about ‘the invention of the Rollaboard’ in the article in which ‘the Rollaboard’ is not ‘something’ being ‘create[d]’ ‘really new’, as ‘the invention of the four-wheeled models’ is known to be there ‘since 1970’. In other words, instead of starting from scratch, ‘it results from’ ‘a lot of experience and analysis’¹⁶⁴ on, for example, how to make ‘wheelers’ ‘really ca[tch] on’, which is, in turn, about ‘an example of seeing’ ‘what is there (but in a new way)’.

[T]here is a clear division between creative imagination, where one focuses on possible realities and the making of reality, and fantasy, the domain of the impossible. When the creative imagination is taken to a negative extreme, we risk indulging in fantasy, the impossible, and the improbable. Strategy makers who lose touch with their experience risk fantasizing.¹⁶⁵

By ‘focus[ing] on possible realities and the making of reality’ that is something ‘probable’, ‘using’ the ‘creative imagination’ is ‘an example of seeing what is not there’ temporarily, as ‘what’ cannot be ‘there’ ‘clear[ly]’ is ‘fantasy, the domain of the impossible’. To put it differently, this is how ‘what is there’ is constructed as ‘what is not there yet’. ‘Strategy makers’ are supposed to know how to ‘make’ ‘reality’ ‘possible’ or how to make ‘possible realities’ ‘real’ ‘with their experience’, otherwise they will ‘risk fantasizing’ and end up with ‘the impossible, and the improbable’ to

¹⁶³ ‘The Rollaboard was invented in 1987 by Robert Plath, a Northwest Airlines 747 pilot and avid home workshop tinkerer, who affixed two wheels and a long handle to suitcases that rolled upright, rather than being towed flat as had been the case since the invention of the four-wheeled models. His ability was to see what was not there yet within the area of luggage with wheels. The four-wheelers had been around since 1970, but had never really caught on’ (Kristiansen and Rasmussen 2014, 122).

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 122.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 122-23.

‘see’ ‘what is’ ‘real[ly]’ ‘there’. The ‘division between creative imagination’ ‘and fantasy’ is as ‘clear’ as ‘what is’ known to be ‘there’, which is prior to any ‘[s]trateg[ies] to be ‘ma[de]’.

3.4 Eco-anxiety and Persuasion

In her book *A Guide to Eco-anxiety*, Anouchka Grose discusses the idea of ‘persuasion’ in the section: ‘You’ve Been Reframed’. This idea does not, however, seem to work so well as it was conceived, even though one might wish to base the ‘arguments’ on a common point rather than ‘in the clothing of the other side’:¹⁶⁶

Matthew Feinberg (a professor of organizational behaviour) and Robb Willer (a sociologist) produce work on the art of persuasion, suggesting that one must ‘reframe’ or dress up one’s arguments in the clothing of the other side. If you want to persuade climate deniers to reduce their meat consumption, you might be wise to tell them that vegetarians are less susceptible to colon cancer. The beauty of it is that no one is expected to change their mind too much.¹⁶⁷

The idea of ‘persuasion’ is not enough to persuade, for example, the ‘climate deniers’. There has to be a ‘work’ ‘produce[d]’ ‘on the art of persuasion’. This idea of ‘art’ lies in ‘refram[ing] or dress[ing] up one’s arguments in the clothing of the other side’, which also implies that: first, even though with the very ‘clothing’ ‘dress[ed] up’, ‘one’s arguments’ are known to be ‘frame[d]’ and based on ‘one’s’ ‘side’ which is different from but are made for persuading ‘the other side’. Second, this ‘other side’ is seen to be able to know what ‘one’s arguments’ are like and therefore not to buy it, but not to be able to tell ‘one’s arguments in the clothing of the other side’. Or, to put it differently, the ‘one’ side is always regarded to be superior to ‘the other side’ in order to display this very ‘art of persuasion’. The only thing between two ‘side[s]’ seems to be not the differences of ‘arguments’ but the *sameness* in disguise; the idea

¹⁶⁶ Anouchka Grose, ‘Denial: Strictly For the Birds’, in *A Guide to Eco-anxiety: How to Protect the Planet and Your Mental Health* (London: Watkins, 2020), pp. 61-80 (p. 76).

¹⁶⁷ Grose, p. 75-76.

of ‘refram[ing]’ is constructed to make ‘the other side’, who knows the differences as ‘one’ does, not know the differences.

Taking the ‘climate deniers’ as an example, ‘meat consumption’ can be read as contributing to ‘climate’ change, according to the perspective on ‘you’ who is claimed to be on the ‘vegetarians’ ‘side’. But it is hard to ‘persuade climate deniers’ who can be seen as ‘the other side’ to accept it, not to mention ‘reduc[ing] their meat consumption’. The very ‘art of persuasion’ can be understood to be twofold at this point: first is about not ‘persuade’ but ‘be[ing] wise to tell them’. Second is that ‘reduc[ing] their meat consumption’ can be seen as ‘one’s arguments’, whereas the claim that ‘vegetarians are less susceptible to colon cancer’ is ‘dress[ing] up one’s arguments in the clothing of the other side’. In this way, the paradox is that if ‘the other side’ believes that as their ‘side’s’ idea – ‘climate deniers’ are known to know that ‘vegetarians are less susceptible to colon cancer’ than themselves. What, then, is the significance of the ‘art of persuasion’?

Furthermore, if the concern about ‘colon cancer’ is read as ‘the clothing of the other side’, this is, then, not about ‘dress[ing] up one’s arguments in the clothing of the other side’ but the same concern coming from both ‘side[s]’ without the need of ‘refram[ing]’ (for instance, to ‘reframe’ ‘colon cancer’ into something else), which might, again, not affect the differences between two ‘side[s]’: because ‘the other side’ might not think that ‘reduc[ing] their meat consumption’ is linked with ‘less susceptib[ility] to colon cancer’; ‘the other side’ is here seen to disagree with ‘one’s arguments’, according to the reason of ‘art of persuasion’.

The difficulty with doing this ‘art’ then is that ‘the other side’ might think: for example, that instead of ‘vegetarians’, they ‘are less susceptible to colon cancer’. That is, this does not affect the idea that ‘the other side’ cares as much about ‘colon cancer’ as the ‘one’ does. As ‘the art of persuasion’ in this instance can be read to ‘dress up one’s arguments in the clothing of’ ‘one’s’ ‘side’ rather than ‘the other side’. In other words, the difficulty ‘of it’ might be ironically the same as what the ‘beauty of it is’ claimed to be: ‘no one is expected to change their mind too much’.

‘[D]ressing up’ ‘the clothing of the other side’ which may not become ‘the other

side’ is seen further in the following discussion:

Food producers are already well onto this and are moving away from the words ‘vegan’ or ‘Vegetarian’ on their packaging, as this apparently alienates meat-eating customers. Instead there is an emphasis on tastiness - words such as ‘sizzling’, ‘sweet and smoky’ or ‘succulent’ are popular - and the use of positive terms such as ‘plant-based proteins’, as opposed to negative terms emphasizing an absence, such as ‘dairy free’. This way they try to include meat-eaters in the set of people who may enjoy their product, rather than suggesting that it’s aimed exclusively at vegetarians or vegans.¹⁶⁸

The claim to ‘already well onto this’ implies that ‘[f]ood producers’ are thought of as those who take sides with the ‘work on the art of persuasion’. Thus, ‘the words “vegan” or “Vegetarian” on their packaging’ can be seen as something in ‘one’s arguments’ not from ‘the other side’ – the ‘meat-eating customers’ at this stage. These ‘customers’ are known not to be ‘alienate[d]’ ‘apparently’ after the ‘words’ have been ‘mov[ed] away’. Meanwhile, the non-‘meat-eating customers’ are also known not to be ‘alienate[d]’ in terms of the same ‘[f]ood’. The idea of ‘alienat[ion]’ is, then, built on the grounds of ‘the words’ ‘on their packaging’; the ‘meat-eating customers’ are, by implication, seen to be unable to know what ‘meat’ is or is not, or to know the difference between foods, without these ‘words’ being provided.

In addition to this, ‘an emphasis on tastiness’ can be read as a repetition, like my analysis above regarding the potentially common concern about ‘colon cancer’. That is to say, even though ‘words such as “sizzling”, “sweet and smoky” or “succulent” are popular’ among or can be going with ‘the clothing of’ the ‘meat-eating customers’ ‘side’, different perspectives on the definitions of ‘meat’ and/or ‘tastiness’ might not guarantee how and why the ‘meat-eating customers’ or ‘customers’ are ‘alienate[d]’. In this sense, the idea of ‘apparently’ in relation to ‘alienating’ may occur only *apparently*. As a result, this uncertainty about ‘refram[ing]’ will disrupt the very ‘art

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 76.

of persuasion’.

Similarly, whether they are ‘positive’ or ‘negative terms’ is not stable and cannot be dichotomized as such. For instance, the ‘customers’ who are allergic to or unable to eat ‘dairy’ products will not consider the term ‘dairy free’ as a ‘negative’, but a ‘positive’ ‘absence’. So the same ‘term’, for example, ‘free’ or ‘absence’, can be either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ depending on the different perspectives. Accordingly, with the ‘positive’ and ‘negative terms’ flipping to one another, who is inside or outside of ‘the set of people’ might not be something that ‘[f]ood producers are already well onto’.

If the main thing that keeps people from addressing the problem is a wish for things to remain the same, it will surely soon become apparent that the best way to prevent catastrophe is to take active steps to address it. In a sense, climate deniers and climate activists want much the same thing: to keep living life in the best possible way. For those in denial, perhaps, it will be their own conservatism that wakes them up to problem: if we want to preserve our ways of living, we’ll have to act decisively to make that possible. If we keep consuming at the current rate, collapse is inevitable.¹⁶⁹

When it comes to the ‘climate deniers and climate activists’, the ‘thing’ they ‘want’ can also not be ‘much the same’ as it is being claimed: ‘a wish for things to remain the same’ can be read as in no need of ‘tak[ing] active steps to address’ anything, according to the perspective on the ‘climate deniers’ who are thought of as not agreeing with or denying ‘the problem’ to be ‘address[ed]’ and/or the ‘catastrophe’ to be ‘prevent[ed]’. While ‘a wish for things to remain the same’ can also be read to imply that ‘things’ might have changed, according to the perspective on the ‘climate activists’. That is why there has to be ‘a wish’ first. Otherwise, ‘things’ are only ‘things’, which will not give rise to the idea of ‘remain’ to be established in that ‘wish’. In this sense, ‘a’ ‘same’ ‘wish’ actually splits into two different ‘wish[es]’, from which

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 77.

‘the best way’ may not ‘become’ as such ‘surely soon’.

Then the certainty of the ‘apparent’ shifts to ‘perhaps’ with regard to the claim to ‘their own conservatism’. Unlike the ‘art of persuasion’ I analysed above, it seems that ‘they’ can be ‘w[oken]’ ‘up to problem’ by ‘their own conservatism’ rather than by the ‘arguments’ or ‘reframe[d]’ ‘arguments’ of the other side. Nevertheless, what is repeated at this point is that it is ‘we’ who are known to ‘realistically hope that those who are currently in denial may be brought round’¹⁷⁰ and to want this ‘problem’ to be recognized in the way of ‘wak[ing]’ ‘them’ ‘up’.

As with the claim to ‘same’, ‘we’ are, by implication, not the same as ‘them’, nor do ‘they’ have the same ‘hope[s]’ as ‘we’ do. That is, ‘their own conservatism’ is not ‘their[s]’ which is related to, for instance, ‘a wish for things to remain the same’ but something to be employed in the service of ‘our’ ‘hope’: the ‘brought round’ of ‘them’. Therefore, it may not be that ‘realistic’ to bring ‘them’ ‘round’, when ‘we’ can be read as those who either include or do not include ‘them’. For example, in the claim that ‘if we want to preserve our ways of living, we’ll have to act decisively to make that possible. If we keep consuming at the current rate, collapse is inevitable’, ‘a wish for things to remain the same’ can again be seen as either ‘preserv[ing] our ways of living’ or to ‘keep[ing] consuming at the current rate’, which cannot be ‘the same thing’ for ‘climate deniers and climate activists’. So is the notion of ‘conservatism’.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 77.

Chapter 4: Gender and Feminism

Starting with a discussion of an example of LEGO concerning boys' toys and girls' toys, this chapter demonstrates how different claims of gender stereotypes and gender bias share the same base and take the idea of representation for granted, and the ways in which a 'body' is constructed in thinking about the reality of gender and implying an unstable *distinction* between sex and gender, and why gender subjectivity will, after all, be reproduced when gender difference is assumed to be such.

4.1 LEGO and Gender Stereotypes

In the chapter 'Representation in Plastic and Marketing: The Significance of the LEGO® Women Scientists',¹⁷¹ Rhiannon Grant and Ruth Wainman introduce how LEGO 'represent[s] the woman scientist' in a set called 'the Research Institute',¹⁷² which contains 'ideas' of 'Ellen Kooijman' who is 'a practicing geoscientist and Adult Fan of LEGO® (AFOL)' and tries to 'address the gender imbalance of scientists' representation in LEGO sets':¹⁷³

According to the packaging, there is a chance to 'explore the world and beyond!' This is the motto of the women scientists as they each set out to make their own discoveries in the Research Institute [...] The message of the set is clear: 'girls can become anything they want.' The accompanying booklet provides further background information about the three occupations and a photograph of a real scientist—Ellen Kooijman—in her laboratory at the Swedish Museum of Natural History.¹⁷⁴

Both 'the packaging' and 'the set' are relevant to the 'three' 'women scientists' 'in the

¹⁷¹ Rhiannon Grant and Ruth Wainman, 'Representation in Plastic and Marketing: The Significance of the LEGO® Women Scientists', in *LEGO and Philosophy: Constructing Reality Brick by Brick* (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), pp. 113–22.

¹⁷² Grant and Wainman, p. 114.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 113.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 114.

Research Institute'. The difference between the two is, however, that '[t]he message of' the latter 'is clear' whereas that of the former is about 'a chance' that may or may not be the case, which is paradoxical to some extent. Because if 'girls' who can be understood to include but are not limited to these 'women scientists' 'can become anything they want', then why 'there is', at the same time, just 'a chance to' 'explore the world and beyond'? In other words, the 'chance' of 'explor[ing]' also implies an impossibility, which cannot be realized even when it comes to the idea of 'becom[ing] anything they want'. This 'anything' turns out to be not 'anything' that covers the 'explor[ation]' of 'the world and beyond' but either a limited 'thing' that 'they' can 'become' or nothing.

On the other hand, if 'girls' means only 'the women scientists'. '[T]hey' do not 'become anything they want' either but are made to 'each set out to make their own discoveries in the Research Institute', which, in turn, disrupts the very idea of 'own'. The ideas of 'each' and 'own' also imply how 'they' are supposed to, not only, be different from one another but also to share the same 'motto'. That is to say, when 'girls' and 'anything' in 'the set' are constructed in a very 'clear' way, '[t]he message' in which 'girls can become anything they want' would and could not be 'clear'.

In addition to 'the packaging' and 'the set', there is also '[t]he accompanying booklet' in need of 'provid[ing] further background information'. The implication is that 'background information about the three occupations' is not enough and 'clear[ly]' 'provid[e[d]]' by 'the set'. Something 'real' or more 'real' needs to be there: first, it has to be 'real' in terms of the relationship between 'the three occupations' and 'Ellen Kooijman', which means if the latter is 'a real scientist', then one of her 'photograph[s]' would be real to 'provide' self-evidently not only her 'background information' but that of 'the three occupations'. That is, although 'Ellen Kooijman' but not 'the women scientists' 'in the Research Institute' is 'real', 'a photograph of a real scientist' can be used to support the idea that 'the three occupations' in relation to 'the women scientists' are 'real' as well. In other words, 'real[ity]' can be built upon '[un]real[ity]]', (for instance, 'the three occupations' 'the women scientists' engage in the 'set'), and vice versa (for instance, the relation of 'the women scientists'

to ‘a real scientist—Ellen Kooijman’ ‘provide[d]’ by ‘a photograph’).

Second, it has to be ‘real’ in terms of the relationship between ‘girls’ and ‘Ellen Kooijman’. That is, ‘girls’ need to believe that ‘they’ *really* ‘can become’ ‘a real scientist’ who is, as in this ‘photograph’, ‘in her laboratory at the Swedish Museum of Natural History’ to ‘explore the world and beyond’. Meanwhile, ‘a photograph’ is seen to be able to ‘provide’ ‘information’ *beyond* it. For instance, the ‘world’ ‘Ellen Kooijman’ ‘explores’ is not confined to ‘her laboratory’. And the ‘explor[ation]’ at this stage is not ‘a chance’ anymore but something ‘real’ *beyond* ‘the set’ (‘the Research Institute’).

In examining ‘[h]ow exactly’ ‘the Research Institute achieve[s] this [the representation of women scientists] and whether ‘it succeed[s]’,¹⁷⁵ ‘[t]he [g]endered [b]ias’ between ‘[g]irls’ [t]oys’ and ‘[b]oys’ [t]oys’¹⁷⁶ is further discussed.¹⁷⁷ However, what is un/real and what is un/biased rely on the same thing:¹⁷⁸

Although the Research Institute alerts us to the fact that science can be a woman’s occupation, its focus on role play may disguise a more problematic issue about how toys such as LEGO attempt to draw girls into the world of science. Where is the creativity in the Research Institute that scientists and

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 114.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 116.

¹⁷⁷ ‘The Research Institute set could help to counteract this [Gendered differences persisting among children]. For girls it provides the possibility that science too can be part of their experience, and challenges the perception that science is a male subject. That said, the Research Institute set continues to support stereotypical ideas of girls’ play in other ways. Apart from building the equipment and figures, no engineering or scientific skills are embedded in playing with the set, and the accompanying marketing focuses on stories about these three women scientists and their research’ (Grant and Wainman 2017, 117). In comparison with ‘stories’, ‘engineering or scientific skills’ are something recommended to be ‘embedded’ in ‘play[ing]’ ‘the Research Institute set’, as the latter are seen as less or non-‘stereotypical’ to ‘girls’ than to ‘boys’. Changing the ‘focus’ to these ‘skills’, however, contradicts, to some degree, the claim of ‘skills’ later on: ‘All of these factors—depictions, experiences, skills developed in play—are part of what gender studies scholars have called the social construction of gender’.

¹⁷⁸ See also the last paragraph of this chapter: ‘However, the Research Institute, perhaps unintentionally, does still seem to replicate the gendered distinctions between men and women in science by engaging girls through largely passive, feminine role play even as it consciously uses LEGO to raise the profile of women in science. As we try to remove bricks from the extensive wall that blocks off access to scientific careers for many women, we need to remember that LEGO and other toys may be part of this wall. In the future, we hope that girls will spend more time with the Spaceport— and perhaps boys can extend their range to the Heartlake Hair Salon, too. For everyone, LEGO’s role play potential shouldn’t be allowed to overshadow its capacity to teach science and engineering’ (Grant and Wainman 2017, 120-21).

policy makers have complained is absent in girls' toys? The LEGO Group argues that girls and boys simply play differently. LEGO's own research shows that boys tend to build in a more linear fashion by replicating what is inside the box whereas girls prefer a more personal approach, to create their own story and to imagine themselves living inside the things they build. Creativity for girls thus derives from the use of their imagination more than it does for boys.¹⁷⁹

Although 'science can be a woman's occupation' is known as 'the fact', it is 'the fact' that needs to be 'alert[ed]' to 'us' by, for example, 'the Research Institute'. So this 'us' is split among which part of them know 'the fact' already and the other does not. It is good to see that 'toys such as LEGO attempt to draw girls into the world of science' due to the 'fact', but 'how' 'LEGO' does this is thought to be related to 'a more problematic issue'. As for this 'issue', however, it is not 'problematic' 'to draw girls into the world of science' by making them engage with 'toys such as LEGO', as 'girls', also 'boys', can be 'draw[n]' to this 'world of science' after all. This 'world' is not the same 'world' in which 'science can be a woman's occupation', but 'toys such as LEGO' can be something like a bridge connecting or integrating somehow two 'world[s]' together for 'girls and boys'.

'LEGO' should not 'attempt to draw girls' by 'focus[ing] on role play' but in some ways *else*, for example, 'engineering or scientific skills',¹⁸⁰ which means, meanwhile, that it may not be 'problematic' in the same case for 'boys' to be 'draw[n]', as 'skills' are seen to be relevant to neither 'role play' nor 'stories'.¹⁸¹ Besides this, the 'attempt' of 'LEGO' is not agreed upon by the perspective on 'girls', as 'role play' 'in the Research Institute' is understood to be likely to lead to a lack of 'creativity', through taking sides with the knowledge of 'scientists and policy makers'. But what the perspective knows to be the right way to 'draw girls into the world of science' is also based on the same idea of representation.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 116.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 117.

In reading 'LEGO's own research', the idea of 'creativity' can be understood as different between 'boys' and 'girls'. For the former, 'creativity' can 'derive from' 'tend[ing] to build in a more linear fashion by replicating what is inside the box', while that for the latter is about 'prefer[ing] a more personal approach, to create their own story and to imagine themselves living inside the things they build'. In this sense, 'the creativity in the Research Institute' is not something 'absent in girls' toys' but is there through 'the use of their imagination' to do, for instance, 'role play'. Nevertheless, it seems that 'girls' are supposed to do what 'boys' do: 'to build in a more linear fashion by replicating what is inside the box'. That is to say, in the case of 'Research Institute', 'girls' should follow up, for example, '[t]he accompanying booklet' and/or 'the set' to 'play', as it includes 'stor[ies]' of how 'the women scientists', in three different 'role[s]', 'each set out to make their own discoveries'. This way can make 'girls' be 'draw[n]' more 'clear[ly]' and less 'problematical[ly]' 'into the world of science', though these are not 'stor[ies]' regarding 'scientific skills'. Therefore, 'the creativity in the Research Institute' can also be approved if 'girls' can 'play' somewhat 'in a more linear fashion by replicating what is inside the box' instead of 'prefer[ing] a more personal approach, to create their own story and to imagine themselves living inside the things they build'.

It is, at this stage, not a problem of 'role play' or 'skills' being 'embedded',¹⁸² but of seemingly different definitions of 'creativity' according to which how 'girls' are thought to 'play' differently, including doing 'role play', even if 'engineering or scientific skills' is the 'focus'. In other words, the denial of 'creativity' in 'girls' 'role play' by the perspective on 'LEGO's attempt' is first denied by the perspective on 'LEGO's own research' – namely the denial of the denial. To deny again and actually affirm the latter claim that '[c]reativity for girls thus derives from the use of their imagination more than it does for boys', how 'the Research Institute' should be 'play[ed]' by 'girls' with 'creativity', at this point, goes with inadvertently and paradoxically what it denies at the very beginning, the relation of 'role play' to

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 117.

‘creativity’ – also as to how ‘creativity’ is defined in terms of ‘boys’ ‘play’.

In order for ‘girls’ to know ‘the fact’, the ‘imagination’ ‘in the Research Institute’ needs to be limited or is not a necessary thing. To ‘explore the world and beyond’, ‘girls’ should first know what is in the ‘world’. Otherwise, something ‘beyond’ ‘the world’, as, for instance, in ‘their own story’ or by ‘a more personal approach’, is merely ‘imagination’ not ‘the fact’. Accordingly, what is also problematic is that ‘replicating what is inside the box’ or learning and applying ‘scientific skills’ ‘in playing with the set’¹⁸³ is irrelevant to ‘imagination’, which is the same point I made above about two ‘world[s]’: the *transparency* between ‘what is inside’ and outside ‘the box’ – the ‘replica’ of the ‘world’.¹⁸⁴

4.2 Gender Subjectivity and Gender Difference

In the chapter ‘Gender difference and the production of subjectivity’¹⁸⁵ of *Changing the Subject*, Wendy Hollway discusses whether the ‘gendered subjectivity’¹⁸⁶ can be rethought instead of reproduced, in considering ‘gender differences’¹⁸⁷ as follows:

As women we can strive to be ‘people’ and ‘women’. Logically there is no contradiction. However, because ‘person’ actually consists of all the attributes which are meant to be characteristic of men, there is an underlying contradiction. I think I managed this contradiction by being (or trying to be) as good as men in the public world, and even competitive in my relationships

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁸⁴ Similarly claimed as: ‘A glance back at older LEGO advertising seems to suggest that the company could also look beyond gendered ideas about its users. Take, for example, the 1981 advertisement of the girl, dressed in jeans and sneakers and holding up her own LEGO model, which seems to be less dictated by gender stereotypes than the LEGO sets of today. The message—“What it is is beautiful”—was simple and drew our attention both to the creation the girl designed and the self-fulfillment she gained from playing with LEGO. In comparison, the Research Institute seems to have taken a backward turn, since it is mostly reliant on the narrative it can create by allowing girls to imagine themselves as one of the scientists that the LEGO women represent’ (Grant and Wainman 2017, 116). What is real and what is not are, again, known in the same structure of representation.

¹⁸⁵ Wendy Hollway, ‘Gender difference and the production of subjectivity’, in *Changing the Subject*, ed. by Julian Henriques and others (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 223-61.

¹⁸⁶ Hollway, p. 226.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 225.

with men.¹⁸⁸

The claim to '[l]ogically' 'no contradiction' can be read as that 'people' is not 'the term' known as 'person' being framed – 'synonymous' with 'man' 'in western, patriarchal thought',¹⁸⁹ and is still somebody that 'women' are different from but 'can strive to be'. So 'people' do not 'actually consist of' 'women' naturally and initially to some extent. This 'strive to be' implies that 'women' might be 'women' but not necessarily 'people', which already produces a 'contradiction'.

Further, how to 'manage this contradiction' is constructed to 'be (or try to be) as good as men in the public world, and even competitive in my relationships with men', according to the perspective on 'I's' perspective. This way of 'manag[ing]', however, can be seen as a recognition of that 'underlying contradiction' – 'I' is not 'good' enough, as 'I' has not been 'person' yet, which will go with what 'people' means discussed above. Therefore, it is not because that 'people' and/or 'person' are framed differently for 'women' or 'men' in the way that constitutes 'contradiction'. It is 'men' who are already defined in the 'mean[ing]' with 'good' 'characteristic' without needing to 'strive to be' as such. The 'men' do not have to 'try to be' 'good' and 'even competitive' 'with' 'women' 'in' 'their' 'relationships'. In this sense, I read that 'this contradiction' cannot be 'managed'. Rather, it will be consolidated by this very idea of 'manag[ing]'.

At the same time, by virtue of maintaining a heterosexual relationship, I preserved my feminine identity. Ever since I had grown up I had been in a couple relationship with a man, and however well I succeeded at doing things, they were always there—men who knew more than me, men whom I could learn from—to guarantee my femininity [...] My position in relation to men demonstrates the non-unitary nature of my gendered subjectivity. I aspired to similarity in some spheres because of the value attached. At the same time I

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 226.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 226.

preserved my difference.¹⁹⁰

‘At the same time’ can be understood as that ‘I’ is also doing something differently from ‘being (or trying to be) as good as men in the public world, and even competitive in my relationships with men’. The perspective on ‘I’ claims to know that ‘feminine identity’ does not have to be there always, but could be ‘preserved’ if there is ‘a heterosexual relationship’ that needs to be ‘maintain[ed]’. ‘I’ is known to have other ‘identit[ies]’ besides ‘feminine’ one. For instance, this non-‘preserved’ occasion can be linked with ‘being (or trying to be) as good as men in the public world, and even competitive in my relationships with men’, which will, nevertheless, implies that ‘feminine identity’ is not enough for ‘I’ to ‘manage’ the ‘contradiction’ and ‘compete’ ‘with men’. In order to be successfully ‘competitive’, ‘feminine identity’ is denied to some extent as it is not ‘as good as’ that of ‘men’. Although this ‘feminine identity’ is still known to be there for ‘a heterosexual relationship’, it is, after all, put into a somewhat negative position when ‘compet[ing]’ ‘with men’ – ‘to be like men I had to be not like women’.¹⁹¹ ‘[I]n my’ different ‘relationships with men’, ‘my’ ‘identit[ies]’ can be defined differently because of ‘men’; ‘my’ ‘identit[ies]’ are constructed by ‘my relationships with men’.

This contradiction is ongoingly to be there even ‘by virtue of maintaining a heterosexual relationship’, as this very action of ‘preserv[ing]’ cannot ‘guarantee’ its own ‘femininity’. In other words, it can also be seen from the ironic claim to ‘[a]s women we can strive to be [...] “women”’. The second term ‘women’ is an option for ‘we’ to ‘maintain’ the ‘heterosexual relationship’. But the perspective does not agree with this, as in this ‘relationship’, ‘however well I succeeded at doing things, they were always there’. That is to say, ‘they were always there’ to be the ‘men who knew more than me, men whom I could learn from’. This is how ‘men’ is framed to be superior to this ‘I’ as ‘women’, even if this is ‘women’ who actually ‘succeeded at doing things’. In this sense, ‘my femininity’ ‘[a]s women’ is ‘my’ ‘identity’ which

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 226.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 225.

is a reason for this 'I' to get success, known by the perspective on 'I'. It is supposed to be 'my' success '[a]s women' which decides 'my' 'identity', including 'my femininity', even with no need of 'preserv[ing]'. But 'a heterosexual relationship' defines what it is like to be 'women' and/or 'men' in which 'my femininity' could only be 'guarantee[d]' from 'men' ironically. Therefore, the very act of 'preserv[ing]' is not what 'I' want to do. Or to say, the 'I' is constructed to 'do what 'I' do not want to do. This 'feminine identity' is seemingly seen as 'mine' but actually 'guarantee[d]' by 'men'.

Then 'I' is framed as knowing what 'I' want to do – 'I aspired to similarity in some spheres because of the value attached. At the same time I preserved my difference'. Here it is 'my difference' rather than 'my feminine identity' that is 'preserved'. Although this 'difference' can also read to be relevant to 'in a couple relationship with a man', 'my feminine identity' at this stage is constituted to be with 'women' whom 'I' do not have to 'strive to be', whom just being 'differen[t]' from 'men' because of 'maintaining a heterosexual relationship' rather than 'men who knew more than me, men whom I could learn from'. That is to say, the 'difference' 'in a couple relationship with a man', is 'aspired to' be, for example, that 'however well' 'a man' 'succeeded at doing things', 'I' 'w[as] always there' as well, 'to guarantee' both that 'man's' 'identity' and 'my feminine identity'. In this way, the 'difference' would not be the 'difference' but could be seen as part of the 'similarity in some spheres because of the value attached'. 'My position in relation to men' can be changed in which 'my gendered subjectivity', with '[a]t the same time' being claimed, can be 'unitary' to some degree – the 'unitary' between 'similarity' and 'difference'. No matter 'being (or trying to be) as good as men' or being a 'women' in 'a heterosexual relationship, 'my gendered subjectivity' is, therefore, known to (re)produce 'contradiction' anyway 'because of the value attached' in relation to 'gender differences'.

4.3 Identification, Unities, and Feminisms

By reading Chela Sandoval's 'oppositional consciousness'¹⁹² for thinking about 'who is a woman of color', Donna Haraway discusses Sandoval's argument with an example of 'a Chicana or U.S. black woman': 'The category "woman" negated all nonwhite women; "black" negated all nonblack people, as well as all black women'.¹⁹³ Both the 'category' of 'woman' and 'black' are already known by the perspective on 'Sandoval' not to include 'all nonwhite women' and 'all black women' respectively. But that perspective on 'women' knows that 'all nonwhite' also share the naming of 'women' with 'all' 'white'; thus 'all' 'women' can be knowable and 'categorize[d]' by 'color'. In a sense, it seems that the idea of 'negation' of 'all nonwhite women' is something with which it disagrees. The 'category' towards 'women' itself – whether 'white' 'women' or 'nonwhite women', however, can be read as problematic. As this 'category', for instance by 'color', implies that 'women' are known to have 'differences' in which the very notion of 'differences' or 'color' itself, in turn, may constitute 'categories' over 'women' as either being 'negated' or 'affirmed'.¹⁹⁴ I read this is why 'Sandoval's oppositional consciousness', which can be understood as opposing against 'conscious appropriation of negation' and as 'emphasiz[ing] the lack of any essential criterion for identifying who is a woman of color', is known by the perspective to be relevant to 'contradictory locations'.¹⁹⁵

Similarly, 'black' is framed not only in contrast to 'all nonblack people', but also to 'all black women'. In this sense, although 'all black women' is constituted to be different from 'all nonblack people', by claiming to 'as well as', this very 'category' of 'black' may in a 'contradictory' way simultaneously 'negate' and 'not negate' 'women' to some extent.

But there was also no 'she,' no singularity, but a sea of differences among U.S. women who have affirmed their historical identity as U.S. women of color.

¹⁹² Donna J. Haraway, 'A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century', in *Manifestly Haraway* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), pp. 3-90 (p. 17).

¹⁹³ Haraway, p. 18.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 18.

This identity marks out a self-consciously constructed space that cannot affirm the capacity to act on the basis of natural identification, but only on the basis of conscious coalition, of affinity, of political kinship.¹⁹⁶

The perspective on 'U.S. women' claims to know that this is 'historical identity' being 'affirmed' by 'the[m]' – 'a sea of differences', not by any of a 'she', which implies, although the 'singularity' of 'identity' is also known to be there historical[ly] and differently, it cannot be 'affirmed' as such. Then this very 'affirmed' 'identity', which shifts from 'historical' to 'women of color', is constituted to be related to the idea of 'self-consciously' rather than 'natural'. So the 'natural identification' of 'differences' in terms of 'identity' cannot construct 'conscious coalition', 'affinity', and/or 'political kinship' as 'oppositional consciousness' does in the name of 'U.S. women of color'. In other words, 'natural identification' regarding 'U.S. women' is known as something that cannot oppose 'negation' 'consciously' but can somehow give way to 'coalition' 'consciously' of 'women of color' for constructing 'self-consciously' 'space' to 'act' 'the capacity' against 'conscious appropriation of negation'.

If 'natural identification' is already constituted with certainty in which 'negation' is framed, how could this 'coalition' of 'color' work 'self-consciously' and differently from its knowable 'natural identification'? Both 'historical' 'identity' – 'natural identification', and 'political' 'identity' – 'women of color' in my reading are self-constructed outside 'women' rather than that one can be 'affirmed' by another, seemingly in a 'heterochronic'¹⁹⁷ way, claimed by the perspective on 'Sandoval'. Furthermore, the very construction of 'self-consciously' 'space' can be also understood as that 'women' are constituted with no 'self-conscious' on 'their' 'natural' 'identit[ies]' by the perspective on 'women'. So no matter whether it is 'conscious' of 'them' or that of the singular 'she'/'self', this is how 'identity' in relation to 'women' is mobilised paradoxically as such. In this sense, even if 'a Chicana or U.S. black woman'¹⁹⁸ can be seen as 'women' and/or 'black', the very notion of 'women

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 18.

of color' would, after all, consolidate knowable 'natural identification' and turn out to be 'endless splitting' 'unity'.¹⁹⁹

Haraway further explores both 'taxonomies' and 'epistemologies' in relation to 'feminisms' by reading Katie King's argument:

Taxonomies of feminism produce epistemologies to police deviation from official women's experience. And of course, 'women's culture,' like women of color, is consciously created by mechanisms inducing affinity. The rituals of poetry, music, and certain forms of academic practice have been preeminent.²⁰⁰

Here, 'women's experience' is known to have different types in which 'official' one is something that needs to be 'police[d]' by 'epistemologies'. So any 'deviation from' the 'official' is not acceptable by these '[t]axonomies of feminism'. This 'official women's experience' is constituted to be relevant to different 'political tendencies' for being 'the telos of the whole [women's movement]' framed prior to this quote,²⁰¹ which implies this very notion of 'official' might be defined differently in different 'feminism[s]'. Thus this 'deviation' will not always be a 'deviation' either.

Then 'tendencies' towards 'women's experience' shift to 'women's culture' which is known to be related to 'affinity' 'like women's color'. At the same time, this 'affinity' is constituted on the ground of 'inducing'. In other words, the perspective on 'women of color' knows that 'affinity' can be seen as a 'political' construction in which 'women' might not be 'induc[ed]' successfully for that 'coalition' discussed above. And this 'inducing affinity' is further explained by already knowing of what 'rituals of poetry, music' and 'certain forms of academic practice' are 'preeminent' to 'induce' 'women' 'cultur[ally]' for 'affinity'. When it comes to the claim to 'of course', the perspective knows that both 'epistemologies' and 'mechanisms' are constructed within 'political tendencies'. Different from '[t]axonomies of feminism'

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 19.

which is known to be ‘criticize[d]’ by the perspective on King’s perspective, the perspective at this point, by comparing ‘consciously creat[ing]’ with ‘produc[ing]’, knows that the very ‘mechanisms’ of ‘inducing affinity’ regarding King’s ‘cultural feminism’²⁰² taking part with that ‘[t]axonomies’ in a sense.

Besides that, both ‘build[ing] effective affinities’²⁰³ and the idea that ‘no construction is whole’²⁰⁴ in ‘imaging possible unities’²⁰⁵ are discussed in relation to the idea of ‘non/innocence’²⁰⁶ as follows:

The politics of race and culture in the U.S. women’s movements are intimately interwoven. The common achievement of King and Sandoval is learning how to craft a poetic/political unity without relying on a logic of appropriation, incorporation, and taxonomic identification.²⁰⁷

The perspective on ‘politics’ claims to know that ‘one’s own political tendencies’,²⁰⁸ for instance, towards ‘women’s experience’, ‘women’s culture’ or ‘women of color’ can never be ‘made’ independently to be ‘the telos of the whole [women’s movement]’ or that the idea of wholeness itself raises the question, as the very ‘criti[que]’ of ‘[t]axonomies of feminism’ would also construct another ‘taxonomies’ ‘intimately’, as I explained above. In this sense, there is no unified ‘telos of the whole’ being there but different ‘political tendencies’ ‘interwoven’ to ‘show’ and produce ‘limits of identification’²⁰⁹ with one another.

Although the perspective on ‘King and Sandoval’ knows that their ‘common achievement’ is different from ‘a logic of appropriation, incorporation, and taxonomic identification’, no matter the knowable ‘mechanisms inducing affinity’ or ‘conscious coalition’, they are both constructed and known by the perspective as something that

²⁰² Ibid., p. 19.

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 20.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 21.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 20.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 21.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 20.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 19.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 20.

can be ‘craft[ed]’ to go with that ‘logic’. That is to say, the claim of ‘without relying on’ can be read as an irony at this point.

The theoretical and practical struggle against unity-through-domination or unity-through-incorporation ironically undermines [...] all claims for an organic or natural standpoint. I think that radical and socialist/Marxist-feminisms have also undermined their/our own epistemological strategies and that this is a crucially valuable step in imagining possible unities. It remains to be seen whether all ‘epistemologies’ as Western political people have known them fail us in the task to build effective affinities.²¹⁰

That said, the perspective knows the ‘craft’ to be ‘crucially valuable’ for ‘imaging possible unities’, despite that ‘epistemological strategies’ regarding ‘craft’ are constructed to be self-‘undermined’ ‘ironically’ when ‘struggl[ing] against’ ‘unity-through-domination or unity-through-incorporation’ and also knows the difference between ‘an organic or natural standpoint’ and ‘revolutionary standpoints’²¹¹ or between ‘relying on’ and not ‘relying on a logic’ mentioned above is converged as both of them can be understood to be one of the ‘epistemologies’ for ‘build[ing] the ‘effective affinities’. And these ‘effective affinities’ are framed as possible ‘fail[ure]’, according to the perspective on ‘Western political people’, as ‘epistemologies’ are known as ‘part of the process showing the limits of identification’ already and could be ‘undermined’ by its ‘own’ ‘strategies’ when ‘changing the world’.²¹² This is how the claim of ‘build[ing] effective affinities’ is constructed in relation to the idea of ‘irony’ for ‘imaging possible unities’.

Furthermore, although the ‘body’ is known to be ‘historically constituted’ instead of having ‘innocence’ in ‘origin’, as is ‘the category “woman”’, according to the perspective on ‘political myth’: ‘We are excruciatingly conscious of what it means

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 20.

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 20.

²¹² Ibid., p. 20.

to have a historically constituted body. But with the loss of innocence in our origin',²¹³ whether the very political notion of 'effective affinities' could be 'buil[t]' possibly and 'ironically' is further claimed as 'do not know', according to the perspective on I's perspective to 'we': 'I also do not know of any other time when the kind of unity we might help build could have been possible [...] Or at least "we" cannot claim innocence from practicing such dominations'.²¹⁴ But what is known by the perspective on 'we' as 'at least' is about 'noninnocence' in 'practicing such dominations'. In other words, 'to confront effectively the dominations of "race," "gender," "sexuality," and "class" ' ²¹⁵ itself can be seen as another way of 'dominations' which need to be 'practic[ed]' rather than regarding 'political unity'²¹⁶ as being built 'innocen[tly]'.

Also, in the claim that: 'Both Marxist/socialist-feminisms and radical feminisms have simultaneously naturalized and denatured the category "woman" and consciousness of the social lives of "women" ', ²¹⁷ the perspective on 'Marxist/socialist-feminisms and radical feminisms' claims to know that the 'naturalized and denatured' are related to not only the notion of 'non/innocence' of 'the category "woman" and consciousness of the social lives of "women" ' but also the notions of 'partial' and 'permanently unclosed' instead of 'whole' 'constructions'²¹⁸ regarding both 'woman' and 'the social lives of "women" '. In other words, for perspective, neither 'the category "woman" ' nor 'consciousness of the social lives of "women" ' is 'natural[ly]' and 'innocen[tly]' being there but constituted as 'dominations' for 'confront[ing]' 'the dominations of "race," "gender," "sexuality," and "class" ', as I analysed before.

Both 'Marxist/socialist-feminisms and radical feminisms' are known to take 'woman' and 'the social lives of "women" ' for granted in 'moves': 'what (some) women did' is framed in 'the basic analytic strategies of Marxism'; 'women's labor

²¹³ Ibid., pp. 20-21.

²¹⁴ Ibid., p. 21.

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 21.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 21.

²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 22.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

in the household and women's activity as mothers generally'²¹⁹ are understood as an 'analogy to the Marxian concept of labor'²²⁰ which relates to 'the knowledge of subjugation and alienation'.²²¹ Although the perspective on 'Marxist/socialist-feminisms' knows that this is a 'unity of women' being 'buil[t]' instead of being 'naturalize[d]' because either 'the ontological structure of labor or of its analogue' is known as 'a possible achievement based on a possible standpoint rooted in social relations', no matter 'social relations' or 'the daily responsibility of real women',²²² they are already knowable as something being 'natural' and 'ontological' without needing to be 'buil[t]' through and for 'analogy'. In this sense, on the one hand, 'denatured the category "woman" and consciousness of the social lives of "women" ' is known by perspective to be in relation to an 'analogy to the Marxian concept of labor' – 'to accommodate what (some) women did';²²³ on the other hand, 'naturalized' both 'woman' and 'women's activity' 'in the socialist-feminist sense' can be read as an irony in claiming that 'Marxist/socialist-feminism does not "naturalize" unity (of women)'.²²⁴ This is how the ideas of 'naturalized and denatured' are claimed to flip from one another with respect to 'Marxist/socialist-feminisms'.

When it comes to 'Catharine MacKinnon's version of radical feminism',²²⁵ the 'analytical strategy' is known to be 'different' from 'Marxism', based on 'the structure of sex/gender and its generative relationship' rather than that of 'class'.²²⁶ As the perspective on MacKinnon's perspective knows 'men's constitution and appropriation of women sexually', this 'strategy' is claimed to be related to 'radical reductionism' in 'construct[ing]' 'a nonsubject, a nonbeing'.²²⁷ The very notion of 'construct[ion]' is known by the perspective on 'MacKinnon' to be both 'ironical' and

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 23.

²²¹ Ibid., p. 22.

²²² Ibid., p. 23.

²²³ Ibid., p. 22.

²²⁴ Ibid., pp. 22-23.

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 23.

²²⁶ Ibid., p. 24.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 24.

paradoxical – ‘ontology’ of ‘a nonbeing’, while ‘woman’ is framed in need of ‘origin’ and ‘experience’.²²⁸

What it means to be ‘denatured’ seemingly can be understood as that ‘a woman’ is known to be constituted by ‘another’s [men’s] desire’ and that ‘her experience as a woman’ is known to be ‘owe[d]’ ‘to sexual appropriation’.²²⁹ The perspective on ‘MacKinnon’, however, not only knows the very ‘ontology’ of ‘a nonbeing’ as an ‘irony’ but also that the ‘nonexistence of women’ itself can be seen as the ‘existence’ ‘of women’ after all – ‘products of men’s desire’ by claiming to ‘except as’.²³⁰ Therefore, this is how ‘except’ is defined ‘ironically’, and how the idea of ‘denatured’ is constituted within the certain knowledge of ‘women’s’ ‘origin’ and ‘experience’, which turns out to be another way of ‘naturaliz[ing]’.

‘Marxist/socialist-feminisms and radical feminisms’ are then compared in the following:

If my complaint about socialist/Marxian standpoints is their unintended erasure of polyvocal, unassimilable, radical difference made visible in anticolonial discourse and practice, MacKinnon’s intentional erasure of all difference through the device of the “essential” nonexistence of women is not reassuring.²³¹

Both ‘socialist/Marxian standpoints’ and ‘MacKinnon’s’ are known as ‘complaint’ concerning the idea of ‘erasure’, according to the perspective on ‘my’ perspective. But the difference between the two is that ‘erasure’ is constructed as ‘unintended’ and ‘intentional’ for ‘standpoints’ respectively. This implies that ‘polyvocal, unassimilable, radical difference’, for example, ‘women of color’, should be ‘made visible’, according to the perspective on ‘anticolonial discourse and practice’. In other words, even though ‘the category “woman” ’ is constituted to be there ‘different[ly]’,

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 24.

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 24.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 25.

²³¹ Ibid., p. 25.

it is both ideas of ‘noninnocence’²³² and ‘partial’²³³ regarding that ‘category’ need to be ‘visible’ for ‘imaging possible unities’²³⁴ instead of being ‘eras[ed]’ by ‘socialist/Marxian standpoints’. Either ‘unintended’ or ‘intentional’ ‘erasure’ is claimed on the grounds of knowing how ‘non/existence of women’ is defined, as the perspective on ‘difference’ knows that both ‘women’ and their ‘experience’ are constructed with the idea of ‘noninnocence’. And ‘reassuring’ is about knowing that the construction will be ‘partial’ rather than ‘whole’.²³⁵

4.4 Gender, Sex, Body, and Self

In ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory’, Judith Butler discusses the idea of ‘gender’ by reading Simone de Beauvoir’s claim that ‘one is not born, but, rather, becomes a woman’: ‘gender is instituted through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self’.²³⁶ ‘[T]he body’ can be ‘styliz[ed]’, which is prior to ‘gender’ being ‘instituted’. And the claim to ‘instituted’ can be read as that there is a start for ‘gender’ being ‘instituted’ with which ‘the’ known ‘stylization of the body’ rather than ‘body’ itself is linked. That is to say, without ‘the stylization’, ‘body’ is something that cannot and does not need to be ‘gender[ed]’.

‘[M]ust be’ implies that there is no other ‘way[s]’ except ‘the mundane way’ known by the perspective for ‘underst[anding]’ the ‘institut [ion]’ of ‘gender’. It is also how ‘the stylization’ is constituted in relation to the idea of ‘mundane’, through making claim to ‘hence’. In a sense, beyond ‘the mundane way’, ‘gender’ cannot ‘be understood’ and ‘instituted’, as ‘the body’ might not be ‘styliz[ed]’ at all. ‘[T]he body’ can only be ‘gender[ed]’ in ‘the mundane way’, according to the perspective on

²³² Ibid., p. 21.

²³³ Ibid., p. 21.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 20.

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 21.

²³⁶ Judith Butler, ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory’, *Theatre Journal*, 40.4 (1988), pp. 519-31 (p. 519), doi: 10.2307/3207893.

‘gender’. In this ‘mundane way’, ‘bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds’ are claimed to be related to ‘the illusion’. And ‘gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds’ are also known by perspective not to be ‘bodily’. Here, it is the notion of ‘bodily’ which is regarded to ‘constitute the illusion’. Thus ‘the illusion’ is known to be there when ‘gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds’ come together ‘bodily’.

To be specific, this is ‘the illusion of an abiding gendered self’, which implies that a ‘self’ can be constructed in other types, even if it is not due to the idea of ‘gender’. In one sense, the claim to ‘the illusion’ knows that the ‘gendered self’ in relation to ‘various kinds’ of ‘bodily’ would not be ‘abiding’, neither is a ‘self’ ‘abiding’. In another sense, ‘the body’ in relation to ‘the stylization’ might also be thought of by others as something being ‘abiding’, according to the perspective on ‘the illusion’. The ‘gender’ is, however, ‘instituted’ ‘mundane[ly]’ after all, no matter how shifting ‘the stylization of the body’ is and how ‘illus[ive]’ ‘an abiding’ ‘self’ is.

The distinction between ‘female’ and ‘woman’ is further explored in Butler’s reading of Beauvoir:

To be female is, according to that distinction[between sex and gender], a facticity which has no meaning, but to be a woman is to have become a woman, to compel the body to conform to an historical idea of ‘woman,’ to induce the body to become a cultural sign, to materialize oneself in obedience to an historically delimited possibility, and to do this as a sustained and repeated corporeal project.²³⁷

For Butler, the ‘meaning’ can be understood as ‘a historical idea and not a natural fact’ and is known to be related to ‘gender’ instead of ‘sex’.²³⁸ And ‘no meaning’ implies that ‘sex’, ‘as biological facticity’,²³⁹ is already there in which ‘female’ is ‘female’ – it does not need ‘to have become’, while the very idea of ‘hav[ing] become’

²³⁷ Butler, p. 522.

²³⁸ Ibid., p. 522.

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 522.

constitutes that there are also other possibilities for ‘the body’ to be, except ‘to be a woman’; ‘a woman’ is known not to be ‘a facticity’ or ‘a natural fact’ as ‘female’ is, but ‘an historical idea’ in which ‘the body’ is ‘compel[led]’ to ‘conform to’. This can be read as that ‘the body’ could, again, be and ‘become’ other possibilities other than ‘woman’ ‘historical[ly]’ or ‘a cultural sign’. Besides that, the claims to ‘compel’, ‘induce’, and ‘materialize’ frame how ‘hav[ing] become’ operates or why ‘to be a woman’ is not about ‘a facticity’.

However, this notion of ‘becom[ing]’ can also be regarded as ‘a facticity’: although the ‘possibility’ is known to be there ‘historically’, the perspective knows that ‘body’ can, after all, be ‘compel[led]’, ‘induce[d]’ and ‘materialize[d]’ to be a ‘delimited’ outcome. In this sense, the ‘woman’ is also known to be there already, as with ‘a facticity’ regarding how ‘female’ is constructed, by making a claim to ‘a sustained and repeated corporeal project’. Therefore, no matter how ‘meaning’ is framed, ‘a facticity’ is not something that is stable but can also be constituted, which seems to make this very ‘distinction’ between ‘sex’ / ‘female’ and ‘gender’ / ‘woman’ not that ‘distinct’.

In terms of ‘the category of woman’,²⁴⁰ Butler suggests that:

Yet, in this effort to combat the invisibility of women as a category feminists run the risk of rendering visible a category which may or may not be representative of the concrete lives of women. As feminists, we have been less eager, I think, to consider the status of the category itself and, indeed, to discern the conditions of oppression which issue from an unexamined reproduction of gender identities which sustain discrete and binary categories of man and woman.²⁴¹

The perspective on the first ‘feminists’ claims to know that ‘the invisibility of women’ can be ‘a category’. And both ‘the invisibility of women’ and ‘women as a category’

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 523.

²⁴¹ Ibid., p. 523.

which need to be ‘combat[ed]’. In other words, although the ‘visib[ility]’ ‘of women’ can be ‘render[ed]’ by ‘combat[ing]’, ‘this effort’ is framed as ‘the risk’ that can go with ‘the invisibility’ to some extent, as either of them implies that ‘a category’ is known to be there. Therefore, in what way and what kind of ‘the concrete lives of women’ can be ‘represent[ed]’ is known by the perspective as something that those ‘feminists’ ‘may’ not realize in their ‘effort’. ‘[A] category’ is constituted to be ‘the risk’ because of the idea of ‘concrete’. In other words, a ‘representative’ is thought of as a construction, whether ‘representative of the concrete lives of women’ or not.

In comparison with the first ‘feminists’, the perspective takes part with the second one, but at the same time, has been knowing more about ‘category’ than ‘feminists’ do by claiming the ‘think[ing]’ of ‘I’. That is to say, ‘feminists’ are supposed to ‘be’ more ‘eager’ ‘to consider the status of the category’, which is important for ‘discern[ing] the conditions of oppression’. To be specific, the perspective disagrees with seeing the ‘oppression’ in relation to ‘women as a category, as it would not be helpful to ‘discern’ what constitutes ‘conditions of oppression’ or where these ‘conditions’ ‘issue from’. In this sense, if ‘the status of the category itself’ is ‘consider[ed]’ more, ‘the conditions of oppression’ would be ‘discern[ed]’ in relation to ‘an unexamined reproduction of gender identities which sustain discrete and binary categories of man and woman’.

Based on Beauvoir’s claims about ‘the body’ in relation to ‘cultural construction’,²⁴² Butler argues differently the relation of ‘sex’ to ‘gender’:

if gender is the cultural significance that the sexed body assumes, and if that significance is codetermined through various acts and their cultural perception, then it would appear that from within the terms of culture it is not possible to know sex as distinct from gender.²⁴³

The idea of ‘facticity’ that I analysed above is applied here in parallel. According to

²⁴² Ibid., p. 523.

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 524.

the perspective on Beauvoir's perspective of 'gender': '[S]he clearly underscores the distinction between sex, as biological facticity, and gender, as the cultural interpretation or signification of that facticity'.²⁴⁴ Here 'gender' is 'distinct' from 'sex', as it is known to be 'the cultural interpretation or signification of that facticity', which implies that 'the cultural interpretation or signification' is not the same thing as and can be separated from 'that facticity'.

Whereas, to the perspective on 'gender', 'the cultural significance' at this point is understood to be 'codetermined through various acts and their cultural perception'. If 'various acts and their cultural perception' are also known to be relevant to 'the tacit conventions'²⁴⁵ claimed before this quote, then 'the cultural significance' could be 'assume[d]' on 'body' to be either 'sexed' or 'gender[ed]'. Since how the known 'tacit conventions' are constructed 'within the terms of culture' can be seen as a 'facticity' to some extent; 'it is not possible to know' 'the cultural significance' 'as distinct from' 'that facticity' as well. In this way, the 'body' will be 'culturally perceived'²⁴⁶ as such, regardless of whether it is 'sexed' or 'gendered'.

Butler also discusses how the idea of 'natural' is constituted in relation to 'the sexed body': 'My point is simply that one way in which this system of compulsory heterosexuality is reproduced and concealed is through the cultivation of bodies into discrete sexes with "natural" appearances and "natural" heterosexual dispositions'.²⁴⁷ The perspective on 'heterosexuality' claims to know it as 'compulsory' rather than 'natural'. And this 'compulsory heterosexuality' is known to have the 'system' being 'reproduced and concealed' in one of many possible 'way[s]'. The idea of 'concealed' hints that 'heterosexuality' might not be thought of by others as 'compulsory' and as having a 'system' to 'reproduce'. But this 'system' is not 'concealed' to the perspective, as is 'the cultivation of bodies': 'bodies' can be 'cultivat[ed]' 'into discrete sexes'; 'bodies' come before rather than coming with 'sexes'. Both 'bodies' and 'sexes' are constructions and can be constructed to be separated from each other.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 522.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 524.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 524.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 524.

Thus the very notion of ‘discrete sexes’ is not something in relation to Beauvoir’s claim as ‘biological facticity’ or ‘a natural fact’. Instead, ‘sexes’ could also be ‘cultivat[ed]’ as ‘discrete’ in which ‘ “natural” appearances’ and ‘ “natural” heterosexual dispositions’ are ‘natural’ only in that ‘system of compulsory heterosexuality’. This is how the idea of ‘natural’ is constituted on the ground of ‘compulsory’ ‘cultivation’, which relates to the claim of ‘an unnatural conjunction of cultural constructs in the service of reproductive interests’ known and agreed upon by the perspective on ‘Foucault and others’.²⁴⁸

When it comes to the ‘gender reality’ of ‘the transvestite’, Butler states that: ‘The transvestite, however, can do more than simply express the distinction between sex and gender, but challenges, at least implicitly, the distinction between appearance and reality that structures a good deal of popular thinking about gender identity’.²⁴⁹ Here, ‘the distinction between sex and gender’ regarding ‘[t]he transvestite’ is known by the perspective on ‘popular thinking’ as ‘simply’ ‘express[ing]’. But for the perspective, the very idea of ‘express[ing]’ is based on the ‘pre-existing categories that regulate gender reality’²⁵⁰ claimed in the article previously. This ‘reality’ which is known to be constructed within the ‘pre-existing categories’ can also ‘regulate’ the ‘appearance’ to make it be in accord with these ‘categories’.

It seems that ‘[t]he transvestite’ ‘challenges’ the knowable conformity between ‘reality’ and ‘appearance’, so the ‘distinction’ is known to be *there*. The knowledge that something rather than the ‘appearance’ of ‘transvestite’ will be its ‘reality’ is also limited by those ‘categories’. The reason why ‘the distinction between appearance and reality’ can be ‘challenge[d]’ is because the perspective knows the ‘appearance’ of ‘transvestite’ is not something ‘distinct’ from its ‘reality’, but could be a reality beyond ‘established categories’²⁵¹ to some extent. As a result, the ‘gender identity’ with respect to ‘the transvestite’ would not be fixed as only one ‘pre-existing’ ‘reality’ but be constructed as different realities according to its ‘appearance[s]’, which, in

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 524.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 527.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 527.

²⁵¹ Ibid., p. 527.

turn, collapses the very notion of stable ‘identity’ no matter it is ‘gender[ed]’ or ‘sex[ed]’.

If the ‘reality’ of gender is constituted by the performance itself, then there is no recourse to an essential and unrealized ‘sex’ or ‘gender’ which gender performances ostensibly express. Indeed, the transvestite’s gender is as fully real as anyone whose performance complies with social expectations.²⁵²

The claim to ‘there is no recourse’ implies that it might be thought of by others with ‘established categories’ in an opposite way – ‘an essential and unrealized “sex” or “gender” ’ is known to be there, *under* that ‘ostensibl[e]’ ‘gender performances’. To the perspective, however, ‘performances’ are not something, like I have read above, to be ‘express[ed]’ to be in accord with ‘sex’ or ‘gender’ on the ground of those ‘categories’ to reassure what the ‘reality’ in relation to ‘gender’ should be. Instead, ‘the performance itself’ is framed to ‘constitute’ the ‘reality’ of and for the ‘gender’ in which this ‘itself’ is also constituted by the perspective outside of ‘itself’. The ‘performance’, whether ‘compl[ying] with’ the known ‘social expectations’ or not, is, after all, a construction through which ‘the transvestite’s gender’ can be ‘fully real’. In other words, it is how ‘social expectations’ are constructed differently, that determines what ‘performance’ should be ‘fully (un)real’. Thus, the claim to ‘[i]ndeed’ can be seen as an irony, as the perspective knows this is not about the question of ‘real’ or unreal.

Based on the idea of ‘performance’, Butler suggests how to consider the ‘self’:

[The] self is not only irretrievably ‘outside’, constituted in social discourse, but that the ascription of interiority is itself a publically regulated and sanctioned form of essence fabrication. Genders, then, can be neither true nor false, neither real nor apparent [...] on some level there is social knowledge that the truth or falsity of gender is only socially compelled and in no sense

²⁵² Ibid., p. 527.

ontologically necessitated.²⁵³

The claim of knowing the ‘self’ as ‘irretrievably “outside” ’ can be understood ‘[a]s opposed to a view’, according to the perspective on ‘Erving Goffman’, in which the ‘self’ is ‘posit[ed]’ as something that ‘assumes and exchanges various “roles” within the complex social expectations of the “game” of modern life’.²⁵⁴ In other words, in Butler’s reading of ‘Goffman’: ‘roles’ are ‘various[ly]’ ‘exchange[d]’ and ‘assume[d]’ while this ‘self’ is always known to be ‘self’ stably and can be retrievable because of the ‘interiority’. However, the perspective claims to know that this ‘self’ is also ‘constituted in social discourse’. The claim to ‘outside’ with single quotation marks can be read as an irony. In other words, the very idea of the ‘outside’ is only claimed to be contrasted with the ‘interiority’, as the perspective knows that there is neither the ‘outside’ nor the ‘interior’ ‘self’, so to claim to be on either side would consolidate the certain knowledge of the contrary.

Furthermore, this ‘interiority’ is claimed as not something being there self-evidently but in relation to the idea of ‘ascription’, which, in turn, disrupts the very ‘essence’ of ‘interiority’, when the ‘essence’ is framed as a ‘fabrication’ ‘form[ed]’ by ‘regulat[ion] and sanction’. And ‘on some level’ implies that the perspective knows more ‘levels’ on which ‘gender’ might be constructed in other ‘discourse[s]’ without ‘the truth or falsity’, as ‘the truth or falsity’ is also a ‘social’ construction with the idea of ‘compell[ing]’ in the sense of making ‘fabrication’ ‘ontologically necessitated’.

Butler also discusses the relation of ‘experience’ to ‘language’:

There is, in my view, nothing about femaleness that is waiting to be expressed; there is, on the other hand, a good deal about the diverse experiences of women that is being expressed and still needs to be expressed, but caution is needed with respect to that theoretical language, for it does not simply report

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 528.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 528.

a pre-linguistic experience, but constructs that experience as well as the limits of its analysis.²⁵⁵

The ‘femaleness’ might be thought of by others to be ‘waiting to be expressed’. The claim to ‘nothing’ implies that ‘femaleness’ is not something essentially and stably being there or can be realized anyway by this idea of ‘express[ion]’²⁵⁶ as I analysed previously. The second ‘expressed’ is known by the perspective to be related to ‘the diverse experiences of women’. The ‘experiences of women’ are different from the idea of ‘femaleness’. Why the idea of ‘express[ion]’ at this point is known as ‘a good deal’ and as ‘still need[ing] to’ do so can be understood from the claim mentioned earlier that ‘it remains politically important to represent women, but to do that in a way that does not distort and reify the very collectivity the theory is supposed to emancipate’.²⁵⁷ Thus, ‘to represent women’ is to see how ‘the diverse experiences of women’ are constituted and/or ‘expressed’, while to ‘express’ the ‘femaleness’ might not be helpful ‘to represent women’ but run the risk of ‘distort[ing] and reify[ing] the very collectivity’ in a sense. The idea of ‘femaleness’ and its related ‘express[ions]’ can also be seen as part of what ‘the theory’ has done.

The very notion of ‘reification’ is also associated with ‘unwittingly preserv[ing] a binary restriction on gender identity and an implicitly heterosexual framework’, which will not get the ‘collectivity’ ‘emancipate[d]’, nor can ‘gender identity’ be anything else without ‘a binary restriction’. In other words, the ‘reification’ with respect to the ‘express[ions]’ of the ‘femaleness’ is regarded to ‘construct the univocal category of women in the name of expressing’²⁵⁸ in which, the more ‘univocal category’ is ‘expressed’ and/or ‘reified’, the less ‘collectivity’ is ‘emancipate[d]’.

In addition to this, how to ‘express’ ‘the diverse experiences of women’ without

²⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 530-31.

²⁵⁶ See for a similar discussion in relation to ‘gender attributes’: ‘The distinction between expression and performativeness is quite crucial, for if gender attributes and acts, the various ways in which a body shows or produces its cultural signification, are performative, then there is no preexisting identity by which an act or attribute might be measured; there would be no true or false, real or distorted acts of gender, and the postulation of a true gender identity would be revealed as a regulatory fiction’ (Butler 1988, 528).

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 530.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 530.

‘reification]’ and how to think about the ‘collectivity’ is already known by the perspective as ‘need[ing]’ the ‘caution’, as it knows the ‘theoretical language’ itself has ‘limits’ to ‘express’ and ‘analys[e]’, not to mention that the ‘experience’ will be ‘construct[ed]’ by that ‘language’. The very ‘express[ion]’ of the ‘femaleness’ is possibly seen to ‘simply report a pre-linguistic experience’ and thus leads to the problem of ‘reification]’. Therefore, although ‘express[ions]’ of ‘the diverse experiences of women’ are known to be ‘a good deal’, the necessity of doing so is already seen within ‘the limits’. That is to say, the gap between ‘the diverse experiences of women’ ‘being expressed’ and the very ‘need’ of ‘express[ing]’ them cannot be closed by ‘that theoretical language’.

Chapter 5: Animal Itself

Having looked at how, for example, ‘child’ and ‘woman’ are produced in the preceding chapters, I will proceed to show here why this is also the case with the ‘animal’: it can only be known from the perspective of another, which also raises the question of how the idea of empathy is problematic.

5.1 The Case of Derrida’s Cat

In ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, Jacques Derrida states that: ‘It follows, itself; it follows itself. It could say “I am,” “I follow,” “I follow myself,” “I am (in following) myself.”’.²⁵⁹ The claim to ‘itself’ twice can be read differently: the former is about knowing ‘itself’ from what ‘[i]t follows’ is doing. Or, to put it another way, ‘itself’ is constituted on the basis of knowing that this ‘[i]t’ is doing the ‘follow[ing]’. Whereas the latter is claimed as something being ‘follow[ed]’ by ‘it’. In this sense, the second ‘follows’ implies that there can be a difference and/or sameness between ‘it’ and ‘itself’; this notion of ‘follows’ connects ‘it’ with ‘itself’, where ‘itself’ can also ‘follow’ this ‘it’, and vice versa, as it is claimed. While the first ‘follows’ implies that ‘[i]t’ is different to ‘itself’; ‘itself’ cannot be this ‘[i]t’. Instead, ‘itself’ here can be understood as something like a unit that frames what this ‘[i]t’ will be doing – ‘follow’.

By and large, although both are doing the ‘follow[ing]’, no matter ‘[i]t’ or ‘it’, either of them can only be known from the perspectives on each ‘itself’. Similarly, when it comes to ‘I follow myself’ or ‘I am (in following) myself’, although ‘myself’ is claimed to be in relation to what ‘I’ is ‘follow[ing]’ and who ‘I’ is, each ‘I’ is split during the process of doing and being. This also adapts to the claims of ‘I am’ and ‘I follow’ in which ‘I’ can only be known from elsewhere,²⁶⁰ regardless of who this ‘I’ is and what ‘I’ will ‘follow’.

²⁵⁹ Jacques Derrida, ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, *Critical Inquiry*, 28.2 (2002), pp. 369-418 (p. 371), doi: 10.1086/449046.

²⁶⁰ See Karin Lesnik-Oberstein, ‘Literature, Literary Pedagogy, and Extinction Rebellion (XR): The Case of Tarka the Otter’, in *The Literature and Politics of the Environment*, ed. by John Parham

Derrida also discusses the idea of ‘promise’ in the claims to ‘man’, ‘animal’, and ‘nature’:

Nietzsche also said, at the very beginning of the second treatise of *The Genealogy of Morals*, that man is a promising animal, by which he meant, underlining those words, an animal that is permitted to make promises. Nature is said to have given itself the task of raising, bringing up, domesticating and ‘disciplining’ this animal that promises.²⁶¹

In reading Nietzsche’s claim in ‘the second treatise of *The Genealogy of Morals*’, the relation between ‘man’ and ‘animal’ is known as: first, ‘man’ is ‘an’ ‘animal’ but can be ‘promising’; secondly, it is ‘promising’ because ‘promises’ can be ‘permitted’ to ‘make’ rather than self-making, which not only constitutes what ‘a promising animal’ means but also what a ‘man’ is. Then ‘permitted’ by whom is further discussed to be related to ‘[n]ature’. In comparison with ‘man’, though ‘[n]ature’ can ‘promise’ and ‘give itself the task’, this idea of ‘promise’ is, after all, framed as being ‘said to’ do so. By ‘hav[ing] given itself the task of raising, bringing up, domesticating and “disciplining” this animal’, ‘[n]ature’ is not but splits into ‘itself’ in order to do this ‘task’. In a sense, both the claims to ‘give’ and ‘promise’ can be read as a repetition of being ‘permitted’, according to being ‘said’ to be such. This is the way in which the idea of ‘promise’ with respect to ‘nature’ is constructed from a position other to ‘nature’, just as how ‘man’ and ‘an animal’ are framed.

Then the relation between ‘modest’ and immodest’ and the idea of ‘nudity’ is further claimed as follows:

What is shame if one can be modest only by remaining immodest, and vice

(D.S. Brewer, 2023), pp. 109-26. Lesnik-Oberstein discusses the ideas of origin and representation: ‘Derrida’s contemplation concerns “when I say ‘I am’” and how this possibility of “say[ing]” is a “following”, without origin or end. In other words: this is neither an I nor an animal or a human (or anything else) that can be the secure and secured prior object of representation (accurate or otherwise): an I always necessarily has to be announced from *elsewhere*’ (pp. 122-23), which has been helping me to think through these issues.

²⁶¹ Derrida, p. 372.

versa. Man could never become naked again because he has the sense of nakedness, that is to say of modesty or shame. The animal would be *in* nonnudity because it is nude, and man *in* nudity to the extent that he is no longer nude. There we encounter a difference, a time or *contretemps* between two *nudities without nudity*. This *contretemps* has only just begun doing us harm, in the area of the science of good and evil.²⁶²

For Derrida, ‘shame’ is built on the ‘*contretemps*’ between ‘modest’ and ‘immodest’; ‘modest’ would not be ‘modest’ if it were not constituted on the grounds of knowing what ‘immodest’ is, and vice versa. So the idea of ‘shame’ cannot be thought of by others as something that can operate ‘in the area of the science of good and evil’. Also, ‘vice versa’ is a claim to know the relation between the two, which defines the idea of ‘shame’. The ‘Man’ is known to be ‘naked’ before ‘he has the sense of nakedness’. And how ‘he’ comes to ‘ha[ve]’ the ‘sense of nakedness’ is seen to be related to ‘modesty or shame’. In this sense, it seems that the idea of ‘modesty or shame’ is something that stops ‘man’ from ‘becom[ing] naked again’. The ‘nakedness’ is, however, still remained in there to define what it is to feel and be ‘modest’, as is the case of feeling ‘immodest’ within the idea of ‘un-nakedness’ framed.

Then the claim to ‘*in*’ respectively and further discusses ‘a difference, a time or *contretemps* between two *nudities without nudity*’ that ‘we’ are known to ‘encounter’. To be specific, in the first situation, ‘it’ is known to be ‘nude’ and, at the same time, is constructed as not knowing that ‘it is nude’. The ‘nudity’ can, then, be claimed from a position other to this ‘it’, which also defines why the ‘animal’ ‘would be *in* nonnudity’. And ‘*in*’ here is claimed to know that the idea of ‘nonnudity’ can, also, be seen as such: this ‘animal’ may not know ‘it is’ ‘non-nude’, as the ‘nonnudity’, at this point, is not claimed as similar as that to ‘man’ in the same article previously: ‘Man would be the only one to have invented a garment to cover his sex’.²⁶³ In other words, ‘nonnudity’ regarding the ‘animal’ is not about ‘invent[ing] a garment to

²⁶² Ibid., p. 374.

²⁶³ Ibid., p. 374.

cover'. Instead, it can be understood as: 'because the animal is naked without consciousness of being naked, modesty would remain as foreign to it as would immodesty. As would the knowledge of self that is involved in that'.²⁶⁴ Similarly, 'consciousness' with respect to the 'animal' is defined as such by making a claim to know what is 'the knowledge of self that is involved'.

In comparison with the 'animal', 'no longer nude' in relation to 'he' is not the same as 'nonnudity', as 'no longer nude' can be understood as something dynamic: although 'nude' is framed as 'no longer', it is still constructed on the basis of knowing and being 'in' 'nudity'. Just as 'a garment' is known to 'cover his sex'. But 'his sex' and/ or 'nudity' is still known to be there. In this sense, for Derrida, 'non/nudity' is a construction (which can be constructed for the 'animal' and for 'man') and can only be seen from a perspective on either of them. The reason why '[t]his contretemps' is known to 'only just beg[i]n doing us harm' is because 'the area of the science of good and evil' is not thought of as reading 'non/nudity' the way in which: they define each other.

No, no, my cat, the cat that looks at me in my bedroom or in the bathroom, this cat that is perhaps not 'my cat' or 'my pussycat,' does not appear here as representative, or ambassador, carrying the immense symbolic responsibility with which our culture has always charged the feline race [...] If I say 'it is a real cat' that sees me naked, it is in order to mark its unsubstitutable singularity. When it responds in its name (whatever respond means, and that will be our question), it doesn't do so as the exemplar of a species called cat, even less so of an animal genus or realm.²⁶⁵

There is a possibility that 'this cat' will 'appear' 'as representative, or ambassador, carrying the immense symbolic responsibility with which our culture has always charged the feline race', including, for instance, how 'this cat' can be defined as mine

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 374.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 378.

and whether it is a ‘cat’ or a ‘pussycat’. And even the claim to ‘the feline race’ and the way ‘the cat’ ‘looks at me’ can be seen to be involved in and constituted through this possibility, although they are, here, regarded as one of ‘question[s]’ for Derrida to differentiate, to distill from the above ‘appear[ances]’ and then to discuss further.

The same applies to the claim made that ‘it is a real cat’, which is a shift from ‘my cat’ and ‘the feline race’. The idea of ‘real[ity]’ of ‘this cat’ lies in ‘its unsubstitutable singularity’ which cannot be ‘mark[ed]’ by other things. At the same time, this ‘real[ity]’ is, nevertheless, known not to be ‘the exemplar of a species called cat’ nor ‘an animal genus or realm’. As both ‘an animal genus or realm’ and ‘the exemplar of a species called cat’ are not thought of as what ‘unsubstitutable singularity’ can be – to raise the ‘question’ that, for example, how to define ‘it’ as ‘respond[ing] in its name’ and what it ‘means’ when ‘I say’ that this ‘unsubstitutable singularity’ ‘sees me naked’.

With regard to the latter ‘question’, it implies that the ‘cat’ here is presumed to have an ability to ‘see’ ‘me’ who is known as ‘naked’. In this sense, how this ‘see[ing]’ can be ‘see[n]’ as a ‘see[ing]’? Where, then, does this knowledge of ‘naked[ness]’ come from? From which perspective this ‘naked[ness]’ can be ‘see[n]’? In combination with what I have analysed above regarding ‘two *nudities without nudity*’ of ‘man’ and the ‘animal’, the claim to ‘unsubstitutable singularity’ can be understood to see how this ‘cat’ can be constructed in front of ‘me’ who is also seen from a position other to this ‘I’ in order to claim to know that ‘I *is* ‘naked’.

And from the vantage of this being-there-before-me it [the animal] can allow itself to be looked at, no doubt, but also—something that philosophy perhaps forgets, perhaps being this calculated forgetting itself—it can look at me. It has its point of view regarding me. The point of view of the absolute other, and nothing will have ever done more to make me think through this absolute alterity of the neighbor than these moments when I see myself seen naked

under the gaze of a cat.²⁶⁶

In ‘these moments’, not only ‘myself’ is known against ‘a cat’ – ‘the absolute other’, but there is something similar operating in between ‘I’ who ‘see myself’ and ‘myself’ being ‘seen naked’. That is to say, ‘myself’ is also ‘seen naked’ ‘under the gaze of’ ‘me’, in which ‘me’ and ‘I’ are split: either of them can also be an ‘absolute alterity of the neighbor’ to the other. In addition, because of this known ‘vantage of this being-there-before-me’, ‘allow[ing] itself to be looked at’ can happen. So does this ‘myself’ which can be ‘seen naked’. Also, the notion of ‘allow’ is similar to what I have discussed above: ‘[n]ature is said to have given itself the task of raising, bringing up, domesticating and “disciplining” this animal that promises’, from which, like the idea of ‘giv[ing]’, the knowledge of ‘allow[ing]’ comes from elsewhere rather than ‘it’ which is seemingly framed to do so. Because there is a deferral between ‘it’ and ‘itself’, which is, again, the same as the relation between ‘I’ and ‘me’.

Furthermore, what ‘make[s] me think through’ but the ‘philosophy’ is known to ‘forget’ ‘perhaps’ is that ‘it can look at me’, as the latter is regarded as ‘perhaps’ ‘forgetting itself’ even when doing the ‘calculat[ion]’. In other words, the ‘philosophy’ is constructed as having an ability to ‘look[ing] at’ ‘it’ but ‘perhaps’ ‘forgetting’ to know that there also is a ‘point of view regarding’ the ‘philosophy’; a ‘point of view’ arising from the ‘philosophy’ will also be ‘seen’ and claimed in the ‘point of view of the absolute other’. No matter what ‘point[s] of view’ the ‘philosophy’ has, they cannot be self-evident and self-seeable. Just as there is already a perspective on ‘myself’ in order to claim to know that ‘me’ is ‘seen naked’. It is also a case when ‘a cat’ is claimed to do the ‘gaz[ing]’. This is how ‘I’, ‘myself’, and ‘a cat’ are mobilised in the discussion of what it means to be an ‘absolute alterity of the neighbor’.

As if someone said, in the form of a promise or a threat, ‘you’ll see what you’ll see’ without knowing what was going to end up happening. It is the dizziness one feels before the abyss opened by this stupid ruse, this feigned feint, what

²⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 380.

I have been feeling for so long whenever I run away from an animal that looks at me naked.²⁶⁷

For Derrida, ‘see[ing]’ cannot be guaranteed by ‘you’ll see what you’ll see’. As ‘what you’ll see’ which seems to be ‘in the form of a promise’ in ‘someone’s’ ‘sa[ying]’ is also ‘in the form of’ ‘a threat’. The claim to ‘or’ between ‘a promise’ and ‘a threat’ is about knowing the alternatives between the two, and knowing the inability and limitation of ‘know[ing]’ ‘what was going to end up happening’ when ‘someone said’ so. Thus, ‘a promise’ of ‘you’ll see what you’ll see’ can also be ‘a threat’ of ‘you’ll see what you’ll see’, for instance, not ‘knowing’ ‘what was going to end up happening’ ‘whenever I run away from an animal that looks at me naked’ – ‘a promise or a threat’ of knowing and ‘see[ing]’ if ‘an animal’ ‘looks at me naked’.

Specifically, the reason why ‘I’ tend to ‘run away from an animal’ is because ‘I’ is framed to know and to ‘see’ that ‘an animal’ ‘looks at me naked’. What makes ‘one’ and this ‘I’ ‘feel’ ‘dizzy’ is that there is the known ‘abyss’, for Derrida, between ‘see[ing]’ ‘an animal’ and ‘see[ing]’ what ‘an animal’ ‘looks at’, which is, then, also related to thinking about why ‘I’ need to ‘run away from an animal’. In other words, ‘you/[I]’ll see what you/[I]’ll see’ can be understood as ‘this stupid ruse, this feigned feint’ at this point, as what ‘an animal’ ‘looks at’ is not something self-evident but constituted as ‘naked’ ‘me’.

Things would be too simple altogether, the anthropo-theomorphic reappropriation would already have begun, there would even be the risk that domestication has already come into effect if I were to give in to my own melancholy. If, in order to hear it in myself, I were to undertake to overinterpret what the cat might be saying to me, in its own way, what it might be suggesting or simply signifying in a language of mute traces, that is to say without any words. If, in a word, I assigned to it the words it has no need of, as is said of the cat’s ‘voice’ in Baudelaire (‘To utter the longest of sentences

²⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 387.

it has no need of words').²⁶⁸

'Things would be' known as 'too simple altogether' in terms of 'the anthropomorphic appropriation'. Here it is the 'reappropriation' which is claimed as 'would already have begun' when it comes to an attempt to 'hear' 'the cat'. And 'my own melancholy' can be read in relation to this attempt and, meanwhile, as not being sure of 'what the cat might be saying to me', during which time this will also cause 'the risk' of 'domestication'. That is to say, there is already the known 'risk that domestication has already come into effect' when 'I' is known to do something 'in order to hear it in myself', as this implies that there is a separation between 'it' and 'myself' so that 'it' needs to be 'interpreted' for 'myself' to 'hear'. In this sense, the idea of 'domestication' cannot be avoided no matter whether it is an 'interpret[ation]' or an 'overinterpret[ation]', as the claim to 'its own way' also needs to be 'interpret[ed]' or 'overinterpret[ed]' from elsewhere; this own-ness cannot be retrieved as such.

The 'over/interpret[ation]' of 'its own way' can also be seen from the claim to 'in a language'. In other words, these are 'mute traces' which can be constituted as 'a language' 'without any words' to 'suggest or simply signify' something as a possible 'saying to me' according to a position other to 'the cat'. So is the idea of 'mute' and/or 'traces'. Similarly, just as 'the words' can be 'assigned to it', whether 'it has no need of' 'words' and how 'voice' is defined to be related to 'the cat', for instance, in Derrida's reading of Baudelaire, can also be 'assigned' and 'interpret[ed]' to do so.

But in forbidding myself thus to assign, interpret or project, must I conversely give in to the other violence or stupidity, that which would consist in suspending one's compassion and in depriving the animal of every power of manifestation, of the desire to manifest to *me* anything at all, and even to manifest to me in some way *its* experience of *my* language, of *my* words and

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 387.

of *my* nudity?²⁶⁹

‘[T]o assign, interpret or project’ can be seen as something ‘myself’ would do when ‘I’ ‘give in to my own melancholy’, which will, then, creates ‘the risk that domestication has already come into effect’. That is to say, ‘to assign, interpret or project’, for example, ‘the cat’, is regarded to be a ‘domestication’ for Derrida. These are, therefore, something ‘violence or stupidity’ which should be ‘forbidden’. However, ‘in forbidding myself thus to’ do so, ‘violence or stupidity’ is still known to be there in ‘other’ ways, which makes the idea of ‘converse’ not that converse: a seeming ‘converse’ – which might be thought of as such by others – before and after ‘forbidding myself’, or to say, between ‘melancholy’ and ‘compassion’ in which, one is because ‘I’ want to know ‘what’ ‘the animal’, for instance, ‘the cat’, ‘might be saying to me’ and the other is, according to the perspective on ‘one’s compassion’ which should not be ‘suspend[ed]’, because ‘the animal’ ‘desire[s]’ a ‘manifestation’ to ‘me’ or someone else being ‘compassionate’.

Why is it then not ‘converse’? Where do the ideas of ‘desire’ and ‘manifestation’ come from? What constitutes ‘compassion’?

The idea of ‘compassion’ can also be understood as related to the reason for ‘assign[ing], interpret[ing] or project[ing]’ and to ‘my own melancholy’ of knowing what ‘the animal’ ‘manifest[s]’ or wants to ‘manifest’. In this sense, ‘I’ is regarded as one of the ‘one[s]’ who has or needs to have ‘compassion’. Also, why ‘depriving the animal of every power of manifestation’ is seen as ‘the other violence or stupidity’ is not seemingly because ‘the animal of every power of manifestation’ will be ‘depriv[ed]’ by ‘forbidding myself’ ‘to assign, interpret or project’ but how Derrida thinks about the claim to ‘the animal of every power of manifestation’. That is, ‘the animal’ is thought of by others as having this ‘power of manifestation’, which is also a certain knowledge framed in ‘one’s compassion’ when this ‘one’ is part of others who, again, think that ‘I’ ought to be ‘compassionate’ as well. It is, however, ‘the other violence or stupidity’ for Derrida, because this ‘animal’ is known to be

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 387.

constituted as having ‘desire’ and having ‘every power of manifestation’. As with the claim to ‘a language of mute traces’ in relation to ‘the cat’, the motivation of ‘assign[ing], interpret[ing] or project[ing]’ remains and leads to ‘the risk that domestication has already come into effect’.

This also applies to the italics ‘*me*’ in the claim of ‘depriving the animal’ ‘of the desire to manifest to *me* anything at all’: by implication, not only can this ‘me’ be thought of to take part in constructing that ‘the animal’ has ‘the desire’ ‘to manifest’ ‘anything’, as I discussed above, but also this ‘me’ is constituted by the idea of ‘depriving’ – to otherwise have the ability to understand ‘*its*’ ‘manifestation’, to understand ‘anything’ it ‘manifest[s]’. In other words, this is how both ‘the animal’ and ‘*me*’ are employed in exploring whether ‘the other violence or stupidity’ has anything to do with the idea of ‘depriving’ apparently, or with a perspective that can, as it were, be claimed *from* either ‘the animal’ or ‘me’.

The repetition is also in the claim to ‘even to manifest to me in some way *its* experience of *my* language, of *my* words and of *my* nudity’. Both the italics ‘*its*’ and ‘*my*’ are made, as an irony, to know how ‘some way’ works and what it means to claim ‘*its* experience of *my* language, of *my* words and of *my* nudity’: although ‘some way’ is known to be different from the knowledge of ‘its own way’ that I analysed above, they are the same in operation – ‘in some way’ will, after all, have to be known and defined as a ‘way’ for ‘the animal’ to ‘say’ or ‘manifest’ ‘to me’ who is, again, involved in and constituted by the idea of ‘depriving’ and/or (‘suspending’ the) ‘compassion’ – to serve ‘my own melancholy’. Similarly with the perspective on ‘me’, this is how ‘melancholy’ is constructed as ‘my own’ or as ‘m[ine]’ at least.

In addition to this, ‘the animal’, by implication of ‘*its*’, is framed to have ‘experience’—including not only ‘experience of *my* language, of *my* words and of *my* nudity’ but also ‘experience of’ differentiating and knowing what is ‘m[ine]’ and what is not – that is grounded on the idea of ‘domestication’: a kind of, again, ‘violence or stupidity’.

Derrida also explores what ‘silence’ means for ‘nature’ and ‘animality’ and how ‘name’ and ‘language’ are related to ‘power’ by reading Benjamin:

It is true that, according to Benjamin, the sadness, mourning, and melancholy of nature and of animality are born out of this muteness, but also out of and by means of the wound without a name: that of having *been given a name*. Finding oneself deprived of language, one loses the power to name, to name oneself, indeed to *respond* to one's name. (As if man didn't also receive his name and his names!)²⁷⁰

For Derrida, 'Benjamin' is claimed to know that both 'nature' and 'animality' are related to 'the sadness, mourning, and melancholy' and to know how these are 'born' because of 'this muteness' which is framed in the article previously as being 'condemned'²⁷¹ to be such and as being further discussed from that 'a melancholic mourning would reflect an impossible resignation, as if protesting in silence against the unacceptable fatality of that very silence'.²⁷² The idea of 'condemn[ation]' can be read as both 'possible' and 'impossible'. Because 'a melancholic mourning' is constructed from a position other to 'nature' and 'animality', so is the claim to 'resignation'; the claim to knowing that the idea of 'reflecting' comes from elsewhere other than 'nature' and/or 'animality'.

This 'impossib[ility]' can be further seen in how to understand 'silence' as 'silence': 'as if protesting in silence against the unacceptable fatality of that very silence'. To be specific, 'that very silence' in relation to 'fatality' is seemingly different from 'in silence' as 'protesting', there is a similarity between these two claims of 'silence'. As the 'very silence' is seen as being 'condemned' as such: 'the unacceptable fatality', which implies that there seems to be an 'acceptable fatality' for 'nature' and/or 'animality' if it can 'protest' 'against' the 'fatality'. The claim to 'as if', however, can be read as an irony, since 'in silence', though framed in the notion of 'protesting' at this point, is also based upon the same 'tru[th]' of how the ideas of 'resignation' and 'fatality of that very silence' are constituted.

Then 'nature' and/or 'animality' are known to be 'without a name', which is seen

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 388.

²⁷¹ Ibid., p. 388.

²⁷² Ibid., p. 388.

as ‘the wound’ in relation to ‘the sadness, mourning, and melancholy’. That is to say, ‘the sadness, mourning, and melancholy’ are also regarded as ‘means’ assigned to ‘nature’ and ‘animality’. And ‘a name’, even though they are known to be with, can also be seen to be related to ‘the sadness, mourning, and melancholy’ ‘by means of the wound’, as this is ‘a name’ that can only be ‘given’ to have.

Through the ironic claim to ‘[a]s if’, there is a parallel between ‘nature’ and/or ‘animality’ and ‘man’ for Derrida in terms of knowing how problematic the idea of ‘[f]inding oneself’ is framed and how ‘name’ and ‘names’ can only be ‘receive[d]’ from elsewhere as same as how ‘language’ is known to be as such. In other words, for the ‘man’ in Derrida’s claim, ‘deprived of language’ does not imply that there is a ‘language’ that can be retrieved and, then, can be used as ‘the power to name’ and as being able to ‘respond to one’s name’. Rather, ‘language’ is also something that can be ‘given’, as ‘a name’ can be ‘given’ to a ‘man’. And the possibility of ‘[f]inding’ is also constituted from the perspective on this ‘oneself’ instead of being made by ‘oneself’ itself. The problem of ‘[f]inding oneself’ is further discussed in relation to how the idea of ‘autobiograparaphing’ is produced:

They[problems] begin where one attributes to the essence of the living, to the animal in general, this aptitude *that it itself is*, this aptitude to being itself, and thus the aptitude to being capable of affecting itself, of its own movement, of affecting itself with traces of a living self, and thus of *autobiograparaphing* itself as it were.²⁷³

What ‘it *itself is*’ is known to be related to ‘this aptitude’ that can be ‘attribute[d]’ ‘to the essence of the living, to the animal in general’ by ‘one’, which is seen to be ‘where’ the ‘problems’ ‘begin’. In other words, if this is an ‘aptitude’ that is ‘attribute[d]’ and claimed from elsewhere, then who is this ‘it’ and how ‘itself’ becomes what ‘it is’ need to be thought about further.

The ‘problems’ in relation to ‘aptitude’ ‘attribute[d]’ also adapt to ‘being itself’,

²⁷³ Ibid., p. 417.

which implies that 'it' can be something other than this 'itself'. Or to put it another way, 'itself' can be read to be many possibilities in the service of explaining what constitutes this 'it'. This 'itself' or 'being itself' is not the spontaneous 'it'.

Likewise, the 'movement' is defined as 'its' 'own', from a perspective on 'itself'; just like how 'itself' is known to be something different from the 'traces of a living self' at this stage. Or to say, there is a split not only in this 'own movement' but also between 'itself' and 'self'. And the 'self' is constituted to be 'living' and have 'traces', which are also framed in the 'capab[ility]' according to the claim of knowing how 'the aptitude' is constructed. In addition to this, how 'it' comes to be 'itself' 'problem[atically]' can also be seen as a prerequisite for 'being capable of affecting itself, of its own movement, of affecting itself with traces of a living self'. And the claim to 'as it were' implies, again, the 'problems' – in knowing how 'autobiograparaphing itself' operates in relation to the ideas of 'attribut[ing]' and 'aptitude'.

No one has ever denied the animal this capacity to track itself, to trace itself or retrace a path of itself. Indeed the most difficult problem lies in the fact that it has been refused the power to transform those traces into verbal language, to call to itself by means of discursive questions and responses, denied the power to efface its traces.²⁷⁴

The 'animal' here can also be read as 'the essence of the living', as claimed above. For Derrida, 'one' is known to 'attribute to' 'the animal' the 'aptitude', but never 'deny' it 'this capacity' of 'attribut[ing]', which implies that 'this capacity to track itself, to trace itself or retrace a path of itself' is something 'problem[atic]' that needs to and can be 'denied'. Why it has not been done is claimed to relate to 'the most difficult problem'. And this is 'the' 'problem' for Derrida whereas 'one' is known to regard 'this capacity' as 'the fact'.

Specifically, this is 'the fact' that both 'transform[ing]' those traces into verbal

²⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 417-18.

language’ and ‘call[ing] to itself by means of discursive questions and responses’ are seen as ‘the power’. And the ‘fact’ is already known to decide that ‘it has been refused’ this ‘power’, which is similar to how the idea of ‘aptitude’ is defined ‘problem[atically]’. What Derrida is saying is not that ‘it’ should not be ‘refused the power’, as he mentioned in the same article previously: ‘It would not be a matter of “giving speech back” to animals but perhaps of acceding to [...] think[ing] the absence of the name and of the word otherwise as something other than a privation’.²⁷⁵

Here, for him, ‘ “giving speech back” to animals’ would be based on the same idea of ‘think[ing]’ ‘the absence of the name and of the word’ ‘as’ ‘a privation’. Instead, ‘the power to transform those traces into verbal language, to call to itself by means of discursive questions and responses’ can be seen as another way ‘to track itself, to trace itself or retrace a path of itself’. Similarly, ‘the power to efface its traces’ is also constituted in knowing what ‘traces’ are and how they come to be so. For Derrida, the idea of ‘something other than a privation’ can be understood as how the ‘speech’ can be ‘giv[en]’ and how ‘the power’, for instance, regarding the idea of ‘transform[ing]’ ‘call[ing]’, and ‘effac[ing]’, is framed. Because ‘the power to’ do these things are, for him, not ‘autobiograparaphing itself as it were’. The claim to ‘or’, although it is regarded as the ‘capacity’ to ‘the animal’, implies the differences between ‘track itself’ and ‘trace itself’ and/or between ‘trace itself and ‘retrace a path of itself’. At this point, ‘one’ is thought of as seeing that they are all alternatives to be the ‘capacity’ and, also, that both ‘verbal language’ and ‘discursive questions and responses’ will be a ‘power to efface its traces’ possibly. But this is not about ‘this capacity’ to ‘trace’ or ‘retrace’ ‘itself’. Rather, it is about how ‘itself’ is ‘trace[d]’ and ‘retrace[d]’ during which ‘a path of itself’ can be read already to be a different position to ‘itself’, which is parallel to the claim of Derrida that ‘[b]ut between this relation to the self (this Self, this ipseity) and the I of the “I think,” there is, it would seem, an abyss’.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 416.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 417.

5.2 Animal, Voice, and Silence

Having looked at the animal in Derrida's article, I will now turn to Alison Suen's *The Speaking Animal: Ethics, Language and the Human-Animal Divide*, in which she argues why 'speaking for the animal' is problematic:²⁷⁷

Speaking for the other is a tricky business because the other always exceeds our knowledge, and our knowledge often exceeds our words. The difficulty of speaking for the other is exacerbated when this 'other' is the animal other, with whom we do not share a language.²⁷⁸

The 'other' is both known and unknown when it is being 'sp[oken]' for, as, on the one hand, 'the other' is already known to 'exceed our knowledge' under the frame of 'always'; on the other hand, by claiming to 'exceeds', the 'knowledge' of 'the other' can be seen as not only different from, but not part of 'our knowledge'. In this way, 'our knowledge' can paradoxically include the 'knowledge' of 'the other' after all.

'Speaking for the other' is also constructed to be 'a tricky business' because of its relation to 'our words', as 'our words', by implication of the second 'exceeds', cannot 'speak' out 'our knowledge' as the 'knowledge' is known to be. So 'speaking for' 'our[selves]', including 'our knowledge', is also limited to some extent, according to 'our knowledge' of 'our words'. That is to say, 'our knowledge' can both define and be defined by 'our words'.

'The difficulty of speaking for the other' is framed on different levels, as 'the other' can be either 'the animal other' or non-'animal other'. The idea of 'exacerbated' in terms of 'speaking for' 'the animal other' lies in not 'shar[ing] a language' between 'we' and 'the animal', which implies that if there is 'a language' being 'share[d]', this 'difficulty' might be mitigated, for instance, 'speaking for' 'the other' who 'share[s]' 'a language' with 'us'. However, not only the idea of 'for', but also the idea of 'share'

²⁷⁷ Alison Suen, 'Giving Animals a Hearing: Rights Discourse and Animal Representation in Animal Ethics', in *The Speaking Animal: Ethics, Language and the Human-Animal Divide* (Washington, D.C.: Rowman & Littlefield Unlimited Model, 2015), pp. 7-28 (p. 14).

²⁷⁸ Suen, p. 14.

implies a division between ‘we’ and ‘the other’. In other words, even if ‘a language’ is ‘share[d]’, ‘speaking for the other’ is still about ‘our words’ of ‘the other’s’ ‘words’ – ‘a language’ of ‘a language’. The ‘difficulty’ generated by ‘speaking for’ cannot be solved by the very idea of ‘shar[ing]’, no matter whether it is known ‘for’ ‘the animal other’ or not, as both ‘we’ and ‘our words’ are already split, so is ‘the animal other’.

As Suen puts it: ‘Nagel is quite right to point out that simply acquiring objective facts about the other does not mean we can inhabit the worldview of the other or know what it is like to be the other’.²⁷⁹ In her formulation of the ‘Nagel’s’ claim, ‘the other’, for instance, ‘a bat’,²⁸⁰ is already known to have ‘the worldview’. This ‘worldview of the other’, which seems to be impossibly ‘inhabit[ed]’ by ‘us’ and is not as ‘objective’ as ‘facts’, can also be understood as part of ‘facts about the other’, thus being ‘inhabit[ed]’ ‘simply’ to some extent. As ‘what it is like to be the other’ is not ‘simply’ ‘the other’, but, also within the perspective of ‘we’ on ‘the other’. Accordingly, ‘the worldview’ is constituted, which can be ‘know[n]’ as ‘simply’ as ‘objective facts’ being ‘acquir[ed]’.

Suen also suggests, in discussing the danger of ‘speaking for the other’, that ‘even silence conjures its own power. The impetus to speak for the other may produce the paradoxical effect of silencing silence’:²⁸¹

As we saw, for Derrida silence can be an exhibition of power rather than vulnerability. God’s silent treatment is an expression of sovereignty by virtue of God’s ‘right’ to withhold response. We do not know when—or if—God would ever respond to our plight and prayers. Yet we cannot hold God accountable because without response, there is no responsibility.²⁸²

This ‘we’ is known to ‘s[ee]’ that ‘silence’ ‘can be an exhibition of’ ‘vulnerability’ in many other cases. But whether it is related to ‘power’ or ‘vulnerability’, ‘silence’

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 14.

²⁸⁰ It is claimed in the same passage that: ‘As Thomas Nagel would want us to believe, we could never authoritatively speak for a bat because we do not know what it is like to be one’.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 15.

²⁸² Ibid., p. 15.

needs to be ‘exhibit[ed]’ first. By reading ‘Derrida’s’ reading, ‘God’ is known to have a ‘silent treatment’ which would be ‘an expression of sovereignty’. At this point, ‘silence’ can be understood twofold: the first is that it can be a ‘treatment’ for which ‘God’ is seen to have the ‘right’ ‘to withhold response’. Second, ‘silence’, again, can be ‘express[ed]’ as ‘sovereignty’, like how ‘silence’ can be linked with ‘power’ through the very idea of ‘exhibition’. Thus, not only ‘silence’ but also ‘God’ can be read within the different frames.

This also remains in the knowledge of ‘we’ in which ‘God’ is supposed to ‘ever respond to our plight and prayers’. At the same time, the ‘silence’ of ‘God’ is read to be ‘without response’. And this is a ‘response’ that can be ‘withh[eld]’ by ‘God’s “right”’. In a sense, ‘silence’ can also be a ‘response’ from ‘God’ ‘to our plight and prayers’. It seems that ‘God’s’ ‘right’ comes out beyond the knowledge of ‘we’. Nevertheless, both this ‘right’ and ‘responsibility’ is the reading of ‘we’ to ‘silence’ and to ‘God’, as there is a need for ‘we’ to ‘hold’ ‘God’ ‘accountable’, including, for example, ‘our plight and prayers’ need to be ‘respond[ed]’ from ‘God’.

Through her reading of the story, Seshadri argues that the silence of the slave woman is manifested as a capability to withhold. Silence is a power rather than a deficiency; [...] as the slave woman uses her silence to nullify her master’s will. If we follow Seshadri’s analysis [...] silence can even invalidate discourse and reverse the law. If Derrida’s and Seshadri’s conception of silence as an active power is right, then we risk undermining the potency of silence when we uncritically take up the task of speaking for the other.²⁸³

The ‘slave woman’ is known as ‘having lost her tongue’²⁸⁴ in this ‘story’. And whether it is related to ‘a power’ or ‘a deficiency’, ‘her’ ‘silence’ needs to be ‘manifested’ outside both ‘her’ and ‘her silence’, by ‘reading’ of ‘Seshadri’s’ ‘reading’ and/or ‘argu[ment]’. The ‘slave woman’ is constructed as such to ‘use’ ‘her silence

²⁸³ Ibid., p. 15.

²⁸⁴ As mentioned prior to this quote on the same page.

to nullify her master's will'. The 'silence' can be 'use[d]' differently for different 'potenc[ies]' in which '[i]f' 'we' do not 'follow' 'Seshadri's analysis', by implication, 'silence can' be 'read' differently, with different 'conception[s]' as well.

The 'silence' does not 'conjure'²⁸⁵ 'its own power'. Instead, it is 'conjured' with 'power' and/or 'potency'. From this sense, 'silence' cannot be 'silence[d]' by the very 'task of speaking for the other', nor does it let the 'silence' be 'silence'. On the contrary, there is always 'the' outside 'impetus' 'to speak for the' 'silence' and to define 'the potency' and/or the 'power' of and for 'silence'. Whether or not 'we' 'risk undermining the potency of silence' or 'produce the paradoxical effect' on 'silence' does not hinge on 'speaking for the other', but on how 'silence' is being read, 'analys[ed]', and 'concept[ualised]'.

In considering the meaning of 'speaking for the other', Suen continues to discuss whether 'listening to' 'the other', for example, 'animals', would be an alternative to 'speaking for' them, or whether the former is a prerequisite for the latter.²⁸⁶

Wyckoff also argues [...] 'A beginning might be a rethinking of the ability of animals to speak for themselves, perhaps not linguistically but through non-linguistic expressions of preference' [...] There are many ways to discern and attend to what an animal wants without the use of propositional claims. To let animals 'speak' we must also reconceptualize and broaden the meaning of 'speaking' to include a plurality of ways to speak.²⁸⁷

For 'Wyckoff', in 'Suen's' reading, 'the ability of animals to speak for themselves' has previously been thought of as something in relation to 'linguistic' 'expressions' which are seen to be different from what and how 'we' 'speak' and 'listen' 'linguistically'. Thus there is a need to 'rethinking of' that 'through non-linguistic expressions of preference' as 'we' are thought of to have 'non-linguistic expressions of preference' as well, which implies that, even if under the frame of 'perhaps',

²⁸⁵ As mentioned in introducing the preceding quote.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 17.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

‘animals’ are known to be ‘able’ to ‘speak’ ‘through non-linguistic expressions of preference’ from which ‘we’ can get it.

The ‘propositional claims’ are known to be ‘use[less]’, in ‘discern[ing]’ and ‘attend[ing]’ ‘to what an animal wants’, and be outside of knowable ‘many ways’. But ‘what an animal wants’ is already built in a deferral by making a claim to ‘many ways to discern and attend’. From this, it can also be read as that without ‘discern[ing]’ and ‘attend[ing]’, ‘what an animal wants’ might not be knowable; ‘what an animal wants’ is constructed by ‘discern[ing]’ and ‘attend[ing]’ on ‘an animal’ in ‘many ways’. In addition, what ‘animals “speak” ’ is already regarded to be different from what we ‘speak’, as ‘animals’ have to be ‘let’ by ‘we’ to do the ‘speak[ing]’ that is related to ‘non-linguistic expressions of preference’.

And ‘we must also reconceptualize and broaden the meaning of “speaking” ’ implies that what we already have in terms of ‘ways to speak’ is not enough for ‘us’ to understand ‘non-linguistic expressions of preference’ of ‘animals’, in comparison with the known ‘meaning of “speaking” ’. In this sense, ‘a plurality of ways to speak’ can be both ‘include[d]’ and not ‘include[d]’, since there is a split of ‘non-linguistic expressions of preference’ between ‘we’ and ‘animals’.

In reading ‘an article’ by ‘Freeman, Bekoff, and Bexel’ which was ‘published in *Journalism Studies*’, Suen suggests that ‘giving a voice need not mean imposing a human voice’:²⁸⁸

The urgency to legitimate the animal’s voice has already prompted some concrete, practical recommendations on how to incorporate the animal’s perspective when writing about animal issues. [...] Like MacKinnon and Wyckoff, Freeman, Bekoff, and Bexell acknowledge that animals do have voices—they just often go ‘unheard.’ A responsible journalist is willing to take up the task of excavating and articulating their voices for the audience.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 18.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 18.

Here ‘writing about animal issues’ is known not to ‘incorporate the animal’s perspective’ yet, but ‘animal’s perspective’ is already knowable in ‘some concrete, practical recommendations’, just as how ‘the animal’s voice’ is framed: it needs to be ‘legitimate[d]’ in the ‘urgency’ while the ‘voice’ is already there. The claim to ‘incorporate’ implies that in ‘writing about animal issues’, it is not enough to have the perspectives on ‘animal’, although they are seen as ‘legitimate’ and as not requiring any ‘recommendations’: ‘animal issues’ are supposed to include ‘the animal’s perspective’ in addition to those perspectives on ‘animal’. Meanwhile, the very idea of ‘writing about’ can also imply that this is the perspective on ‘animal issues’ rather than that either ‘animal’s voice’ or ‘animal’s perspective’ can be transparently retrieved for ‘writing’.

In Suen’s reading, ‘animals’ voices’ can be ‘heard’ by ‘MacKinnon’, ‘Wyckoff’, ‘Freeman’, ‘Bekoff’, and ‘Bexell’. To ‘Freeman’, ‘Bekoff’, and ‘Bexell’, ‘[a] responsible journalist’ is also supposed to ‘hear’ ‘animals’ voices’ as well, if this ‘journalist’ ‘is willing to take up the task’ to do so. More specifically, this is ‘the task’ of ‘excavating and articulating their voices for the audience’, which is also claimed to differentiate what ‘[a] ir/responsible journalist’ is. Thus ‘the audience’ can get ‘their voices’ that are framed, in journalism, by the very idea of ‘excavati[on] and articulati[on]’ from ‘[a] responsible journalist’, which, in turn, constructs how ‘unheard’ ‘go[es]’ ‘heard’.

But for Suen, this is not about ‘go[ing]’ ‘un/heard’. Instead, how to think about ‘that animals do have voices’, as discussed in the following section of the same chapter of her book. At this stage, however, although ‘giving voice to the voiceless’ is known to be linked with ‘the necessity of human representation and mediation in animal advocacy’,²⁹⁰ what is at stake in her reading of ‘Freeman’, ‘Bekoff’, and ‘Bexell’ is that ‘giving voice to the voiceless’ can ‘mean’ ‘letting animals speak for themselves and listening to their perspectives’.²⁹¹ According to the above analysis, ‘the necessity of human representation and mediation’ does not necessarily ‘mean’

²⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

²⁹¹ Ibid., p. 18.

‘listening and helping the other articulate its voice’.²⁹² In other words, the ‘voice’ being ‘articulate[d]’ is already split in this very ‘necessity of human representation and mediation’.

Suen also points out ‘an illusion’ of getting ‘what nature says’ without ‘human biases’, by reading ‘Carbone’s observation on the tradition of academic writing’, and further argues that ‘[j]ust as scientists imagine that “nature speaks through them,” are we not in some way hoping that animals “speak through” us?’ – an inevitability of ‘a human representative’ to ‘mediate’ ‘the animal voice’:²⁹³

Given that most of us are not attuned to the subtle and individualized ways animals communicate, we rely on experts to translate and interpret their voices for us. (Even the experts themselves have to translate the animal’s voice in terms that are intelligible to themselves and other humans.)²⁹⁴

Here ‘animals’ are already known to be able to ‘communicate’ in ‘subtle and individualized ways’ in which ‘us’ are also seen to have the possibility of being ‘attuned to’ those ways. Not all of ‘us’, thus, for Suen, need to ‘rely on experts to translate and interpret their voices’; the ‘us’ can also be part of the ‘experts’. How ‘the experts’ are ‘attuned to’ ‘the subtle and individualized ways animals communicate’ is further claimed with ‘[e]ven’, which implies that these ‘experts’ might be thought of by others to be ‘attuned to’ ‘the animal’s voice’ without ‘translat[ing]’.

The ‘animal’s voice’, however, is known to be different from, but can and ‘ha[s] to’ be ‘translate[d]’ ‘in’ ‘intelligible’ ‘terms’. In this way, the very idea of ‘translat[ion]’, from ‘the animal voice’ to ‘intelligible’ ‘terms’, is, after all, seen as a necessary means for both ‘most of us’ and ‘experts’ to be ‘attuned to’ ‘the subtle and individualized ways animals communicate’, although ‘themselves and other humans’ are framed to be different. In other words, ‘the experts’ can take the side of ‘most of

²⁹² Ibid., pp. 18-19.

²⁹³ Ibid., p. 20.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 20.

us', as 'terms' will be deferred anyway, no matter if it is the 'translat[ion]' of the 'translat[ion]' or the 'translat[ion]' of the 'voice'.

The 'animal's voice' is constructed through these 'translat[ions]' and 'interpret[at]ions', as it is the only way to make their 'voice' 'intelligible'. However, it is not the 'way animals communicate' that is known to be 'subtle and individualized' and therefore 'we' need to 'rely on experts to translate and interpret their voices for us'. It is both 'our' and 'the experts'' very 'rel[iance] on' the idea of 'intelligible' that constitutes: 'animals' can 'communicate' and have 'voice'. And the 'ways' they 'communicate' are, therefore, 'intelligibl[y]' 'subtle and individualized'.

My point is not that a good translation is impossible. Rather, my point is that even when we let animals speak for themselves, we cannot easily extract the animal's voice from the human's voice. There is always the risk of projection, imposition, or anthropomorphism when it comes to translating and interpreting the animal's voice. While the appeal to let the animal speak may curb our unreflective impulse to speak for the animal, it does not give us a voice that is properly animal, free from the contamination of human biases.²⁹⁵

The claim that 'we cannot easily extract the animal's voice from the human's voice' is based on the knowledge that 'the risk of projection, imposition, or anthropomorphism', in relation to 'the human's voice', is 'always' there. This can be read as that, for Suen, 'a good translation' could and should avoid 'projection, imposition, or anthropomorphism', which then contradicts her previous criticism of 'academic writing' previously in the same chapter of her book. That is to say, the very idea of 'a good translation' goes with what '[s]cientists (and scholars in many fields)' do: [to] 'use the impersonal passive voice in their writing as a sign of their attempts to remove their particular interests and biases from their project at hand'.²⁹⁶ Thus, 'the animal's voice' would be 'possibly' 'extract[ed]' 'from the human's voice', as if

²⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 20.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 20.

‘[n]ature’ can ‘speak through’ ‘[s]cientists (and scholars in many fields)’.²⁹⁷ Although ‘projection, imposition, or anthropomorphism’ are known as ‘the risk’, they are not the same thing as ‘unreflective impulse’. In this sense, ‘a good translation’, in terms of ‘reflective-ness’, can be seen as both ‘free[ing] from the contamination of human biases’ and part of ‘the contamination of human biases’.

Like nature, animals do not ‘speak through us.’ Every time we represent an animal, we are constructing their needs and desires. Perhaps the best way to minimize projection and imposition is not to imagine that there is such a thing as the ‘animal voice’ free from human prejudices, but to recognize the inevitability of human representation in animal advocacy and then work to minimize misrepresentation.²⁹⁸

Even though ‘animals’ are known not to ‘speak through us’, by ‘represent[ing]’ them, ‘we’ are already claimed to know what ‘needs and desires’ they need to have. When this ‘inevitability of human representation’ is ‘recognize[d]’, ‘animal voice’ will only be produced in ‘human prejudices’ in a way which, in turn, justifies the idea of ‘prejudice’ and makes it somehow not ‘prejudice[d]’. Accordingly, not only can ‘projection and imposition’ be ‘minimize[d]’, but also ‘free from’ this very idea of ‘projection and imposition’. In contrast to ‘misrepresentation’, ‘representation’ is known to be there, like ‘a good translation’, without ‘projection and imposition’ perhaps and paradoxically, where both ‘needs and desires’ can be ‘construct[ed]’ in ‘the best way’ for ‘animal advocacy’.

In discussing why her ‘point’ is that ‘representation is inevitable even in the most radical rejection of representation’ rather than ‘that animals would have preferred a spokesperson’, the problem of the notion of ‘representation’ can be seen, in Suen’s formulation, when the idea of ‘bias’ constructs the difference between ‘us’ and ‘the animal’.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 20.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 21.

As long as we write and talk about animals, we are constructing their perspectives and representing their positions. In fact, even the appeal that we should let animals speak for themselves involves a representation of their desire, namely, the desire that they would rather speak for themselves than have a spokesperson.³⁰⁰

‘As long as we write and talk about animals’ can be read as that ‘animals’ can be ‘writ[ten]’ and ‘talk[ed]’ ‘about’ ‘[a]s long as’ ‘we’ want to do so; what will be ‘writ[ten]’ and ‘talk[ed]’ ‘about animals’ are already the perspective on the perspective of ‘we’ to ‘their perspectives’. So ‘constructing’ implies that ‘their perspectives’ are split. As is the claim to ‘representing their positions’ – during which ‘their positions’ are being ‘construct[ed]’.

This can also be read from ‘a representation of their desire’. For Suen, ‘we’ are thought of as those who have not seen that there is a ‘fact’ that ‘the appeal’ ‘involves a representation of their desire’, according to the claim to ‘even’. How ‘a representation’ is ‘involve[d]’ is further claimed in relation to ‘we should let’ in the ‘appeal’: first, ‘animals’ are seen to be able to ‘speak’ if ‘we’ ‘let’ them do so; second, ‘animals’ need to be ‘let’ into ‘speak[ing] for themselves’, as, by implication, ‘animals’ are, otherwise, known as not wanting to ‘speak for themselves’ possibly. This is how the very ‘let[ting]’ of we in relation to ‘the appeal’ constructs what ‘animals’ are assumed to be; ‘we’ are known to have a ‘desire’ of knowing ‘animals’. From this stage, ‘their desire’ can either be ‘that they would rather speak for themselves than have a spokesperson’ or ‘that they would rather’ ‘have a spokesperson’ ‘than’ ‘speak[ing] for themselves’. That is to say, the latter seems to be in opposition to Suen’s formulation of ‘we’ but can also be understood in the ‘appeal’ of this ‘we’ who can be read as ‘a spokesperson’ of these possible ‘speak[ing]’ ‘animals’, as the very notion of ‘representation’ defines what ‘their desire’ ‘would’ and could be like.

It is ironic, though not surprising, that this particular representation of the

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

animal betrays our own bias in favour of speaking for ourselves— it is important for us to speak for ourselves, so it must also be the case for the animal.³⁰¹

The notion of ‘representation’ is constituted differently than what it has been analysed, although it is, at this point, known to be ‘particular’ in the frame of ‘ironic, though not surprising’. For Suen, the reason why there will be ‘the appeal that we should let animals speak for themselves’ is that there is known to be ‘our own bias in favour of speaking for ourselves— it is important for us to speak for ourselves, so it must also be the case for the animal’. Thus knowing that ‘it is important for us to speak for ourselves’ is not ‘our own bias’ but something ‘in favour of speaking for ourselves’, whereas ‘it must also be the case for the animal’, which is seen as ‘our own bias’ towards ‘the animal’. In other words, ‘the animal’ is already known as ‘the’ different ‘case’ from ‘us’ and is knowable in terms of how to ‘speak’ ‘important[ly]’; they cannot and/or do not have to ‘speak for themselves’ as ‘we’ do, according to Suen’s ‘unbiased’ knowledge of ‘representation of the animal’. How ‘the animal’ will ‘speak’ and/or be ‘spoken for’ is, after all, known to be ‘important for us’, which will also not ‘betray our own bias’. The notion of ‘representation of the animal’ remains ‘not surprising’ by knowing what ‘the case’ ‘must’ ‘be’ ‘for the animal’, which would be ‘ironic’ anyway.

5.3 Authorship and Ownership

In ‘A Freudian Account of Animal Care Ethics’,³⁰² how ‘Anna Freud used to write poems’, ‘on behalf of their dogs’, ‘for her father, Sigmund, on his birthdays’ makes Suen think about ‘whose voice is speaking’ among ‘Anna’, ‘Sigmund’ and ‘dog’,³⁰³

³⁰¹ Ibid., p. 21.

³⁰² Suen, ‘From Animal Father to Animal Mother: A Freudian Account of Animal Care Ethics’, pp. 29-48 (p. 29).

³⁰³ ‘“Whose voice is speaking through this rhyme? A dog separated from its master? or the one-time naughty daughter expressing her love for her father?”. Indeed, whose voice is speaking here? Anna the writer of the poems? Sigmund the reciter whose physical voice delivers the poems? Or the dogs from whose perspective the poems are composed?’ (Suen 2015, 29).

and why ‘the indeterminacy of authorship’ becomes ‘more generally’ than just in ‘psychoanalysis’.³⁰⁴

That the patient relies on the analyst to construct and come to terms with her psychic story calls into question the patient’s ownership of her story. But the indeterminacy of authorship in psychoanalysis is symptomatic of the difficulty of being one’s own author more generally. As Judith Butler argues, insofar as the self is always interrupted by the other, insofar as one’s account of oneself is always an address to the other, there is no account of oneself that is entirely one’s own making.³⁰⁵

The relationship between ‘the patient’ and ‘the analyst’ is read by Suen as something to do with ‘com[ing] to terms with’ which is also known under the frame of ‘relies on’, as is how the idea of ‘construct’ is claimed. This can be understood as: on the one hand, ‘her psychic story’ needs to be ‘construct[ed]’ by ‘the analyst’; she cannot construct ‘her’ ‘story’ for ‘the analyst’ without this ‘reli[ance] on’; on the other hand, ‘the patient’, by implication of ‘come to terms with’, seems not to be willing but has to accept what ‘the analyst’ thinks ‘her psychic story’ is. At this point, ‘relies on’ becomes something like a forcible agreement so that there can only be one version of ‘her psychic story’ working and circulating between ‘the patient’ and ‘the analyst’, which is inconsistent with what Suen wants to argue regarding the notion of ‘the patient’s ownership of her story’.

This is how the notion of ‘come to terms with’ is at stake in making a claim to know why ‘the patient’s ownership of her story’ can be ‘call[ed]’ ‘into question’. In this sense, the ‘ownership’ does not ‘call into question’ but is still there, to some extent, for ‘the patient’, not to mention, then, how ‘the indeterminacy of authorship’ is paradoxically framed: according to Suen, ‘the difficulty of being one’s own author more generally’ is seemingly based on knowing that, in ‘psychoanalysis’, ‘the patient

³⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 29.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 30.

relies on the analyst to construct' 'her psychic story'. So what does 'relies on' mean? Can 'the analyst' 'construct' 'her psychic story' without 'rel[ying] on' 'the patient'? if not, can this also be understood as the way in which 'the analyst' 'relies on' 'the patient' 'to construct' what 'the analyst' views 'her psychic story' to be? Thus, 'the patient' and 'her story' within the perspective of 'the analyst' is not as 'indetermina[te]' as Suen thinks as to who is the 'author'. The 'patient' is known to have 'her story' anyway. Also, the claim to 'come to terms with her psychic story' may unwittingly produce the idea that there is also a possibility of overcoming 'the difficulty'. That is, 'the patient' can be 'her' 'own author', as I have analysed above with regard to 'ownership'. Accordingly, 'the indeterminacy of authorship' collapses again.

How 'the difficulty of being one's own author', from 'psychoanalysis', becomes 'more generally' is further discussed by Suen's reading of 'Judith Butler's' 'argu[ment]'. These two formulations of 'insofar as' for Suen imply, however, that there should and could be an 'account of oneself that is entirely one's own making' 'insofar as' this 'one' is known to 'address' 'oneself', namely, again, 'being one's own author'. But the 'difficulty' is that even though there is no 'the other' being there to 'interrupt' and/or to be 'address[ed]', this 'self' is split already when it is known to 'make' 'one's own' 'account'. The 'account of oneself' is 'construct[ed]' by 'one's' perspective on 'oneself', which will be, after all, 'interrupted' by 'oneself' in this very 'account of oneself'. That is to say, 'the other' can be read differently, as this 'other' includes 'oneself' – the displaced and deferred 'one/self'.

Indeed, psychic story aside, have we ever told a story that is absolutely our own? Is it ever possible to tell our own story without supplementary anecdotes from the other? We cannot, for example, tell the stories of our birth and our death. Even childhood memories are often contaminated by the memories of our parents or siblings. Insofar as psychoanalysis displaces the self in the unconscious, it makes us all wonder whether the voice that we take as our

own is not already some kind of translation, some act of ventriloquism.³⁰⁶

For Suen, not only ‘psychic story’, but ‘a story’, can be ‘call[ed] into question’ in terms of ‘absolute[ness]’. This ‘our own story’ being ‘told’ is known as something which needs ‘supplementary anecdotes from the other’, which consolidates, nevertheless, the difference between ‘our own story’ – ‘absolute’ ‘our[s]’ and ‘anecdotes’ – ‘absolute’ ‘supplementary’ of ‘the other’. And this ‘absolute[ness]’ which she ‘question[s]’ and denies remains in the idea of ‘contaminated’ when ‘childhood memories’ are discussed.

That is, there are ‘childhood memories’ known to be there for her – purely and independently ‘[un]contaminated’ from ‘the memories of our parents or siblings’. Similarly, ‘the self’ is being there ‘conscious[ly]’ before ‘displace[d]’ by ‘psychoanalysis’. And the claim to ‘displaces’ then shifts to ‘translation’ and ‘ventriloquism’, even though these are seen to be distinct from each other. But the notion of ‘ventriloquism’, in comparison with the very notion of ‘displaces’, can be read as that ‘our own’ ‘voice’ is still ‘our own’ ‘voice’. Also, ‘translation’ does not affect the certainty of knowledge about which is ‘our own’ and which is not, as ‘we’ are framed to know such prior to the very act of ‘tak[ing] as’.

5.4 Empathy

In the section of ‘A Freudian Care Ethics’, Suen, by reading ‘Carol Gilligan’s’ reading of Freud in her ‘chapter of *In a Different Voice*’, argues that, even though ‘Freud epitomizes psychology’s male bias’, ‘there is a Freudian-inspired animal care ethic to be had’,³⁰⁷ in her reading of ‘Freud’s *Leonardo da Vinci and A Memory of His Childhood*’,³⁰⁸ if there is ‘a psychoanalytic perspective’³⁰⁹ to be taken.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 30.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 43.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 38.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 43.

That is, ‘da Vinci’s relationship with the vulture-mother captures’, not only how ‘the animal cares for us’,³¹⁰ in response to why ‘the language of “care” can still be problematic’ in operating ‘a single direction’ from ‘human caretaker’ to ‘the animal’, when Suen reckons ‘a disability studies perspective’ will not agree with ‘the protector-victim dyad’.³¹¹ But also this ‘vulture-mother’, meanwhile, an ‘ambiguous and undecided’ ‘vulture’s sex’, ‘exemplifies another important commitment in ecofeminism—a resistance to binary thinking’ in ‘care ethics’. Namely, the ‘relationship between care and justice’ does not have to be ‘antithetical’. Instead, for example, she states that ‘Lori Gruen develops the concept of “entangled empathy” that incorporates both empathy and cognition’.³¹²

The wellbeing of another grabs the empathizer’s attention; then the empathizer reflectively imagines himself in the position of the other; and then he makes a judgment about how the conditions that the other finds herself in contribute to her state of mind or wellbeing. The empathizer will then carefully assess the situation and figure out what information is pertinent to empathize effectively with the being in question.³¹³

In Gruen’s argument, this is the ‘wellbeing of another’ known to be able to ‘grab the empathizer’s attention’, which implies that this ‘wellbeing’ needs to ‘grab the attention’ prior to getting ‘empathize[d]’ and seems that there is known ‘another’ and the ‘wellbeing of another’ being there before ‘grab[bing]’. It is, however, the claim to ‘grab’ that constructs the ‘wellbeing’ and ‘another’ in this ‘attention’. This is similar to what is framed in a problematic knowledge of ‘then’ from which how ‘the empathizer’s attention’ operates is further discussed in relation to the idea of ‘imagin[ation]’. This is ‘the position’ that ‘the other’ is known to have but can be ‘imagine[d]’ ‘reflectively’ by ‘the empathizer’. So the ‘attention’ to the ‘wellbeing of

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

³¹¹ Ibid., p. 43.

³¹² Ibid., p. 44.

³¹³ Ibid., p. 45.

another' is created in this very 'reflective' 'imagin[ation]' by, meanwhile, knowing that 'himself' and 'the other' are in different 'position[s]'.

The 'imagin[ative]' position' remains split in 'a judgement' 'he makes'. That is, 'how the conditions that the other finds herself in contribute to her state of mind or wellbeing' are constituted according to 'his' 'position' on 'her' 'position'. In other words, 'her state of mind or wellbeing' is known from 'the conditions' that are, in the name of 'a judgement', 'f[ound]' by 'he' on 'herself' not by 'herself', as how the very idea of 'contribut[ion]' works is also defined through 'a judgment' of 'he' on the basis of 'imagin[ation]' of 'the other' to be 'himself' rather than 'herself'. Therefore, this is why and how the 'wellbeing of another' is being 'empathize[d]' through the notions of 'attention', 'imagin[ation]', and 'judgment' within which 'the position of the other' is split from the very beginning of 'grab[bing]', making an implication of how to be a 'reflective' 'empathizer' and what it means to be 'entangled'.

And this 'reflecti[on]' on the 'wellbeing of another' is further claimed to be related to the idea of 'effectively'. Specifically, the 'wellbeing of another' shifts to 'the being in question' at this point. So the 'question' is already known to be there before 'empathiz[ing]'. But not all of the 'question[s]' in relation to 'the being' need to be 'empathize[d]'. Instead, 'a judgment' needs to be 'ma[de]' for 'carefully assess[ing] the situation and figur[ing] out what information is pertinent to empathize effectively'. That is to say, it is seemingly known that 'information' is seen to include 'pertinent' questions and not 'pertinent' ones among which the former calls for 'empathiz[ing] effectively' from 'the empathizer'. It is the idea of 'judgment' that constructs both 'the situation' and the 'information' – whether it is 'pertinent' or not. Also, the 'question' regarding 'the being' is constructed in this 'judgment'. This is, how 'the being' needs to be 'empathize[d]' through which 'effective' 'judgment' which is grounded on the 'imagin[ation]' of 'the empathizer' defines what 'the being in question' is and how 'wellbeing' should be. As with Gruen, the notion of 'empathiz[ing]' 'the other' should and could be 'effectively' produced, by virtue of the 'judgment' of 'imagin[ing]' to be 'the other', during which the very choice of 'pertinent' 'information' disturbs what it means to be in 'the position of the other'. As

a result, by knowing that ‘affect and reason are not mutually exclusive’,³¹⁴ this very ‘concept of “entangled empathy” ’ constructs the ‘empathy’ to be ‘effective[ly]’ ‘[un]entangled’, to be ‘in’ – no ‘pertinent’ – ‘relation with others’.³¹⁵

³¹⁴ Ibid., p. 45.

³¹⁵ Ibid., p. 45.

Chapter 6: Children's Literature and Irony Comprehension

6.1 Reader and Reading Comprehension

In *The Child and the Book: A Psychological and Literary Exploration*, Nicholas Tucker discusses the 'differences between the literary tastes and needs at least of experienced adult readers and those of the average child' in relation to 'intellectual skills':³¹⁶

It follows, therefore, that younger children will not on the whole welcome ambiguity in their literature. The type of moral judgement they can most easily share and understand will tend to praise or condemn characters for their surface acts alone, without wanting to consider more subtle explanations, either in terms of motivation or else in the suggestion of an altogether more complex scale of values.³¹⁷

What '[i]t follows' is known to be as such in the claim to 'therefore', which implies that 'welcome ambiguity in their literature' is relevant to 'hold[ing] two contradictory, abstract ideas together in one concept'.³¹⁸ This is also an 'ambiguity in their literature', according to the perspective on 'younger children', that is supposed to be 'welcome[d]'. In one sense, there are others who are known to be able to 'welcome ambiguity in their literature'. In another sense, the 'ambiguity' is defined as 'their[s]' but is knowable to the perspective when the 'literature' is 'welcome[d]'. That is to say, when 'ambiguity' becomes 'welcome', it is no longer 'ambiguous' 'in' the 'literature' paradoxically but is already constituted as having 'two contradictory, abstract ideas together in one concept'. In this sense, 'ambiguity' is both known and not known to be there 'in' the 'literature' for 'un/welcome[ing]'.

Similarly, 'moral judgement' is claimed to be with multiple 'type[s]'. To the

³¹⁶ Nicholas Tucker, 'Introduction', in *The Child and the Book: A Psychological and Literary Exploration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 1-22 (p. 9).

³¹⁷ Tucker, p. 9.

³¹⁸ Ibid., p. 9.

perspective, ‘moral judgement’ can be understood differently, for instance, in which ‘judgement’ can both ‘praise’ and ‘condemn characters’ at the same time in knowing ‘their acts’ that are more than the ‘surface’, while ‘younger children’ are constituted to know ‘acts’ ‘alone’ at the ‘surface’ level, as these are ‘children’ who are also known to ‘prefer books that deal with concrete events rather than with abstract discussion’ and to be with ‘still immature intellectual skills’.³¹⁹ Although knowing ‘two contradictory’, for example, means that which ‘characters’ would be ‘praise[d]’ and ‘condemn[ed]’ are already framed to be one of the ‘intellectual skills’, it is ‘still immature’ for ‘children’ to making an alternative between ‘praise’ and ‘condemn’ instead of ‘hold[ing]’ the two together.

When it comes to the notions of ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’, however, the perspective knows they are ‘contradictory’ to each other and cannot be ‘held’ ‘together in one concept’ at this point. Therefore, the idea of what is ‘im/mature’ is not stable: not only are ‘immature intellectual skills’ defined by the self-evident ‘mature intellectual skills’; but also ‘mature intellectual skills’ can, in turn, fall into the ‘immature intellectual skills’ they themselves criticise.

What are not ‘surface acts’ outside of this ‘type of moral judgement’ is further claimed to be the knowledge that these ‘acts’ contain ‘motivation’ and/or ‘the suggestion of an altogether more complex scale of values’. In comparison with ‘ambiguity in their literature’, ‘more subtle explanations’ which can be regarded as ‘explain[ing]’ the implications behind the ‘acts’, are, nevertheless, not about the issue of ‘can/not’ but ‘wanting to consider’ or not. In other words, contradictions remain in this claim that ‘younger children’ are known ‘not’ to ‘welcome ambiguity in their literature’ as ‘they can most easily share and understand’ ‘characters’ ‘surface acts alone’ on the one hand; on the other hand, ‘more subtle explanations’ are ‘easy’ to ‘understand’ for these ‘children’ as long as they ‘want to consider’. Thus, ‘younger children’ are constructed not to ‘welcome’ ‘ambiguity’ as ‘ambiguity’ but be able to ‘consider’ ‘more subtle explanations’ ‘in their literature’ if they ‘want’ to do so.

³¹⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

Tucker goes on to compare ‘[o]lder children’ to ‘younger children’ in the following:

Older children, it is true, eventually get past this particular stage of making very simple, absolute moral judgements, but usually arrive at an only slightly more complex level, where conventional morality will still be preferred to more radical ideas that sometimes challenge tradition and the majority view.³²⁰

According to the perspective on ‘[o]lder children’, there are other known ‘level[s]’, besides ‘an only slightly more complex level’ after ‘get[ting] past this particular stage’, at which ‘more radical ideas that sometimes challenge tradition and the majority view’ are ‘preferred to’ ‘conventional morality’. In this way, there are other two couples of dichotomies, for instance, between ‘tradition[al]’ and ‘radical’ and between ‘majority’ and minority, being framed and that can be regarded as ‘two contradictory, abstract ideas’ in relation to ‘mature intellectual skills’, as I analysed above, to be a potential bench-mark for measuring whether or not readers have ‘im/mature intellectual skills’.

The idea regarding ‘mature intellectual skills’ here, however, ironically disturbs themselves when these ‘more radical ideas’ are constituted to only ‘challenge’ rather than co-existing with ‘tradition and the majority view’ and when it is claimed to be in line with what ‘Scott Fitzgerald once wrote’ and what ‘Piaget would probably agree from his own researches’ – “[t]he test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still maintain the ability to function”.³²¹

With ‘younger children’ and ‘[o]lder children’ shifting to ‘[a] young audience’, ‘moral judgements’ are further stated in relation to ‘a children’s author’:

A young audience, therefore, always has a tendency to go in for snap moral

³²⁰ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

³²¹ Ibid., p. 9.

judgements, often based upon preconceived, immediate emotional reactions towards certain acts or situations and this, in turn, limits a children's author in any attempt to develop a more complex view of things.³²²

There is a gap anyway between what '[a] young audience' will react to and what 'a children's author' 'develop[s]' and/or 'attempt[s] to develop'. But it seems that, to the perspective, this gap can be closed to some extent as long as '[a] young audience' stops to 'go[ing] in for snap moral judgements'; 'a more complex view of things' will, then, be retrieved. This also implies that there are certain 'audience[s]' who can react well 'towards' 'a more complex view of things' rather than 'limit[ing]' what 'a children's author' 'attempt[s] to develop'. I read that, however, both '[a] young audience' and 'a children's author' are constructed in the way in which the very idea of how and why 'limit' operates in such 'a tendency' can also be seen as 'preconceived' and 'immediate'.

In fact, one of the appeals of fiction for all ages is that it can present the reader with a pattern of events that is in itself more comprehensible than the jumble of happenings that seems to make up real life. But while Tolstoy or Henry James can write for an audience capable of understanding the necessarily indeterminate complexity of much human experience, a children's writer will usually have to offer a more comprehensible world of cause and effect, simplified towards a minimum of explanation.³²³

When it comes to 'one of the appeals of fiction for all ages', the perspective on 'the reader' claims to know that both 'an audience' and 'children' can be counted as such 'reader[s]'. To be more specific, why 'fiction' becomes an 'appeal to 'all ages' can be attributed to that this 'audience' takes the side of these 'children' who can 'comprehen[d]' 'a pattern of events' more easily than 'the jumble of happenings', even if 'audience' are known to be 'capable of understanding the necessarily

³²² Ibid., p. 10.

³²³ Ibid., p. 10.

indeterminate complexity of much human experience’.

But no matter ‘a pattern of events’ or ‘the jumble of happenings’ or ‘indeterminate complexity of much human experience’, they are all ‘ma[de] up’ to ‘present’ and ‘explain’ what ‘real life’ is like to be for ‘the reader’. It seems that ‘the jumble of happenings’ is constituted to be closer to ‘real life’, as is ‘indeterminate complexity of much human experience’. How ‘real life’ is ‘real’, however, still relies on ‘explanation’ regardless; both ‘happenings’ and ‘much human experience’ are framed within ‘a pattern’ as well – ‘a pattern of’ ‘present[ing]’ ‘real life’. Therefore, there may not be such a difference between ‘Tolstoy or Henry James’ and ‘a children’s writer’, as ‘Tolstoy or Henry James’, ‘a children’s writer’, ‘an audience’, and ‘children’ are also all claimed in the middle of what ‘real life’ and/or a ‘fact’ means.

The certainty of knowledge can be seen ongoingly with the claim shifting as follows:

there is a strong wish, usually reflected in children’s literature, that stories should always be quite clearly rounded off, with justice more or less seen to be done, even if this works against characters with whom children may generally sympathise.³²⁴

How ‘stories should always be’ done is already decided in ‘a strong wish’ ‘reflected in children’s literature’ prior to how ‘this works’, which is similar to the claim to know which should be ‘complex’ and/or ‘comprehensible’ above. In other words, what ‘children’ might ‘reflect’ on ‘children’s literature’ is not a priority in this ‘wish’. Instead, the perspective on this ‘strong wish’ knows what kind of ending the ‘story’ should have for the ‘children’ to read.

If how ‘this works’ can be seen to be constructed on the basis of the idea about ‘moral judgements’ in relation to ‘children’ – ‘this works against characters with whom children may generally sympathise’, ‘a strong wish’ of what ‘this’ should ‘work’ – ‘that stories should always be quite clearly rounded off, with justice more or

³²⁴ Ibid., p. 10.

less seen to be done' can also be regarded as another way of 'moral judgements' 'usually reflected in children's literature' on 'children'. At this stage, the definition of 'stories' can be understood to be in line with the claim to 'conventional morality', for example, 'with justice more or less seen to be done'; this 'strong wish', then, goes with rather than 'challeng[ing]' 'tradition and the majority view' – the latter is framed as 'more radical ideas' that are agreed by the perspective as what '[o]lder children' are supposed to be but have not yet achieved. In this sense, it is, again, 'a strong wish' that creates how 'younger' and/or '[o]lder' 'children' should react to 'children's literature' and dictates what kind of 'level' they are supposed to 'arrive at'.³²⁵

6.2 Irony Comprehension

The difference between 'adult readers' and 'younger readers' is explained more in terms of whether 'irony' can be 'detect[ed]':³²⁶

The failure to detect irony lies in the reader's inability to understand the author's intention, often signalled by a particular use of language bordering on parody of whichever person or institution is being satirized [...] Children, however, have neither the literary skill nor the historical perspective for this sort of analysis; they are, anyhow, naturally susceptible to sarcasm, becoming easily confused over the way that the surface meanings of words can also convey a contrary interpretation.³²⁷

How 'this sort of analysis' proceeds can then be understood as relevant 'to understand the author's intention, often signalled by a particular use of language bordering on parody of whichever person or institution is being satirised'. And 'hav[[ing]]' both 'the literary skill' and 'the historical perspective' 'for this sort of analysis' can be seen as 'reader's' 'ability' to 'detect irony'. Specifically, 'to understand the author's intention', there are deferrals needing to be 'detect[ed]' as well in which, for example,

³²⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

³²⁶ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

³²⁷ Ibid., p. 11.

‘a particular use of’ ‘language’ is not meant to be a ‘parody of whichever person or institution is being satirised’ but only ‘bordering on’, as is the claim to a knowledge of what is ‘often signalled’. In other words, how ‘irony’ is ‘detect[ed]’ is not simply related to knowing ‘which’ ‘person or institution is being satirised’.

Furthermore, the problematic ‘ability’ regarding ‘reader’ up to this point, by implication, already excludes ‘[c]hildren’ as the latter are known to be ‘naturally susceptible to sarcasm’ ‘anyhow’ due to the ‘inability’ to understand ‘a contrary interpretation’ ‘convey[ed]’ on the one hand; on the other hand, the ‘ability’ to know ‘the (surface) meanings of words’ can also be regarded to involve ‘[c]hildren’ in what accounts for ‘reader’. In other words, how can ‘[c]hildren’ become ‘easily confused’ about what they are supposed not to be ‘easily confused’ about?³²⁸

Once again, this difficulty is not always confined to children. In research on the reading comprehension of college of education students, for example, older readers were sometimes seen to let their immediate reactions to a text swamp more critical and accurate understanding, often becoming quite confused between what authors appeared to write and their actual intention.³²⁹

The perspective claims to know that ‘children’ have ‘this difficulty’ ‘anyhow’ and ‘naturally’, according to my analysis above, without needing to do the ‘research on the reading comprehension’ of them, whereas ‘college of education students’ is defined to be ‘older readers’, at this point, who are known to be ‘confined’ by ‘this difficulty’ ‘sometimes’. The difference between ‘children’ and ‘older readers’ would seem not to be there ‘always’ by making a claim to ‘[o]nce again’. However, both age difference and ‘reading comprehension’ with respect to ‘education’ are already taken for granted to differentiate them.

³²⁸ See Sue Walsh, ‘ “Irony?—But Children Don’t Get It, Do They?”: The Idea of Appropriate Language in Narratives for Children’, *Children’s Literature Association Quarterly*, 28.1 (2003), pp. 26-36, doi: 10.1353/chq.0.1405. Walsh analyses ‘Kipling’s “How the First Letter was Written”’: ‘[I]t also signals that which is ostensibly the text’s own project—the writing of orality and the writing of the origins of the written—as impossible, since how can “Neolithic man” know that he does not want to know that which he does not already know?’ (2003, 31-32), which helps me think of this question.

³²⁹ Tucker, *The Child and the Book*, p. 11.

And ‘more critical and accurate understanding’ is known to be the right ‘reaction’ if these ‘old readers’ will, by implication, not ‘let their immediate reactions to a text swamp’ it. That is to say, ‘immediate reactions’ are something that will hinder ‘more critical and accurate understanding’ and that can and needs to be stopped by ‘old readers’ when doing ‘reading comprehension’. Thus, the ‘education’ for ‘students’ in ‘college’ in terms of ‘reading comprehension’ is supposed to equip them with the ability to stop ‘their immediate reactions to a text’. Nevertheless, ‘education’, it seems to me, is already involved in the construction of ‘their im/mediate reactions’: for example, ‘their immediate reactions to a text’, according to the perspective on ‘old readers’, in comparison with that on ‘children’ discussed previously, should have been ‘educat[ed]’ to know rather than should have known ‘immediate[ly]’ the difference ‘between what authors appeared to write and their actual intention’. In this way, it can be seen how the notion of ‘im/mediate reactions’ always shifts and is paradoxically mobilised in relation to ‘education’.

The age at which children are capable of understanding irony is further explored in ‘Children, Irony and Philosophy’.³³⁰ Gareth B. Matthews argues ‘many stories that are enjoyed and appreciated by pre-school children depend for their primary interest on irony’³³¹ and suggests ‘a sort of dramatic irony’³³² by taking ‘the collection, *Frog and Toad Together* by Arnold Lobel’ as an example and discussing one of the stories called ‘The Garden’:

I have a two-year-old granddaughter who likes to hear stories from this collection. I’m not sure how much she understands. But certainly a bright three-year-old can be expected to laugh spontaneously in the right places, and perhaps even to say a little about why he or she thinks such-and-such a part is funny.³³³

³³⁰ Gareth B. Matthews, ‘Children, Irony and Philosophy’, *Theory and Research in Education*, 3.1 (2005), pp. 81-95, doi: 10.1177/1477878505049836.

³³¹ Matthews, p. 83.

³³² Ibid., p. 86.

³³³ Ibid., p. 83.

‘[A] two-year-old granddaughter’ is known to ‘like to hear stories from this collection’, although ‘how much she understands’ is claimed as ‘not sure’. Thus the idea of ‘lik[ing] to hear stories’ does not have to rely on ‘understand[ing]’ all of them. When it comes to ‘a bright three-year-old’, both the knowledge of “lik[ing] to hear’ and of ‘understand[ing]’ are further discussed. Although it could be one of many possible ‘three-year-old’, it must be ‘bright’ in the first place. Which are the ‘right places’ in the ‘stories’ that are ‘expected’ to be ‘laugh[ed] spontaneously’ are also known prior to reading to ‘a bright three-year-old’. Provided ‘a’ ‘three-year-old’ is ‘bright’, it knows when to ‘laugh’ as ‘I’ does. And if it does so, the ‘expected’ ‘laugh’ will be considered as the reason why it ‘likes to hear stories’.

In addition to this, ‘such-and-such a part’ differs from, but can be seen to be related to, ‘stories from this collection’, as ‘he or she’, after all, is ‘three-year-old’ but ‘bright’ so that ‘I’ can relate the two. And ‘perhaps even to say a little’ implies that ‘say[ing]’ why ‘funny’ is only a possibility. But, as with the claim to ‘not sure how much she understands’, this im/possibility does not affect the ‘certain’ knowledge of how ‘he or she’ ‘likes to hear stories from this collection’ as ‘a two-year-old granddaughter’ does. In this ‘say[ing]’, even if it is ‘a little’, the idea of ‘funny’ is also something that has already been ‘expected’. In other words, which ‘part[s]’ of the ‘stories’ are supposed to be ‘funny’ have also been decided for ‘a bright three-year-old’ to ‘laugh’ at, which is why ‘such-and-such a part’ can also be seen as part of ‘the right places’.

I have read this story to many different children on many, many different occasions. Three-year-olds, four-year-olds, and five-year-olds can be expected to enjoy and appreciate the story. Several lines in the story make children, even very young children laugh, or at least smile. I can increase the probability of getting smiles from pre-school children if I act out Toad getting very close to the ground and shouting, ‘NOW SEEDS, START

What ‘I have read’ is different from what ‘I act out’, but both of these share a common point: ‘[t]hree-year-olds, four-year-olds, and five-year-olds can be expected to enjoy and appreciate the story’. These ‘children, even very young children’ are constituted in the ‘expect[ation]’ of not only how they should react to ‘the story’ – ‘laugh, or at least smile’ but also of when and why they, the ‘pre-school children’ at this point, should ‘get’ (more) ‘smiles’ because of the ‘act[ing] out’ of this ‘I’.

In this case of ‘story’, how these ‘children’ are known ‘to enjoy and appreciate the story’ is related to ‘[s]everal lines in the story’ which ‘make’ them ‘laugh, or at least smile’. The idea of ‘smile’, although it is known as ‘at least’, is not sufficient in comparison with what ‘laugh[ing]’ means. It needs to be ‘increase[d]’ by ‘I’. In this sense, it can be seen that ‘I’ ‘can’ also ‘increase’ ‘children’s’ ‘probability of’ ‘enjoy[ing] and appreciat[ing] the story’ by acting out what ‘Toad’ (a character) does in the ‘story’.

Combined with what I have read about the idea of ‘right places’ above, according to Matthews, where ‘[s]everal lines’ come from does not matter, nor about to what extent the ‘children’ ‘understand’ ‘the story’, as this ‘I’ can ‘make’ them ‘understand’ what ‘I’ ‘act out’ based on this ‘story’ in which ‘I’ know that which ‘places’ will be ‘right’. In this way, the ‘made’ ‘understand[ing]’ for ‘children’ can also be regarded as a way of how they ‘enjoy and appreciate the story’.

6.3 *Aviary Wonders Inc.*

In the following, I will think more about claims regarding animals (in particular, birds), (child) readers, and their understanding of satire, through reading a picture book and critical discussions around it.

At the beginning of *Aviary Wonders Inc.*, ‘birds’ are claimed as: ‘All the birds named in “The Right Parts” are real—or once were. The moa, Carolina parakeet,

³³⁴ Ibid., p. 84.

Javanese lapwing, laughing owl, great auk, caracara, and Haast's eagle are now officially extinct'.³³⁵ 'The Parts' are framed as '[r]ight' due to their relation to the notion of 'real'. And this is a 'real[ness]' regarding 'nam[ing]' of the 'birds'. The perspective knows that whether 'birds' 'are real' 'or once were' 'real' does not affect their '[a]ll' '[r]ightness'. With the 'birds' shifting to '[t]he moa, Carolina parakeet, Javanese lapwing, laughing owl, great auk, caracara, and Haast's eagle', 'extinct' can be known both 'officially' and 'non-officially'. But '[t]he moa, Carolina parakeet, Javanese lapwing, laughing owl, great auk, caracara, and Haast's eagle', by implication, haven't been '*extinct*'³³⁶ to some extent in the perspective on 'The Right Parts', as they 'were' not only 'real' in the past, but could still be 'real[ly]' 'named' in 'The Right Parts'. In this sense, the 'real[ness]' of the 'birds' can be constructed through 'nam[ing]', regardless of 'extinct[ion]' or not.

There is also an introduction 'ABOUT THE COMPANY' framed as:

I was born and raised in Lakemont, New York, and discovered a passion for bird watching while working for my family's logging company, first in the Northeast and then in Brazil. I noticed that as the birds' habitat disappeared, their numbers and species declined. As soon as I inherited the company, I shut down operations and devoted myself full-time to building birds. I traveled the world to assemble a team of the finest biologists, engineers, and artisans. Together, we spent two decades on research and development, and in 2031 we put our first bird on the market. We've been selling birds as fast as we can make them ever since.³³⁷

According to the perspective on 'I's' perspective, 'their' 'numbers and species declined'. And why 'I' can 'notice' the 'disappeared' 'birds' habitat' is because 'a passion for bird watching while working for my family's logging company' is

³³⁵ Kate Samworth, *Aviary Wonders Inc. Spring Catalog and Instruction Manual: Renewing the World's Bird Supply Since 2031* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), p. 2.

³³⁶ My italics.

³³⁷ Samworth, p. 2.

‘discovered’ first. In this ‘bird watching’, what has been ‘noticed’ is that the ‘disappeared’ ‘birds’ habitat’ might be related to ‘working’ of ‘my family’s logging company’, which can also be read from ‘[a]s soon as I inherited the company, I shut down operations and devoted myself full-time to building birds’. In the perspective on ‘I’s’ perspective, ‘operations’ and ‘building birds’ are distinct things. The former can cause a ‘decline’ in ‘numbers and species’ whereas the latter are thought to increase ‘their numbers and species’. In other words, ‘birds’ can be ‘buil[t]’ in terms of ‘numbers and species’, even though ‘birds’ being ‘buil[t]’ are known as different from ‘birds’ being ‘watch[ed]’.

Furthermore, both ‘selling’ and ‘mak[ing]’ ‘birds’ can, ironically, be seen as part of the ‘operations’ of the ‘company’: ‘building birds’ needs ‘a team of the finest biologists, engineers, and artisans’ to be ‘assemble[d]’ for doing the ‘research and development’ ‘[t]ogether’ within ‘two decades’ before which the ‘first bird’ can be ‘put’ ‘on the market’. And the perspective on ‘we’ knows that this is ‘our first bird’ that has been ‘put’ ‘on the market’ ‘in 2031’. More of them will be ‘ma[de]’ and ‘sold’ in that future. In this way, ‘their’ ‘numbers and species can apparently be increased without being affected by the ‘disappeared’ ‘birds’ habitat’, as the former, at this point, depends on ‘we’ rather than on the ‘habitat’. And the ‘birds’ habitat’ can also be ‘buil[t]’ in the way in which ‘habitat’ can, by implication, be ‘ma[de]’ and ‘sold’ ‘as fast as’ the ‘birds’ being ‘buil[t]’.

Aviary Wonders closely copies the form and function of each bird part as it is found in nature and enhances it with patterns and color combinations of our own creation. Everything we manufacture, down to the smallest feather, meets our rigorous standards of beauty and durability. The results are stunning, if I do say so myself, and our birds are built to last. I know we can’t replace the birds that have been lost. But we can provide you with the opportunity to create an exquisite alternative: your very own bird, a work of art you’ll

treasure for a lifetime.³³⁸

The perspective on 'Aviary Wonders' claims to know that '[t]he [r]ight [p]arts', for example, can 'closely' 'copy' 'the form and function of each bird part as it is found in nature', which implies that 'copies' of 'the form and function of each bird part' are known to have levels in terms of how 'closely' 'as it is found in nature'; 'copies' are different from 'bird part[s]' 'found in nature', even though they are seen as being 'copie[d]' 'closely', in one sense. In another sense, the 'copy' of 'each bird part' is also 'enhance[d]' 'with patterns and color combinations of our own creation'; 'our own creation' is known as not something that can be 'found in nature'. Nor are 'our rigorous standards of beauty and durability', as the perspective on 'we' knows that 'our birds' are different from 'birds' 'in nature' which are thought of as not 'beaut[iful] and durab[le]' enough.

This is how 'each bird part' can be 'manufacture[d]' in 'Aviary Wonders' by 'closely' 'copy[ing]' and 'enhanc[ing]' 'with' 'our own creation' in order to 'meet our rigorous standards', for instance, as in 'The Right Parts', at the same time, with a claim to 'real' that has to be there for the 'nam[ing]' of the 'birds', as I analysed above. That is to say, 'each bird part' can and needs to be 'built to last' longer whereas the 'name[s]' of 'birds' in 'The Right Parts' have to follow 'real[ly]' what they 'are' and/or 'were' 'named' 'in nature'. Therefore, 'nam[ing]' is apparently not disrupted by 'durability'. There is, however, already an idea of 'built to last' constructed upon 'nam[ing]' in the service of when and why 'real[ness]' needs to be 'built' for and in 'The Right Parts' of 'Aviary Wonders'.

The perspective on 'I's' perspective knows that 'the birds that have been lost' 'can't' be 'replace[d]' by what 'we' 'manufacture'. '[E]ach bird part', instead, is known as 'the opportunity' that 'can' be 'provided' by 'we' to 'you', as 'you' is thought of, by the perspective on 'we', as the one who needs this 'opportunity' 'to create an exquisite alternative'. The 'birds that have been lost' are, by implication, not 'exquisite' enough and cannot be 'create[d]' to be as 'exquisite' as 'an' 'alternative'

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

‘we’ ‘provide’. Besides, this ‘alternative’ can be ‘your very own bird’ and be ‘a work of art you’ll treasure for a lifetime’, in which, again, it can be read that ‘the birds’ ‘found in nature’ cannot be ‘your very own bird[s]’, even though they have not ‘been lost’ yet. Nor can they be ‘a work of art’. So this is ‘an alternative’ which is related to both the ideas of possession and ‘art’ for ‘treasur[ing]’, which has to and can be ‘create[d]’ in the frame of ‘exquisite-ness’. Otherwise, ‘an ‘alternative’ might not be ‘treasure[d]’ ‘for a lifetime’ due to its lack of ‘exquisite-ness’ and *naturalness*.

Choose from our catalog of high-quality parts to create the bird that lives in your memory or imagination. Each bird is unique and yours to keep or set free. Imagine the thrill of populating the woods with colorful birds and listening to them sing your favorite songs. That’s right! You can even teach your bird to sing. All of our parts are handcrafted and made to order by world-class artisans. And our assembly instructions are simple to follow. Building your own bird is as easy as building a bookcase ... and twice the fun!³³⁹

The ‘parts’ here are known as ‘high-quality’ and framed within ‘our catalog’. And the perspective on this ‘catalog’ knows about ‘your memory or imagination’ where the ‘bird’ can ‘live in’ and knows that ‘the bird’ being ‘create[d]’ by ‘[c]hoos[ing]’ from our catalog’ will be ‘the bird that lives in your memory or imagination’ which is supposed to appear first in the retrospection. In other words, this self-evident identification and correspondence through the very idea of ‘create’, from ‘the bird’ being ‘create[d]’ to ‘the bird that lives in your memory or imagination’, are contradictory to what is claimed as ‘we can’t replace the birds that have been lost’ mentioned above, although ‘the bird that lives in your memory or imagination’ does not have to be the same as ‘the birds that have been lost’.

But the gap between the ‘create[d]’ ‘bird[s]’ and ‘the bird[s]’ that either ‘lives in your memory or imagination’ or ‘have been lost’ is always there. That is to say, what is at stake is that the perspective on ‘our catalog’ claims that ‘the bird that lives in

³³⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

your memory or imagination’ can be retrieved by these ‘high-quality parts’, or vice versa. At the same time, these ‘parts’ are already prepared to be there for ‘you’, even prior to ‘your memory or imagination’; ‘our catalog’ knows better and earlier than ‘you’ what this ‘you’ will ‘memor[ize]’ and ‘imagin[e]’ about ‘the bird’.

‘Each bird’ is known as ‘unique’ in ‘our catalog’, which is, again, a similar and problematic claim to know certainly that the ‘bird that lives in your memory or imagination’ is ‘unique’ already, when ‘yours’ is framed to belong to one of these ‘unique’ ‘bird[s]’. These are ‘yours’ that will be ‘unique’ anyway, whether ‘to keep or set free’; ‘to keep or set free’ does not affect its ‘unique[ness]’, because ‘[e]ach bird’ is constructed as such, as is ‘your memory or imagination’ and/or ‘yours’. Further, these ‘unique’ ‘bird[s]’ are known to be able to ‘populate’ ‘the woods’ with different ‘color[s]’ and ‘sing your favorite songs’, although this ‘unique[ness]’ which as a ‘thrill’ needs the ‘you’ to ‘[i]magine’ it first. Otherwise, you will not get this ‘thrill[ing]’ idea regarding ‘birds’, not to mention that ‘you’ can get to know what ‘songs’ ‘sung’ by ‘birds’ are ‘your favorite’.

In this sense, again, as I analysed above in relation to the claim to ‘your memory or imagination’, not only are ‘your favorite songs’ knowable outside of you, a position which is also anterior to ‘you’ to know what ‘your favorite songs’ are; but also the idea of ‘sing’ – as long as ‘you’ can ‘[i]magine’ of that ‘listening’, the ‘favorite songs’ will be *transparently* known to be ‘yours’. This certainty of knowledge about ideas of ‘[i]magin[ation]’, ‘listen’, and ‘sing’ is further confirmed by the perspective as ‘That’s right!’. What needs to be ‘right’ else is, at this point, shifting to knowing about ‘your’ ability to ‘teach’ ‘bird’ ‘to sing’ and about the ‘sing[ing]’ of ‘your favorite songs’. And the claim to ‘even’ implies a conviction in which both ‘you’ and ‘your bird’ can be known *correctly* to do different ‘thrill[ing]’ things not just in but beyond ‘[i]magin[ation]’ of ‘yours’. In other words, not only ‘[e]ach bird’ but also this ‘you’ is already ‘create[d]’ as such in ‘Aviary Wonders’.

‘All of our parts’ are claimed to be related to both the ideas about ‘world-class artisans’ and ‘simple to follow’, which can be understood as that ‘you’ is known to be able to both enjoy and ‘assembl[e]’ the ‘parts’ by ‘follow[ing]’ the ‘instructions’

as ‘simpl[y]’ as what ‘we’ think of. The perspective on ‘our parts’ also claims to know that ‘building a bookcase’ is ‘easy’ and that ‘you’ know how to ‘build’ ‘a bookcase’ in ‘fun’ already before ‘[b]uilding your own bird’. The difference is that ‘[b]uilding your own bird’ is seen as ‘twice the fun’, which is, also, prior to the very ‘building’ of ‘you’. Since the repetition here is how ‘you’ will respond to ‘instructions’ and ‘build your own bird’ is already constituted in the perspective on ‘[a]ll of our parts’, so is ‘building a bookcase’ and/or ‘...’. ‘...’ can be read as that there are also other things known to be ‘built’ as ‘eas[ily]’ as ‘building a bookcase’.

6.4 Book Reviews of *Aviary Wonders Inc.*

These critical questions and issues can be seen to recur in the critics’ discussions of *Aviary Wonders Inc.*: Haley Cook reviews the book as follows: ‘Of course, these birds are manufactured and may or may not behave exactly as wild birds, but with the number of wild birds dwindling, this is one of the only ways to enjoy their presence’.³⁴⁰ The idea of ‘nature’, as discussed above, is repeated here: for Cook, ‘these birds’ and ‘wild birds’ are different but, at the same time, can be linked together by making the claim to ‘may’ ‘behave exactly as’. And this idea of ‘exact[ness]’ continues in terms of knowing that ‘this is one of the only ways to enjoy their presence’. First, the ‘wild birds’ are constructed in relation to an idea of ‘enjoy[ment]’. And ‘with the number of wild birds dwindling’, ‘enjoy[ment]’ needs to be considered and remedied from other ‘ways’, even though Cook seems to know that ‘their presence’ is not, in fact, ‘their’ ‘presence’; ‘their presence’ splits already, according to the claim to ‘but’.

Kate Samworth has created a book that perfectly blends imagination with facts. Aviary Wonders Inc. has been supplying customers with artificial birds since 1931 [sic], which seem to be alive and function just as wild birds [...]

³⁴⁰ Haley Cook, ‘Aviary Wonders Inc. Spring Catalog and Instruction Manual’, *Children’s Book and Media Review*, 39.2 (2018), n.p. <<https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/cbmr/vol39/iss2/7>> [accessed 6 February 2023].

The plot is abstract and may need to be explained to younger children, but with some support in their reading, most children will enjoy learning about birds through their unique parts.³⁴¹

Time can be a measure that makes known ‘artificial birds’ ‘seem to be alive’ and ‘function just as wild birds’. This is how the notion of time is claimed to ‘function’ on ‘artificial birds’, so that ‘artificial’ ‘birds’ are not enough; the ‘artificial’ needs to ‘seem to be alive’, although this of course also means that they are not.

‘The plot’ to Cook is ‘abstract’ and therefore ‘may need to be explained to younger children’ but does not need to be explained to Cook: ‘younger children’ then, may be seen as likely to understand ‘plot[s]’ that are not ‘abstract’. Specifically, ‘with some support in their reading’, ‘younger children’ become ‘most children’ who ‘will enjoy learning about birds through their unique parts’. This is ‘most children’s’ ‘enjoy[ment]’ of ‘learning’ not that of all ‘younger children’ that can be obtained through ‘some support’. In combination with what I have discussed above regarding ‘our’ ‘simple’ ‘assembly instructions’ in ‘ABOUT THE COMPANY’, ‘[b]uilding your own bird’ is seen as not ‘easy’ here, nor about ‘twice the fun’. In order to ‘follow’ the ‘instructions’, ‘younger children’ are constituted as those who need to be able to ‘read’ and understand the ‘instructions’ ‘with some support’ before they can ‘enjoy learning about birds through their unique parts’. This is how Cook defines ‘read[er]’ differently by ‘reading’ *Aviary Wonders Inc.*, compared with how ‘Aviary Wonders Inc.’ is introduced in my reading.

Elizabeth Bush, however, in the ‘Book Review’, thinks that: ‘The gilding-the-lily exaggeration of birds’ natural beauty is satire at its child-appropriate best, and the subtle digs at our perennial efforts to domesticate animals for our pleasure won’t be lost on young readers’.³⁴² To Bush, ‘birds’ have different ‘beaut[ies]’ among which ‘natural beauty’ can be ‘exaggerat[ed]’ as ‘gilding-the-lily’. To be specific, Bush

³⁴¹ Cook, n.p..

³⁴² Elizabeth Bush, ‘Review of Aviary Wonders Inc. Spring Catalog and Instruction Manual: Renewing the World’s Bird Supply Since 2031’, *Bulletin of the Center for Children’s Books*, 67.7 (2014), p. 376, doi: 10.1353/bcc.2014.0170.

reads that, in *Aviary Wonders Inc.*, for example, ‘The Right Parts’ are ‘gilding-the-lily exaggeration of birds’ natural beauty’, which implies that there are also non-‘exaggeration[s] of birds’ natural beauty’ known to be there. But I read that this ‘birds’ natural beauty’ is also constructed on the basis of ‘our creation’ and ‘standards’ for ‘each bird part’, as mentioned in ‘ABOUT THE COMPANY’. In other words, the idea of the ‘natural’ is also known from ‘each bird part’ the ‘company’ ‘manufacture[s]’ in the book. Or to put it another way, ‘standards’ can ‘create’ ‘birds’ natural beauty’ too.

Besides this, unlike Cook’s claims about the notion of ‘abstract’ in relation to ‘younger children’ in reading the ‘plot’ of the book, Bush knows that the ‘gilding-the-lily exaggeration’ is about ‘satire’. And this is a ‘satire’ known as ‘at its child-appropriate best’. So ‘child’, at this stage, is seen as knowing ‘appropriate[ly]’ about what is ‘birds’ natural beauty’, what is the ‘exaggeration of’ it, and what is the ‘gilding-the-lily exaggeration’ before knowing how and why all of these can be linked and formulated as ‘satire’.

As ‘child-appropriate’ shifts to ‘young readers’, ‘satire’ becomes ‘subtle digs’. For Bush’s reading, ‘teach your bird to sing’, for example, can be understood in relation to ‘our perennial efforts to domesticate animals for our pleasure’. Similarly, the idea of the imaginative ‘thrill’ claimed in ‘ABOUT THE COMPANY’, as I analysed previously, can be read as ‘the subtle digs’ here in which ‘to domesticate animals for our pleasure’ is also claimed to be different from Cook’s relevant reading as ‘enjoy[ing]’ ‘their’ ‘presence’, as the ‘animals’, for instance, the birds here, are seen to be in need of, not only being the ‘animals’ but also being ‘domesticate[d]’ ones ‘for our pleasure’. In addition, these are ‘subtle digs’ that not only ‘we’ but ‘young readers’ ‘won’t’ ‘lose’: both the ‘perennial efforts’ and ‘pleasure’ are seen as ‘our[s]’, which may or may not also involve ‘young readers’. And ‘we’ are already assumed to understand ‘the subtle digs’. This is how ‘child’, ‘young readers’, and ‘we’ are mobilised differently in relation to the notion of ‘satire’.

Carolyn Phelan, meanwhile, reviews *Aviary Wonders Inc.* by understanding the readers differently but the ‘birds’ similarly to the previous reviewers:

Deadpan rather than didactic in presentation, this is an original, somewhat disturbing, and wholeheartedly bizarre (but in a good way!) picture book for older children [...] Though set in the future, the presentation has a distinctly vintage quality. The more the text delves into the intricacies of bird construction, behavior, and care, the more realistic it sounds, and the crazier it becomes. Reflective readers will soon reach the unstated but inescapable conclusion: birds are awesome creatures, and once gone, they're simply irreplaceable.³⁴³

For Phelan, a 'bizarre' and 'disturbing' 'picture book' could also not be 'in a good way' 'for older children'. This 'picture book' is not in that case but known to be '[d]eadpan rather than didactic' 'in presentation', although both '[d]eadpan' and 'didactic' are seen as possible when it comes to the 'presentation' of 'picture book[s]'. The idea of 'didactic' might be thought of as something which is not as 'bizarre' as '[d]eadpan', but is not suitable for 'older children', which also implies that 'bizarre picture book[s]', for example, would not be 'in a good way' for 'children' who are not 'older'. Further, the claim to '[d]eadpan' is known to be related to the 'distinctly vintage quality', which can also be regarded as being 'wholeheartedly bizarre' 'in a good way'. In other words, to Phelan, '2031', as claimed in 'ABOUT THE COMPANY' of 'Aviary Wonders Inc.', can be read as 'the future' – a 'wholeheartedly bizarre' 'set' up in relation to 'a distinctly vintage quality'; this is how 'the future' can be 'set' retrospectively with 'a distinctly vintage quality'.

In addition to this, 'bird construction, behavior, and care' are framed as 'the intricacies' which need to be 'delve[d] into' by 'the text'. So the 'text', by implication, does not have these 'intricacies' and can only be near to them by 'delv[ing] into', whereas 'bird construction, behavior, and care' are seen to be there priorly. Additionally, this very idea of 'delves into' is claimed to be in the service of 'realistic'.

³⁴³ Carolyn Phelan, 'Aviary Wonders Inc: Spring Catalog and Instruction Manual-Renewing the World's Bird Supply since 2031', *The Booklist*, 110.13 (2014), p. 68
<<https://www.proquest.com/trade-journals/aviary-wonders-inc-spring-catalog-instruction/docview/1504816917/se-2>> [accessed 7 February 2023].

And this is a ‘realistic-ness’, by comparison, as ‘it sounds’: ‘the text’ is not ‘realistic’ but could ‘sound’ as such, as ‘the intricacies of bird construction, behavior, and care’ are also ‘sound[ed]’ ‘realistic’ to Phelan. The relationship between ‘the text’ and ‘the intricacies’ can ‘become’ ‘crazier’ when the former is ‘present[ed]’ more ‘realistic[ally]’ to ‘sound’ as the latter, which, in turn, consolidates the difference between ‘the text’ and ‘the intricacies’ ‘of bird construction, behavior, and care’.

Although this is a ‘picture book’ known for ‘older children’, only part of them can be ‘[r]eflective readers’, which implies that ‘readers’ are known as different, among which only ‘[r]eflective’ ones can ‘soon reach’ the ‘conclusion’ while the others are seen to ‘escape’ ‘the’ ‘unstated’ ‘conclusion’ due to the lack of ‘[r]eflecti[on]’. But even if, from the ‘text’, ‘birds’ can be ‘conclu[ded]’ to be ‘awesome creatures’, ‘simply irreplaceable’ and potentially ‘gone’, these ‘birds’ in the ‘text’ nevertheless just ‘sound’ ‘realistic’, which, then, paradoxically, would make ‘awesome creatures’ ‘replaceable’ simply.

Stephanie Bange reads *Aviary Wonders Inc.* to be a ‘[b]rilliant’ business by knowing the difference between ‘extinct’ ‘birds’ and ‘automaton’ ones:

Get ready to travel to a time when birds are extinct due to deforestation and other environmental factors. Brilliant businessman Alfred Wallis gathered biologists, engineers, and artisans to work together and fill this void. In 2031 he opened a mail-order catalog company that offers kits to build automaton birds. In her debut book, author/illustrator Samworth has envisioned a bleak future; the bulk of the book is Wallis’ catalog.³⁴⁴

Here ‘2031’ is read as ‘a time when birds are extinct due to deforestation and other environmental factors’ in Bange’s reading of ‘ABOUT THE COMPANY’ as described in *Aviary Wonders Inc.* And this is ‘a time’ that can be ‘travel[ed]’ within

³⁴⁴ Stephanie Bange, ‘Aviary Wonders Inc. Spring Catalog and Instruction Manual’, *Library Media Connection*, 33.1 (2014), p. 55 < <https://www.proquest.com/trade-journals/aviary-wonders-inc-spring-catalog-instruction/docview/1560277522/se-2> > [accessed 7 February 2023].

the ‘book’ when ‘birds’ are already known as ‘extinct’. The certainty of knowledge regarding both ‘birds’ and ‘time’ is further claimed to be related to a ‘void’ which can be ‘fill[ed]’, which, in turn, confirms the ‘extinct’ situation during that ‘time’ before ‘[g]etting ready’ for ‘travel[ing]’. This is how the ‘birds’ are constituted, ‘due to deforestation and other environmental factors’, as ‘extinct’ to be a ‘void’ which can be ‘fill[ed]’ by the ‘work’ of ‘biologists, engineers, and artisans’ ‘together’ under the frame of ‘[b]rilliant business’.

The notion of ‘[b]rilliant’ is further framed in relation to ‘offer kits to build automaton birds’ by ‘a mail-order catalog company’, while this ‘business’ about ‘Wallis’ catalog’ is known as ‘the bulk’ of ‘Samworth’s’ ‘book’ in which ‘a bleak future’ is being ‘envisioned’. It seems that ‘extinct’ ‘birds’ and ‘automaton birds’ are known as different by Bange: the former can be replaced by the latter for ‘fill[ing]’ the ‘void’ as if the former is something that is not ‘envisioned’ in that ‘bleak future’. Not only the ‘extinct[ion]’ of the ‘birds’, however, but also ‘deforestation and other environmental factors’ can also be ‘buil[t]’ in the service of ‘a mail-order catalog company’ – the ‘[b]rilliant’ ‘business’. In other words, this is how both ‘birds’ and ‘company’ are mobilised to claim why ‘a future’ of ‘birds’ needs to be ‘envisioned’ as ‘bleak’ – for the sake of being ‘[b]rilliant businessman’ who can come on stage.

Unlike Cook, Bush, Phelan, and Bange, Dianne Timblin explores what kind of work is for adult readers and what is not, by comparing *Extraordinary Birds* to *Aviary Wonders Inc.* as follows:

The first is a history of ornithological artwork. Secured with a pale blue ribbon into a handsome clamshell box decorated with John James Audubon’s painting of a fierce-eyed brown pelican, the book arrives accompanied by a sheaf of ornithological plates. It’s a work aimed unambiguously at adult readers. The second is a fanciful work of children’s fiction. With pulsing jewel tones, breezy descriptions, and snippets of natural history, this book is flashy. Further, it poses as a product catalog for a company founded in the year 2031. One book looks to the past, the other to the future. Nonetheless, they make

fine companions. Together, one informs the other, offering Januslike views along a continuum of thought about the natural world.³⁴⁵

‘The first’ (*Extraordinary Birds*) and ‘[t]he second’ (*Aviary Wonders Inc.*) are different ‘work[s]’ to Timblin, as the former is claimed to be ‘a work aimed unambiguously at adult readers’ whereas the latter is ‘a fanciful work of children’s fiction’. So ‘adult readers’ are already supposed to know ‘unambiguously’ what ‘a history of ornithological artwork’ and/or ‘a sheaf of ornithological plates’ mean. Also, ‘John James Audubon’s painting of a fierce-eyed brown pelican’, for example, is seen as something not ‘fanciful’ and ‘flashy’ but ‘ornithological artwork’ with ‘a history’.

Comparatively, ‘a fanciful work of children’s fiction’ is known to be associated with the notion of ‘flashy’: with ‘pulsing jewel tones, breezy descriptions, and snippets of natural history’. In this way, Timblin also knows what kind of ‘tones’ and ‘descriptions’ should be ‘aimed’ ‘unambiguously at adult readers’ and what should be regarded as ‘natural history’ and/or ‘a fanciful work’. Here ‘a fanciful work’ can also have ‘natural history’ if ‘natural history’ is known as ‘snippets’. Or to say, ‘natural history’ can be part of ‘fanc[y]’ while ‘a history of ornithological artwork’ cannot: ‘a fierce-eyed brown pelican’ in ‘Audubon’s painting’ is not about ‘pulsing jewel tones’ according to Timblin’s reading; ‘a sheaf of ornithological plates’ defines that ‘pelican’ should have ‘fierce-eyed’ and be in ‘brown’ rather than ‘pulsing jewel tones’ ‘flash[ily]’. In other words, ‘ornithological plates’ ‘aimed unambiguously at’ ‘adult readers’ are seen as ‘artwork’ not being ‘fanciful’ but have ‘a history’ of knowing what ‘birds’ should be ‘paint[ed]’, which differs from ‘birds’ with ‘pulsing jewel tones’ in ‘children’s fiction’ – ‘descri[bed]’ ‘breez[ily]’. That is to say, ‘birds’ in *Aviary Wonders Inc.* cannot be ‘[s]ecured’ as such, even within the knowable ‘snippets of natural history’. This is, thus, how ‘birds’ are mobilised within different constructions of ‘history’ to define which ‘work’ is for ‘adult readers’ and/or ‘children’.

³⁴⁵ Dianne Timblin, ‘Of a Feather’, *American Scientist*, 102.5 (2014), pp. 392-94 (pp. 392-93) <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43707846>> [accessed 14 February 2023].

Interestingly, not only the idea of ‘history’ but also the ‘natural’ can actually be defined as *not* being a ‘continuum’ in the shifting perspectives, along with different pieces of knowledge regarding the ‘birds’: ‘the year 2031’ is something that ‘unambiguously’ ‘looks’ ‘to the future’, while ‘a history of ornithological artwork’ ‘looks to the past’. The claim to ‘[n]onetheless’ implies, again, the distinction between ‘[o]ne book’ and ‘the other’, and also between ‘the past’ and ‘the future’. But I read that ‘they’ can ‘make fine companions’ to some extent, although this is different from what is claimed as ‘Januslike views’. Because the idea of ‘looks to’, however, decides that whether ‘the past’ or ‘the future’, they are already constructed to be there as ‘a history’ or as ‘the year 2031’; In order to be ‘look[ed]’ ‘to’, ‘2031 is already a retrospective ‘future’ in which ‘a company’ could be ‘founded’.

Nevertheless, ‘mak[ing] fine companions’ here is thought of as ‘offering Januslike views along a continuum of thought about the natural world’. From this point, not only the ‘ornithological artwork’ but also ‘a fanciful work’ is known to be connected with ‘a continuum of thought about the natural world’. Firstly, the idea of ‘inform’ is based on the claims to know that ‘[o]ne’ is ‘the past’ and ‘the other’ is ‘future’. What I have analysed above is that there may not be ‘a continuum’ between the two – ‘one informs the other’, which would, by implication, both ‘make’ and not ‘make fine companions’. Secondly, ‘snippets of natural history’ can, as discussed previously, be framed in ‘a fanciful work’. Also, ‘birds’ are constructed differently in ‘ornithological artwork’ and ‘a fanciful work’. Thus both the claims to ‘natural’ and ‘birds’ are not stable but would disturb the very ‘continuum of thought about the natural world’.

In *Extraordinary Birds*, Sweet describes the historical moment (in the last half of the 1700s) when artists began depicting birds amid the flora of their natural environments [...] So it’s striking to see Samworth’s birds, rarely represented in any kind of environment, existing in such isolation. The birds are shown strictly for the (fictional) consumer’s perusal. More troubling are the handful of illustrations depicting these birds in context. A section providing assembly

instructions opens with the image of a newly purchased fowl ready for outfitting. Resting on a pillow as it gazes at the reader, the bird isn't yet recognizable as a bird.³⁴⁶

The 'birds' in *Extraordinary Birds* are known as being 'depict[ed]' 'amid the flora of their natural environments' by 'artists' 'beg[inning]' at 'the historical moment (in the last half of the 1700s)' 'describe[d]' by 'Sweet'. Without this 'descript[ion]' of 'artists', 'the flora of their natural environments' cannot be 'their[s]', nor can there be 'the historical moment' for 'describe[ing]' 'artists' and 'their' 'birds'. In other words, 'artists', 'birds', and 'the flora of their natural environments' are all constructed either through 'describ[ing]' or 'describ[ing]' of the 'descript[ion]', according to Timblin's reading of 'Sweet'.

When it comes to 'Samworth's birds', they are 'see[n]' as 'striking' for being 'rarely represented in any kind of environment, existing in such isolation'. Thus, to Timblin, 'birds' should and could be 'represented in any kind of environment' instead of 'existing in such isolation', which implies that 'birds' are known as not 'isolat[ed]' but 'amid the flora of their natural environments' framed in 'the historical moment' in *Extraordinary Birds*. As I mentioned, 'birds' in *Extraordinary Birds*, although 'depict[ed]' as such, can still have an 'isolation' between 'birds' and 'the flora of their natural environments'. Because 'natural environments' are also part of 'descrip[tion]': knowing that 'the historical moment' is 'in the last half of the 1700s' cannot guarantee that 'the flora' is 'their' 'natural environments'; 'their natural environments' are not 'their[s]' but being 'depict[ed]' as 'their[s]' by 'artists', as is 'the historical moment'.

The 'bird' can be 'recognizable as a bird' to Timblin, whereas 'the reader' is thought of as not 'yet' 'recogniz[ing]' 'it', although 'it', '[r]esting on a pillow', is known to have 'gaze' already. In this sense, 'gaze' does not have to be 'recogniz[ed]' and to be related to 'a bird', as there is already 'the bird' and 'gaze' of 'it', known as, for example, 'a' 'fowl', prior to 'ready for outfitting'. And 'the reader', in order to claim why is '[m]ore troubling', needs to be formulated as 'yet' 'recogniz[ing]' but

³⁴⁶ Timblin, p. 394.

already being ‘gaze[d]’ ‘at’ by ‘it’. Therefore, ‘the handful of illustrations depicting these birds in context’ are not ‘[m]ore troubling’, as ‘assembly instructions’ are known to be ‘provid[ed]’ by ‘a’ ‘section’. It is ‘the reader’ that is seen as ‘[m]ore troubling’ than ‘a newly purchased fowl ready for outfitting’. Because ‘the reader’, though shifting from ‘the (fictional) consumer’s perusal’, needs to figure out the ‘context’ in which these ‘birds’ in ‘illustrations’ are being ‘depict[ed]’ before ‘assembl[ing]’.

In ‘A Manifesto for Radical Children’s Literature (and an Argument Against Radical Aesthetics)’,³⁴⁷ Philip Nel suggests one of the ‘questions’ that need to be ‘address[ed]’ by ‘students’ manifestos’.³⁴⁸

What must radical teachers do? Is knowledge always liberatory? Or: How can we present knowledge to children in a way that is more liberatory than oppressive? Related question: How should we distinguish between indoctrination and liberation?³⁴⁹

The claim of ‘radical teachers’ takes part with ‘we’ by knowing that ‘knowledge’ needs to be ‘present[ed]’ ‘to children’. And the ‘way’ of ‘present[ing]’ can be ‘liberatory’ and/or ‘oppressive’. But ‘we’ are already known to have this ‘knowledge’. The reason why ‘we’ are seen to ‘present knowledge’ possibly ‘in a[n]’ ‘oppressive’ ‘way’ ‘to children’ is because ‘we’ are, further, claimed as not being able to ‘distinguish between indoctrination and liberation’. In other words, there ‘should’ be a difference known between ‘indoctrination and liberation’, which is framed by ‘[w]hat’ ‘radical teachers’ ‘must’ ‘do’. So this is how the difference between ‘indoctrination and liberation’ is known both to be and not to be there, whereas either the relationship between ‘radical teachers’ and ‘children’ or the notion of the ‘radical’ is already decided.

³⁴⁷ Philip Nel, ‘A Manifesto for Radical Children’s Literature (and an Argument Against Radical Aesthetics)’, *Barnboken: Journal of Children’s Literature Research*, 42 (2019), pp. 1-26
<<https://www.barnboken.net/index.php/clr/article/view/437>> [accessed 20 February 2023].

³⁴⁸ Nel, p. 2.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

Amplifying the discomfoting feeling, illustrated step-by-step instructions for bird assembly show images of living but partially dismembered birds. In the process of being put together, they look very much alive and in pain. (In this sense, the book gestures back to John James Audubon, who created vivid portraits of birds... by killing birds and then painting them.)³⁵⁰

This is the ‘bird’ that is known to be ‘assembl[ed]’ ‘step-by-step’ within the ‘illustrated’ ‘instructions’. At the same time, ‘images’ can be ‘show[n]’ from these ‘instructions’, which implies that ‘images’, as something different but related to ‘instructions’, can ‘[a]mplify’ ‘the discomfoting feeling’. So this ‘discomfoting feeling’ is known to be there with respect to ‘bird assembly’ already; ‘bird’ is not supposed to be ‘assembl[ed]’ as such, nor should ‘birds’ in ‘images’ be ‘show[n]’ as ‘living but partially dismembered’: what is a comforting ‘feeling’ about the ‘bird’ and/or ‘birds’ is also knowable.

But this very ‘amplif[ied]’ idea of ‘the discomfoting feeling’, for instance, shifting to ‘look[ing] very much alive and in pain’, needs to be there for Nel, because *Aviary Wonders Inc.* is read as the ‘book’ that ‘make[s] especially effective use of their form’ to be ‘liberating’, framed in ‘[r]adical children’s literature’.³⁵¹ That is to say, based on knowing how the ‘bird’ in the ‘instructions’ can be ‘fe[lt]’ and ‘look[ed]’ as, ‘a liberating form’ is constructed for ‘[r]adical children’s literature’. Even though ‘birds’ are ‘show[n]’ and ‘fe[lt]’ as ‘living but partially dismembered’ and ‘look[ed]’ as ‘very much alive and in pain’, they are there for ‘liberating’ and ‘[r]adical’.

In addition, the idea of ‘liberating’ is further discussed as a ‘gesture back’ to John James Audubon, which implies that ‘portraits of birds’ ‘created’ by Audubon are also seen as related to ‘the discomfoting feeling’ – for example, ‘killing birds and then painting them’. Therefore, as is analysed above, ‘killing birds’ can be, again, seen as a necessary ‘form’ in the service of what both the ideas of ‘liberating’ and ‘[r]adical’ mean. Meanwhile, although this is known as ‘gestur[ing] back’ retrospectively,

³⁵⁰ Ibid., p.18.

³⁵¹ Ibid., p.17.

‘killing birds’, according to Nel’s reading of Audubon, seems to already help Nel to ‘feel’ and ‘look’ the ‘bird’ within the ‘instructions’ being both ‘partially dismembered’ and ‘in pain’.

Samworth activates a sense of the uncanny (*unheimlich*) in vividly realistic birds that are both living and not living, animate and inanimate – haunting doppelgangers of extinguished species. As extinction rates rise, I hope that the uneasy experience of reading Aviary Wonders Inc. inspires readers to save the dwindling variety of life on planet earth.³⁵²

Here ‘the uncanny’ and ‘*unheimlich*’ are known to be different but could both be ‘activated’ by ‘Samworth’ as ‘a sense’, in which ‘birds’ are seen to be ‘vividly realistic’: ‘both living and not living, animate and inanimate’. But either ‘living’ or ‘animate’ is claimed differently, in comparison to ‘look[ing] very much alive’ mentioned above; both ‘living’ and ‘animate’ are, in a sense, formulated in opposition to ‘not living’ and ‘inanimate’, even though they may co-exist with each other. When ‘birds’ are regarded, for example, on either side, being ‘living’ or ‘animate’ seems to be paradoxical, to some extent, with the claim of ‘vividly realistic’. In other words, the juxtaposition between ‘living and not living’ or ‘animate and inanimate’ can contradict what ‘vividly realistic’ means.

These ‘vividly realistic birds’ are further claimed to be ‘haunting doppelgangers of extinguished species’, which implies that ‘birds’ are different from ‘extinguished species’ but, at the same time, can be ‘doppelgangers’ of them. And these are ‘doppelgangers’ known as ‘haunting’, which can be read as relying on the claim to ‘both living and not living, animate and inanimate’. From this sense, on the one hand, ‘haunting doppelgangers’ do not ‘sense’ so ‘uncanny(*unheimlich*)’. Rather, they are known already as ‘vividly realistic’ as the ‘extinguished species’; on the other hand, unlike ‘extinguished species’, ‘haunting doppelgangers’ can be either ‘living’ / ‘animate’ or ‘not living’ / ‘inanimate’.

³⁵² Ibid., p.18.

In the ‘hope’ of ‘I’, ‘readers’ are only supposed to ‘read’ *Aviary Wonders Inc.* within ‘the uneasy experience’ in order to be ‘inspire[d]’. and this is ‘the uneasy experience’ that is different from knowing that ‘extinction rates rise’ or that the ‘variety of life on planet earth’ is ‘dwindling’. This ‘uneasy experience’ can, nevertheless, be understood to be what ‘[r]adical children’s literature’ explicitly wants ‘readers’ to ‘read’ out and to be ‘inspire[d]’ by, which would, then, not be as ‘liberating’ ‘effectively’ as *Aviary Wonders Inc.* is thought of to be. That is to say, the idea of ‘liberating’ is constructed in the way in which ‘readers’ have to ‘read’ and ‘experience’ *Aviary Wonders Inc.* ‘uneas[ily]’, otherwise they cannot be ‘inspire[d]’ ‘to save the dwindling variety of life on planet earth’. By doing so, it can also be read as predictable to Nell when the following claim is previously made in the article discussing the limitations of being ‘radical’. But ‘a radical aesthetic’ is still known to be there, even if it is framed as ‘cease[ing] to be’ by the very notion of ‘institutionalized’:

I wrote the manifesto because I know what I want radical children’s literature to do, but the many ways in which it might achieve these goals frustrates any attempts to place parameters around a ‘radical aesthetic.’ In that sense, this manifesto for radical children’s literature is also a record of my failure to locate a politically radical aesthetic. I say ‘failure’ because, first, once institutionalized, a radical aesthetic ceases to be radical. Second, a radical aesthetic depends upon standards of taste, which are highly individual and ever-changing – historically, regionally, nationally, and institutionally. Third, the cultural aesthetic experiences against which radicalness must be judged makes a radical aesthetic for children especially difficult to gauge. As I observe in ‘Surrealism for Children,’ ‘When everything is new, there can be no shock of the new. When everything is new, everything can be – on some level – shocking.’³⁵³

³⁵³ Ibid., p.5.

Similarly, even though there are ‘standards of taste’ which are seemingly regarded to be related to ‘historically, regionally, nationally, and institutionally’ in the frame of ‘ever-changing’, being ‘individual’ is, after all, known as ‘highly’ there.

Also, the idea of ‘gauge’ is still retained on ‘children’; ‘children’, as is analysed with the idea of ‘present[ing] knowledge’ above, need to be ‘gauge[d]’ anyway, as are ‘aesthetic experiences’ seen to be ‘cultural’ instead of being ‘historical, regional, national, and institutional’ at this point – an idea of unchanging ‘cultural aesthetic experiences’ is constituted as ‘*ever-changing*’³⁵⁴ ‘against which radicalness must be judged’.

Also, ‘the new’ cannot be differentiated to be with the ‘shock’ when ‘everything is new’. In order to know which ‘new’ – for instance, there can be a ‘new’ ‘everything’ – should be accompanied by the ‘shock’ or ‘no shock’, however, there is already a known difference between ‘everything’ and non-‘everything’ and between what is ‘new’ and what is not ‘new’.

³⁵⁴ My italics.

Chapter 7: Realism and Ecology

Both child readers and their reading comprehension, as well as that of adult readers, rely on the idea of transparency, in terms of thinking about the relation between ‘text’ and ‘world’. The chapter will continue to point out why the shifting literary perspectives, as in Derrida’s arguments about the cat, lead to different readings of the text in relation to climate change, and also why the known differences can handicap the reading of differences.

7.1 Adéquation, Mimesis, and Correspondence

Before illustrating why Buell’s reading of Paul’s ‘notion of adéquation’ is relevant to ‘the realistic representational scenario’, Phillips reads the ‘adéquation’ ironically from Paul as ‘not to be confused with correspondence’ but ‘a variety of literary impressionism’.³⁵⁵

Paul understands the concept as entailing a sort of mimesis in which the imitation of the object inheres in certain formal qualities not necessarily present at the level of the individual word, phrase, or clause. According to Paul, adéquation transpires when form becomes content, thereby freeing what is usually regarded as content from the gloomier prospects of referential specificity, wherein it might seem inadequate. Adéquation gives you some sense of the gist of the thing, without concerning itself overmuch about giving you the thing itself.³⁵⁶

According to the perspective on Paul’s perspective, ‘the concept’, being read as ‘adéquation’, ‘entail[s]’ ‘a sort of mimesis’, in order to be ‘underst[ood]’. And ‘the imitation of the object’ is already known to ‘inhere in certain formal qualities’, which is also prior to ‘the imitation’. But ‘certain formal qualities’ need to be associated

³⁵⁵Dana Erin Phillips, ‘Ecocriticism, Literary Theory, and the Truth of Ecology’, *New Literary History*, 30 (1999), pp. 577-602 (pp. 587-88).

³⁵⁶ Phillips, p. 588.

with ‘the object’, when doing ‘the imitation’. Even though ‘the imitation of the object’ are seen to be ‘presented’ ‘at the’ different ‘level’ and different from what ‘the individual word, phrase, or clause’ do, ‘adéquation’ may still be regarded as ‘a sort of’ (re)presentation which ‘entail[s]’ the separation anyway.

Further, the way in which knowing that ‘becomes’ will and/or needs to happen itself constructs that both ‘form’ and ‘content’ are supposed to be prerequisites for ‘adéquation’ to ‘transpire’ and to ‘free’ the possible ‘inadequa[cy]’ of the knowable ‘content’. In this sense, the ‘content from the gloomier prospects of referential specificity’ might not be ‘free[d]’ to some extent but can be supplemented with ‘adéquation’ that comes from ‘form’; How can this ‘content’ be ‘free[d]’, instead of being produced as the other ‘content’, to be not ‘inadequate’ if it is known to ‘from the gloomier prospects’ already? Since the implication of the ‘content’ in relation to not ‘gloomier prospects of referential specificity’ is also known to be there in the way in which ‘adéquation’ ‘transpires’.

That is to say, it does not matter if ‘form’ can ‘become’ ‘content’, as ‘adéquation’ is known to be able to make ‘prospects of referential specificity’, whether it is ‘gloomier’ or not, ‘transpire’. This can also be seen from the claim that ‘[a]déquation gives you some sense of the gist of the thing, without concerning itself overmuch about giving you the thing itself’. Here, although ‘[a]déquation’ is framed not to ‘concern’ ‘itself overmuch about giving you the thing itself’, this seeming separation of not ‘giving’ implies ironically that as if ‘the thing itself’ can be ‘give[n]’ if ‘[a]déquation’ does ‘concern’ ‘itself overmuch’.

In other words, the separation between ‘[a]déquation’ and ‘the thing’ cannot be avoided, in one sense. As this is an ‘[a]déquation’ of ‘the thing’ rather than ‘the thing *itself*’.³⁵⁷ So is the case of how such an ‘[a]déquation’ is constituted, for instance, either to be ‘itself’ being ‘concern[ed]’ or as knowing how ‘the thing’ can be understood. In another sense, ‘some sense of the gist of the thing’ ‘without’ ‘the thing itself’ seems to claim a separate relation between the two but holds ‘the thing’ more

³⁵⁷ My italics.

tightly, on the ground of knowing what is ‘the thing itself’ and what is not, for certainty. The implication of ‘without’ is, therefore, not the separation between ‘[a]déquation’ and ‘the thing’ I analysed above. On the contrary, it claims, again, the impossible possibility of an exchange and transparency between the two. This is a self-contradictory claim of knowing a distinction between ‘some sense of the gist of the thing’ and ‘the thing itself’, and, meanwhile, of consolidating the relation to each other. The idea that they are related to one another does not mean that they can be one and the same. Even ‘the thing’ ‘itself’ is already being ‘give[n]’ as a deferral.

Although Paul’s ‘notion of adéquation’ regarding ‘impressionism’ can be read as problematic, Buell’s reading of him, shifting from the ‘[e]quivalence’ to ‘the “equivalent” ’, is claimed to be ‘more idealistic’ by introducing the idea of ‘representation’ back onto the stage:³⁵⁸

He [Buell] writes that adequate literary representations involve ‘verbalizations that are not replicas but equivalents of the world of objects, such that writing in some measure bridges the abyss that inevitably yawns between language and the object-world’. This gloss on the concept of adéquation bears traces of a lurking theory of correspondence, something Paul specifically rejects [...] The distinction between the ‘equivalent’ and the ‘replica’ is a nice one [...] Of course, it may be no distinction at all, given that the two words are near-synonyms [...] in much of their [ecocritics’] work to date, discredited ‘correspondence’ theories of representation are never more than a synonym or two away.³⁵⁹

According to Phillips, in Buell’s perspective, ‘verbalizations’ might be thought of by others as something that can ‘replica[te]’ ‘the world of objects’. It is, then, known that there is a difference between the ‘replicas’ and the ‘equivalents’, which implies that, for Buell, ‘verbalizations’ can – do better than ‘replicas’ – be ‘equivalent’ to ‘the

³⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 587-88.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 588-89.

world of objects’, without thinking that there is already a deferral of a deferral from ‘adequate literary representations’ to ‘the world of objects’ in which there has to ‘involve’ ‘verbalizations’ firstly and to be ‘equivalents’ then.

Even though it is claimed by the perspective on Buell as ‘a nice one’ of knowing ‘[t]he distinction between the “equivalent” and the “replica” ’, the very idea of ‘equivalents’ does not seem to claim to know how ‘nice’ ‘[t]he distinction’ is: in one sense, ‘[t]he distinction’, at this point, can also be read as between ‘adequate literary representations’ and ‘the world of objects’; in another sense, ‘nice’ also lies in the claim to ‘near-synonyms’ in which ‘near-synonyms’ can be read as ‘near’ to ‘synonyms’, rather than knowing ‘nice[ly]’ about ‘the two words’ are ‘distinct’ – not even ‘synonyms’ but ‘near-synonyms’.

This could also be seen from ‘no distinction at all’ according to Phillips’s reading of Buell, as the claim to ‘equivalents’ is doing the same thing as what ‘replicas’ are supposed to do – being capable of ‘bridg[ing] the abyss that inevitably yawns between language and the object-world’ – by ‘a lurking theory of correspondence’, without thinking about both ‘adequate literary representations’ and ‘the world of objects’ are constructions instead of that the former can somehow ‘represent’ and/or ‘correspond’ to the latter ‘equivalent[ly]’. That is to say, although what ‘Paul specifically rejects’ regarding ‘the concept of adéquation’ is also regarded as ‘discredited’, as I mentioned above, to the perspective on ‘representation’, ‘language’ and ‘the object-world’ are ‘never’ ‘a synonym or two away’.

By trying to peg particular details in the poem to particular things in the world—to ‘stimuli’—Buell makes the originally expansive notion of adéquation seem reductive: ‘rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim’ is a Buellian equivalent, which seems to be a replica after all. It is not an instant of Pongean adéquation.³⁶⁰

The perspective here claims to know what ‘an instant of Pongean adéquation’ is. As

³⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 590.

there is a previous claim about ‘Ponge’ in the article that ‘Buell comes to Ponge indirectly, by way of Sherman Paul’s book’,³⁶¹ ‘the originally expansive notion of adéquate’ can be understood as: neither ‘Paul’s’ description of ‘adéquate’, as discussed above in relation to the problematic notion of ‘impressionism’ – ‘gives you some sense of the gist of the thing, without concerning itself overmuch about giving you the thing itself’, nor about ‘to the stimuli it [Hopkins’s poem] registers’ with respect to Buell’s reading.³⁶²

‘[T]rying to peg particular details in the poem to particular things in the world’ is thought of, by the perspective on ‘Buell’, as ‘seem[ing] reductive’: there is already a knowledge with the certainty as to which ‘particular details’ belong to ‘the poem’ and/or to ‘the world’. These two kinds of ‘particular details/things’, however, do not have to be ‘peg[ged]’ ‘to’ one another, according to the perspective on the ‘notion of adéquate’. Also, the idea of ‘particular’ is already seen as an attempt to link ‘details’ and ‘things’ together.

By making a claim to ‘expansive’, the implication is that the perspective on ‘Ponge’ can, in a sense, both know and not know about what ‘particular details’ are ‘in the poem’ in relation to ‘particular things in the world’, not least that ‘things’ are not stable ‘in the world’ either. For instance, ‘a Buellian equivalent’ is regarded as knowing what will be ‘particular[ly]’ ‘peg[ged]’ ‘to’ ‘the world’ when reading ‘rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim’, whereas ‘an instant of Pongean adéquate’ is seen as knowing more ‘expansive’ about ‘rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim’ than identifying ‘particular details in the poem’, thus not necessarily to ‘peg’ ‘details’ ‘to’ ‘things in the world’. In this way, I read that ‘an instant of Pongean adéquate’ can also be understood to be related to a sort of ‘imaginary pool’³⁶³ which has been critiqued by the perspective on Buell’s reading of ‘Hopkins’ – ‘ask[ing] about’ ‘the question of whether an “imaginary pool” is the sort of habitat in which “live trout” fare the best’.

³⁶¹ Ibid., p. 587.

³⁶² Ibid., p. 589.

³⁶³ Ibid., p. 590.

By discussing Buell's reading of 'Peterson's *Field Guide*', Philips disagrees with his claim about 'Peterson's illustrations' in relation to 'outer mimesis', when Buell is known to think of the notion of 'adéquation' differently as: 'the capacity of the stylized image[Peterson's images] to put the reader or viewer in touch with the environment'. I will first read what it means to be a 'birder' and/or 'reader' 'of the *Field Guide*' for Philips in the following:³⁶⁴

Peterson's illustrations highlight field-marks—occasionally, with arrows—and a student of the *Field Guide* learns to recognize a bird in terms of its abstract patterns of marking in so far as those patterns differ from others, rather than in terms of its overall body image or coloration, both of which can be remarkably similar across species, as well as remarkably variable within species. An experienced birder is *de facto* also an experienced 'reader' of the *Field Guide*. Such a birder has [...] an ability which can seem inexplicable to the uninitiated.³⁶⁵

The 'overall body image or coloration' is read to be different from 'abstract patterns of marking', as the latter can 'differ from others' for 'recogniz[ing] a bird'. Thus 'abstract patterns of marking', for instance, 'occasionally, with arrows', can do what 'overall body image or coloration' cannot do – differentiate 'similar[ities]' 'across species' and/or one variety 'within species' from another. In order to do so, the idea of 'abstract patterns' regarding 'Peterson's illustrations' is '*de facto*' framed to know all 'species' of 'bird[s]', including their 'body image[s] or coloration[s]', which can also be seen as what 'a student of the *Field Guide*' is expected to 'learn' for being '[a]n experienced birder' and, at the same time, making the known difference between 'a birder' and 'the uninitiated' not so different – because of this explicable 'abstract[ness]' that can qualify 'the uninitiated' to be 'a birder'. In other words, 'field-marks' in 'the *Field Guide*' are supposed to be 'learn[ed]' and 'read[able]', in

³⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 592.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 592.

making ‘a student’ ‘experienced’ to have ‘an ability’ ‘to recognize a bird’.

The different understanding from Buell’s argument, in terms of ‘the meaning of the word “mimetic” ’ and of ‘the meaning of “stylization” ’, is further discussed:

Mimesis presumes the *sameness* of the representation and the represented object. Earlier field guides, and the Peterson guide’s inferior contemporaries, depict birds mimetically and in their natural habitats, according to the techniques of bird portraiture as refined by painters like Audubon. Peterson’s *Field Guide* is only incidentally mimetic, precisely because his great innovations were to base his field-mark system on the diagnostic *difference* between one bird and another, and to ignore many of the conventions of bird portraiture in the manner of Audubon and others, opting instead to portray his avian subjects more schematically—and I would argue, in a notably less ‘stylized’ way.³⁶⁶

The perspective on ‘[e]arlier field guides ’ claims to know they are also as ‘inferior’ as ‘the Peterson guide’s’ ‘contemporaries’ are, in comparison with ‘Peterson guide’, as both of them ‘depict birds mimetically and in their natural habitats, according to the techniques of bird portraiture as refined by painters like Audubon’. This is how Philips thinks that the ‘bird portraiture’ in relation to ‘painters like Audubon’ can be ‘inferior’ either, in terms of the idea of ‘[m]imesis’. Since ‘[m]imesis presumes’ ironically – in order to be the ‘*same*’ as ‘bird’ ‘represented’, ‘the techniques of bird portraiture’ can be ‘refined’ in the service of ‘depict[ing] birds mimetically and in their natural habitats’. The ‘*sameness*’ is constructed based on several deferrals from ‘the represented object’ to ‘the representation’.

When it comes to ‘Peterson’s *Field Guide*’, however, it is known as ‘only incidentally mimetic’. So ‘mimetic’ can be either ‘only incidentally’ or not ‘incidentally’. The ‘great innovations’ of ‘Peterson’s *Field Guide*’ can belong to the former, whereas ‘many of the conventions of bird portraiture in the manner of

³⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 593.

Audubon and others' cannot. The 'great[ness]' lies in, in one sense, 'his field-mark system' is seen to be different from 'many of the conventions of bird portraiture'; in another sense, these 'conventions' with respect to 'Audubon' are not thought to both diagnose the '*difference* between one bird and another' and 'portray' the 'avian subjects' in a ('more') 'schematical' way.

However, the 'field-mark system' can also be regarded as a kind of 'portray' in the way in which this 'system' can somehow *leap over* the knowledge about 'one bird and another' first to 'portray' the '*difference* between' them 'more schematically'. That is to say, according to the perspective on 'Peterson's *Field Guide*', both the ideas of 'mimetic' and 'stylized' are known to be there: it is just the difference between 'field-mark system' and 'many of the conventions of bird portraiture' that makes the former 'more schematically', 'only incidentally mimetic', and 'notably less stylized'. But the 'schematical' 'diagnos[is]' of 'bird[s]' is known to remain the traces of 'mimesis' and 'styliz[ation]' always, which, in turn, implies that 'innovations' regarding 'Peterson's *Field Guide*' can also be read as ironically 'great' to some extent.

Mimesis is synthetic; the images in the *Field Guide* are splendidly analytic. They are, to retranslate and modify the term Buell borrows from Ponge, *merely adequate*. And the merely adequate image is not the same as a realistic image of the sort Buell celebrates; the merely adequate image may eschew realism altogether, and it seems a lot less exciting aesthetically.³⁶⁷

The perspective on 'the *Field Guide*' claims to know that 'analytic' is different from 'synthetic', which implies that 'the images' can be seen as not related to '[m]imesis' or, as stated above – 'only incidentally mimetic'. Also, Philips has a different reading of 'Ponge' than 'Buell' regarding the notion of 'adéquation'; '*merely adequate*' is thought of as a 'retranslat[ing]' and 'modify[ing]' term against how 'Buell' reads 'adéquation' in relation to 'realism'. The difference is thus explained more in the sense that, for 'Buell', in Philips's reading, 'the images' in 'Peterson's *Field Guide*'

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 593.

can be regarded as an example of the ‘adéquation’ associated with ‘a realistic image’. For Philips, nevertheless, ‘the merely adequate image’ is not about ‘realistic’ but ‘may eschew realism altogether’ and ‘seems a lot less exciting aesthetically’, even if the ideas of ‘eschew[ing]’ and ‘aesthetically’ are both framed as a possibility at this point. In this sense, ‘eschew[ing]’ can also be a problem, according to Philips’s reading of ‘Ponge’. But Philips does not think that ‘Buell’ reads ‘adéquation’, ‘realism’, and ‘aesthetic’ as same as he does, when ‘Buell’ is claimed to do that ‘sort’ of ‘celebrat[ion]’.

The Field Guide reduces the visual field and makes ornithology portable, as the Double Elephant Folio edition of Audubon’s *Birds of America*, which might have been a better text for Buell to ponder as an exemplary work of realism, does not.³⁶⁸

The perspective on the ‘*Field Guide*’ does not agree with what ‘Buell’ would ‘ponder’ – the ‘*Field Guide*’ could be ‘an exemplary work of realism’. Either in terms of ‘visual field’ or ‘portable’, the ‘*Field Guide*’ does not work as ‘better’ as ‘Audubon’s *Birds of America*’; ‘Audubon’s *Birds of America*’ can be seen as ‘an exemplary work of realism’ because of the more ‘visual field’ and ‘the Double Elephant Folio edition’. In other words, ‘realism’ is a construction, as is ‘ornithology’: both can be constructed differently, according to different ideas of ‘the visual field’ or different needs for the size of the ‘work’, for example, to be ‘portable’ or not.

Peterson’s drawings are intentionally less vivid than Audubon’s, in order to convey more information about each species, so that ‘live birds may be run down by impressions, patterns, and distinctive marks’ by birders in the field, as Peterson puts it in his 1934 preface. Running down live birds in this way means that the Peterson-trained birder does not look for the whole bird or the

³⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 593.

bird-in-itself.³⁶⁹

According to the perspective on ‘Peterson’, ‘vivid’ ‘drawings’ can conflict with ‘convey[ing] more information about each species’, as it is mentioned previously in the article: ‘the Field Guide is mimetically parsimonious, and deliberately so’.³⁷⁰ In this way, not only is the ‘information about each species’ known prior to the very ‘conveying’ of the ‘drawings’; but also the notion of ‘more’ can be built based on the notion of ‘less’ in the framing of ‘intention’. And this certain knowledge of ‘each species’ is further claimed as ‘live birds’. The ‘live-ness’ here is relevant to ‘impressions, patterns, and distinctive marks’, which also implies that ‘impressions, patterns, and distinctive marks’ are seen as ‘less vivid than Audubon’s’ ‘bird portraiture’ but as being capable of ‘convey[ing] more information’. In other words, the ‘live-ness’ can be constituted through the idea of ‘less vivid[ness]’.

Further, ‘the field’ is assumed to be shared between the ‘live birds’ and the ‘birders’. But these ‘birds’ can be ‘run down’ by ‘birders’ only if the latter are ‘trained’ to ‘look for’ ‘impressions, patterns, and distinctive marks’ with respect to ‘live birds’ rather than ‘look[ing] for’ ‘the whole bird or the bird-in-itself’. But this idea of ‘whole[ness]’ can still be read to remain in the perspective on Peterson’s perspective. For the perspective on a ‘Peterson-trained birder’, nevertheless, ‘the whole bird or the bird-in-itself’ can be both unknown and known when ‘[r]unning down live birds’ ‘in the field’.

That is to say, on the one hand, they are ‘trained’ to know how to ‘run down’ the ‘birds’ by virtue of ‘impressions, patterns, and distinctive marks’ instead of ‘the whole bird or the bird-in-itself’, or to say, ‘the whole bird or the bird-in-itself’ here has already been and will be constructed as ‘impressions, patterns, and distinctive marks’ in the retrospection – this is how ‘birder[s]’ are ‘trained’ without possibly ever knowing or seeing of ‘the whole bird or the bird-in-itself’ that Peterson is supposed to know.³⁷¹ In this way, learning to ‘run down’ by, for instance, ‘impressions’, implies

³⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 593-94.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 593.

³⁷¹ I am trying to read the difference between Peterson and ‘Peterson-trained birder’. But even if

that ‘the bird-in-itself’ is open to be defined – with the different versions of ‘itself’, which, in turn, constitutes the knowledge of what ‘live birds’ might be. That is, ‘birder[s]’ can ‘run down’ what ‘the whole bird’ is like to be in the way that this very idea of ‘run[ing] down’ can be seen as producing.

On the other hand, ‘impressions, patterns, and distinctive marks’ can be based on the premise that ‘the whole bird’ is held to be there. Thus, the claim to ‘does not look for’ can be read as an irony, which parallels what I have mentioned about the idea of ‘[a]déquation’ above: the relation of ‘some sense of the gist of the thing’ to ‘the thing itself’ and, also, entails the problem of ‘eschew[ing] realism’ discussed above. Moreover, similar parallels can be found between ‘the techniques of bird portraiture as refined by painters like Audubon’ & ‘the Peterson guide’s inferior contemporaries’ and Peterson & ‘Peterson-trained birder’. In other words, although this is not to ‘depict birds mimetically and in their natural habitats’, the idea of ‘refined’ is repeated from ‘the whole bird or the bird-in-itself’ to ‘impressions, patterns, and distinctive marks’ to some degree, which, again, introduces the idea of ‘[m]imesis’ back in relation to ‘Peterson’s drawings’.

But either of sides reflects the difficulty of ‘[r]unning down’. This is also the problem of ‘[m]imesis’ of which Buell is framed to know as: ‘put[ting] the reader or viewer in touch with the environment’. But Philips disagrees with this ‘in touch’ and explores the consequences of ‘realism’ further in the following.

7.2 Literature, Reader, and the World

Why ‘[t]he user of the *Field Guide*’ ‘must become a “reader” ’³⁷² is discussed as:

Peterson’s field-mark system encourages a process of ‘identification by

Peterson had claimed to have seen ‘the whole bird or the bird-in-itself’ before writing this ‘*Field Guide*’, it is not a self-referential knowledge of ‘birds’. Instead, a perspective on Peterson’s perspective to ‘the whole bird or the bird-in-itself’. Not to mention, here are the claim to ‘impressions, patterns, and distinctive marks’ in relation to but not the same as ‘the whole bird or the bird-in-itself’, and the shift from Peterson to ‘Peterson-trained birder’. I will also explore more about the idea of seeing (and/or memorising) in the same chapter later, by reading Roman Bartosch’s *Literature, Pedagogy, and Climate Change*.

³⁷² Ibid., p. 594.

elimination.’ In ‘How To Use This Book,’ Peterson explains the logic behind this process: ‘It is often quite as helpful to know what a bird could not be as what it might be’ (*FG* xx). The user of the *Field Guide* therefore must consult both its illustrations and the book’s other resources, such as the descriptive text accompanying each illustration on the opposite page, in order to decide ‘what a bird could not be.’³⁷³

The perspective on ‘Peterson’s’ perspective claims that ‘know[ing] what a bird could not be’ might be thought of by others as not being as ‘quite’ ‘helpful’ as ‘know[ing]’ ‘what it might be’. Also, the former may be seen to be different from the latter. But both the perspective on ‘Peterson’ and the perspective on ‘Peterson’s’ perspective know about the relationship between the two – ‘what a bird could not be’ and ‘what it might be’ define each other, whereas, to the perspective on ‘Peterson’, this relationship needs to be ‘explain[ed]’ as ‘the logic behind this process’ to ‘users’ who are supposed not to know ‘how to use this book’.

And this ‘logic’ of, for instance, knowing ‘what a bird could not be’ is discussed further as something that cannot get directly from ‘its illustrations and the book’s other resources’: there is an idea of ‘must’ for ‘[t]he’ ‘user’ to ‘consult’ ‘both its illustrations and the book’s other resources’ before ‘decid[ing]’ ‘what a bird could not be’. In this way, ‘what a bird could not be’ is open to ‘decide’ into different ‘identification[s]’, as is ‘what it might be’, even though ‘its illustrations and the book’s other resources, such as the descriptive text accompanying each illustration on the opposite page’ are known to be there already. This also parallels the relation, I read above, of ‘impressions’ to ‘the bird-in-itself’.

Further, I read that there can also be ‘each illustration’ ‘accompanying’ ‘the descriptive text’ ‘on the opposite page’, which is involved in this idea of ‘consult[ing]’ and/or ‘decid[ing]’. Also, ‘each illustration’ can be read as ‘descriptive’. Because both the ideas of ‘descriptive’ and ‘accompanying’, by implication, can make ‘consult[ing]’ and ‘decid[ing]’ not stable as they are thought to be, and vice versa. Therefore, not

³⁷³ Ibid., p. 594.

only is there a claim to ‘a process of “identification by elimination” ’ within the framing of ‘encourage[ment]’ ironically, according to the perspective on ‘Peterson’s field-mark system’. But why this ‘process’ needs to be ‘encourag[ed]’ calls into question the very notion of ‘elimination’: the uncertainty and instability about what needs to be ‘eliminat[ed]’ exactly, before doing the very ‘elimination’ for ‘identification’.

Next she looks once more at Peterson’s illustrations, and realizes that she did not see the characteristic white wing-stripe of the Black-capped. Then she reads Peterson’s discouraging note about poor conditions (‘season, wear, angle of light, etc.’) and has to confess that her not having seen it does not mean that the white wing-stripe was not there.³⁷⁴

‘Peterson’s illustrations’ are seen to provide ‘her’ with ‘the characteristic white wing-stripe of the Black-capped’ for ‘identification’. However, ‘looks once more’ implies that what ‘she’ ‘saw’ is different from what ‘Peterson’s illustrations’ constitute for ‘her’ to ‘see’. And this difference can be explained by ‘Peterson’s discouraging note about poor conditions (“season, wear, angle of light, etc.”)’ in which ‘Peterson’s note’ is known to already anticipate ‘her not having seen it’ before and for the seeing of ‘she’. In other words, both ‘she reads’ and ‘has to confess’ can be read as consolidating the authority of ‘Peterson’s illustrations’ and ‘her’ dependence on them: ‘her not having seen it does not mean that the white wing-stripe was not there’.

In this sense, ‘Peterson’s note’ is somewhat less ‘discouraging’; this idea of ‘discouraging’ ironically implies a certain knowledge – ‘the white wing-stripe’ can be ‘there’ anyway. This ‘she’ does not need to ‘see’ it herself, which, then, counts as an ‘identification’; ‘her not having seen it’ does not affect the very ‘there-ness’ of ‘the white wing-stripe’. This is how ‘not having seen it’ can also be ‘mean[t]’ as a kind of seeing and/or ‘identification’ of ‘it’ by virtue of both ‘Peterson’s illustrations’ and ‘note’.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 595.

Despairing, she consults Maps 246 and 247, and realizes that she has chosen that day to go for a walk in one of those liminal areas the maps chart [...] To make matters worse, Map 247 reiterates the text's warning that the two species 'mingle at times and hybrids are known.'³⁷⁵

With the perspective shifting from 'Peterson's note' to 'Maps 246 and 247', 'her' dependence on 'the *Field Guide*', according to the perspective on 'her' perspective, is not so much shifted, as is the relation of 'Maps' to 'the text'. To be specific, not only can 'the text's warning' be 'reiterate[d]' by 'Map'; but also the very status of 'Maps' can be understood from this idea of 'reiterat[ing]': what she 'has chosen' rather than what 'the maps chart' is '[d]espairing'; '[d]espairing' of 'not having seen it' is about 'go[ing] for a walk in one of those liminal areas'. What is not '[d]espairing' is, ironically, the very 'chart[ing]' of 'the maps' already defines which 'areas' are 'liminal' and which 'areas' are not. This 'she' is supposed to 'go for a walk' by avoiding 'one of those liminal areas the maps chart'. Similarly, what 'make[s] matters worse' is that 'she' is trying to see and differentiate 'the two species' from the beginning, instead of knowing that these 'two species' are already 'known' as 'mingle at times and hybrids'. In a sense, therefore, 'the text's warning' can 'make matters' not that 'worse', as this is the way in which 'the two species' are defined.

But in order to decide which of the two, possibly three, kinds of chickadee it is that she has just seen, she is going to have to rely on something more than just the resources provided by text—in this case, Peterson's—and world, where it is now that dark night in which all chickadees are black.³⁷⁶

According to the perspective on 'she', 'just the resources provided by text—in this case, Peterson's—and world' are known not to be enough for 'her' 'to rely on', when 'it is now that dark night in which all chickadees are black'. But I read that 'something' is also regarded as not being able to fill the gap between what 'she' 'saw' in the 'world'

³⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 595.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 595.

and what ‘she’ ‘read’ from the ‘text’. For not only are these the ‘kinds of chickadee’ that are only known as being ‘two’ or ‘three’ with the idea of ‘possibly’ being framed; but also the perspective knows that, even if there is a certainty of knowledge about how many ‘kinds of chickadee’ there are, and even if they are not ‘all’ ‘black’ in the ‘dark night’, the idea of ‘possibly’ is still known to be there as the claim to ‘rely on’ already decides that there is a deferral between what ‘she’ ‘saw’ / ‘read’ and what ‘she’ thought ‘she’ ‘saw’ / ‘read’, not to mention the difference between what ‘she’ ‘saw’ in the ‘world’ and what she ‘read’ from ‘something more than just the resources provided’.

It will help her, of course, to become a better ‘reader’—a better user of Peterson’s guide, to figure out what he means when he says that a bird is ‘casual’ in a given area and to learn what ‘chickadee flight years’ are.³⁷⁷

The perspective on ‘her’ claims to know that what will not ‘help’ is, by implication, that ‘she is going to have to rely on something more’, as I discussed above. However, ‘to become a better “reader”’, at this point, can ‘of course’ be understood to be an irony, as this ‘what he means’ is also seen as uncertain and multiple: in terms of how to ‘better’ ‘use’ ‘Peterson’s guide’, ‘she’ is supposed to have a capacity of being ‘a better “reader”’ ‘to figure out what he means when he says that a bird is “casual” in a given area and to learn what “chickadee flight years” are’. That is to say, ‘what’ ‘he says’ can be known to have different ‘mean[ings]’ that need to be ‘figure[d] out’. Only ‘becom[ing] a better “reader”’ can ‘she’ feel ‘help[ful]’ to ‘figure out what he means when he says’; either the claim of ‘a bird is “casual”’, even if this is known ‘in a given area’ not ‘in one of those liminal areas’ as mentioned above, or that of ‘chickadee flight years’, ‘what he means’ needs to be ‘figure[d] out’ by ‘a better “reader”’.

This also applies to thinking about ‘what’ ‘something’ ‘means’ – the un/knowable and extra ‘something’ discussed above. In other words, the perspective

³⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 595.

already knows that even if ‘she’ tends to ‘rely on something more than just the resources provided by text—in this case, Peterson’s—and world’, the problem remains as to how ‘to become a better “reader” ’ of this ‘something’.

Philips also explores whether ‘the screech owl’s call is unparaphrasable’ in the following:

In the chapter of *Walden* entitled ‘Sounds,’ Thoreau paraphrases the screech owl’s call as ‘Oh-o-o-o-o that I never had been bor-r-r-n!’ This paraphrase is not unlike the versions of birdcalls Peterson offers in many of the entries in his guide. But Peterson declines the opportunity to paraphrase the screech owl’s call. He describes it in fairly abstract terms as a ‘mournful whinny, or wail; tremulous, descending in pitch. Sometimes a series on a single pitch.’ Peterson is more circumspect in this case, I think, for the simple reason that the screech owl’s call is unparaphrasable.³⁷⁸

The perspective on ‘Peterson’ claims to know that there is ‘the opportunity to paraphrase the screech owl’s call’, which is ‘decline[d]’ by ‘Peterson’. But ‘Thoreau’ is known to ‘paraphrase’ it ‘as “Oh-o-o-o-o that I never had been bor-r-r-n!” ’. At the same time, ‘[t]his’ ‘paraphrase’ is claimed as ‘not unlike the versions of birdcalls Peterson offers in many of the entries in his guide’, which implies that there are other ‘paraphrase[s]’, according to the perspective on ‘Thoreau’, known as ‘unlike the versions of birdcalls Peterson offers’. I read that although ‘Oh-o-o-o-o that I never had been bor-r-r-n!’ and ‘mournful whinny, or wail; tremulous, descending in pitch. Sometimes a series on a single pitch’ are framed as different, the claim to ‘not unlike’ constructs a connection between the idea of ‘paraphrase’ and ‘describes it in fairly abstract terms’. Because both of them are others to ‘the screech owl’s call’, even if ‘Oh-o-o-o-o that I never had been bor-r-r-n!’ is framed, in this sense, as not being something in relation to ‘fairly abstract terms’.

The idea of ‘paraphrase’ is, at this stage, constituted as neither ‘fair’ nor ‘abstract’

³⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 596-97.

enough. And the notion of ‘fairly abstract’ is further known to be related to the notion of ‘more circumspect’, as ‘the screech owl’s call’ is seen as ‘unparaphrasable’. However, both ‘more circumspect’ and ‘declines the opportunity to paraphrase’ can be regarded as not being able to guarantee this ‘unparaphrasable-ness’. By implication of ‘not unlike’, the perspective on ‘Peterson’ knows that these are ‘birdcalls’ which have different ‘versions’, ‘offer[ed]’ by the perspective on ‘Peterson’s’ perspective to ‘birds’, in ‘many of the entries in his guide’ with ‘fairly abstract terms’, during which ‘birdcalls’ are already constructed as such – the deferred ‘paraphrasable-ness’, before the next coming deferral – with ‘versions’. The perspective knows that, in many ‘case[s]’, ‘birdcalls’ are ‘paraphrase[d]’ differently. If there is any difference among these ‘case[s]’, some ‘paraphrasable-ness’ is seen as ‘more circumspect’, for which ‘paraphrasable’ can also be understood as ‘unparaphrasable’, and vice versa.

When ‘Oh-o-o-o-o that I never had been bor-r-r-r-n!’ is further claimed in the article later as ‘a representation of the screech owl’s call’, the perspective claims to know why this ‘representation’ is ‘faulty’ is because ‘[i]t will not put Thoreau’s reader in touch with the world’.³⁷⁹ I read, according to the perspective on ‘Peterson’, ‘a “mournful whinny, or wail; tremulous, descending in pitch. Sometimes a series on a single pitch” ’ can also be known as a denial to some extent in terms of ‘put[ting]’ ‘reader in touch with the world’, even though there are ideas about ‘fairly abstract’ and ‘more circumspect’ framed ‘in this case’. And the question of what kind of ‘representation’ in ‘literature’ can be seen to be capable of ‘put[ting]’ ‘reader in touch with the world’ is discussed more as follows:

There is no doubt that literature can be realistic and even in some limited sense representational: it can point to the world. That is, it can point to some carefully circumscribed aspect of the world which it must describe and locate in more or less detail for a competent reader who understands what it is trying

³⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 597.

to do.³⁸⁰

Both the ideas of ‘realistic’ and ‘representational’ are seen as possibilities for ‘literature’ to be able to ‘point to the world’. To be specific, first of all, the perspective claims to know that, not in all ‘sense’ but only ‘in some limited sense’, ‘literature’ ‘can be’ ‘representational’; secondly, ‘the world’ is known as ‘some carefully circumscribed aspect of the world’; lastly, ‘reader’ has to be ‘competent’. In other words, only ‘a competent reader’ is supposed to ‘understand’ ‘what’ the ‘literature’ ‘is trying to do’, before which ‘literature’ is constituted to ‘describe and locate in more or less detail’ under the frame of ‘must’.

Once all these ‘limited’ conditions can be met and put in place, ‘literature’ with ‘more or less detail’ can, then, be seen to have a chance to ‘point to’ ‘some carefully circumscribed aspect of’ ‘the world’ for ‘a competent reader’. In other words, this is how ‘literature’, ‘reader’, and ‘the world’ are mobilised to claim why ‘[r]ealism’ ‘is idiomatic’: ‘[i]t works only when interlocutors share similar assumptions about what is perfectly ordinary and its proper description; such sharing is not universal’.³⁸¹ Otherwise, the relation of ‘literature’ to ‘world’ can also be in ‘doubt’, which is already known by the perspective on ‘literature’.

7.3 Perspective, Seeing, and Memory

In his book *Literature, Pedagogy, and Climate Change: Text Models for a Transcultural Ecology*, Roman Bartosch gives an example in relation to ‘a number of transcultural concerns as well as concerns with scale effects’³⁸² through reading Teju Cole’s novel *Open City* and discussing the ideas of perspective, memory, and difference concerning the Anthropocene: ‘Julius wonders about perspective and the possibility of perspectival change, indicative, perhaps, of a desire for cross-species

³⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 597.

³⁸¹ Ibid., p. 597.

³⁸² Roman Bartosch, ‘Towards Transcultural Competence: Scaling | World | Literature’, in *Literature, Pedagogy, and Climate Change: Text Models for a Transcultural Ecology* (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 15-46 (p. 31).

Fremdverstehen that also articulates itself culturally via anthropomorphism and animal symbolism'.³⁸³ 'Julius' is known to 'wonder about perspective and the possibility of perspectival change'. Meanwhile, this is the 'Julius' who is introduced by Bartosch's reading as 'deliver[ing] in autodiegetic voice'.³⁸⁴ Together with his agreement on Vermeulen's 'observ[ation]': 'a "flat, nearly affect-less tone" ',³⁸⁵ 'Julius' is, then, seemingly read as the same as the narrator in the sense of 'tell[ing] the story'³⁸⁶ of and for 'Julius' without mentioning its name, for instance, through the narration on the 'I' that I will also be discussing in more detail with the following quote, which implies a division already either between the narrator and 'Julius' or between the 'I' and the narrator. Besides this, how the 'possibility' can be understood is also related to and based on what has been quoted within this 'autodiegetic voice':

Each time I caught sight of geese swooping in formation across the sky, I wondered how our life below might look from their perspective, and imagined that, were they ever to indulge in such speculation, the high-rises might seem to them like firs massed in a grove.³⁸⁷

For Bartosch, the 'I' is always seen as the 'Julius'. So what this 'I' 'wondered' is read as what 'Julius' 'wondered', according to the certainty of the knowledge of the 'autodiegetic voice'. The idea of 'wonder[ing]' relies on the 'sight' of the 'I' in which the 'geese' are 'swooping in formation across the sky'. It is from this 'sight', in other words, the perspective of the 'I' on the 'geese', that the 'geese' are also known to have 'perspective' which is claimed to relate to 'our life below'. However, the paradox is perhaps that the very idea of 'autodiegetic voice' may, in turn, disrupt the knowledge of 'the possibility of perspectival change': firstly, 'I' is known as different from the 'geese', even though 'I' can 'catch sight' of and 'wondered' about the latter, including, for instance, 'wonder[ing]' a 'perspective' for and on them. Secondly, 'our

³⁸³ Bartosch, p. 31.

³⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 30.

³⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 30.

³⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 30.

³⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 31.

life' is *autodiegetic* to be 'our[s]'; the claim to 'below' cannot guarantee that the 'perspective' is 'their[s]'.

Similarly, 'firs massed in a grove' would be the same as 'the high-rises' to the extent that both of them are claimed to be 'such speculation' within an 'indulgence' which is constituted as the 'imagination' of 'I' to 'them'. Therefore, although there might be other possibilities regarding what 'the high-rises might seem to them', so is 'how our life below might look' like, 'the possibility of perspectival change' is about how the 'I' is narrated to 'wonder' the 'geese' that would have or not have 'their perspective[s]', and, as a result, putting the very 'flat, nearly affect-less tone' at stake. To put it differently, this cannot be, in Bartosch's reading, 'the possibility of perspectival change' between 'I' and 'geese', 'indicative, perhaps, of a desire for cross-species *Fremdverstehen*', nor can the very notion of an 'autodiegetic voice' be at the same time 'Julius' and the 'geese'.

Accordingly, 'anthropomorphism and animal symbolism', though appearing to function in opposite positions, is not something that can be understood in relation to the very 'possibility of perspectival change'. Instead, they are both claimed within a 'cultural' 'articulat[ion]' due to 'a desire for cross-species *Fremdverstehen*', which would also consolidate that there will be again the 'possibilit[ies] of perspectival change' in so far as how the 'I' is being narrated 'culturally' to 'wonder' the 'geese' to make possible the 'cross-species *Fremdverstehen*' of the 'I' and the 'geese', calling into the question what 'a "flat, nearly affect-less tone" ' means and how it could operate as such for 'a desire'.

Cole complicates this form of appropriation, however, by removing the animals and their possible 'meaning' into a fictitious realm in the conclusion of the passage: 'Often, as I searched the sky, all I saw was rain, or the faint contrail of an airplane bisecting the window, and I doubted in some part of myself whether these birds, with their dark wings and throats, their pale bodies and tireless little hearts, really did exist. So amazed was I by them that I

couldn't trust my memory when they weren't there'.³⁸⁸

By knowing further what 'this form of appropriation' is, for example, in relation to the ideas of 'anthropomorphism and animal symbolism', in Bartosch's reading of Cole, both 'perspective and the possibility of perspectival change', at this point, are possible and impossible, as I discussed above. As is the case in which 'the animals and their possible "meaning" ' can be '(re)mov[ed]' 'into' the (non)-'fictitious realm[s]'.

And why the claim to 'a fictitious realm' is not stable can be further read from this 'conclusion of the passage': the 'geese' and 'these birds' are different for Bartosch, as the former can be 'caught' in the 'sight' of the 'I' as 'swooping in formation across the sky', which seems to be read as not 'fictitious' while the latter are not something like 'rain, or the faint contrail of an airplane bisecting the window' which is included in 'all I saw' 'as I searched the sky'. Thus, to Bartosch, the idea of seeing is employed at the service of the very idea of 'exist[ence]' – whether or not 'these birds' are 'fictitious'.

Nonetheless, they can be read as 'really did exist' to some extent. If 'these birds' are already regarded to be in 'a' 'realm', then they and 'their possible "meaning" ' can be not only linked up 'with their dark wings and throats, their pale bodies and tireless little hearts', but also understood as being 'there' in 'my memory'. In other words, whether 'they were there' or not, 'they were there' in 'my memory'. It is 'my memory' and '[s]o amazed' of 'I by them', even though known as not being 'trust[ed]' by 'some part of myself', that make this 'exist[ence]' happen. The claim to not 'trust[ing] my memory' does not stop 'they were there', so does that how 'rain, or the faint contrail of an airplane bisecting the window' is claimed to be. For the latter is also 'seen' in the 'memory' of 'I'. It seems that there is a difference between what is being 'seen' and 'memor[ized]' that decides the very idea of 'exist[ence]' in Bartosch's reading. The knowledge of 'all I saw' cannot, however, be spontaneously and simultaneously what 'all I saw', as there is always a division between the 'I' who,

³⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 31.

for instance, ‘searched the sky’ or ‘my memory’ and ‘the sky’ or ‘my memory’ being ‘searched’.

Blending personal and global-ecological concerns, this passage too invites us to reflect on the different scales it invokes, and on the different meanings of climate change and weather phenomena as well as individual human perception—‘I hadn’t yet occasion to wear my coat’—and the deep time of the Anthropocene. Vermeulen likewise mentions the text’s ‘magisterial display of literature’s enabling role in fostering cosmopolitan feeling and understanding’ and James Wood’s claim that it creates a ‘productive alienation’ from this idea through its exploration of public and global space and the role of the individual. Note how the three scales identified by Clark—the subjective, the communal, and the planetary—are brought into play here.³⁸⁹

Here, ‘this passage’³⁹⁰ can be read for Bartosch to ‘blend personal and global-ecological concerns’. Although these can also be seen as two of three different ‘scales identified by Clark’, two ‘concerns’ are ‘blend[ed]’ because of sharing the readings of the ‘I’: what ‘I had come to agree’ is also what ‘personal and global-ecological concerns’ are – ‘it’ should not have ‘been’ ‘warm’ ‘all season long’ as ‘there was a rightness about’ both ‘warm’ and ‘cold seasons’, ‘that there was a natural order in such things’. Thus the ‘absence of this order’ in relation to ‘a sudden discomfort’ can be ‘constantly palpable’ as ‘a sense of unease’, even if it is claimed to be ‘hard to pin down’ ‘in Julius’s stream of consciousness’.

In other words, two ‘scales’ become ‘concern[ing]’ for the same thing that can be ‘constantly palpable’; ‘a natural order in such things’ turns out to be something

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 32.

³⁹⁰ ‘[A] sense of unease, hard to pin down but constantly palpable in Julius’s stream of consciousness: “I walked four blocks to the movie theatre on what, I recall, was a warm night. I had my recurrent worry about how warm it had been all season long. Although I did not enjoy the cold seasons at their most intense, I had come to agree that there was a rightness about them, that there was a natural order in such things. The absence of this order, the absence of cold when it ought to be cold, was something I now sensed as a sudden discomfort”’ (Bartosch 2019, 32).

unified, at this stage, beyond these ‘scales’ no matter whose ‘stream of consciousness’ it is, which also remains in what ‘this passage too invites us’: for example, ‘I hadn’t yet occasion to wear my coat’ can be read due to the same reason – the non-‘rightness’ and ‘[un]natural order’ in ‘the absence of cold’, thus ‘fostering cosmopolitan feeling and understanding’.

7.4 Un/known Differences

Although what ‘Vermeulen’ ‘mentions’ about ‘the text’s “magisterial display of literature’s enabling role”’ is read to be a ‘different’ idea from ‘James Wood’s claim’ as both of them can be regarded as the part of ‘us’ who are ‘invite[d]’ ‘to reflect on the different scales it invokes, and on the different meanings’, they share the same ‘difference[s]’ paradoxically and namely: ‘climate change and weather phenomena as well as individual human perception—“I hadn’t yet occasion to wear my coat”—and the deep time of the Anthropocene’. This repetition of unitary ‘difference’ can also be understood in Bartosch’s reading of ‘James Wood’s claim’: ‘it creates a “productive alienation”’ ‘from’ and ‘for’ ‘public and global space and the role of the individual’. Since how ‘this idea’ will be ‘explor[ed]’ is already decided and read by Bartosch’s taking part with ‘the three scales identified by Clark’. That is, ‘the three scales’ are already known prior to framing what ‘this passage’ will ‘invite us to’ do.

This seems to be contradictory with ‘Anthropocene f(r)ictions’ proposed in the introduction of this book in ‘seek[ing] to challenge this particular teleology [speak to the whole world] that sees development only in the sense of an increasing scope of totality and globality’ and ‘carefully consider[ing] more local and individual dimensions of reading and writing for reasons of both readerly processes and literary politics’.³⁹¹ To be specific, his reading of ‘this passage’ is not so much ‘the three scales identified by Clark’ concerning, for instance, ‘scaling, at least in theory, requires multiple, contradictory readings’³⁹² and/or ‘an interpretive engagement with

³⁹¹ Ibid., p. 18.

³⁹² Ibid., p. 28.

scaling techniques that radically throw into relief the blind spots of each approach to literary fiction, thus mutually completing, but never fully succeeding in pinning down, the meanings of world, planet, globe, and literature'³⁹³ as 'the three scales identified by Clark' from which the 'derangement of scale'³⁹⁴ might be 'brought into play here'. This latter in relation to the 'scale effects' is exactly something that 'Anthropocene f(r)ictions' is thought of as in need of avoiding, because of the problem of 'hav[ing] a map'³⁹⁵ being read as 'Clark's' 'caution'.³⁹⁶

In addition to this, by calling for 'the three scales identified by Clark' to embrace 'tensions and frictions'³⁹⁷ rather than '[t]rying to focus on both scales at once leads to a form of derangement',³⁹⁸ different 'scale-bound perspective[s]',³⁹⁹ – either 'local-political or planetary-ecological',⁴⁰⁰ for instance, instead of the juxtaposition of the two – on reading 'this passage' and/or both 'Vermeulen' and 'James Wood', seems to fall into the same and known perspective already and paradoxically before the possible readings of them due to the very idea of 'bound'.

Moreover, the certainty of (re)employing the idea of 'scale effects' – which are based on but different from 'scale effects' mentioned above by reading Clark – can also be regarded as problematic from how Bartosch reads 'Trexler's' claims. 'Trexler' is thought to 'slightly move from a description of "how the world works" to a prescription of "how fiction should be working" [...] for its representationalist stance and its commitment of the naturalistic fallacy of inferring an "ought" from an "is" '. For Bartosch, this brings into question the notion of 'the canon'.⁴⁰¹ However, 'the

³⁹³ Ibid., p. 29.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 25.

³⁹⁵ ' "We have a map", he continues, "its scale includes the whole earth but when it comes to relating the threat to daily questions of politics, ethics or specific interpretations of history, culture, literature, etc., the map is often almost mockingly useless" ' (Bartosch 2019, 25).

³⁹⁶ For further discussions of why 'scale effects' are 'confusing' and what 'blind spots', for example, of 'the Anthropocene scale of globality' are, see Bartosch, p. 25.

³⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 30. Also see the related claim, for example: 'The plurality of interpretations thus gained would be closer to a truly cosmopolitan vision of the hermeneutic potential of fiction, and it would point to both the blind spots inherent in any critical approach and the potential of changing perspectives' (Bartosch 2019, 28).

³⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

³⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 27.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 28.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., p. 21. On the other hand: 'It is worth to pursue further Trexler's observation that the effects of climate change are felt on different scales—a notion that would radically question not only the

three scales identified by Clark', even though concerning the *different* 'scaling techniques',⁴⁰² can, still, be understood to 'set up a canon of works seemingly equipped to narrate the Anthropocene' rather than, or to say, in 'rethink[ing] the interplay of writings in an age of climate change'.⁴⁰³ That is, the position exchange between the former and latter claims, at this point, seems to make the need for 'rethink[ing]' the same as 'think[ing]' to some degree.

What Chakrabarty dubs the 'nonhuman human' figure of/in the Anthropocene rests on humans' 'becoming a geological force' which makes humankind 'a form of collective existence that has no ontological dimension': 'A geophysical force [...] is neither subject nor object. A force is the capacity to move things. It is pure, nonontological agency'. This leads him to posit that, indeed, there is no 'humanity' to speak of in any phenomenologically or even ontologically sound sense. This has serious repercussions on all levels of scale—a phenomenological void on the personal, a disconcerting absence of frames of justice and rights on the communal as well as an analytical on the planetary one—that any reading capable of negotiating Anthropocene frictions must be able to tackle.⁴⁰⁴

Without 'rest[ing on]' 'humans' "becoming a geological force" ', 'the "nonhuman human" figure of/in the Anthropocene' will not be 'nonhuman'. Also, 'humankind' will not be 'a form of collective existence that has no ontological dimension' 'ma[de]' by 'a geological force' in relation to the idea of 'nonhuman'. Thus 'the "nonhuman human" figure' cannot be 'nonhuman', nor can it be 'human'. Both the 'nonhuman' and 'human' here 'rest on' each other, defining the paradox of the 'figure of/in the Anthropocene'.

uniform(ing) tendency of both Anthropocene and world literature discourse but also call for a novel approach to reading fiction in an era of, or engaged with, environmental change' (Bartosch 2019, 24-25).

⁴⁰² Ibid., p. 29.

⁴⁰³ '[W]hich forces us to rethink the interplay of writings in an age of climate change rather than set up a canon of works seemingly equipped to narrate the Anthropocene' (Bartosch 2019, 24).

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 34.

In Bartosch's reading of Chakrabarty, what 'to speak of' in the 'posit' hinges on a 'phenomenologically or even ontologically sound sense'. In this way, 'humankind' can be understood as either 'humans' or 'humanity'. That is, when 'humankind' becomes 'a form of collective existence', it is denied according to the 'sound sense' of 'phenomeno[n]' and 'ontolog[y]'. The implication of how to avoid this is that there seems to be a possibility in which 'humankind' goes with the idea of 'humans' before being 'ma[de]' by 'a geological force' and/or 'move[d]' together by a 'pure, nonontological agency'— there has to be some sort of 'human' both being *purely* 'exist[ing]' and 'ha[ving]' a 'ontological dimension'.

The claim to 'serious repercussions' also implies that 'any reading capable of negotiating Anthropocene frictions' will not take for granted 'the "nonhuman human" figure of/in the Anthropocene'. Instead, the notion of 'frictions' considers 'all levels of scale' on which 'human(s)' can and need(s) to be known from 'a phenomenological void on the personal, a disconcerting absence of frames of justice and rights on the communal as well as an analytical on the planetary one'.

What is at stake is that 'any phenomenologically or even ontologically sound sense' appears to circumvent the problem of 'humanity'. It is, however, because there is such a known and knowable 'phenomenological or even ontological' perspective that 'humanity' can be ironically introduced back and again. For example, although the 'human(s)' in relation to 'Anthropocene frictions' can be read and 'tackle[d]' from 'the personal', 'the communal' and/or 'the planetary' 'scale', namely, 'ontological dimension(s)', either 'a phenomenological void' or 'a disconcerting absence of frames of justice and rights' already decides and defines what the 'human(s)' should and could be in this 'void' or 'frames', before any 'capable' 'reading', thus falling back to what it criticises – the 'humanity' will, after all, be 'sp[oken] of', though constituted by the known and different 'pure, ontological agenc[ies]' this time. Similarly, rather than claiming to know what 'the planetary' is, 'an analytical' seems to sound different from what would entail in 'speak[ing] of' 'humanity'. The idea of 'sound sense' frames, nevertheless, where 'an analytical on the planetary one' should go before a very 'analytical' way of 'reading'.

In pedagogical contexts, moreover, it [looking for the single text's meaning] poses methodological problems that could easily be avoided: instead of trying to have the whole class discuss a novel or other narrative, one might just as well move discussion towards a variety of texts on different levels of difficulty, say, or with different matters of concern, so that a discussion of scale effects need not concentrate on one narrative, insightful as this might be, but bring into fruitful play several narratives concerned with comparable content, topics, or problems.⁴⁰⁵

'In pedagogical contexts', according to Bartosch, the idea of 'fruitful' might be valued more than the idea of 'insightful', although 'concentrat[ing] on one narrative' can also be used to 'discuss' the 'scale effects', as with his reading of Cole's work earlier as one of the examples to see how 'the perspectives of different scales'⁴⁰⁶ are read through one novel.⁴⁰⁷ Also, because of these 'pedagogical contexts', the known 'methodolog[y]' already decides what the 'problems' would be and how to 'avoid' them 'easily'. For example, compared with 'mov[ing] discussion towards a variety of texts', 'looking for the single text's meaning' or 'trying to have the whole class discuss a novel or other narrative' would not be thought of as the right method but 'pos[ing]' the 'problems', 'pedagogical[ly]' speaking, in embracing 'different levels of difficulty, say, or with different matters of concern'.

In combination with what I have analysed before surrounding 'scale effects', firstly, 'pedagogical' 'methodolog[y]' at this point can be regarded as something which guarantees 'a discussion' for 'scale effects'. In other words, to 'have the whole class discuss' 'a discussion of scale effects' is premised on the 'discussion towards a variety of texts on different levels of difficulty, say, or with different matters of

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 35.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 38.

⁴⁰⁷ See also, at this stage, why more *differences* are needed in *different* texts when comparing 'close reading' with 'distant reading': 'I find it important to underline that we might move our focus away from the form of "close reading" of single texts that Franco Moretti criticises in his discussion of world literature. "Distant reading", according to Moretti, is less an alternative to close reading but an additional offer for knowledge production—and one that I think the notion of scale, and of different interpretive results depending on different scalar frames, can explain well' (Bartosch 2019, 35-36).

concern'. There seems to be no 'problem' and/or division from a 'discussion towards a variety of texts' to 'a discussion of scale effects'. Secondly, unlike what 'scale effects' are discussed in terms of 'the personal', 'the communal' and/or 'the planetary' aforementioned, here the way of 'discuss[ing]' 'a variety of texts on different levels of difficulty, say, or with different matters of concern' itself can be understood to be 'a discussion of scale effects'.

Either of them, however, remains the problem I have mentioned before. That is, the idea of known difference(s) would hinder the reading of *possible* difference(s); a shared sameness of the difference(s) defines what kind of difference(s) would be read out prior to the very reading or discussing of difference(s).⁴⁰⁸ For example, here is about 'comparable content, topics, or problems', which might also be inconsistent with what Bartosch argues all the time in relation to 'Anthropocene F(r)ictions':⁴⁰⁹ 'It is the very friction produced by the scale effects the narrative evokes that I find remarkable and helpful in pointing to its transcultural potential'.⁴¹⁰ And 'the novel's form' should not be seen as 'resolving conflict', but 'interrogat[ing] established reading practices and point[ing] to the necessity of interpretive flexibility'.⁴¹¹ What 'the novel's form' is thought to do, for example, '[i]n pedagogical contexts', turns out to not only limit this so-called 'interpretive flexibility' but also call into question the very ideas of both 'transcultural potential' (which is, meanwhile, served as different from the notion of '(inter)culturalism'⁴¹² and to avoid the problems that the latter can cause) and 'conflict' related.

The difficulty of reading through 'multiple and incommensurable scales' can also be seen in the claim that: 'I think that an awareness of relative

⁴⁰⁸ The repetition can be read further in the claim: 'If we accept the idea of scales as interpretive conditions of possibility, we can see through a distant reading of the roles of identity and place that all novels are concerned with these issues in somewhat different scalar dimensions' (Bartosch 2019, 36). Also claimed, by reading the 'work of Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie' (which is exemplified as that 'scale differences can be construed across several texts', p. 38), as: 'it still points to a scalar dimension different from the ones found in the other novels, while thematic concerns remain comparable' (Bartosch 2019, 37).

⁴⁰⁹ See Bartosch, for example, the Chapter One of this book 'Anthropocene F(r)ictions: Transcultural Ecology and the Scaling of Perspectives', pp. 1-13.

⁴¹⁰ Bartosch, p. 33.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., p. 33.

⁴¹² Ibid., pp. 7-8.

incommensurability together with the experience of relative harmonisation in the process of narrative emplotment tells us important things about the stories of the Anthropocene',⁴¹³ in which the ideas of 'together[ness]' and 'relative[ness]' between 'incommensurability' ('awareness') and 'harmonisation' ('experience'), as with the ideas between 'differen[ce]' and 'comparab[ility]' discussed above, structures the knowledge of 'narrative emplotment', including how it is being 'process[ed]', thus making 'interpretive flexibility' not that 'flexib[le]'.⁴¹⁴ As is the claim of what 'the very friction' means.

⁴¹³ Ibid., p. 33.

⁴¹⁴ Why this kind of 'interpretation' could, on the contrary, lead to the difficulty of reading in differences and flexibility can also be read through the claim: 'the notion of scale is a much more readerly than writerly thing, and one that can inform or rather trouble interpretations based on the notion of fixed frames' (Bartosch 2019, 37-38).

Conclusion: Child's Own?

In *The Case of Peter Pan, or, The Impossibility of Children's Fiction*, Rose discusses why the claim to a 'child's version' is at stake, through taking J. M. Barrie's 'The Blot on Peter Pan' as an example.⁴¹⁵ Her formulation surrounding the quote from Barrie, however, not only sometimes blocks the reading of 'what children have been given in its place',⁴¹⁶ but also results in me thinking further about why and how Barrie's claims are situated as such, thus leading to my curiosity of looking at 'The Blot on Peter Pan'⁴¹⁷ from which I can draw a different reading,⁴¹⁸ for example to understand yet further how 'Neil produces his own play, in his own special language'.⁴¹⁹ In what follows, I will be discussing how the knowledge of 'Neil's play'⁴²⁰ turns out to be impossible and paradoxical, even if 'Neil's play' can be there, by reading Rose's reading of 'The Blot on Peter Pan'.

In this story, the narrator tells a group of children about how he based *Peter Pan* on his relationship with a little boy, Neil [...] The story is a type of child's version of *The Little White Bird* which reintroduces the relationship between the writer and child which was cut out of *Peter Pan*, and gives back something of its difficulty. In this story, writing *for* the child is an act of rivalry *with* the child – the 'truth' about, or 'blot' on Peter Pan is his cockiness for vying with the narrator and trying to outdo him as a writer. On the opening night of *Peter Pan*, Neil produces his own play, in his own special language, and has it

⁴¹⁵ Jacqueline Rose, 'Peter Pan and Freud: Who Is Talking and to Whom?', in *The Case of Peter Pan, or, The Impossibility of Children's Fiction* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), pp. 1-41 (p. 39).

⁴¹⁶ Rose, p. 41.

⁴¹⁷ J. M. Barrie, 'The Blot on Peter Pan', in *The Collected Peter Pan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 421-33.

⁴¹⁸ I turn back to 'The Blot on Peter Pan' not because I take for granted the search for origin and authority or try to look for the real answer, nor compare whose reading is un/reliable, but, as discussed throughout this thesis, to be interested in seeing how and why the related idea is claimed as such and what it is based on.

⁴¹⁹ Rose, 'Peter Pan and Freud', p. 39.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., p. 40.

performed as an opening piece when the playwright[sic] is out of the theatre.⁴²¹

In Rose's reading of Barrie's published 'story' about 'Peter Pan', 'Neil' is 'a little boy' with whom 'the narrator' 'based *Peter Pan* on his relationship', which implies that the 'children', as 'a group', can be 't[old]' to know about the relation of '*Peter Pan*' to 'Neil'. Why the 'story' is defined as 'a type of child's version of *The Little White Bird*' is also grounded in the knowledge that 'Neil' is 'a little boy'. In other words, a 'child' is supposed to understand this 'version' as 'a group of children in the 'story' do, because 'a little boy' is also seen as a 'child'.

Whether a 'child' could, however, know the other 'child/ren' without any difficulties is further discussed with which 'something of its difficulty' is known to 'give back' in 'reintroduc[ing] the relationship between the writer and child'. There might be another type of 'relationship between the writer and child' in which the 'difficulty' is thought of as something that is neither being nor needs to be 'give[n] back' to, for instance, both the 'child' inside and outside the 'story'.

This division is also seen in Rose's claim to 'an act of rivalry *with* the child': firstly, 'the child' can be understood as someone who is being 'writ[ten] for'. The irony of this italic '*for*' in the very 'act of 'rivalry' is that 'the child', including 'a group of children' at this point, is set up as both knowing and not knowing the 'difficulty', as I discussed above. Secondly, 'the child' can also be understood as either 'Peter Pan' or 'Neil'. Since 'the "truth" about, or "blot" ' is constituted on 'Peter Pan' in the way in which 'Peter Pan' needs to be 'cock[y]', based on the knowledge of 'Neil', and thus can 'v[ie] with the narrator and try to outdo him as a writer'. In this seeming 'rivalry', both 'Peter Pan' and 'Neil' are constituted to be different from 'the narrator', as the latter, without being 'cock[y]', can be the 'writer' who defines the former to be 'a writer'.

Although both 'the child' in the first sense (who is being 'writ[ten] for') and the second sense ('Peter Pan' or 'Neil') are mobilised in this 'rivalry', the difference between the two lies in, however, the former is known to be possibly able to recognize

⁴²¹ Ibid., p. 39.

the distinction between two or three ‘writer[s]’ or between ‘the narrator’ and ‘a writer’, due to the very notion of ‘child’s version’ and the knowledge of how ‘a group of children’ can be ‘t[old]’ about the relationship between ‘Peter Pan’, ‘Neil’ and ‘the narrator’ in the ‘story’. The implied paradox perhaps is that: these ‘child/ren’ can be seen to side with ‘the narrator’ in knowing how ‘Peter Pan’ or ‘Neil’ comes to be ‘a writer’ and knowing why the ‘writer’ is doing so, which contradicts both the ideas of ‘rivalry’ being ‘act[ed]’ (as the ‘child/ren’, as those who are being ‘writ[ten] for’, are also involved in this ‘rivalry’) and ‘difficulty’⁴²² being ‘give[n] back’ in the sense of what they mean to ‘child/ren’ in ‘reintroduc[ing] the relationship between the writer and child’.


No matter to whom the ‘story’ ‘gives back something of its difficulty’, the perspective on ‘writing *for* the child’ always claims to know who the ‘child’ is and what it needs inside and outside the ‘story’, for instance, ‘an act of rivalry’. From this point, the ‘relationship’ might be introduced again rather than being ‘reintroduce[d]’. In doing so, together with the split ‘child’, as I analysed above, make it difficult for the ‘child’s version’ to be the ‘child’s version’ anyway. Moreover, the irony of the ‘child’s version’ remains in the claim that ‘Neil produces his own play, in his own special language’. Even if this ‘play’ is ‘performed as an opening piece when the playwright[sic] is out of the theatre’, the idea of ‘own[ing]’ cannot be guaranteed but is constructed as such, for example, with ‘special language’, in the service of ‘special’ ‘difficulty’.

This can be further read in Rose’s following quote from Barrie to discuss more about ‘Neil’, according to the claim to the first ‘.’, concerning how ‘he’ ‘produces his own play, in his own special language’.⁴²³

⁴²² Not only can the ‘difficulty’ (in one sense) be two-fold but also related to one another. That is to say, there cannot be two ‘difficult[ies]’ at the same time: if ‘the child’ in the first sense cannot recognize how and why both ‘Peter Pan’ and ‘Neil’ (‘the child’ in the second sense) can and need to be employed for this idea of ‘rivalry’ (with which it also involves another sense of the idea of ‘difficulty’ regarding ‘his own play, in his own special language’ and ‘challeng[ing] our own [language]’ with which I will be discussing immediately), it would ‘give back something of its difficulty’ to this ‘child’. Since it is also situated in the ‘rivalry’. If, on the contrary, it can recognize why either ‘Peter Pan’ or ‘Neil’ is mobilised as such, there might be no ‘difficulty’ to and so-called ‘rivalry’ with this ‘child’ in the first sense.


⁴²³ The first sentence I quote here overlaps with the last sentence of the previous quote, and I will

On the opening night of *Peter Pan*, Neil produces his own play, in his own special language, and has it performed as an opening piece when the playwright[sic] is out of the theatre:



(Figure 4)

This was a problem in three lines and a glass bowl that I had given to some youthful onlookers at that luckless Monday's rehearsal and it stumped them as it had stumped me when propounded to me once by a friend. I see it also stumps you, but debase yourselves sufficiently and you will find it reads:



(Figure 5)

You follow? I agree with you that'tis but a tiny joke, and at once it passed out of all our minds save one. That mind was the awful mind of Neil. Though none was in the secret but his Nannie it was suddenly revealed to him how plays are written; quick as a lucky one may jump through a paper hoop and come out on the other side a clown, he had gained access through that friend

further analyse why this sentence plays such a key role in her claim that I do so.

of mine to a language which he could read, write and spell.⁴²⁴

Here, a ‘friend of mine’ is claimed to know how to read this ‘problem’. Or that these ‘three lines and a glass bowl’ might not engender ‘a problem’ to this ‘friend’. Unlike ‘some youthful onlookers’, ‘me’ is known to stop being ‘stumped’ when ‘it’ has been ‘propounded’ ‘once by’ ‘m[y]’ ‘friend’. That is to say, although both ‘some youthful onlookers’ and ‘a friend’ can be ‘given’ ‘three lines and a glass bowl’ by this ‘I’, they are constructed differently in terms of knowing whether or not ‘[t]his was a problem’. Then it is ‘you’ who is also ‘see[n]’ to be ‘stumped’ but can ‘follow’, as ‘you’ is known to have the possibility – though ‘you’ did not know but ‘I’ know – to ‘debase yourselves sufficiently and you will find’ how to ‘read’ ‘it’. Thus ‘debas[ing] yourselves sufficiently’ can also be related to what my ‘friend’ had ‘propounded to me’.

The implication of the ‘agree[ment]’ is that: firstly, ‘I’ know ‘you’ can ‘follow’ as ‘you’ is known to be able to ‘debase’ themselves from some knowable higher levels to which ‘some youthful onlookers’ do not belong.⁴²⁵ Nor is the latter thought to have levels from which to ‘debase’. Secondly, by making a claim to ‘a tiny joke’, ‘a problem’ is not a ‘problem’ anymore for both ‘I’ and ‘you’ who are, at this point, seen as a group, namely, ‘all our minds’ against and not including these ‘youthful onlookers’. And ‘our minds’ are known not to be ‘awful’ as ‘a tiny joke’ can ‘pass out of’ them ‘at once’, whereas it is ‘Neil’s’ ‘mind’ that is being ‘save[d]’ and cannot ‘follow’ until ‘it was suddenly revealed to him how plays are written’, although ‘none was in the secret but his Nannie’ who is constructed as the *only* one that knows why the ‘mind of Neil’ ‘was’ ‘awful’.

In this sense, it does not matter what ‘his Nannie’ knows, as ‘the secret’ does not matter too; this is how ‘his Nannie’ is known to be with and, at the same time, becomes part of ‘the secret’. It is the idea of ‘suddenly revealed to him’ that matters.

⁴²⁴ Rose, ‘Peter Pan and Freud’, pp. 39-40.

⁴²⁵ See in ‘The Blot on Peter Pan’, this ‘you’ can be understood as four ‘children’ in the ‘story’ (they are also ‘a group of children’ in Rose’s reading) who also ‘listen’ to the ‘story’ of ‘Neil’ given by the narrator (Barrie 2019, 427), which also implies how ‘some youthful onlookers’ and ‘children’ (and also, ‘Neil’ in the following discussion) are structured differently towards ‘[t]his’ ‘problem’.

In other words, even if the ‘mind of Neil’ is known to be ‘awful’, ‘he’ can ‘read, write and spell’ as ‘quick[ly] as a lucky one may jump through a paper hoop and come out on the other side a clown’. Therefore, it is ‘some youthful onlookers’ who become as ‘luckless’ as the ‘Monday’s rehearsal’ is deemed, as they are not only eliminated from ‘all our minds’ but also worse than ‘Neil’ whose ‘awful mind’ that can be understood as a past or being temporary in the retrospection and, as a result, not to affect ‘his’ ‘access’ ‘to a language’, though in the way of being ‘suddenly revealed’ rather than ‘debas[ing]’ himself ‘sufficiently’.

Following the above quote from Barrie, Rose continues to argue:

The child’s own play and its own language – not in the sense of some spontaneous and unspoilt form of expression which speaks for itself (another mystification), but a language which cannot simply be read, and which challenges our own. Neil’s play is a rebus or puzzle (Freud, perhaps not coincidentally, used the model of the rebus for his method of interpreting dreams). It breaks up the page and demands a special type of attention, inserting its difficulty into the otherwise perfect communication between the adult and child.⁴²⁶

My question is, in combination with the previous quote, what can be read as relating to the knowledge that ‘Neil produces his own play, in his own special language’, and that ‘a language [child’s own language] which cannot simply be read, and which challenges our own. Neil’s play is a rebus or puzzle (Freud, perhaps not coincidentally, used the model of the rebus for his method of interpreting dreams)’? To be more specific, according to Rose’s reading of Barrie’s ‘The Blot on Peter Pan’, what makes her draw the idea that ‘child’s’ ‘own language’ ‘cannot simply be read’? Who is this ‘we’ being ‘challenge[d]’? In what sense is ‘Neil’s play known as ‘a rebus or puzzle’? Why is ‘the rebus’, ‘perhaps not coincidentally’, linked with the idea of ‘the model’ in relation to the ‘method of interpreting’ something?

⁴²⁶ Rose, ‘Peter Pan and Freud’, p. 40.

It seems that, on the one hand, Rose knows the problem of the claim to ‘child’s own play and its own language’, by making a claim that ‘not in the sense of some spontaneous and unspoilt form of expression which speaks for itself’. That is, a ‘child’ is always known from a position other to this ‘child’, as I analysed above, for instance, with respect to the irony of the ‘child’s version’ and how I read the italics from Rose’s claim that: ‘writing *for* the child is an act of rivalry *with* the child’.

On the other hand, all the ideas, such as ‘a language which cannot simply be read’, ‘Neil’s play’ that is ‘a rebus or puzzle’, and ‘the model’ which is needed for the ‘method of interpreting’ seem to make sense to Rose, in quoting and reading of Barrie’s claim, if ‘three lines and a glass bowl’, for instance, ‘MACCD / MNO / OSAR’, is presumed to be ‘his own play, in his own special language’:⁴²⁷ the notion of ‘special’ lies in knowing that the ‘language’ ‘cannot simply be read, and which challenges our own’, which implies a seeming difference of ‘own[ing]’ between ‘his’ and ‘our[s]’. This ‘language’ ‘can’, however, ‘be read’ by ‘us’ after all, as something like ‘the model’ ‘used’ by ‘Freud’ is known to be there as ‘the method of interpreting’. The claim to ‘perhaps not coincidentally’ may consolidate the relation between ‘the method of interpreting’ and what a ‘friend of mine’ had ‘propounded to me’ – that ‘MACCD/MNO/OSAR’ is ‘read’ as ‘Emma sees de Goldfish / ‘Em no goldfish, / Oh ess A are Goldfish’. In this way, ‘his own special language’ is not that ‘special’ and becomes somehow unified with ‘our own’, through the idea of ‘model’, which calls into question the very knowledge of ‘his own’.

In addition to this, not only is the ‘child/ren’ in its ‘own play and its own

⁴²⁷ Although, in my reading of ‘The Blot on Peter Pan’, this is not the case: first, Barrie’s claims, quoted by Rose, can be read as how the narrator ‘show[s]’ the ‘listeners’ (the four ‘children’) why ‘[a] miracle had happened’ in which ‘[t]he boy [Neil] who was unable to read, write or spell on Monday was a dab at them all by Tuesday. You may say “Oh, rot!” but it is true’ (Barrie 2019, 427). In this way, ‘Neil’ can also be part of ‘some youthful onlookers at that luckless Monday’s rehearsal’, though this does affect the distinction between him and other ‘youthful onlookers’, as I discussed earlier. Therefore, the quote cannot be read to see how ‘Neil produces his own play, in his own special language’. In other words, it is not what he ‘has it performed as an opening piece when the playwright[sic] is out of the theatre’, as how Rose introduces based on the quote (1993, 39). Nor can ‘MACCD / MNO / OSAR’ be regarded to be ‘his own special language’ or ‘a rebus or puzzle’, which is relevant to the second reason: according to the narration after this quote, ‘[s]o far as I can recollect, this is an accurate reproduction of his MS., all of it out of his own noddle except the first three lines: MACCD / MNO / OSAR’ (Barrie 2019, 428). These ‘three lines’ can be seen as part of the contribution – ‘it was suddenly revealed to him how plays are written’.

language' split, as I analysed above, for example, the differences between 'Neil', 'you', and 'some youthful onlookers' in terms of 'gain[ing] access' 'to a language', but also can this be seen to happen on 'Neil' and the idea of 'own[ing]' – to consider what it means, again, to claim 'his own play, in his own special language'.

Also, if the notion of 'a rebus or puzzle' is based on knowing there 'was a problem in three lines and a glass bowl that I had given to some youthful onlookers at that luckless Monday's rehearsal', according to Rose's reading before and after Barrie's claims, it is interesting to think further: to whom, the 'play' is 'a rebus or puzzle' and un/readable, as with both ideas of 'a problem' and 'a tiny joke'. If 'three lines and a glass bowl' are thought as 'his own play, in his own special language' for Rose, it is something, not 'play[ed]' by 'Neil' himself (although it appears to be done as such, as it is claimed to be 'performed as an opening piece'), but being 'given' by this 'I', who is known as not 'Neil', as a 'rehearsal' or 'perform[ance]' towards, for instance, not only including 'some youthful onlookers', but also 'a friend' and 'you', to some extent, in the narration. What is ironic is, then, that 'Neil' is also involved in this 'giv[ing]', not in the sense of 'perform[ing]' actually, but, from which 'he' cannot 'follow', paradoxically, what 'he' has 'written'.

To put it differently, unless 'gain[ing] access through that friend of mine' and getting 'suddenly revealed' somehow, there is a period when 'he' is known as the one with 'the awful mind', who cannot 'follow' 'how' 'his own play' is 'written'. 'Neil' is constructed with 'his own special language' which is different from 'a language which he could read, write and spell'. Therefore, 'we' (with 'all our minds'), for instance, including 'I', 'you', and a 'friend of mine', can 'all' 'gain access to' 'his own special language' except (though temporarily) or earlier than 'Neil' *himself*. In this sense, it seems that '[t]he child's' 'own language' is claimed to be 'a language which cannot simply be read, and which challenges our own'. It is, however, '[t]he child' who is being 'challenge[d]' because of the inability to 'read' 'a language' – including 'its own language'.

Therefore, what 'breaks up the page and demands a special type of attention' is not about, seemingly, that 'child's own language' 'challenges our own', or that the

‘language’ ‘appears here in this mostly forgotten story as an explicit challenge or threat to adult forms of speech’,⁴²⁸ but how ‘Neil’s play’ is claimed as ‘a rebus or puzzle’ in the service of the idea of ‘challenge’. This is a ‘difficulty’ that needs to be ‘insert[ed]’ ‘into the otherwise perfect communication between the adult and child’. The implication of ‘inserting’ is that whether it is ‘difficult’ or ‘otherwise perfect’, the ‘communication between the adult and child’ is always knowable and defined differently. This is also the case in the idea of ‘adult’ – what ‘adult’ has to do with ‘language’.

As has been demonstrated throughout the thesis, the question of ‘own’ and ‘voice’ is posed by reading a range of texts in perspective. While these texts cover many areas, what remains the same is that they all claim to know *the* truth – for instance, the ‘child’ and the ‘animal’ can be known as such transparently, instead of from a position other to it, under different principles and benchmarks. The importance and urgency of my research is to point out that examining the ways in which knowledge is produced, rather than taking the knowledge for granted, will draw out different readings and lead to various consequences.

Taking as an example a recent research project conducted in the Department of Experimental Psychology at St John’s College within the University of Oxford, Nation and others compare the ‘written language’⁴²⁹ with the language used in communication in ‘Book Language and Its Implications for Children’s Language, Literacy, and Development’:

Incomplete and ambiguous utterances are common in conversations but rarely trouble listeners for long. In the absence of a shared situation and shared cues such as facial expression, intonation, and gesture, written language has a difficult job to do—it has to work hard so that the intended meaning of the

⁴²⁸ Rose, ‘Peter Pan and Freud’, p. 41.

⁴²⁹ Kate Nation and others, ‘Book Language and Its Implications for Children’s Language, Literacy, and Development’, *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 31.4 (2022), pp. 375–80 (p. 376), doi: 10.1177/09637214221103264.

writer can be re-created in the mind of the reader.

My question is: do ‘facial expression, intonation, and gesture’ not need to be read? How is ‘a shared situation and shared cues’ guaranteed to be complete and not ‘ambiguous utterances’? That is, what is at stake is the implied transparency here between ‘the intended meaning of the’ speaker / ‘the writer’ and ‘the mind of the’ ‘listener’ / ‘reader’. In addition, neither this ‘intended meaning’ nor ‘the mind’ is taken into account with the idea of ‘supplementarity’ which is always discussed in the thesis.

Reading the claims of the knowledge of ‘presence’ and/or ‘representation’ in relation to ‘child’, ‘woman’, ‘animal’, ‘employee’, ‘employer’, ‘reader’, ‘student’ and ‘teacher’, therefore, will bring about, for example, very different ways of considering the grounds on which psychological assessment and testing depend, and the implications of differentiating the toys for boys and girls and of claiming the ideas of agency, compassion and emancipation, as well as the potential solutions to the issues around, for instance, how and why children’s literature can be used for children’s language and literacy development and for cultivating awareness of protecting animals and environment, how to think about the ideas of teaching and parenting involved, and how both the child and adult get benefits from play.

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