

No Man is an Island

Dethinking Island Methodologies

A Rigmarole in eight, or possibly ten, parts with readings of Jacques Derrida, the Pacific Journals of Captain James Cook, a twelfth-century Benedictine map, the Neverland(s), a Bear, a swan, and Monty Python (some brains).

Doctor of Philosophy

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Declaration

I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

Alexander Leigh Hellens

Abstract

This thesis provides readings of identity and/as islands in a range of disciplines from the perspective of Jacques Derrida's *The Beast and the Sovereign* (2010) in which he states repeatedly: 'What is an island?', to consider how perspective matters in the formation of identifications.

I begin by reading a key work in critical psychology, *Changing the Subject* (Henriques, et al., 1984), on educational pedagogies, to illustrate a parallel issue between the analysis of certain problems in education, which are still current, and the rethinking that has taken place with relation to island studies. For me, in spite of the copious amounts of 'rethinking' that have taken place in various related discourses, 'dethinking' is very much about a deconstruction of the claim to 'rethink' what island studies are. '(Not) In the Land of Israel' is a play on the title of the first chapter in Jacqueline Rose's *States of Fantasy* (1994), in which I read the claims to various states: 'belonging', 'travelling' and 'returning' and the politics of representation(s). 'Little petri dishes floating in a saltwater medium' is a reading of how 'islands', 'brain', and the 'antipodes' are constructed with respect to a number of texts, including a *mappamundi* from a twelfth-century encyclopaedia. Following this, 'The desert of the real' addresses maps. I read the construction of maps in relation to J.M. Barrie's *Peter Pan* (1911) and the mapping of authority in two iterations of Captain James Cook's Endeavour journals.

An interlude punctuates the first half of the thesis and serves as a segue between my previous readings of authority and my subsequent readings of metaphor as, in my reading, both are relevant to constructions of the island. I then return to readings about island(s) and constructions of suppression, supplement, and transgression in the diaries of Joseph Banks (1768-1771) and, finally, a range of children's literature, including: *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* (Lewis, 1950), *The Blue Lotus* (Hérge, 1935), *The Adventures of Tupaia* (Meredith & Tait, 2019), *The House That Jack Built* (Bishop, 1999), and *Winnie-the-Pooh* (Milne, 1926).

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A note on the text

Throughout my thesis I will be reading a range of texts in perspective and, as such, I will do my best to follow the source when it comes to citations. As such, there are a range of different spellings, punctuation, and formatting that I have endeavoured to keep in place to maintain a secure reading of the perspective, and in all cases I will be following the spellings, punctuation, and formatting of my source text unless stated otherwise.

Persons attempting to find a motive in this narrative will be prosecuted;
persons attempting to find a moral in it will be banished; persons
attempting to find a plot in it will be shot.

(Twain, 1884, p.ix)

Introduction: Dethinking island methodologies

What is an island? [*Qu'est une île?*]

(Derrida, 2010, p.3)

This is the problem of my thesis. That a translation to the *me* or to the *I*, in some way, (a way that I struggle with) is actually the question of this thesis — not necessarily to answer Derrida's question, but to consider: what does it mean to *belong*?

On a personal note, I have been considering these notions because of all the discussions around Brexit¹ (when I began writing this thesis in 2016) and the ongoing conflicts around the world,² and it struck me again that, on every personal level, how difficult I find it to locate a lot of these claims because I do not feel as though I am, and never have been, from any one place in particular. As well as myself, even my parents, grandparents, and other relatives have all come from

¹ On 23 June 2016 the United Kingdom voted in a referendum where the electorate asked whether the country should remain a member of, or leave, the European Union (EU). The referendum resulted in 51.9% of the votes cast being in favour of leaving the EU, triggering calls to begin the process of the country's withdrawal from the EU which the media termed 'Brexit'.

² In particular, the ongoing international conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and, more recently, between Israel and Hamas-led Palestinian militant groups(s) that have been taking place in and around the Gaza Strip have felt especially pertinent to me in the writing of this thesis; I currently live and work in Peterborough where there are large communities and demographics of all concerned above.

different places — but then even to say that is problematic because they did not come from those places, but at the same time you can say that *they did*, and then I find that *I do*. What I ended up finding was that, now that these things are so much at the forefront of all kinds of discussions, because it seems to matter so much now more than ever, is that it does not matter to me, at least, not in the ways it seems to matter to other people. Now that it is something that I feel as though I am constantly brought up against again and again, it seems to highlight how different it is for me than for many people who constantly have that claim to mattering with regard to where they come from, or where they belong; or where others come from and where they belong.

Identification is the other problem because the question of how to, or what it might mean to, ‘identify’ is such a massive problem, especially in children’s and postcolonial literature (of which much of this thesis examines) because it predicates the whole model of reading in children’s and postcolonial literature. Very few people write about this problem: Martin Barker (1989), writing on *Comics*, does write on the problem of identification — not reading in perspective, more cultural studies — as does D. W. Harding (1953), as a psychologist, asking: *what is identification supposed to mean*; are we supposed to go round reading, going *that’s me*, or *there I am* in the

book and, more importantly, why would we do that?³ How on earth is this supposed to work? What about the things that we do not identify with; are we not supposed to be interested in them? Do we not read them precisely because we do not identify with them? Do we not see them?

These are both much more liberal critiques, however both Barker and Harding help to think about the ‘in perspective’ critique of identification because if you know that you identify, what is the knowledge of your identification? There is an excess; in perspective there has to be. When I say *I identify* there is a perspective on the I because it is retrospective. So I have got a perspective on an I that is known to identify; identification is *known to be identification*, so then what is that identification in perspective? Thinking about reading identification in this way then raises the question: where is the perspective *not* identifying. What does it mean to (not) identify? This is totally pertinent to the current fashion where identifying has been remobilised to be completely about *who do you identify yourself to be?* Where the I that is identifying completely falls out of the picture; who is the I that chooses, who is the I that identifies?

³ As Karín Lesnik-Oberstein notes with reference to Harding: “Identification’ cannot account for reading which is not a perpetual reading of the self; and, finally, it cannot account therefore for other hypothetical processes in reading such as a possible learning of the new, or escapism, or what D. W. Harding has called “imaginative insight into what another person may be feeling, and the contemplation of possible human experiences which we are not at that moment going through ourselves” (Lesnik-Oberstein, 1994, p.28).

This is not a criticism in any sense; I understand that what matters to me partially is also the not-mattering, in the way it matters to others — and in that sense I am not attempting to make a political point here by saying that this is wrong — but what I am saying is that I am finding myself in an area and a situation where I genuinely am reading out how other people have claims to it mattering that I did not even consider or conceive of on a personal level. And I still have that; when people ask me: *what are you?* or: *where are you from?*, I can never have an answer. I could give an answer — I could pick and mix from what I might understand belonging, in all its different forms, to mean, but at the same time it puts everything in suspension because I actually have no sense of what it is to, say, be English or be Norwegian, against which I can say I am that; I have no idea what that would mean. And at the same time there is something about me which has to do with English- and Norwegian-ness, in a way which other people do not claim.

In that sense, this is exactly what a text such as *States of Fantasy* (Rose, 1994), which I discuss in the next chapter, argues about; the psychoanalytic principal that what matters is actually never what a liberal argument argues; a liberal argument will do so through materiality, through ideas of possession or objects, and even if they are doing that in a very liberal sense there is always that underlying real, that underlying object, that underlying materiality which in some way or another makes this a ‘real’ thing. What I am trying to argue here, is that it is, in that sense, a completely different argument; it is *fantasy* that matters, it is the unconscious that matters.

What many other critics want to argue is that, actually, the problem with constructivism or deconstruction and the constant liberal critique is that we are always saying that these things are secondary; their argument is always: constructive means that it is not important, that meaning evaporates, that it does not matter. For me, it is exactly the opposite. Not that I am arguing that it is more important that material things (that would be a reversal) but I am arguing that, actually, everything is determined by fantasy, and that fantasy produces what others call, 'the real'; fantasy produces the real, rather than the real producing fantasy, and that the real is, in its own right, fantasy.⁴ The real, in this sense, can not just 'be', autonomous and outside of perspective and knowable; and I think that this is, for me, such a crucial argument because everything about who is allowed to work where, live where, where people are supposed to be, who are they financially or economically, rests in every respect on what is supposed to be the most hard-reality by all these 'liberal' (non-scholarly) claims. These are the claims in fantasy; what does it mean to be English, or Norwegian, or foreign, or local, at home, out of place?

Why is this the difference?

Why is this the issue?

⁴ For more on the production of reality, see, for instance: Freud, Sigmund. *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Translated and edited by James Strachey. Penguin Freud Library Volume 1. London: Penguin, 1991. First published in German as *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* in 1916-17.

I recently attended a local schools' literary conference as part of my job,⁵ and was presented with some national curriculum documents, produced by the government, about what reading is and how it can be, or should be, measured.⁶ As part of the discussions, the hosting school showcased the NGRT test⁷ which they, and other schools, use to implement reading programmes and initiatives that include classic, but flawed, structures like 'texts for boys' and 'texts for girls' — where, unsurprisingly to most in the room (confirmed to me by a plethora of assenting murmurs and nods), Suzanne Collins' *The Hunger Games* (2008) was given as the example as an exceptional text for young girls⁸. The whole thing had a very nineteenth-century feel about it, where at the same time the narrative was absolutely about helping young readers 'read' by reading things over and over and over to

⁵ The Literary Conference was held at Nene Park Academy, Peterborough, UK, on 15 November, 2023. My (current) job is as the Group Assistant Head of Faculty for GCSE English at the largest further education college group in the East of England.

⁶ The three in particular that are of interest, are: Newton, Paul E.. *Learning During the Pandemic: Quantifying Lost Learning*. Ofqual, 12 July 2021; and Government of the United Kingdom. *The Reading Framework*. Department for Education, July 2023.

⁷ The New Group Reading Test (NGRT) is a product developed by GL Assessment which claims to be a standardised, termly assessment that 'reliably measures reading skills' against the national average to help practitioners 'get to the root of any problems' precisely and quickly. It purports to provide information about sentence completion and comprehension skills enabling teachers 'to identify where difficulties lie'.

⁸ There was no mention at this conference about what, specifically, a good text for boys might be.

them, before the ‘young readers’ will go: *Harry Potter lives in a cupboard under the... STAIRS*; and practitioners then measure reading ability by way of ‘young people’ anticipating the word ‘stairs’, after it has been read to them a great number of times. The sad fact of this was brought home to me when I related this story to a senior colleague of mine, who admitted that when their six-year-old daughter came home and read their schoolbook to her it was beautifully read and flawlessly pronounced, however when presented with a book that had been gifted to them for a birthday, was unable to read it because *I don’t know that one*.

Changing the Subject was published in 1984 and features contributions from Julian Henriques, Wendy Holloway, Cathy Unwin, Couze Venn, and Valerie Walkerdine. It remains the foundational text on critical psychology (brought together with psychoanalysis) to argue against neoliberalism; that neoliberalism cannot engage with the issues psychoanalysis raises. Neo-liberalism has to reject any idea of the unconscious because everything has to be about transparency, everything has to be about immediacy, everything has to be about affect; in 1984 *Changing the Subject* already made all these arguments with relation to things such as: healthcare, education, psychology in the context of things like The World Bank,⁹ the

⁹ The World Bank in the 1980s faced problems of a weak resource base, poor intermediary role and a greater pressure for the Bank to bend its development philosophy towards the private sector. For more on the impact of The World Bank at this time, see: Haq, Khadija. *Economic Growth with Social Justice: Collected Writings of Mahbub ul Haq*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2017.

developments with the International Monetary Fund,¹⁰ the coming in of New Labour. So the point here, really, is that people were already saying this forty years ago, and this (still) is the political climate that we are in, that is running everything.

In the text, Valerie Walkerdine makes the following claims in relation to the Nuffield Mathematics Project, *I Do, and I Understand* (1967):

¹⁰ James Boughton's *Silent Revolution* (2001) details a full history of the evolution of the Fund in which the institution truly came of age during the 1980s as a participant in the international financial system. Major upheavals hit every region of the world in this time, initiating revolutionary changes in economic policymaking and producing lessons that conditioned the Fund's responses to the even more dramatic events of the 1990s.

I hear and I forget

I see and I remember

I do and I understand¹¹

The above quotation forms the frontispiece to the first teachers' guide to the Nuffield Mathematics project, *I Do, and I Understand*. This was the first and most influential curriculum intervention into primary school mathematics in the 1960s. This quotation juxtaposes hearing and forgetting on the one hand and doing and understanding on the other.

(Walkerdine, 1984, p.155)

¹¹ While I will not do a reading of it here, nor will I touch on it in any great detail, these 'words' are often directly attributed to a proverb by the Confucian contemporary, Xunzi (often also 'mis-appropriated' to Confucious, as many 'Chinese' sayings and proverbs are): '不闻不若闻之, 闻之不若见之, 见之不若知之, 知之不若行之; 学至于行之而止矣'; a rough translation of which is: 'not hearing is not as good as hearing, hearing is not as good as seeing, seeing is not as good as knowing, knowing is not as good as acting; true learning continues until it is put into action'. The relevance of this is that the 'proverb' seems to have emerged, in English at least, in the middle-to-late 1960s in the context of *education*. A search using the online Google Books database finds seven occurrences in this time period — almost all of which are in the context of education — and nothing prior to that. In terms of education, this is still widely used today: in 1984, David Kolb published on the Experiential Learning Theory (ELT) and it is still one of the most widely used learning models. ELT is based on the premise that a person learns from direct experience or 'learns by doing'; the core idea being that a person learns through action. Kolb's theory is of note to me because it focuses on the learner's perspective and on personal development. In experiential learning, the individual guides the learning process as opposed to the conventional, didactic method (Kolb, 1984).

What I want to focus on in this claim is the relationships identified between ‘hearing and forgetting’, and ‘doing and understanding’. For the perspective, these are constituted as being ‘juxtapose[d]’ against one-another; that to ‘hear’ juxtaposes ‘forgetting’, and that to ‘do’ juxtaposes ‘understanding’. There is no claim as to whether seeing and remembering are juxtaposed, so in that sense to ‘see’ and to ‘remember’, while still being about what the ‘I’ can do, neither of these things are similar, in some respect, to the same perspective on what the ‘I’ can ‘hear’, ‘forget’, ‘see’ and ‘understand’. The perspective goes on to claim that:

[T]he polarization of passive remembering and active learning produced the most important theoretical tenet in the recent history of the primary school.

(Walkerdine, 1984, p.155)

This is helpful for my reading in the sense that the perspective ‘remembering’ is constituted as being ‘passive’, where the claims, in perspective, to ‘forgetting’ and ‘understanding’ are juxtaposed against ‘hearing’ and ‘doing’ respectively. In the above instance, ‘passive remembering’ — in which there are then other ways of ‘remembering’ that are not ‘passive’ — is not juxtaposed, like ‘forgetting’ and ‘understanding’ are, but there is ‘polarization of’ in relation to ‘active learning’. In this way, I can read that ‘I hear and I forget’ and ‘I do and I understand’ produce a reading that ‘juxtaposes hearing and forgetting on the one hand and doing and

understanding on the other'; and 'I see and I remember' produces a reading of 'the polarization of passive remembering and active learning' — all in perspective, of course. So there is very much a difference between what the perspective on the 'I' can 'hear and [...] forget', 'do and [...] understand' — which 'the quotation juxtaposes' — and what the 'I' can 'see and [...] remember' — which is about a 'polarization' where the 'remembering' is 'passive'. So then in the claim that 'I see and I remember' I can read that the perspective is making a claim to the 'I' as being 'passive' in its 'remembering' which is 'polariz[ed]' not against what the 'I' can 'see' but against 'active learning'. The 'polarization' here is about both what is 'passive' and 'active' as well as 'remembering' and 'learning', in the sense that 'learning' can be 'active' in the same way that 'remembering' can be 'passive'. So where is seeing in all of this?

If I follow the reading that 'I hear and I forget' is about a claim to the 'quotation juxtapos[ing] hearing and forgetting' I might think about the way(s) in which the 'quotation juxtaposes hearing and forgetting [...] and doing and understanding' but does not do so for 'I see and I remember'. So I might then say that there is something about seeing and remembering that does not 'juxtapose' in the way that 'hearing and forgetting' or 'doing and understanding' do; or, rather, is not something that the 'quotation juxtaposes'. In this way, where the 'quotation' is doing the work, so to speak, the perspective on the quotation — to be absolutely specific, the perspective on the perspective on the quotation, because this is all in retrospection — does not

juxtapose seeing and remembering, but does formulate a claim with respect to ‘remembering’. If I then consider that, in this perspective, seeing and remembering are not juxtaposed, nor are they ‘polzariz[ed]’ (because here the ‘polarization’ is ‘of passive remembering and active learning’) then if the ‘I’ can ‘see’ *and* the ‘I’ can ‘remember’ in a way that is not passive, then there is no ‘polarization’. I read the ‘and’ as important in this formulation, as it is about addition and supplement; where the ‘I’ sees ‘and’ remembers, is not the same as where ‘active learning’ is ‘polzariz[ed]’ against ‘passive remembering’, unless the reading is of ‘I see and I remember’ *as* ‘passive remembering’, which is not the way I read it since it is ‘passive’ remembering and hence a way of remembering, rather than all remembering.

But why is sight, rather than sound, vital to memory?

This is not so much about losing the perspective on what is/not being seen so much as the perspective shifting from being on what the ‘I’ is doing to what the ‘quotation juxtaposes’ and what the ‘polarization of passive remembering and active learning produce[s]’ which is, according to the claim, ‘the most important theoretical tenet in the recent history of the primary school’:

children, *developing at their own individual rates, learn through their active response to the experiences that come to them; through constructive play, experiment and discussion children become aware of relationships and develop mental structures* which are mathematical in form and are in fact the only sound basis of mathematical techniques. *The aim of Primary teaching, it is argued, is the laying of this foundation of mathematical thinking about the numerical and spatial aspects of the objects and activities which children of this age encounter.*

(Walkerdine, 1984, p.155)¹²

Walkerdine follows this up by stating that: ‘The central statements from the above quotation are those which I have italicized’ (1984, p.155); the claim that these ‘statements’ are ‘central’ already puts into place a structure where the perspective is able to have knowledge of what is and is not ‘central’; it is also interesting to me that in making a claim about italics being about what is central, the claim to ‘children’ is not ‘italicized’ in relation to the first two ‘central statements’; what ‘children’ do, however, is. Again, like with all claims to the child, this is a perspective on ‘children’

¹² Walkerdine is quoting the *Mathematical Association* (1955, pp.v-vi). Now what I feel needs acknowledging is that Walkerdine is citing a text which, at the time, would have been almost thirty years old, and I am making reference to it as well almost forty years since Walkerdine did. It is my hope that the reasoning for this is in support of my previous point: that people were already saying this in the 1980s, and the points that are being made are (still) the political climate that we are in, especially with regard to (childhood) education.

from the non-child, with the ‘central’ claims being about that which ‘children’ do. I want to read what the perspective is claiming this is done ‘through’ here as this is what the perspective on ‘the above quotation’ identifies as ‘central statements’.¹³

Firstly, ‘children, *developing at their own individual rates, learn through their active response to the experiences that come to them*’ and secondly, ‘through constructive play, experiment and discussion children *become aware of relationships and develop mental structures*’.

The ‘central statement’ insists that the first claim only applies to all ‘children’ who are ‘*developing at their own individual rates*’; all other children who might then develop at the rates of others, or perhaps even not develop at all, will not do the following: ‘*learn through their active response to the experiences that come to them*’. So what children do here is ‘*learn through*’, where learning takes place by way of ‘*their active response*’ — this is what the learning is done ‘*through*’. Similarly, in the second claim, it is ‘through constructive play, experiment and discussion children *become aware of relationships and develop mental structures*’, where for ‘children’ to ‘*become aware*’ takes place by way of ‘constructive play, experiment and discussion’ — this is what the becoming aware is done ‘through’. What takes place ‘*through*’ and ‘through’ is

¹³ While Walkerdine insists that the ‘central statements from the above quotation are those which I have italicised’, I have maintained the ‘formatting’ of the italics in my readings and although I do not do a ‘proper’ reading of the italics, they are of interest in some respects as a claim to that which is ‘central’, in perspective, because of the ‘*through*’ and ‘through’ that I read.

different. The former is in relation to '*learn*' and the latter in relation to '*become aware*', but also there is something about the '*learn*' that is 'central' because it is '*through*', whereas the '*become aware*' is, arguably, not-central because it is '*through*'. So there is then something about the way that 'children' who are '*developing at their own individual rates*' are able to '*learn*' and '*become aware*', '*through their active response to the experiences that come to them*' and 'through constructive play, experiment and discussion' respectively. The 'central statement' is all about '*active response*' — which I read as being similar, and perhaps in relation, to the 'active learning' that Walkerdine was claiming earlier — whereas the non-central statement is all about 'constructive play, experiment and discussion'. It can be read, then, that these things are seen to be, in relation to the 'central statements', somewhat supplementary or marginal because the 'I' has instated a hierarchy where the 'central statements from the above quotation are those which I have italicized'; the authority here being the 'I' in that the 'italicized' has taken place in retrospection. In other words, the idea of 'central' exists only within this perspective on the 'I' but because of this 'constructive play,

experiment and discussion’, in terms of how ‘children’ who are ‘*developing at their own individual rates*’ are able to ‘*become aware*’, is not central.^{14 15 16}

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¹⁴ For discussions on ‘constructive play’ in childhood education, see: Drew, Walter, James Christie, James Johnson, Alice Meckley, and Marica Nell. “Constructive Play: A Value-Added Strategy for Meeting Early Learning Standards.” *Young Children* 63.4 (2008): 38-44; Forman, George. “Constructive Play.” *Play from Birth to Twelve Contexts, Perspectives, and Meanings*. Fourth Edition. Edited by Doris Pronin Fromberg and Doris Bergen. New York, NY: Teachers College Press, 2006. 103-110; Forman, George and Fleet Hill. *Constructive Play: Applying Piaget in the Preschool*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1980; Johnson, James, James Christie, and Francis Wardle. *Play, Development, and Early Education*. New York, NY: Pearson, Allyn & Bacon, 2005; Park, Juhee. “The Qualities Criteria of Constructive Play and the Teacher’s Role.” *The Turkish Online Journal of Educational Technology* 18.1 (2019): 126-132; Trundle, K. C.. “Not All Play is Created Equal.” *Child Care Exchange* 40.2 (2018): 60-62.

¹⁵ For discussions on ‘experiment’ in childhood education, see: Craft, Anna. *Creativity and Early Years Education: A Lifewide Foundation*. London, New York, NY: Continuum, 2002; Ghorai, Kalyan, and Lalit Lalitav Mohakud. “A Study on the Effect of Story-Telling Method on Creative Development of Primary School Children.” *COGNIZANCE: Perspectives on Modern Issues of Education and Development*. Kolkata: Paschimbanga Anchalik Itihas O Loksanskriti Charcha Kendra, 2018. 71-81; Gündoğan, Asyun. “Scamper: Improving Creative Imagination of Young Children.” *Creativity Studies* 12.2 (2019): 315-326; Lin, Yu-Sien. “Fostering Creativity Through Education: A Conceptual Framework of Creative Pedagogy.” *Creative Education* 2.3 (2011): 149-155; Lindqvist, Gunilla. “Vygotsky’s Theory of Creativity.” *Creativity Research Journal* 15.2-3 (2003): 245-251; Mundy, Eleanor, and Camilla K. Gilmore. “Children’s Mapping Between Symbolic and Nonsymbolic Representations of Number.” *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology* 103.4 (2009): 490-502; Zeng, Bin. “Study on the Experiment of Cultivating the Peer Interpersonal Skill of the Children in the Kindergarden.” *Canadian Social Science* 12.7 (2016): 41-45.

¹⁶ For discussions on ‘discussion’ in childhood education, see: Anderson Richard, Clark Chinn, Janice Chang, Martha Waggoner, and Hwajin Yi. “On the Logical Integrity of Children’s Arguments.” *Cognition and Instruction* 15.2 (1997): 135-167; Anderson Richard, Kim Nguyen-Jahiel, Brian McNurlen, Anthi Archodidou, So-Young Kim, Alina Reznitskaya, Maria Tillamnns, and Laurie Gilbert. “The Snowball Phenomenon: Spread of Ways of Talking and Ways of Thinking Across Groups of Children.” *Cognition and Instruction* 19.1 (2001): 1-46; Kim, Il-Hee, Richard Anderson, Brian Miller, Jongseong Jeong, and Terri Swim. *Influence of Cultural Norms and Collaborative Discussions on Children’s Reflective Essays*. Champaign, IL: Center for the Study of Reading, 2009; Murphy, P. Karen, Ian Wilkinson, Anna Soter, Maeghan Hennessey, and John Alexander. “Examining the Effects of Classroom Discussion on Students’ Comprehension of Text: A Meta-Analysis.” *Journal of Educational Psychology* 101.3 (2009): 740-764; (Jadallah, May, Richard Anderson, Kim Nguyen-Jahiel, Brian Miller, Il-Hee Kim, Li-Jen Kuo, Ting Dong, and Xiaoying Wu. “Influence of a Teacher’s Scaffolding Moves During Child-Led Small-Group Discussions.” *American Educational Research Journal* 48.1 (2011): 194-230; Rogoff, Barbara, and James V. Wertsch. (Eds.). *Children’s Learning in the “Zone of Proximal Development”*. New Directions for Child Development Volume 23. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1984.

In this thesis, I will be covering a whole range of texts from the broader fields of education, literature, book covers, criticism, diaries, illuminated manuscripts, and picturebooks precisely because, as Jacques Derrida states in *Of Grammatology*:

Following the appearances of the word ‘supplement’ and of the corresponding concept or concepts, we traverse a certain path within Rousseau’s text. To be sure, this particular path will assure us the economy of a synopsis. But are other paths not possible? And as long as the totality of path is not effectively exhausted, how shall we justify this one? [...] We must begin wherever we are and the thought of the trace, which cannot take the scent into account, has already taught us that it was impossible to justify a point of departure absolutely. Wherever we are: in a text where we already believe ourselves to be.

(Derrida, 1967, pp.161-162)

This is then about not doing a ‘classical’ literature review, which might amount to creating or reproducing a hierarchy of key texts in any of the fields I mention, particularly in island studies. For me, doing so would mean that my work falls out of its own significance, and it is actually about the reading of any text; nothing is

excluded as being too easy, simple, or obvious.¹⁷

That is what island studies is. In light of this, I will read across a range of texts as I am interested in reading the repetition of issues primarily, as opposed to conducting or providing some sort of survey of what is ‘relevant’ or ‘inherent’ to the field (I am also, then, aware that in doing so this thesis is producing its own ‘heirarchy’, but it is well aware of the problem, and the challenge); this thesis engages with island studies from a different perspective.

In January 2023, Rowman & Littlefield published *Rethinking Island Methodologies* which, according to the claim on the website: ‘Round[ed] off the “Rethinking the Island” series’.¹⁸ The ‘Introduction’ to the same text, states as part of ‘OUR AGENDA’ that:

¹⁷ For an example of this, see Rose, Jacqueline. *The Case of Peter Pan, or, The Impossibility of Children's Fiction*. London: Macmillan, 1994. First published in 1984. It is called ‘The Case of Peter Pan’ (italics mine) because it is very much a case; it is not about Peter Pan being *the* text or some sort of important argument, but more that Peter Pan is a case, if you will.

¹⁸ The website also states that: ‘Over the last three decades, academic and policy writing on islands has grown rapidly. To date, effort has focused on island ecologies and environments, on island heritage and culture, and on island vulnerabilities and resilience. In much of that work, characteristics such as isolation, insularity, small size, or dependency are presented uncritically and taken for granted. The Rethinking the Island series seeks to unsettle such assumptions by comprehensively investigating the range of topological and topographical characteristics that lie at the heart of the idea of ‘islandness’. The books in this series work from a twin understanding that the island is central to Western conceptions of self, place, and planet, and that their idealization is upheld by strong associations between islands’ materialities and their status as powerful imaginaries’.

This book is a one-stop, go-to volume to prompt some rethinking about island studies and research methodologies. It fosters opportunities to reflect on and engage in comparative analysis of different approaches used across the study of islands and archipelagos. This study we sometimes describe as island and archipelagic studies, or as island studies and archipelagic studies, or as island studies: all three terms now “fail” what it is we think we are dealing with, but we are comfortable with, and excited about, what the polyvalence invites.

(Stratford, et al., 2023, p.5)

The claim by the perspective on '[t]his book' that is is 'a one-stop, go-to volume to prompt some rethinking about island studies and research methodologies' is then also a claim to other 'volume[s]' that may or may not also 'prompt some rethinking about island studies and research methodologies' but there is something about this one which is 'one-stop, go-to volume'; not only that, but it is also 'a', so one of multiple others that do the same thing. So the 'book' is, and is not, also a 'volume', but specifically a 'volume to prompt some rethinking'. The 'rethinking' is that which requires a 'prompt', in this perspective, and it is also 'some rethinking' at that, in which the 'rethinking' is known to be 'some' so then the perspective knows of other 'rethinking[s]' that are not just 'some'. A 'rethinking' that is not, or perhaps more than, just 'some' would have to be done without the prompting of the 'one-stop, go-to volume'. The 'some rethinking' is 'about island studies and research

methodologies’, so while the perspective on the ‘book’ is aware of ‘rethinking’, and that ‘rethinking’ — and then also, by the nature of the claim, *thinking* (in order for it be a claim to *rethink*) ‘about island studies and research methodologies’ — can be done with respect to ‘island studies and research methodologies’, or, rather, ‘about’ them, what the ‘volume prompts’ is only ‘some’ of this. The assurance, by the perspective on ‘[t]his book’, that this is ‘a one-stop, go-to volume’ is then also about something that is not complete or not whole; by way of reading the ‘some’, where the whole or all exists elsewhere; not here.

The perspective goes on to frame this ‘study’ as something which ‘we sometimes describe as island and archipelagic studies, or as island studies and archipelagic studies, or as island studies’. So there is a shift now to a perspective on the ‘we’ who, in reference to this ‘study’, ‘sometimes describe[s it] as’. There are a couple of things going on here, firstly, this is about a ‘this study’ which is known to a perspective outside of the claim to the ‘we’ in the sense that the ‘we’ will ‘describe [this study] as’ but the perspective on the ‘we’ does not describe ‘this study’ as anything but knows of it in reference to how the ‘we sometimes describe’ it; and secondly, this is all known by the perspective on the ‘we’ that this is something that they ‘sometimes’, so not always, ‘describe[d it] as’. In the perspective on the ‘we’ making a claim to ‘describe as’ I can make a reading of a claim, by the perspective not the ‘we’, to authority in that sense that the ‘we’ only ‘describes [it] as’; so this is an authority in terms of how it functions as a kind of authority which, in perspective, shifts. I am

reading the ‘we’ in relation to the text that is about the text framing itself as drawing on another authority (‘we’);¹⁹ in considering the notion of the claim to authority and how or why what I am reading as the footnotes being either the claim to an authority or in some way contributing to this, there is a tension between what the text is and what it is making reference to in order to substantiate or validate itself, of course, in perspective.²⁰

So what I read ‘this study’ to be in reference to is what the ‘we sometimes describe as island and archipelagic studies, or as island studies and archipelagic studies, or as island studies’ and, again, because the perspective on the ‘we’ is ‘describ[ing] as’ this is also *not* what the ‘this study’ is. I can read the ‘or’ in different ways here. What ‘this study’ is ‘describe[d]’ to be, according to the perspective on the ‘we’ is: ‘as island and archipelagic studies, *or* as island studies and archipelagic studies, *or* as island studies’;²¹ the claim sets up ‘island and archipelagic studies’, ‘island studies and archipelagic studies’, and ‘island studies’ as claimed others or alternates to one another that ‘this

¹⁹ Much in the same way that Daniela Caselli does in *Beckett’s Dantes: Intertextuality in the Fiction and Criticism* (2005) where the the argument is that intertextuality is never about finding the source or origin but instead how that claim is made to a prior as an authority.

²⁰ For more, see my chapter on ‘Islands’, where I read similar ideas about how I read claims to authority, in perspective, with relation to *Islanded Identities: Constructions of Postcolonial Cultural Insularity* (2011); and my chapter on ‘Endeavours’, where I read the issues of naming and the changing of names as important issues that are closely linked with questions of identity with relation to *The Adventures of Tupaia* (Meredith & Tait, 2019) and *Winnie-the-Pooh* (Milne, 1926).

²¹ Italics mine.

study' can be at any one time — either 'as island and archipelagic studies, *or* as island studies and archipelagic studies, *or* as island studies', but never all three of them at the same time. They are established as potential alternatives to one another as well as being different but also similar because they are together as what the perspective on the 'we' claims that they 'sometimes describe' '[t]his study [...] as'.

The same perspective on the we claims 'all three terms' as 'terms' and as 'all three' as well; in which there are no others and they are distinct from one another in so far as my reading of the 'or' also differentiates them, yet also groups them together.

However the claim is that these 'three terms now "fail" what it is we think we are dealing with, but we are comfortable with, and excited about, what the polyvalence invites'. The perspective on the 'we' is now concerned with what 'we think we are dealing with' as well as what 'we are comfortable with, and excited about' with respect to 'terms now "fail"'. This is interesting in the sense that, until 'now' I can read that the 'all three terms' did not "fail" and the 'now' is all about 'what it is we think we are dealing with'. This is important as well because there is an awareness of the 'we', in perspective, that the failing of the 'terms' is about a 'think' as opposed to a not-thinking about what 'we are dealing with'.²² Where what before did not — 'island and archipelagic studies', 'island studies and archipelagic studies', and 'island studies' — these 'terms now "fail"' with respect to what it is thought the 'we are

²² I am wondering what it might mean to de-think about what the perspective claims as a being a2 'rethink', by way of reading a 'we think'.

dealing with'. I am also reading that failure has something to do with discomfort and excitement here, by way of reading the 'but we are comfortable with, and excited about, what the polyvalence invites'; where prior to the 'now "fail"', 'what the polyvalence invites' will not have been that which the 'we are comfortable with, and excited about' because it is all 'but'. So if comfort and excitement are *not* part of what failure is about, then there is something about 'what the polyvalence invites' that is about non-failure.

[T]he authors model what it means to think about and rethink island and archipelagic methodologies and point to emergent innovations in the field.

(Stratford, et al., 2023)²³

There is a shift in perspective with the claim here, that is on the back cover of *Rethinking Island Methodologies*, in that the 'terms' that 'now "fail"' with respect to 'what it is we think we are dealing with' ('island and archipelagic *studies*', 'island *studies* and archipelagic *studies*', and 'island *studies*')²⁴ are not what the 'authors' in this text are 'think[ing] about'. Here, it is in relation to 'what it means to think about and rethink island and archipelagic *methodologies*'.²⁵ I can then, perhaps, read that by way

²³ No page number; this claim is on the back cover.

²⁴ Italics mine.

²⁵ Italics mine.

of the perspective on the ‘we’, that ‘studies’ are that which is about the ‘now “fail”’ and that ‘what the polyvalence invites’, is what ‘we are comfortable with, and excited about’, which is the ‘methodologies’.

In reading this, it is also important to acknowledge that where one perspective is on the ‘we’, another is on the ‘authors’; where it is the ‘we’ who ‘think’, it is the ‘authors’ who ‘model what it means to think’. The idea that the perspective knows ‘what it means to think’ and that this is modelled by ‘the authors’ is interesting to me because the modelling is not of thinking but of ‘what it means to think’; the *meaning* is that which ‘the authors model’; in this way thinking has meaning. This is also about what ‘it means to think about and rethink’, where meaning is in relation to ‘think about’ as well as to ‘rethink’ which are different.

As well as ‘model’, ‘the authors [...] point to emergent innovations in the field’, so the perspective on ‘the authors’ knows also of ‘emergent innovations in the field’ that exist outside of the perspective and outside of ‘the authors’ since they can ‘point to’ them. The claim here is then that ‘the authors’ are facilitating, in a way, by modelling ‘what it means to think about and rethink island and archipelagic methodologies and point to emergent innovations in the field’; they do not actually do any of these things.

Rather than model or point to things that already exist in excess of my own ideas and thinking, throughout the narrative of this thesis I hope to provide something that might be considered ‘emergent’ or ‘innovative’ in its relative ‘fields’.

* * *

It is one of Jacques Derrida’s opening questions from his ‘First Seminar’, published in *The Beast and the Sovereign*, that gives its title to my thesis and helps motivate many of my readings that form my own (de)thinking of islands: ‘What is an island? [Qu’est une île?]’ (2010, p.3). I will do a reading of a longer section of this seminar in my final chapter, but at this stage I want to think about the argument that Derrida’s seminar puts forward and how my thesis might engage with similar ideas. In the seminar, deconstruction is demonstrated as a method or approach for challenging the metaphysical claims of modern philosophy.²⁶

²⁶ I do a reading of this same problem in my later chapter on ‘Islands’, where I read the perspective on Bill Ashcroft’s perspective on ‘The Western gaze’. Here, I problematise the use of perspective, and state that I am coming at this from a different angle.

Between my world, the ‘my world,’ what I call ‘my world’ — and there is no other for me, as any other world is part of it — between my world and any other world there is first the space and the time of an infinite difference, an interruption that is incommensurable with all attempts to make a passage, a bridge, an isthmus, all attempts at communication, translation, trope, and transfer that the desire for a world or the want of a world, the being wanting a world will try to pose, impose, propose, stabilize. There is no world, there are only islands.

(Derrida, 2010, p.9)

In an article on Anthropocene islands, David Chandler and Jonathan Pugh propose that ‘faith in modern reasoning has collapsed’ and that ‘[f]or Derrida, islands were key framing devices and the most obvious spaces of disruptive relations which work against modernity’s requirement of coherence and its metaphysical grounding propositions’ (2021, p.396). Disturbing the long- and widely-held notion of the island as a ‘liminal and transgressive space’, they go on to claim that:

islands, under modern frameworks of reasoning, were reductively understood as isolated, backward, dependent, vulnerable, and in need of saving by others, [...] islands have shifted from the margins in a number of international debates, becoming key sites for understanding relational entanglements, enabling alternative forms of thought and practice in the Anthropocene.

(Chandler & Pugh, 2021, p.395)

I am in agreement with much of this: so much discourse around ‘the island’ is precisely as stated above: ‘isolated, backward, dependent, vulnerable, and in need of saving by others’; but as for them having ‘shifted from the margins’ or ‘enabling alternative forms of thought and practice’? This is what I am eager to find out for myself. So in the same way that I hope to consider the island in ways that might be considered ‘emergent’ or ‘innovative’, so too do I endeavour to engage with Derrida’s challenge and provide some alternative forms of thought and practice myself.

* * *

In my next chapter, I will read Jacqueline Rose’s *States of Fantasy* (1994) which, in the context of ongoing histories, demonstrates the importance of psychoanalysis to an understanding of public and private identities in the sense of belonging.

States: (Not) In the land of Israel

In *States of Fantasy* (1994), Jacqueline Rose discusses the importance of psychoanalysis in the understanding of identity and the sense of belonging — key ideas in this thesis — with specific respect to the historical significance of travel to Israel:

There is something bizarre about travelling to a country where you do not belong, in the sense of having no lived connection, not for me, not in my family's past, a country to which I was not therefore returning, but where to say that much is already, in the eyes of the country itself, grounds for reproach.

(Rose, 1994, p.2)

Straightaway I can ask: 'bizarre' to whom? And what is it that constitutes 'bizarre[ness]' in this perspective? Could it be something to do with a relative non-'bizarre', that comes with 'travelling to a country where you' (who is this 'you?') 'do [...] belong'?

It is also a 'something bizarre about', where this 'something' is perhaps an unknown or unspecific entity or thing in relation to the 'bizarre', so constructed in the perspective. This would then suggest that this non-exact 'bizarre[ness]' is undermined or compromised because it is only 'bizarre' to some extent — never or

not quite a full or complete construction of 'bizarre'. This is all an 'about', which I read as being in relation to a 'something', whereby that thing that is or has 'something bizarre about' it, can never then be the thing that is 'something bizarre'.

I read this then to be about the 'travelling to a country where you do not belong', in which 'a country' can be travelled 'to', and 'where', in which, 'you' does not 'belong'. The 'bizarre[ness]', then, is to do with the 'travelling', where there can then be other 'travel[lings]' that there is not 'something bizarre about', or perhaps the 'bizarre[ness]' exists 'about' the 'travelling' rather than as any part of it; in relation to it in some way.

This 'you' — a claim of a known other by the perspective — is what 'do[es] not belong', in relation to 'a country'. So other 'you's can 'belong' to 'a country' where they 'do [...] belong', but not this 'you'? In any case, the 'belong[ing]' 'you' might then be said to be in is a state of displacement in relation to its 'belong[ing]',²⁷ as the 'travelling to' could then be read as a coming from? In other words, to enter into a place to which this perspective's 'you' 'belong[s]', it must have come from another place of non-'belong[ing]' prior to this. If this 'belong[ing]' is also about having a 'lived connection' — perhaps, simply living in 'a country' — then to travel to this place, one must have been displaced from 'a country' of 'belong[ing]' before being

²⁷ This is Jacqueline Rose's argument throughout the text; that any kind of 'state', constructed by any perspective, is a fantasy.

able to re-place oneself in this same place of 'belong[ing]'. But, again, this is also a 'you', constructed as an other in this perspective, that must then also know of the above formulation regarding the prior 'belong[ing]', and non-'belong[ing]', of this ambiguous 'you'.

If I follow through with the notion of displacement and replacement where the perspective, again, knows of what and where this 'you' should and (by definition) should not be, in relation to 'a country'; I think that this idea of 'belong[ing]' is about a 'return' as well. I am reading the 'lived connection' to be a 'connection' (whatever that may be) to a country by way of 'lived'; this then suggests that by living in 'a country', the 'you' has a connection to that 'country' and could therefore 'belong' to this 'country', in this perspective. But then what constitutes a 'lived' or a living?

This is all, as well, 'in the sense of', because apparently 'having no lived connection' can be 'in the sense of' or not 'in the sense of'. So there can be 'having no lived connection' which is not 'in the sense of', so there is something in excess of 'the sense of having no lived connection' which is something other or more than 'in the sense of'.

But then what is it that the perspective shifts from, in making a claim on behalf of the 'where you do not belong' to the 'not for me'; 'in the sense of having no lived connection, not for me, not in my family's past'? So, why 'you'? Or, how 'you',

when it is not ‘for me’? So there is a split already instituted here *in* the perspective itself and *by* the perspective itself, by way of the claim that ‘there is something bizarre about travelling to a country where you do not belong in the sense of having no lived connection’; where not ‘belong[ing]’ is about ‘sense[s]’. It is ‘in’ and it is ‘the sense’ (not *a* ‘sense’), so not ‘belong[ing]’ has, again, multiple ‘sense[s]’ of which ‘having no lived connection’ is one. And so ‘lived connection’ is other to not ‘belong[ing]’, because it is ‘in the sense of’, but at the same time apparently that is also about a relationship, because it is ‘*in* the sense’ of this.²⁸

With regard to the ‘something bizarre’, I read this to be that in terms of the claim that for the ‘me’ and for the ‘I’, which here also claims a ‘you’, there is a ‘bizarre[ness]’ (so constructed against a non-‘bizarre’) that is a ‘something’, so it is also other to ‘bizarre[ness]’; it can not be ‘bizarre’, or at least not a whole or complete ‘bizarre[ness]’. I am reading fragmentation here, a breaking down in the perspective that I am tentative about because is it, in fact, a splitting of ‘bizarre[ness]’? Is that what the perspective is claiming?

In any case, I think ‘bizarre’, in its ‘something’-ness, can be read as multiple in itself, or as lesser or more in itself, and here there is ‘something bizarre’, but then it is also a ‘something bizarre about’, so it is not anyway ‘bizarre[ness]’ as such, because the ‘about’ is a claim that I am reading as something to do with proximity or closeness to

²⁸ Italics mine.

the 'bizarre'. This 'about' is to do with 'travelling to a country where you do not belong', 'a country'²⁹ that is troubled by the claim here about the 'where' and the 'to'. So, is it from 'a country' to 'a country'? Or is travelling about 'to a country where you do not belong'? In any case it is 'travelling to', and a 'travelling' in which the action of travel has yet to be completed, it is ongoing, in the perspective. But at the same time it is an aboutness anyway (in that there is 'something bizarre about') so it is about that ongoing travel which does not finish, and it is 'a country' that is amongst others, but only when it is 'where you do not belong', so it is also a 'where', and so is this about a location?

As I understand it, the whole argument of this text is about the location of location; so again, in these struggles with reading location, this is perhaps the question: Why would location ever be a location?

I think that the following example from Daphne du Maurier's 1938 gothic novel, *Rebecca*, perfectly elucidate the problem of physicality I am having here reading location in Rose:

²⁹ This is not a lack of specificity here in that there is no 'country' that is being explicitly claimed in the perspective; a 'the' country as opposed to the 'a country' that the perspective is claiming here, or even what 'a country' is, because I can not read a lack or that there should be more detail, because that would be setting up a normative construction from which I could then read some kind of inadequacy.

I can see her as though it were but yesterday, on that unforgettable
afternoon — never mind how many years ago.

(du Maurier, 1938, p.13)³⁰

In this example, one might read that the claim here, ‘I can see her as though it were but yesterday’, is not a claim to a physical ‘see[ing]’. But what is the claim to the (lack of) physicality here? Is the ‘see[ing]’ taking place here, because it is a retrospective ‘see[ing]’; ‘as though it were but yesterday’? Again, though, what is a physical ‘see[ing]’? Is it looking through your eyes? Are you physically ‘see[ing]’ when you look through your eyes? Surely, one must always have a perspective on one’s own sight to make a claim about it, which then problematises the whole notion of physicality. The issue of physicality might be that there are a great many different constructions of ‘the body’, different ways of thinking about ‘the body’, but always there has to be a reinstating of a body to make that claim. The point here, for me, is that the body is always in perspective, so the claim is always in perspective, and therefore physicality can never be literal; the literal can not be literal. This is about a reading of physicality, which I am thinking of as a parallel to how I am reading location here in *States of Fantasy*.

³⁰ The reference to this text might seem obscure, but I find it helpful in constructions of identity, which I could fairly do with other examples of ‘gothic’ texts as this is a widely accepted trope of the genre.

Just in the same way, the claim of ‘never mind how many years ago’ can never be an instruction (an instruction to whom?), because you have to read the claim before you can then have a perspective of it as an instruction. The inherent paradox here is that instruction can never be instruction, just as physicality can never be physicality, and location can never be location. To see something as a location — or as instruction, or as physicality — you must retrospectively, then, read something that has already been read, that is other to location, as that location.

In this way, perspective always disrupts categorisation in anything other than its own terms, and, in a sense, I think this is why I am reading the ‘about travelling to’, which is where ‘a country’ is not the final location; the claim being here, in this perspective, that this is ‘where you do not belong’, and there is ‘something bizarre about’ this ‘travelling to a country’, and in particular the ‘travelling’, the thing which is not actually completed, that is causing the issues in my reading.

The ‘lived connection’ is also a ‘having’, in the sense of ‘having no lived connection’, where ‘lived connection[s]’ can or can not be had. And ‘connection’ itself is a query here, I think, because it is a ‘connection’; so there is a ‘lived connection’ and a non-‘lived connection’, but is it still a connection, where it is already apart? Perhaps this is where I am reading the idea of a belonging which is always, in a sense, a displacement from itself, because a ‘connection’ is also about a separation. So in the ‘having no lived connection’, the issue around ‘connection’ itself already sets up a ‘belong[ing]’ which is in some sense not a ‘belong[ing]’, but has to be had through

living, or through having ‘lived’; living or ‘lived’ constitutes a kind of ‘connection’, but at the same time ‘connection’ itself is about separation, about something that has to be established.

This kind of reading is coming back around now in a number of ways: there is a ‘travelling to’, but there is also a living connection, or a connection that has to be ‘lived’, which in turn is therefore the right kind of connection — but only ‘in the sense’. So even that is only a sense of that same construction of belonging, where ‘you do not belong’, but that belonging is in turn about a separation which has to be bridged or overcome, so it has to be supplemented through the living which constitutes that connection, but only in the sense of a not-belonging, because it’s an absence; ‘not belonging’ and ‘no lived connection’.

Also, here, in the ‘something bizarre about travelling’, there is something about lacks: a lack of belonging, a lack of ‘lived connection’ ‘in the sense of’; this is, for me, what the ‘something bizarre’ is about. In that sense, ‘belong[ing]’ is ‘connection’, because ‘belong[ing]’ is also about multiples. If you ‘belong’, it is like something to which you have to somehow be affiliated, reduplicated, and repeated, as well as being about property; for something to ‘belong’ to someone is also for someone to own it. It seems to me that there is something here about how, like ‘connection’, which is about a separation that is overcome or negotiated in some way, ‘belong[ing]’ is also about something which somehow has to be about a lack or a gap. But then can it be a lack of ‘belong[ing]’ if there is no ‘belong[ing]’? I think this

still has to be a lack because even in the formulation of the ‘where you do not belong’ that instates the ‘you’, which is about also a generality, there is something paradoxical about a generality which is about a ‘belong[ing]’, that that generality does not belong to another ‘belong[ing]’.

So why is the claim here about a generality of ‘belong[ing]’, which inherently is about a ‘belong[ing]’ which does not ‘belong’? It is like a lack of a lack, here; ‘where you do not belong’, not where we or I do not ‘belong’.

Here I am thinking about what ‘belong[ing]’ could mean; to belong to always implies an other, to whom you must belong or to whom you ‘belong’, in this claim: ‘you do not belong’. But perhaps the issue I am reading, in my own reading, is why there should be a ‘belong[ing]’; why can something simply not belong to anything? Then what would it mean to ‘belong’ to nothing? Even that would be a relationship between nothing and ‘belong[ing]’; ‘belong[ing]’, then, has to be to something else, including not-something else. If I ‘belong’ to nothing, I cannot make the statement, *I belong to nothing* because, in my own claim, *I belong*. I have to ‘belong’ in relation to something else, even if that relationship is to nothing, or nobody; it is still a belonging, rather than a deleted ‘belong[ing]’, and so must always relate to a larger group or an other. In this way, ‘belong[ing]’ is always constituted by its absence, by a rejection. This is not to say that everything must ‘belong’, or that all things ‘belong’ to something else, and that something else also ‘belong[s]’, in some sense, to another thing that also ‘belong[s]’, but rather that in the claim to ‘belong[ing]’ there

must be a relationship inherently instated.³¹ There is always a contradiction there in these ideas which are all about groups and groupings, but groupings which insist on their kind of mutuality when they can not in terms of perspective; it is always a claim on behalf of: *I belong to*, or *I belong with*.

That is why the ‘you’ in this perspective is so enigmatic in my readings; the perspective can see the ‘you’ not ‘belong[ing]’.

In the ‘travelling’ it is not actually in the ‘a country’ apart from the ‘there is something bizarre about travelling to’; and also ‘you’ already ‘do not belong’, even before ‘you’ are there, in that sense. If this is a state of being in between a pre- and a post-travel, then where does the ‘belong[ing]’ lie? I do not think that it does, because it is ‘in the sense of having no lived connection’, so there has not been that ‘lived connection’, whatever that is, because, like ‘travelling’, it is a ‘having’ of a ‘no’; it is still being had.

³¹ For more on the idea of belonging and community, see: Foucault, Michel. *History of Madness*. Translated by Jonathan Murphy. Edited by Jean Khalifa. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006. First published in French as *Folie et Dérision: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* in 1961. Foucault’s critique of community states something similar: that community is completely exclusionary. It seems to me that the insistence on community nowadays in political discourse is exactly what Foucault argues, which is that the insistence on community is about the lack of community. Not that this is about a loss in the kind of sense that there used to be a community and now there is not, but his argument is that inherently the insistence on community is about the inability to have community; if you have to keep insisting on it, then it lacks autonomy. It is like saying: *you belong to me* — you can insist all you like but you can not make it so.

So, along these lines, if ‘lived’ can be read as something that has taken place where, say, something has had ‘a lived connection’, then is this a ‘having’ of something that is completed or finished? This is a ‘connection’ that is living, it has to be produced in the having been ‘lived’, as well as ‘had’; completed and possessed.

Maybe this is where the ‘return’ comes back into my readings?

What I think is at stake in this argument, is: what does it mean to make these claims of ‘belong[ing]’ on behalf of one’s self or on behalf of an other; what does it mean to say that ‘a country’ is already and always a separation from the ‘you’, and at the same time is about something that could be ‘belong[ed]’ to or not be ‘belong[ed]’ to, or could be related to senses of ‘lived connection[s]’; what is that?

These are all, as Rose formulates herself, fantasies. What kind of things produce the notion of a plurality which nevertheless has some sort of supplementary unitariness; what does that even mean?

* * *

In the claim to ‘the country itself’ — where I can read a difference from the claim to ‘a country’ — there is a ‘country’ already divided against itself in order to have a ‘the country itself’, which has an excess that is not itself, but is still ‘the country’. And in this perspective there are ‘the eyes of the country itself, as well as the eyes which are not of ‘the country itself’, or not of ‘the country’. But I keep on coming back to this

‘you’; I want to ask: why the ‘you’? Why not a country where *I* do not belong? Is this something to do with the ‘not for me, not in my family’s past’? The ‘me’ is in opposition, it seems, to the ‘you’ that it claims, even as it also makes the claim that it, too, is in the ‘there is something bizarre about travelling to a country where you do not belong, in the sense of having no lived connection’; nevertheless, the ‘me’ claims that there are more for whom this is the case; that this is a kind of communal experience.

What does ‘not in my family’s past’ mean in relation to the ‘you’ who also finds ‘something bizarre’ according to the ‘me’? Is this something to do with what ‘belong[ing]’ is constituted as being; for ‘me’, and for ‘you’, as well as also not for ‘me’ and not for ‘you’?³²

In this perspective, because it is making a claim about ‘travelling to a country’, the ‘you’ can not be in this ‘a country’. The ‘country’ here is something external, as well as the ‘not belong[ing]’, so it is already something which ‘you’ do not have or ‘do not belong’ to because it is a ‘travelling to’. And if this is also a ‘having no lived connection’, even if there were to be a ‘lived connection’ that is had in this

³² For more on this idea of that which is ‘for’ as well as gifting and returning, see: Mauss, Marcel. *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. Translated by W.D. Halls. London: Routledge, 2002. First published in French as *Essai sur le don* in 1950. Much like my readings here, gift giving for the Māori is all to do with a return; you give something to someone else, but they can not keep it, they must give it again to a third person. This is because if you give something, you are giving something of yourself and something else can not own you and that spirit.

perspective, it is still external because it has to be ‘connect[ed]’ in some way. It is not that the perspective does not know what the ‘connection’ is, as such, but that there is something there and that there is some distance and some kind of tension.

The ‘you’ may actually have a ‘belong[ing]’ to this ‘country’ that it is ‘travelling to’, just not ‘in the sense of having no lived connection’; in other words, there is more than one way to have a ‘belong[ing]’, or at least, other ‘sense[s]’. So you can ‘belong’ in different ways — perhaps this is the ‘bizarre[ness]’: that you both can and can not ‘belong?’

I am reading here a relationship between the ‘bizarre[ness]’ and this idea of the uncanny;³³ that there can be a ‘belong[ing]’ that is not ‘in the sense of having no lived connection’, and this is the ‘bizarre[ness]’. But the ‘bizarre’ thing is about the ‘not belong[ing]’, not about a different kind of ‘belong[ing]’; does this mean that a different kind of ‘belong[ing]’ that is not ‘in the sense of having no lived connection’ would not, then, be ‘bizarre’? I am reading something about the foreign here, in the ‘bizarre[ness]’ — in the sense that there is something where it should not be, in the

³³ I use the term ‘uncanny’, in the sense of supplement and disruption; that something is weird and familiar at the same time, that there is a likeness which should not be there. For more on the uncanny, see: Freud, Sigmund. *The Uncanny*. Translated by David McLintock. London: Penguin, 2003. First published in German as *Das Unheimliche* in 1919; Royle, Nicholas. *The Uncanny*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003; and, in a postcolonial context, Lawson, Alan. “The Anxious Proximities of Settler (Post)colonial Relations.” *Literary Theory, An Anthology*. Edited by Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. 1210–1223.

sense that it is ‘not belong[ing]’ and with the lack of ‘lived connection’. The lack of all of these things, in the perspective, suggests to me that this is about the foreign, the alien. Not necessarily the foreigner, but something where it should not be; the loss of a separation, in some ways.

This notion can be read again in that this ‘not belong[ing]’ that I am reading in the perspective is also ‘not for me, not in my family’s past, a country to which I was not therefore returning’; this is about an again-ness, a return, where the notion here is not about the foreign or the alien, because the idea of a return is precisely about a familiarity that negotiates its own absence.

In this sense, when the ‘me’ and the ‘my’ comes into the claim — ‘not for me, not in my family’s past’ — for me this is reading as though ‘a country’ can be returned to them in a ‘belong[ed]’ way, a ‘belong[ing]’ way, or a way in which they can ‘belong’ to it; the ‘country’ can be returned to by the ‘me’ and the ‘my’. But is the notion of ‘returning’ quite right here, because it was never there in the first place? And even if this is a ‘returning’, it is still different to actually or really being there.³⁴

³⁴ Again, this is very much like Marcel Mauss’ claim about ‘the hau’; a spirit coming back round, being returned in a new or different way/state. For more on this idea of the return, see: Mauss, Marcel. *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. Translated by W. D. Halls. London: Routledge, 2002. First published in French as *Essai sur le don* in 1950.

It is interesting that the perspective changes from ‘where you do not belong’ to ‘not for me, not in my family’s past’, where also the ‘not’ is seen to be ‘for me’ in one instance, and then ‘in my family’s past’; ‘for’ and ‘in’. The difference as well here is about ‘you’ and your ‘belong[ing]’, and then ‘me’ and ‘my family’s past’ — the perspective shifts on what the ‘bizarre[ness]’ is and to whom it is ‘bizarre’.

‘Where you’, ‘for me’, ‘in my family’s past’ — these are all claims that locate the ‘I’; is there something to do with the idea of place here? Different placings; ‘where’, ‘for’, and ‘in’? Is it the belonging, then, that is not ‘in’ my family’s past, nor ‘for me’, and is rather ‘where you’ are? It is about a place, but at the same time it is a not-place, a relation, because there is an aboutness that is around or negotiating location rather than actually dealing with location.

So then, if this is all ‘not for me’ and ‘not in my family’s past’, could this ‘something bizarre’ be something to do with the ‘you’ and the ‘you’ not belonging to ‘a country’ is all to do with a ‘for me’? This is all to do with how the ‘you’ is ‘not for me’, how the other is ‘not for me’. Does this, again, have something to do with the notion of the foreigner, and the foreign?

If ‘there is something bizarre about travelling to a country where you do not belong in the sense of having no lived connection, not for me’, I am wondering about the ‘for’ here, and whether ‘something bizarre’, which I read to be about ‘travelling to a country where you do not belong’ is all ‘for me’? Or ‘not for me’? The idea here,

then, is that the 'I', in perspective, knows it is 'not for me', so much like the notion of foreignness that I was reading earlier, there is this separation that the I can read about the 'something bizarre' — almost like a rejection, that it is 'not for me' and it knows that it is 'not for me', but might it yet still be 'for' something or someone else? This knowing of it not being for me is then the knowledge of what is foreign, what does or does not 'belong', and that in it not being 'for me' there is the idea of its presence being like some kind of contamination or transgression or repulsion; something inherently *wrong*.

Is this a rejection as well of the 'not belong[ing]', perhaps? If it is 'not in my family's past', then could it then be out of 'my family's past', where I am reading the 'past' here as constructed against the perspective's present? So, could the 'not belong[ing]' exist, for instance, 'not in my family's past' but instead in the same 'family's' present, or future? Is this a rejection of what is 'in my family' by the I, and by the 'me', in it not being 'for me'?

This is not then something that the 'me' has, but is instead something that could be 'for' the 'me'. Where I am reading place or location in locating the 'I' (*where* you' and *in my*'),³⁵ 'for' is not quite doing the same thing. It is almost like a vicariousness, even though it is a 'not'; if someone else is having a 'lived connection' (there is a 'no

³⁵ Italics mine.

lived connection' that is 'not for me'), then is this a double negative, in which the 'I' does have a sense of 'lived connection'?

Part of me wants to read through the commas here: 'There is something bizarre about travelling to a country where you do not belong, in the sense of having no lived connection [...] a country to which I was not therefore returning', where the 'not for me, not in my family's past' is taken out and dislocated in doing so. Or, what if the 'where you do not belong, in the sense of having no lived connection' is a not belonging 'for me', and a 'not belong[ing]' that is 'in my family's past'. The 'bizarre[ness]' that is 'travelling to a country where you do not belong', that is in the sense, is the same 'belong[ing]' that is also 'not for me', and is also 'not in my family's past'. The you and the me are sharing the 'not belong[ing]' but they also are not because it is a 'you' and a 'me'. So can the 'not belong[ing]' be repeated, can it be reiterated? The 'not belong[ing]' is the same and different in this way.

I find 'not in my family's past' easier to read, or at least, the 'in' is easier to read as location, than the 'for' with which I am struggling. The same rejection that I am reading in the claim to a 'belong[ing]' (as constituted by its absence or its rejection), is also not in 'my family's past', it's out of it in some way, which amplifies its rejection.

‘[M]y family’ is also constituted by what is not of the ‘my’, like the ‘you’ — the ‘my’ is not part of the ‘family’ but the ‘family’ is ‘m[ine]’ — owned by the ‘my’ in some way? And since ‘belong[ing]’ is all about the idea of ownership, I think what is going on with all of this then, is the idea that if ‘I’ were to ‘belong’ to ‘a country’ (either in the sense of having a ‘lived connection’ or not), then the ‘I’ is also making some kind of claim to ownership in relation to that same ‘country’, and it would not be ‘bizarre’.

On the ‘travelling to a country where you do not belong [...] a country to which I was not therefore returning’; is this the same ‘a country’? I am not so sure it is, because there is an idea of ‘reproach’ going on here as well, possibly. What is ‘grounds for reproach’ here? Is it ‘much’, or ‘much [...] already’? What is (‘where’) in ‘a’ or ‘the country’? It is not even a ‘country’, as such, because it is ‘the country *itself*’.³⁶ In this way, it is ‘the eyes of the country itself’ which are saying, all in the perspective on the ‘I’ (the claim to ‘eyes’ by the ‘I’, which the perspective is on).

It is also only ‘grounds for reproach’ rather than ‘reproach’ itself, and in the same way as I was reading the ‘for’ earlier, the ‘grounds’ are ‘for reproach’ just as the ‘not’ was ‘for me’. This is the same issue in reading the ‘for’, this in-between space that you can not say is an in-between, for that would be to fix it. Is that what the ‘for’ is

³⁶ Italics mine.

here? A between? Certainly there can be a between in the ‘travelling to’, I think, and perhaps the ‘not therefore returning’?³⁷

If the ‘grounds’ are ‘for’ the ‘reproach’, is there an idea that this ‘reproach’ could help or aid in the grounding, in some way? That it could aid the ‘me’ in its notness? This is almost like a designation,³⁸ where the ‘not’ and the ‘grounds’ are nominated ‘for’ the ‘me’ and the ‘reproach’; the ‘for’ is sort of chosen as the beginning of the ‘grounds for reproach’, which would be to do with some sort of separation. In this way, the reproaching needs or relies on the grounding of the ‘much’ that is already said, which is located, in my reading, because there is a ‘where’ in which I can read the ‘much [that] is already’ said to be ‘the country to which I was not therefore returning’.

There is also a shift between ‘a’ and ‘the’ country: ‘a country to which I was not therefore returning’ and ‘the eyes of the country’, which is where the ‘say[ing]’ of the ‘much’ is ‘in’. So ‘say[ing]’ is located the ‘eyes’ of ‘the country’ itself, and it is not in ‘the country’.

I am wondering now whether this shift I am reading between the ‘a’ and the ‘the’ means that there can not be a kind of indefiniteness when there is an idea of

³⁷ For more on the notion of a ‘between’, see: Bennington, Geoffrey. “Inter.” *Post-Theory: New Directions in Criticism*. Edited by Martin McQuillan, Graeme Macdonald, Stephen Thomson, and Robin Purves. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1999. 103-122.

³⁸ In the same way as I was thinking about Mauss’s gift-giving earlier in this chapter.

ownership going on.³⁹ So when there is ownership it has to be definite, much like the claims here, and in relation to my reading of this ‘country’. If it is ‘a country to which I was not therefore returning’ and the ‘I’ can ‘return’ or not ‘return’ to, say, any ‘country’, then the ‘the’ is something to with sameness and some kind of ‘reproach’ in making the claim to ‘the’ here. While there is ‘the country’ and this idea of ‘reproach’, there is also the reading of ‘a country’ and the idea of a return, or a ‘not returning’.

I think that ‘a country’ is ‘the country to which I was not therefore returning’, the same ‘country’; but why are they the same, when I am reading a difference and a shift from ‘a’ to ‘the’? Has it got something to do with the ‘I’? There is a claim ‘in the eyes of the country itself’, so even though the perspective on the ‘I’ is claiming that it is ‘in the eyes of the country itself’, I think that maybe there is this idea of a separation, or a separateness (where there inherently was a togetherness beforehand), so the ‘the’ would be the distance; this is something distinct from the ‘I’. Perhaps this is the idea of the ‘already[ness]’; whether or not the ‘I’ ‘return[s]’ to ‘a country’, it has got no bearing on the ‘grounds for reproach’ because this is already happening because of the ‘but’; but is this right? ‘But’ is like a contradiction, so there is something about the ‘not therefore returning’ that is to do with a contradiction with

³⁹ For more, see my chapter on ‘Games’ where I read claims to ‘a’ and ‘the’ and ‘ownership’ in relation to the ‘Introduction’ to *Winnie-the-Pooh* (Milne 1926).

what 'is' and what is 'is already [...] grounds for reproach'. I think the 'is already' then comes back to the 'was' ('I was not'), and so the returning or not returning is part of the 'much' (or 'that much'), and then that the 'not returning' is the 'grounds for reproach'. Although it is a 'not returning' and more, because if it is a 'much', then there are these other things which are not claimed but are within the muchness, which is in turn within the 'eyes', which are the 'grounds'.

So if it is 'grounds', and there is more than one ground, it knows that there is a difference within these grounds, which would be the 'that much'. So if that 'much is already, in the eyes of the country itself, grounds for reproach' then the 'much' is also to do with a difference if it is constituting the difference of the 'grounds'.

I get the feeling that this sentence does make sense (to me) if I take out the 'in the sense of having no lived connection, not for me, not in my family's past', to read:

There is something bizarre about travelling to a country where you do not belong [...] a country to which I was not therefore returning, but where to say that much is already, in the eyes of the country itself, grounds for reproach.

(Rose, 1994, p.2)

This reading, in some way, better helps me to read the countries 'where you do not belong' and 'to which I was not therefore returning' as being the same 'a country'.

This would then be to read a kind of subordination going on here, and this, for me, is what is troubling the sentence, and the claims that are being made.

Could this then be flipped around, to argue that the 'me' is the apologist, in some way? The 'me' has to anyway, as it is what is constituting foreignness for the perspective in my readings, not just because of the perspective but also on another level that this is the difference, the foreign body, that I keep coming back to in my reading.

There is then the issue of memory; the 'lived connection'. But what is that? There is a non-'lived connection' and there is a 'lived connection', so 'lived' has to be in excess of 'connection' somehow. So how is this memory, exactly? How is this the past if it is 'lived'? This is all retrospective anyway. It is 'not in my family's past'; there is 'no lived connection'; 'not for [the] me'.

I want to think about the 'no[t]'; when the 'I' is making these claims there is the idea of a repulsion or rejection of these things and in this way they are a present absence. The 'me' is apart from that which the 'lived connection' is 'for' (between-ness is about a constituted difference); if something is 'for' something else it is like the idea of being *about* something. The problem with all of these things is that it cannot be the restatement, it must be in the reading of it.

Both 'for' and 'about' make a claim to difference and yet there is a claim that somehow the 'me' can have the 'for' but not, since this is 'not for me', and does 'not belong'; these are all the things that are there for an other; the 'me' is not that.

So, for the perspective on the 'I' the 'me' is not that other, this is maybe a way in which to read the 'for'. And so, funnily enough, again it is not about reading the 'for' in terms of translating it into something else or paraphrasing it; but that in perspective (in the perspective of the 'I') it knows a difference, it claims a difference, between its 'me' and the others. In my own thinking though, it is also not a claim to location; so in that respect there is actually something more complicated hidden in 'in'; in its so-called obviousness, in a sense, of location. This is because of the claim: 'in my family's past'; but where is 'in my family's past'? What is that? It is not even within, but 'in' and the more obvious (to me) it becomes, the more complex it actually gets, because none of this is actually the case. There is nothing 'in my family's past', which is 'in my family's past'.

So what looks like an obvious reading, in fact is only about a repetition of the problem that I am coming up against in my reading(s) so far. None of this is about something which is descriptive or local or placed. It cannot be. It can only be about

a claim to a repetition; repetition is never an absolute repetition and it can not be because it is already repetition.⁴⁰

But what I am also thinking is that to make any claim about a ‘lived’, a past living, is to, in perspective, recall something. In this way, a living is never in the moment of living. So if this is about a past living, that has been recalled, or is being recalled — retrospectively — is that not how I am reading memory? This links back to my readings of physicality; that a physicality is never physicality. This is not the argument that there is a physicality which can then, or is then, troubled by liberal multiplicities or different definitions, it is actually that retrospectively, physicality is only ever physicality retrospectively, and that therefore it is undermined by definition, and not by that kind of liberal idea that we have lots of different bodies and lots of different ideas about gender. I think, in the same way, that that is the argument here.

Psychoanalytically speaking, there is no present present. So by definition, when I read retrospectively — yes, that is what memory is, psychoanalytically, but there is nothing else, in much the same way that I was thinking about fantasy earlier.

Something can not be purely memory, just like something can not be purely fantasy;

⁴⁰ For more on repetition, with relation to identity specifically, see: Heidegger, Martin. *Identity and Difference*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002. First published in German as *Identität und Differenz* in 1957; and Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. London: Routledge, 1990.

there is not anything else. So then to say that *this is memory* would be then to invoke the problem. To identify memory *as memory* is the problem, because then it becomes apart from retrospection and, of course, in perspective there can be claims within retrospection as distinct from something else. But that, in turn, is retrospective. It cannot escape that. That, I could say again, is the unconscious, that is always there without being known, seen, claimed; it is the underpinning for meaning. Who am I, but my view of my past self which is already my past self? At which point do I stop and say *no, now I am just purely being me*? And when I say *this is my memory of being me*, psychoanalytically, is that not my memory of me, whether I label it as such or not, even though I'm not talking about defining memory, so to speak? It is my retrospection and that retrospection makes a claim to memory as distinct from something else, so that isn't necessarily 'memory', but it is retrospection by definition. And that, again, is why psychoanalytically, memory is a *wunscherfüllung*.⁴¹

⁴¹ For more on wish-fulfilment, see: Freud, Sigmund. *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Translated and edited by James Strachey, Alan Tyson and Angela Richards. Penguin Freud Library Volume 4. London: Penguin, 1977. First published in German as *Die Traumdeutung* in 1899. As I read it here, it is not about this being a 'good' wish fulfilment, or things that one is hoping for and then they happen; but that they are an investment. You remember the way you remember because that has a meaning, but also it is not a choice. So, you are who you are not because you go around saying *today I'll be this version of myself*, or *today I'll have these memories because that's what I want*, but those memories are never about just random memories (they are never random); everything can be read, which is the whole point of this thesis, in a way. There is no predetermined 'important' and/or 'unimportant'; the claim can be made, but that is not in itself important.

Not to return as a Jewish woman to Israel, not to feel a sense of belonging, not to recognize the very fact and existence of Israel as in itself a historic return, is to break on each count the symbolic parameters of the nation. It is a willed refusal, a rejection of proffered desire.

(Rose, 1994, p.2)

Is ‘not to’ instructional in some way? Not to do one thing is to do another? Also, in the ‘not’- (‘return[ing]’, ‘feel[ing]’, ‘recogniz[ing]’) there is a recognition in perspective of some kind of consciousness, where a choice has been made — in this case, ‘not’ to do something, as opposed to doing it. But how am I reading ‘not’? Is it inherently some kind of refusal? A rejection of the thing that is ‘not’ being done? This would then be to say that the thing that is ‘not’ being done can be done — in the sense that it is do-able and within the ability of the do-er in perspective, but has, or is, ‘not’. This would also be about a knowing, then, of what to do these things would bring about, in contrast or as opposed to ‘not’ doing them; for instance, ‘to return [...] to feel [...] to recognize [...] is [not] to break on each count’. But then the idea here is that my reading is simply shifting the ‘not’, shifting the rejection to another in which there is always a rejection or repulsion of something.

As such, then here there is always something ‘not’ being done. In this case, ‘not’ ‘break[ing]’ as a result of ‘return[ing]’, ‘feel[ing]’, and ‘recogniz[ing]’. Is there a formulation where doing one thing produces another doing as opposed to a ‘not’-doing? Surely, though, a ‘not’-doing is still a kind or version of a doing?

In this there is something about a reaction to either claim to positivity/negativity; the presence or absence of something, but in which the absence is still a presence. If an absence is still present in a claim to absence, then in what way is it absent? Is absence perhaps just a different kind of presence? Perhaps, also, these claims to ‘not’-doing are (in their absent-presence) retrospective or speculative in some way.

To ‘not return as a Jewish woman to Israel’ is in one sense to say that there can also be a ‘return [...] to Israel’ but ‘not [...] as a Jewish woman’ — perhaps ‘as’ a ‘woman’ that is ‘not’ ‘Jewish’, or as a ‘Jewish’ ‘not’-‘woman’. Or even ‘to return’ not ‘as a Jewish woman’; ‘to return’ ‘a Jewish woman’? Is this to do with something ‘as’ another thing not bound up with ideas or notions of performance/façade/mimicry? It is always a comparison (or relationship) to an other, in (what I am reading as) an attempt to be *like* it in some way (‘as’). Could this also be about desire and its unfulfillment? The failure to replicate the other thing?

Would, then, to ‘not return as a Jewish woman to Israel’, but as (for instance) a ‘Jewish’ *man*, still ‘break on each count the symbolic parameters of a nation’? What about (‘not’) ‘return[ing] as a Jewish woman to’ something or somewhere else? I

want to read 'Israel' here as place — is this as a result of 'return' or 'to'? Even 'as a Jewish woman' brings notions of iteration with the claim; there are other kinds of 'woman' of which 'Jewish' is one, but then (much like 'as') can 'Jewish' hold in itself a claim to otherness? I am reading here that to be 'Jewish' is almost to be Jew-like ('ish'), where again there is a claim to similarity that is all about Jew; in the sense that there is a pertaining to another thing (almost like an -esque). In this manner, I want to say that 'Jewish' (or perhaps any 'ish') modifies the subject in perspective to be not that thing; for example, a person can be 'Jewish' but this is a claim about the person, not a claim as to what the person is. Someone can be a Jew, say, but that does not make or mean that they are 'Jewish' — indeed, they would be very different things. Does this create, within my own reading at least, some idea of (false) identity construction?

To follow this through (very loosely, at the moment), the claim, 'as a Jewish woman' is a compounding of appeals to other things that are in the likeness of ('as' and 'ish'), that are both, in some way, 'woman'.

* * *

I am also reading this as counting in some way since it 'is to break on each count the symbolic parameters of the nation'. So I am then reading the 'not to return as a Jewish woman to Israel', where the as implies, already, that this perspective is not 'a Jewish woman', it is other to 'a Jewish woman'. But that somehow 'return' can be

about being ‘as a Jewish woman’, or the ‘return’ can take place ‘as a Jewish woman’; not unlike the ‘to a country’ and ‘something bizarre’. However there is also this ‘to break on each count’, so then I think also that these nots are counts: ‘not to return as a Jewish woman [...] not to feel [...] not to recognize’; so I read these as ‘each’ of the ‘count[s]’. And what do ‘count[s]’ do here? They can ‘break’. What they ‘break’ is ‘the symbolic parameters of the nation’ (without being ‘the nation’), so ‘the nation’ is also something which is not a ‘symbolic parameter’, but here it has ‘symbolic parameters’, which can be ‘broken on each count’. In this way, these are things which can be ‘count[ed]’, so the ‘not’s are a repetition but they are also about a separateness because they are ‘each’. There are also ‘symbolic parameters’, so each of the ‘count[s]’ that ‘break [...] the symbolic parameters’ as plural symbolic parameters has something to do with an excess to ‘the nation’ itself, but in turn this is also a plural excess because it is only ‘the’ nation, not nations.

‘Not to [...] not to [...] not to [...] is to?’

This is the production of an effect as a result of ‘not’ doing something. Does this link back to instruction? This comes through the reading of ‘to break on each count’, because the instruction — but of course it cannot be an instruction to anyone — for me, is in the idea of the ‘not’; that which is ‘not’ is in relation to that which ‘is’; here, each ‘count’ which ‘is’. So what I think I am reading as instructional is that idea that there should not be a ‘break[ing]’; there should not be a ‘break[ing]’ of ‘the symbolic parameters of the nation’, but each of these ‘count[s]’ does ‘break’ it. It ‘break[s]’ it by

doing ‘not’ what should be done, which is the ‘not’-‘break[ing]’. In this way, it is upholding ‘the symbolic parameters of the nation’ if, say, the ‘you’ was to ‘return as a Jewish woman’, if the same ‘you’ ‘feel[s] a sense of belonging’, and if the same ‘you’ ‘recognize[d] the very fact’.

So, to do all of these things, is not ‘to break the symbolic parameters of the nation’.

The instructional reading, then, lies in that it should not be a ‘break[ing]’. This also pulls through in the claim to a ‘willed refusal’ a ‘rejection of proffered desire’; again, the idea of the ‘not’ being a ‘refusal’ about what should not be ‘refus[ed]’, and that, I think, goes from the earlier reading: the ‘something bizarre about travelling to a country where you do not belong, in the sense of having no lived connection’, because here I am already thinking about the ‘no’ and that this is all about what should be, because that is not the ‘bizarre’. In its own perspective, it knows both how it is ‘bizarre’ because it knows how it would not be ‘bizarre’, if it did those things. For me, I think this is where the ‘not’ is situated; it is situated in the ‘break[ing]’, and that for each of the ‘count[s]’ that ‘break’ (and they should not be broken, just like there should not be ‘a rejection’) there should not be ‘a willed refusal’; all of these things are in place as the not-‘bizarre’ things to do.

I read this to be the same as for the ‘as’ and for the ‘ish’; these things are another ‘not’.

Here, is it about a kind of ‘woman’; ‘a Jewish woman’, so there are multiple ‘Jewish wom[en]’, but there are ‘wom[en]’ who are ‘wom[en]’ without being ‘Jewish’, so it

is a certain kind of ‘woman’, not a standalone thing, not something that can exist in its own right. It is also not what the perspective is, not what the perspective claims itself to be. It is always, in that sense, an analogy to the perspective. I think this, bizarrely enough, becomes crucial because the very notion of a subject as being already in place is actually not a reading of perspective. This is the idea that, for instance, gender is already in place; there is no gender which relies on the subjectivity that is already present;⁴² for me, the same things are happening here.

Part of me wants to say that the ‘as’ or the ‘ish’ is somehow performative, but actually I think it is an analogy; it is about the perspective knowing what *is* and what *is not*. This is the problem, I feel, with a claim to performance. One does not have to bring, with performance, the idea of willedness or intent. This is simply something that the perspective is not, but it can be ‘as’ that, in the sense that it can draw the analogy to itself; that is which it is not is something that which, at the same time, it can claim. In this case, a ‘return’. Here, the ‘as’ is a way of returning, so there are different ways to return, and this one here is it.

⁴² For more on gender issues and theory, see: Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. London: Routledge, 1990. For Butler, there is no gender which relies on the subjectivity that is already present. This is exactly what I am reading here. For deconstructive readings of (trans)gender, see: Valentine, David. “Sue E. Generous: Toward a Theory of Non-Transexuality.” *Feminist Studies* 38.1 (2012): 185–211; and Valentine, David. *Imagining Transgender: An Ethnography of a Category*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.

Reading perspective in the end is not about reading the claims of the perspective; it is about the implications of the claims, for what the perspective is. So in this case, if the perspective is not ‘a Jewish woman’, because it is claiming only that that is a way of ‘return[ing]’, it could potentially ‘return as a Jewish woman’, but also that it is not going to do so, and that it does not do so. So it constitutes, in a sense, the ‘willed refusal’ that it also claims is the way that others see it, because it is a ‘willed refusal, a rejection of proffered desire’ (‘proffered’ by whom?). In addition to this, there is also the ‘break[ing] on each count [of] the symbolic parameters of the nation’, so ‘the nation’ and its ‘symbolic parameters’ are in place, and are upheld by the not ‘break[ing] on each count’. One of the things I need to clarify (for myself) here is that the reading I am making is about the claim ‘as a Jewish woman’ rather than about the implications for the perspective that make that claim in that way. For the implications of the ‘as’; what else could ‘as’ be other than that which the perspective is not? So does the claim here to ‘break[ing]’ the ‘count[s]’ of ‘the symbolic parameters of the nation’ (that is constituted as ‘a willed refusal, a rejection of proffered desire’) suggest that ‘the symbolic parameters of the nation’ are the ‘proffered desire’? And why is the ‘willed refusal’ the same breaking?

‘It’ is the shift. Is the ‘it’: ‘not to return as a Jewish woman to Israel’? Is that another way of reading the ‘not to return’? Are these accumulated ‘willed refusal[s]’? But it is an ‘it’ so it is a singularity. But there is also a ‘break[ing] on each count’, so this is no longer an ‘each count’, it is now an ‘it’. So is all of this, together, the ‘willed refusal’?

Or is the ‘break[ing] on each count’ the same breaking, for instance, and that is the ‘it’? A ‘return’ is contingent on doing it as something that you are not; this really sets in place the split. What then is ‘return[ing]’? The ‘return’ has to, already, be about something prior and different to one’s self here, in this claim. That is what makes the stake; returning to the land to colonise, for instance.⁴³ This is all about the politics of representation, and then this is the very problem of trying to argue politics on the grounds of there always being a return and there always being a representation as a representation.⁴⁴ Position is never really about a piece of land that we know is somewhere, even with historical disputes about how a piece of land is divided up.

Land? Pieces?

* * *

My next chapter will focus on ‘islands’, and I will read islands and the antipodes predominantly from a book called *Islanded Identities: Constructions of Postcolonial Cultural Insularity* (McCusker & Soares, 2011), a mediaeval drawing of the world by a French Benedictine monk, as well as some readings of ‘brain’. My aim here is to

⁴³ For more, see my chapter on ‘Endeavours’ in which I read extracts from Captain James Cook who travels to, and later returns to colonise, the South Pacific.

⁴⁴ For readings of representation as a representation in the context of language, see: Gates Jr., Henry Louis. *The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

think not necessarily about island(s) as 'land', but more about difficulties and problems of island theory, generally speaking. I have included a short epigraph from Freidrich Nietzsche from *The Gay Science* (1882) that, for me, introduces this very problem: the idea that '[t]he antipodes, too, have the right to exist', is proceeded by a rallying imperative that I heed: 'Embark, philosophers!' (p.232).

Islands: Little petri dishes floating in a saltwater medium

The moral earth, too, is round. The moral earth, too, has its antipodes. The antipodes, too, have the right to exist. There is yet another world to be discovered — and more than one. Embark, philosophers!

(Nietzsche, 1882, p.232)

* * *

Maeve McCusker and Anthony Soares' text, *Islanded Identities: Constructions of Postcolonial Cultural Insularity* (2011), claims to be 'devoted explicitly to the postcolonial island', and 'should be required reading of scholars working in postcolonial studies, in island studies, and for those working in and across a range of disciplines'.⁴⁵ As I feel as though my thesis ticks many of these boxes, I will provide the aforementioned required reading of the opening lines:

Popular imaginings of the island — as refuge or as prison, as paradise or as inferno, as child or as chip off the old block of the mainland — take on a particular charge when read in a postcolonial context. The Western gaze, rooted in what Bill Ashcroft describes as 'imperial passion for perspective', frequently imagined the island as an inferior, marginal or easily dominated

⁴⁵ No page number; these claims are on the back cover.

space, as an obvious site for subjugation and organization by the colonizer. Thus the island was a natural colony for the European, not just, as Rod Edmond and Vanessa Smith note, ‘because of the desire to possess what is paradisaal or utopian, but because islands, unlike continents, look like property’. Their supposed vulnerability and isolation, and their (imagined) small geographic scale, meant that islands were both archetypal and prototypal sites of the colonial experience. Historically, the island was considered as an ideal locale, or even a laboratory, in which to materialize the colonial will, free from undesirable alien influences emerging from the outside.

(McCusker & Soares, 2011, p.xi)⁴⁶

‘The island’, a singular, known island, can be imagined (or can have ‘imaginings’ of it) and these ‘imaginings’ can also be ‘popular’ amongst other things. This perspective knows what the imagining of the particular ‘island’ is and that this is a ‘popular’ imagining but, as well, there are multiple ‘imaginings’ all of which are ‘popular’ so then there can be more than one ‘popular imaginings’ of this one ‘island’. Of interest, too, is that ‘the island’ is known by the perspective outside of its

⁴⁶ McCusker and Soares are referencing, in this citation: Ashcroft, Bill. *Post-Colonial Transformation*. London: Routledge, 2001; and Edmond, Rod, and Vanessa Smith. “Editors’ Introduction.” *Islands in History and Representation*. Edited by Rod Edmond and Vanessa Smith. London: Routledge, 2003: 1.

‘popular imaginings’ in order to know that these are to be ‘as refuge or as prison, as paradise or as inferno, as child or as chip off the old block of the mainland’, because it’s all as; it is in excess of ‘the island’ and known to be in excess of ‘the island’.

At the same time as all of this, what also interests me is that they are all ‘as’, so as well as being alternates the ‘as’ makes them all similar in all being in their alternation and exclusivity, with regards to one another, nevertheless all knowable as potential excesses to ‘the island’ which does tie them together in that sense as being only ‘as’. So, it is also not what they are in that sense; they are not anything themselves because it is only ‘popular imaginings as’.

I read these ‘popular imaginings’ to be: ‘as refuge or as prison, as paradise or as inferno, as child or as chip off the old block of the mainland’ in which they are constituted as both what is ‘popular’ and ‘imagined’ — they are ‘as’. It is also worth pointing out here as well that none of these claims are to ‘the island’ as such but rather of that which ‘the island’ is imagined to be ‘as’. The binaries, as I read them to be by way of the ‘or’, in perspective, of the ‘popular imaginings’ are: ‘refuge or [...] prison’, ‘paradise or [...] inferno’ set up each of them as claimed others or alternates to one another that the ‘popular imaginings’ of ‘the island’ can be at any one time — either imagined ‘as paradise’ or ‘as inferno’, but never both. With regard to ‘child’, I can read this in two ways. One is that ‘child’ is one of the ‘popular imaginings’ and does not have an ‘other’, so to speak, in the same way that ‘refuge’ and ‘paradise’ do in ‘prison’ and ‘inferno’ respectively; instead ‘chip off the old block of the mainland’

is also one of the ‘popular imaginings’ of ‘the island’ as well. Or, because of how I can read the ‘,’ in perspective, ‘child’ does have an other which is ‘chip off the old block of the mainland’, albeit a different alternate.

This claim then sets up the idea that one of the ‘popular imaginings’ of ‘the island’ is ‘as child’; not the child or a child, just child as known but not with regard to any particular ‘the’ or ‘a’. Where I can read the alternative nature of ‘refuge [...] prison’ and ‘paradise [...] inferno’, so too is the claim within the perspective regarding the relationship between ‘child’ and ‘a chip off the old block of the mainland’ in that each is inherently what the other is not. This is not about opposites or antitheses so much as if ‘refuge’ is what ‘prison’ is not and ‘inferno’ is what ‘paradise’ is not, then so too is ‘child’ with respect to ‘a chip off the old block of the mainland’. So even if it is, in a sense, alternate to ‘child’, ‘a chip off the old block of the mainland’ is one of many possible ‘chip[s]’ where ‘child’ is not.

These ‘[p]opular imaginings’, in whichever form, then take on a particular charge when read in a postcolonial context. I want to look at this claim in particular:

The Western gaze, rooted in what Bill Ashcroft describes as imperial passion for perspective, frequently imagined the island as an inferior, marginal or easily dominated space, as an obvious site for subjugation and organization by the colonizer.

(McCusker & Soares, 2011, p.xi)

The 'rooted in what Bill Ashcroft describes' is where I can make the reading of the claim to authority but at the same time it is also what 'Bill Ashcroft describes', so in that sense there is also something other to 'Bill Ashcroft'. In that respect the 'imperial passion for perspective' is not the authority because 'Bill Ashcroft' only 'describes' it according to this perspective, but it is what 'Bill Ashcroft describes', whereas according to this perspective it is '[t]he Western gaze' that is rooted in what 'Bill Ashcroft describes as imperial passion for perspective'. This is exactly what the difference is between what I am doing, and what 'Bill Ashcroft' is doing, when thinking about perspective.

In this I can read a claim, in perspective, to an authority; not as a category of authority but in terms of how it functions as a kind of authority which, in perspective, will always shift. This might be established as a 'source' or something that is claimed as an 'origin' or an 'argument' or a 'basis'. I read the footnotes in relation to the text that is about the text framing itself as drawing on another authority.⁴⁷ In considering the notion of the claim to authority, and how, or why, what I am reading as the footnotes being either the claim to an authority or in some

⁴⁷ For more on readings of footnotes and marginalia as authority, see: Caselli, Daniela. *Beckett's Dantes: Intertextuality in the Fiction and Criticism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005; and Derrida, Jacques. *Margins of Philosophy*. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984. First published in French as *Marges de la philosophie* in 1972. For Caselli, the argument is that intertextuality is never about finding the source or origin but instead how that claim is made to a prior as an authority. This is something that both Caselli and Derrida write about with regard to the way that the marginal defines the centre.

way contributing to this, there is a tension between what the text is and what it is making reference to in order to substantiate or validate itself, of course, in perspective. There is obviously no reference in perspective because that would project and institute a fixed hierarchy as if there was a fixed, knowable thing that refers to something else, so instead reading the way in which one determines the other produces what I will call the map of authority.

For example, in T.S. Eliot's *The Waste Land* (1922) he puts in all kinds of footnotes but you can read that a lot of them are a parody about the whole issue: that there is a challenge to the idea of supplementarity and the idea of the irony of the notion of the explanatory, that the footnotes hold the truth or explanation to something.⁴⁸ There is not the consideration that the 'marginal' and the 'main' as determining one another and instead that the truth or explanation lies elsewhere because the footnotes are transparent.

⁴⁸ For example, on lines 46–55 the poem reads: 'With a wicked pack of cards. Here, said she, / Is your card, the drowned Phoenician Sailor, / (Those are pearls that were his eyes. Look!) / Here is Belladonna, the Lady of the Rocks, / The lady of situations'; and the footnotes claim: 'I am not familiar with the exact constitution of the Tarot pack of cards, from which I have obviously departed to suit my own convenience. The Hanged Man, a member of the traditional pack, fits my purpose in two ways: because he is associated in my mind with the Hanged God of Frazer, and because I associate him with the hooded figure in the passage of the disciples to Emmaus in Part V. The Phoenician Sailor and the Merchant appear later; also the "crowds of people," and Death by Water is executed in Part IV. The Man with Three Staves (an authentic member of the Tarot pack) I associate, quite arbitrarily, with the Fisher King himself'. In this example, by noting that the association is 'quite arbitrar[y]', Eliot is being satirical; footnotes are being used to underscore the arbitrary associations made in his mind. Eliot is the source and the authority.

At this point, in complete consciousness of the thinking I am doing here about marginalia and paratext, I consider the ‘cover’ of *Islanded Identities* which is also of particular interest in light of my readings:

Cross/Cultures 139

Islanded Identities

Constructions of Postcolonial Cultural Insularity



Edited by
Maeve McCusker and Anthony Soares

(McCusker & Soares, 2019)⁴⁹

⁴⁹ The only references in the text to this are: ‘COVER IMAGE: Gordon Collier’ and ‘atoll image: © atanas.dk/fotolia’. The latter produces a ‘404 Not Found’ error following an online internet search.

The claim on the book's cover that I can read is about 'Islanded Identities' and 'Constructions of Postcolonial Cultural Insularity' so there is something about these 'Identities' that are not only 'Islanded' but as known 'constructions' that are also culturally insular in a 'Postcolonial' sense. I can also read four images as part of this cover as well: a drawing of a brain with writing around it in Latin,⁵⁰ a photograph of an atoll in the middle of an ocean, a topographic map of an island, and a collage of cutouts from Irish newspapers in the shape of Ireland.

Does this maybe have something to do with the first line from the book: 'Popular imaginings of the island — as refuge or as prison, as paradise or as inferno, as child or as chip off the old block of the mainland'? Is this cover also popular imaginings of the island much like the 'or's (all the images are next to each other): the brain, the atoll, the topographic map and the collage, as I read them? They also seem to be a kind of 'or' in much the same way as are 'refuge', 'prison', 'paradise', 'inferno', 'child', and 'chip off the old block of the mainland'; potentially alternates as well as different but also similar because they are together as 'cover'.

In the text I am reading the ',' as the separation between that which is one of the 'popular imaginings of the island', say, 'as refuge or as prison, as paradise or as

⁵⁰ I later read this same image as a 'map', however my initial reading was of 'brain', so I have left this as part of my reading. I only make reference to it here to avoid (potential) confusion later in the chapter.

inferno' which would then be a claim to the popular and to the imagining, none of which are islands.

The title: 'Islanded Identities: Constructions of Postcolonial Cultural Insularity' is interesting because with 'Islanded Identities' I can read that 'Identities' here can be 'Islanded' but also not 'Islanded', but 'Constructions of Postcolonial Cultural Insularity' intrigues me. Is 'Insularity' then 'Islanded Identities' but also different? What is it 'Insularity' from? 'Islanded Identities' seem to be a certain kind of identity, but 'Insularity' seems to be 'Insularity' from something else in order for it to be insular(ity); it is in relation to something it is against. Is the 'Insularity' from the non-islanded 'Identities', for instance? Where is the perspective in the idea of 'Constructions of Postcolonial Cultural Insularity'? Are 'Cultural Insularit[ies]' already 'postcolonial' in and of themselves? Are 'Constructions' not 'Postcolonial'? Are 'Constructions' the thing they are 'of'? The 'Postcolonial' is itself a 'Construction' because these are 'Constructions of Postcolonial'. Is this, perhaps, about lots of different types of 'Insularity'? Is the 'Insularity' the thing that is being constructed as 'Postcolonial' or as 'Cultural', and that is what 'Islanded Identities' is; 'Insularity' in this form as constructed. In this way, 'Islanded Identities' then are those 'Constructions'.

In any case, the 'Postcolonial' has not resolved the 'Insularity'; the 'Insularity' remains in place even as a 'Construction', 'Postcolonial[ly]'. What I am thinking about here is the notion that 'Postcolonial[ism]' is a resolution of colonialism, not necessarily all

of the time, but here I am then reading that in any case it is not an 'Insularity'. So if the 'Insularity' is in relation to the non-insular then that has not been affected as a construction by this perspective to the non-'Islanded Identities'. It means that even in the title, then, the tension is already there — where these islands are all known as islands, regardless of what 'Imaginings' ('Popular' or otherwise) are piled on top of them or what things are done to them — this is already still completely known in this perspective. This leaves the 'Imaginings' and the 'Popular' and the 'Constructions' to be the problem, as I read it.

To come back then to the 'Popular imaginings of the island — as refuge or as prison, as paradise or as inferno, as child or as chip off the old block of the mainland'; these can then be read as all 'Cultural[ly] Insular'. Is this about all culture, in a general sense? Is there only one culture, for this perspective? Is this the culture of the perspective itself or is this the culture of the perspective that the perspective claims it is on? '[W]hat Bill Ashcroft describes as 'imperial passion for perspective' is not the perspective as I read it; it is a different kind of idea of perspective: '[t]he Western gaze' — this perspective is on '[t]he Western gaze' anyway, so it is not '[t]he Western gaze' itself. This, in turn, is 'rooted' in the 'what' that 'Bill Ashcroft describes as' where the 'what' is the thing that is described, which is interesting, too, for a 'gaze' to be 'rooted' in a 'what'. If I think then about '[t]he 'Western' as being a different kind of 'gaze' to other gazes (could this be the answer to which cultural?), the 'what' does not have any of that; it is just 'what', it is 'rooted in what' where

there is no claim to that being a ‘Western’ what, except in ‘Bill Ashcroft[’s] descri[ption]’ where it is ‘imperial’, which is not ‘Western’, it is the ‘imperial passion for perspective’. Much like the ‘[p]opular imaginings of the island’ this is also ‘as’, and is ongoingly ‘as’ — ‘frequently imagined the island as an inferior, marginal or easily dominated space’, ‘as an obvious site for subjugation and organization’, then ‘historically, the island was considered as an ideal locale, or even a laboratory, in which to materialize the colonial will’ — which is all in excess of that known and knowable island. Not only are these ‘as’s are all culturally insular, they are also ‘or’ — ‘as an inferior, marginal or easily dominated space’ and ‘as an ideal locale, or even a laboratory’ — which are both different from ‘as refuge or as prison’ because they are ‘or easily’ and ‘or even’.

In light of these readings of the ‘brain’ as ‘map’, I return to think about the claims in *Islanded Identities* (McCusker & Soares, 2019, p.ix): that ‘The island’ continues to be known throughout: ‘frequently imagined [...] as an inferior, marginal or easily dominated space’, ‘was a natural colony for the European’, ‘islands, unlike continents, look like property’, ‘islands were both archetypal and prototypal sites of the colonial experience’; none of these constructions are any of the ‘popular imaginings’. This is also all in the past: ‘was a natural colony for the European’ which is also supposed to no longer be the case except that that ‘insularity’ is still there, even as a ‘construction’. Additionally, since their ‘vulnerability’ is ‘supposed’ it

is known not to be the case that they are vulnerable and since their ‘small geographic scale’ is ‘(imagined)’ this is also known not to be the case.

This perspective *really* knows their islands.

This is interesting to me as well: ‘thus the island was a natural colony for the European, not just, as Rod Edmond and Vanessa Smith note, ‘because of the desire to possess what is paradisaal or utopian, but because islands, unlike continents, look like property’. How do islands ‘look like property’? Is that what ‘supposed vulnerability and isolation’ is? Or is it that ‘the desire to possess what is paradisaal or utopian’ is simply equated with ‘look[ing] like property’?

‘Islands’ are also ‘unlike continents’, so then ‘continents’ do not look like property and cannot be islands, or at least do not ‘look like property’.⁵¹

Thinking again about the image on the cover of *Island Identities*, I have read a brain but I have also read Latin; in that sense I am also reading something that is not a brain, something other to brain in a sense. It is also, in perspective, on a brain from

⁵¹ Upon sighting Antarctica in 1775, James Cook writes in his Journals: ‘I firmly believe that there is a track of land near the pole which is the source of most of the ice that is spread over this vast S. Ocean. It is true, however, that the greatest part of this S. continent (supposing there is one) must lie within the polar circle, where the sea is so pester’d with ice that the land is thereby inaccessible. I also think it probable that it extends farthest to the north opposite the S. Atlantic and Indian Oceans, because ice was always found by us farther to the N. in these oceans than any where else, which I judge could not be, if there were not land to the S.; *I mean a land of far too consid’rable an extent to indeed be entertain’d as property to inhabit. It is no island*’ (Cook[§], 21 February 1775, pp.414–416); italics mine.

elsewhere that is not a brain. So what is this not-brain that knows this as a brain, yet also knows it as not a brain because it is Latin?

* * *

My own readings of brains, in particular in relation to maps and the child and its constructions, recall a 2014 seminar that I attended, and a subsequent publication by Simon Bailey on Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): *Rethinking Disability Theory* (2015). In it, he argues that ADHD is the most commonly diagnosed psychiatric condition of childhood worldwide, yet the medical and psychological perspectives that dominate understandings of ADHD present problems in their reductive understanding of the condition. ADHD is for Bailey what the island is for me, in many ways. In Bailey's chapter on 'ADHD Mythology', there is the following claim made with regard to maps and brains with relation to the 'construction of the scientific legitimacy of ADHD via an analysis of brain imaging and the metaphor of the map':

The first task to focus an exploration of the metaphor of the map and the imaging of the brain is to decide which of the many kinds of map available we are talking about. In the following analysis I take three types of map in turn: political, physical and topographical. To begin with the ‘political’ map of the brain.

(Bailey, 2015, p.108)

‘Maps’ have ‘metaphors of’ them and ‘brains’ have ‘images of’ them in which both ‘maps’ and ‘brains’ are known in perspective to have things that are other to them that at the same time constitute them. There is also only one ‘the metaphor’ and one ‘the imaging’ and then only one ‘the brain’ and one ‘the map’ respectively in this perspective. In turn these are, together, what constitutes an ‘exploration of’ so they can and are being explored.⁵² In order to do this, however, the ‘first task’ (of more than one) ‘is to decide which of the many kinds of map available we are talking about’. In this formulation it is the ‘decision’ that initiates the ‘focus’ of the exploration where deciding is also constructed as a ‘task’ because ‘the first task [...] is to decide’. It is worth noting that this is also only one way to ‘focus an exploration’, as there may be others by way of the ‘an’, or at least this is the kind of exploration that can be repeated and done more than one time; re-exploration. Interestingly, this

⁵² As seen in Episode 15, Season 7 of *Dora the Explorer*, ‘Little Map’, in which Dora and Boots use pictures drawn by Little Map to find the sparkling golden treasure.

task then claims that there are ‘many kinds of maps available’, so then also many other kinds of maps that are not ‘available’ as well as these ‘maps’ being ‘kinds of’.

In spite of all this, the ‘task’ (which is ‘to decide’) that focuses the exploration of ‘the metaphor of the map and the imaging of the brain’ is all about a ‘kind of map’ (‘one of many’); this perspective knows that a single, particular kind of map needs to be secured before ‘an exploration’ can take place — of that which is ‘of the metaphor’ and ‘of the imaging’. So the ‘metaphor of the map and the imaging of the brain’ both rely on a constructing of a ‘kind of map’ in which these ideas can be explored. With this comes the notion that the perspective has knowledge of both the ‘exploration’ itself as well as that which is being explored; there are a number of ‘tasks’ involved with focusing it, and the ‘first’ is to make this decision: ‘to decide which of the many kinds of map available we are talking about’. So ‘talking about’ one ‘of the many kinds of maps available’ is then what I read to be ‘the first task to focus an exploration’, whereby talking about another ‘of the many kinds of maps available’ may then be where there can be other tasks. It is also a ‘we’ that is doing the ‘talking about’, known in perspective to be a ‘we’ that is other to itself.

What I am thinking about with this construction is that while the claim is about the task and the decision, the result and outcome of this is already known; regardless of ‘which of the many kinds of maps we are talking about’ is decided upon, this will ‘focus an exploration of the metaphor of the map and the imaging of the brain’. I can then read that ‘the metaphor of the map’ is and is not contingent on the map that

‘we are talking about’. One way to read this is that ‘the metaphor of the map’ is of whichever ‘map’ is decided upon as part of the ‘first task’ whereby different ‘metaphor[s]’ are being explored based on ‘the map’; another way to read this is that ‘the metaphor of the map’ is the same ‘metaphor’ irrespective of the available ‘map[s]’ and so the ‘exploration’ of it is known in spite of the ‘many kinds of maps’. So what about ‘the imaging of the brain’?

I am reading ‘the imaging of brain’ because it is constituted as part of ‘an exploration’ along with ‘the metaphor of the map’ which does not change or shift in my reading depending on which ‘kind of map’ is decided on to be talked about by ‘we’. In this way, I can read that while the ‘metaphor of the map’ may change, or rather will be different based on the decision about ‘which of the many kinds of map available’ will be talked about, ‘the imaging of the brain’ will not be talked about. It is always the same brain and the same ‘imaging of the brain’ outside of the decision. The only other reading would be that the ‘imaging of the brain’ does shift with the different ‘map’ that is talked about but this relies on the idea that ‘brain’ and ‘map’ are inherent to one another; that if the ‘map’ is different then so is the ‘brain’. However, here I read them to be completely separate in perspective — the ‘brain’ is constant.

The claim goes on to elaborate on this decision: ‘I take three types of map in turn: political, physical and topographical’. There is now an ‘I’ that is ‘tak[ing]’ as well as a ‘we’ that ‘talks about’. So are the ‘types of maps’ the same ‘many kinds of maps available’? In one sense, they are not: the ‘we’ is ‘talking about’ ‘maps’ while at the

same time the 'I' is 'tak[ing]' maps, besides, they are 'kinds of' and 'types of' respectively so I can read them as different maps altogether. In another sense, they are: the 'talking about' and the 'tak[ing]' both have not happened yet as this is framed as being yet to come by the perspective: 'in the following analysis'. There is the idea that these things both have and have not taken place (although I am aware that because all claims are retrospective anyway, so in yet another sense none of this is 'following' as it has already been), so because of this the 'kinds of' and the 'types of' maps could be the same maps if neither of them have been talked about or taken (even if they will be, or rather have been, in perspective).

There is then the question of the difference that I can read between 'many kinds of map available' and 'three kinds of map'. If the 'kinds' and 'types' are in reference to the same 'map' then in this perspective 'many' is the 'three types of map' and 'three' is the 'many types of map'. Another way to read this is that the 'I' is taking 'three types of map' from the 'many kinds of map available' (of which there are these 'three' but then also maybe others that are not taken) that the 'we' is 'talking about'. If this is the case, then because these maps are being taken from the 'many [other] kinds of maps' then these maps (those taken from the 'many') can not form part of the decision that is 'the first task to focus an exploration'. In this way, 'political, physical and topographical' maps — the maps that are taken by the 'I' — can not then be 'talked about' by the 'we' and therefore can not be part of the focus of an 'exploration'.

So if, as the perspective claims is ‘in the following analysis’, they ‘begin with the ‘political’ map of the brain’, which I read as one of the ‘three types of map’ being taken by the ‘I’ from the ‘many kinds of map available’ that the ‘we are talking about’, then this map can not assist or form part of ‘an exploration of the metaphor of the map and the imaging of the brain’. As such, the ‘following analysis’ with the ‘political’ map of the brain’ will not be exploring the ‘imaging of the brain’; so there are now different brains with maps and images of them. Alternatively, is it always the same ‘brain’ but in one instance the ‘map’ of it is analysed after the ‘I’ takes this ‘map’ and the ‘imaging’ of it is what is explored as part of the ‘first task’: the ‘talking about’?

The ‘map’ here that is taken by the ‘I’ is not just a “political’ map’ but is ‘of the brain’. It is important to distinguish here that ‘brain’ can have ‘imaging’ and ‘map’ of it, which are different, and so if this ‘map’ is “political” then there are other maps of the brain that are not “political” — but the brain is still the same brain just with different maps of it. Are these the ‘many other kinds of maps’? Are all these ‘maps’ of the same ‘brain’?

My own reading of ‘Latin’ and ‘brain’ on the cover of *Islanded Identities*, alongside my readings of Bailey’s claims regarding ‘brains’ and, in particular, ‘maps’, have helped me consider the following claims about what I read as ‘brain’:

Political maps ‘are designed to show governmental boundaries of countries, states, and counties [...] differing colours are often used to help the user differentiate between nations’. Transposing this definition on to the brain, we are given a picture of the brain as a left and right hemisphere, and a number of regions — hippocampus, pre-frontal cortex, etc.

(Bailey, 2015, p.108)⁵³

Bailey’s perspective on the perspective on ‘[p]olitical maps’ and then ‘[t]ransposing this [...] on to the brain’ make me, once more, consider what I initially read as brain on the front cover of *Islanded Identities*.

I consider now the following images from a twelfth-century encyclopaedia, *The Liber Floridus*:⁵⁴


⁵³ Here, Bailey is referencing: <https://www.worldatlas.com/>.

⁵⁴ From the Ghent University Library website: ‘*The Liber Floridus* (“Book of Flowers”) is an encyclopaedia compiled in the early twelfth century by Lambert, canon of the Church of Our Lady in St Omer. The Ghent University Library possesses the autograph of this work, i.e. the actual copy scribed by the author himself’. Available at: https://www.liberfloridus.be/wat_eng.html.



(Lambert of St. Omer, c.1180, fol. 69v)⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Page refers to folio 69 verso (left).



(Lambert of St. Omer, c.1180, fol. 70r)⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Pages refers to folio 70 recto (right).

In relation to this ‘World map of Lambert of St. Omer’, Suzanne Akbani claims that ‘Lambert’s map includes a fourth continent “unknown to the sons of Adam”’ (2009, p.72):⁵⁷

World map of Lambert of St. Omer, featuring the oriental ‘island of the sun’ slightly below and to the right of Eden (at the top), with the island of Taprobana just below. A fourth continent appears in the southern hemisphere (at right) cut off by the equatorial torrid zone and consequently ‘unknown to the sons of Adam’.

(Akbani, 2009, p.71)

The claim here is that it is not ‘Latin’ or ‘brain’, but ‘world map of Lambert of St. Omer’. This ‘world map’ contains or is constituted by a number of things: it is ‘featuring the oriental ‘island of the sun’” and it is also ‘with the island of Taprobana’ where the perspective knows ‘the oriental island of the sun’ and ‘the island of Taprobana’ as other and separate to one another as well as the ‘world map’, yet they also form part of the ‘world map’ — which in turn is ‘of Lambert’, which is then of ‘St. Omer’, so actually these known islands also constitute this perspective on ‘St. Omer’, in this way. So once again there is a known ‘island’ which is of other things:

⁵⁷ Akbani references Danielle Lecoq for a transcription of the map legends and schematic: Lecoq, Danielle. “La mappemonde du Liber Floridus ou la vision du Monde de Lambert de Saint-Omer”. *The International Journal for the History of Cartography* 39.1 (1987): 9–49.

‘the sun’ and ‘Taprobana’ so these, too, are constituted as having things of them, of which ‘island’ is one such thing. So this ‘world map’ is made up of two islands.

‘Eden’, however, is not featured in the ‘world map’ but instead is constituted as being in relation to ‘the oriental ‘island of the sun’”; which is ‘slightly below and to the right of Eden’ and also ‘(at the top)’ where I can read ‘below’, ‘right’ and ‘top’ to be about being separate from ‘the oriental ‘island of the sun’” and then because this is what the ‘world map’ is ‘featuring’, ‘Eden’ does not form part of that feature.

As well as this being about a ‘world map’, there is also the claim that there is a ‘fourth continent [that] appears in the southern hemisphere (at right) cut off by the equatorial torrid zone’. I read the ‘fourth continent’ as other to ‘world map’ but I also read these as separate claims about the same thing.

C. Raymond Beazly claims that ‘nowhere else in mediaeval cartography do we find greater prominence assigned to the Unknown southern Continent’ (1949, p.570).

Matthew Goldie’s chapter entitled ‘Island Theory: The Antipodes’ claims that ‘some maps tried to represent the southern hemisphere, which complicated the already hard task of representing the round surface of the globe on a flat page. A magnificent example of this kind of map appears in Lambert of St. Omer’s *Liber floridus*’ (2011, p.22). The text then makes a reading of the map:

The map is oriented east like the T-O map rather than a typical Macrobian zonal *mappamundi*, which is oriented north. The long glosses outside the circular earth ascribe the map's authority to Orosius, Ptolemy, and Martianus while inside about 140 names identify and sometimes describe locations. Condensed into the left half of the circle is the northern hemisphere and a version of a T-O map.⁵⁸

(Goldie, 2011, pp.22-23)

Already the claims here are establishing a certain kind of difference, as I read it: 'The map is oriented east like the T-O map' which is 'rather than a typical Macrobian zonal *mappamundi*, which is oriented north'; there is something not 'typical' about this being 'oriented east' as opposed to 'oriented north'. The perspective on this 'map' also, as part of the 'map', claims there is 'the circular earth' and then as part of this 'long glosses outside'. '[T]he map's authority' lies elsewhere according to this

⁵⁸ Matthew Goldie references T-O maps as follows, for context: 'Macrobius had encouraged thinking about the globe as divided into a series of rings or bands, the climate zones that are still with us today, and the Middle Ages inherited this tradition. It also inherited and developed the idea of the earth being divided into distinct land-masses. The maps that draw on this other tradition are now frequently referred to as T-O maps. [...] The O describes the overall circular shape of the map, the land outlined by the Great Sea Ocean (from Homer), which was thought to encircle the *oikoumene*, the known world. Inside the O is a T to represent three waterways — the River Don, the Nile, and the Mediterranean — which separate Asia at the top, Africa to the right, and Europe on the left. Some developments of this basic scheme also picture Earthly Paradise in the East at the top. [...] Europe, in the south-east near the bottom of the map, is therefore far from the godhead and godliness, as fallen and as far from redemption as possible' (2011, pp.21-22).

perspective and there is also something about the ‘outside’ and ‘long glosses’ which ‘ascribe the map’s authority’ that is different to the ‘inside’ which is about ‘names’ which ‘identify and sometimes describe locations’. The ascription of ‘authority’ (outside) and the identification and description of ‘locations’ (inside) then sets up a difference between where names and naming figure in the perspective on the ‘map’ with relation to an ‘authority’. In any case, the perspective, because of retrospection, knows all of this and is an authority in a sense itself, irrespective of it being able to identify the ‘map’s authority’ existing elsewhere.

The claim that ‘Condensed into the left half of the circle is the northern hemisphere and a version of a T-O map’ continues to provoke ideas of authority. For the reading to be that ‘the northern hemisphere and a version of a T-O map’ is ‘Condensed into the left half of the circle’, I can then read the claim to ‘Condensed’ is being about a change or difference or concision. Rather, ‘the northern hemisphere and a version of a T-O map’ have been ‘Condensed into’ so there is something about both ‘the northern hemisphere’ as well as ‘a version of a T-O map’ that are, here, condensed versions, if you like, of an uncondensed ‘the northern hemisphere’ and an uncondensed ‘version of a T-O map’ — I do read these as separate by way of the ‘and’, as well as the idea that the ‘northern hemisphere’ is ‘the’ and ‘T-O map’ is ‘a version of a’. There is authority here in the sense that the perspective knows what an uncondensed ‘northern hemisphere’ and an uncondensed ‘version of a T-O map’ are in order to claim them as being ‘Condensed’ in this instance. Also, because it is a

‘Condensed into’ there is the idea that ‘the left half of the circle’, in a way, is what ‘the northern hemisphere and a version of a T-O map’ *are* here; in them being ‘Condensed’ they are, in some way, no longer uncondensed, and they have become, or are, something else. Now, obviously, the claim in perspective is that they are ‘the northern hemisphere and a version of a T-O map’, but with the perspective able to hold a position that can claim them as being ‘Condensed into’ there is the idea that despite the condensing there is still something of them that remains. Perhaps this is the ‘version of a’ that, in some way, modifies the ‘T-O map’ that the claim also knows exists elsewhere that is an other ‘version’. The perspective goes on to claim that:

The right-hand land-mass is equal in size and overall shape to the north. The main area of the region is labelled “Auster”, it is internally undifferentiated by rivers or separate regions, and a schematic wavy line outlines its boundary, unlike those that outline the north with more detailed coastal variations. The extensive passage in it says the area is “unknown to the sons of Adam” and yet “philosophers affirm it is inhabited”. The Australian terrain is cut off from the northern hemisphere, which the sun’s ecliptic (the red diagonal line that runs across the equator) and two equatorial oceans emphasize.

(Goldie, 2011, p.23)

Here, the perspective differentiates between the ‘right-hand land-mass’ and ‘the north’, yet also is able to claim that these two are ‘equal in size and overall shape’.

The ‘right-hand land-mass’ has a ‘main area of the region’, so then also has non-main areas that may or may not be of regions; the claim to ‘main’-ness I read to being about ‘is labelled “Auster” where ‘main’ and ‘labelled’, as well as the claim that ‘it is internally undifferentiated by rivers or separate regions’ where ‘main’ also has something to do with the absence (‘undifferentiated’) of ‘rivers or separate regions’.

The reading I am making here then would follow that ‘rivers or separate regions’ differentiate where ‘the main area of the region’ does not: ‘unlike those that outline the north with more detailed coastal variations’. Much like earlier, the claims to ‘*internally* undifferentiated’ and ‘*outline* the north with more detailed coastal variations’⁵⁹ are about the perspective being in a position to know and understand what is internal as opposed to outside. Here, this is very much about what is internal is ‘undifferentiated’ and lacks information, whereas detail is precisely what is able to outline and, to a certain extent, define what is ‘the north’ here. There is also excess in the sense that ‘the north’ has ‘more detailed coastal variations’; ‘more’ than indicates as well that the perspective knows of lesser ‘detailed coastal variations’ that are not here. The ‘right-hand land-mass’, on the other hand, is all about dearth: it is ‘internally undifferentiated by rivers or separate regions’, and where ‘the north’ has excess and detail to ‘outline’ it, here ‘a schematic wavy line outlines its boundary’.

⁵⁹ Italics mine.

But it does have a ‘main area’, so then there are other areas that are not ‘main’ and the perspective claims that it ‘is labelled “Auster”’.⁶⁰ The claim to it being ‘labelled’ is interesting in the sense that, in thinking about this being retrospective, it is being read *as a label* so the perspective is claiming a difference between ‘main area of the region’ and “Auster” because it is reading it as ‘is labelled’. So this is, and is not “Auster”, in this perspective. The following claim is that, with relation to this ‘main area of the region’: ‘The extensive passage in it says the area is “unknown to the sons of Adam” and yet “philosophers affirm it is inhabited”’. On reading the “ ” here, I read this as being about authority again in that I can read a difference between what is outside of the “ ” and what is inside. I read this out in more detail with relation to ‘()’ and “*” in my next chapter, but the foundation of my thinking here is that the claim is that in this perspective there is another perspective; that what is within the “ ” is another perspective.⁶¹

So there is an ‘extensive passage in it’ and this is something that ‘says’, so I can read that the perspective here is on the saying of the ‘extensive passage’: this is the difference. What it ‘says’ is that ‘the area is “unknown to the sons of Adam” and yet “philosophers affirm it is inhabited”’. So the perspective that is on the perspective that

⁶⁰ The Latin word ‘auster’ translates as ‘the south wind’ or the compass direction of ‘south’.

⁶¹ For more, see my chapter on ‘Maps’, where the problem is that this is still within the same perspective and this can never, even in a residual way, be an absolute other perspective. Reading speech marks in this way is about a claim that the perspective of that other perspective is just different.

is on the ‘the area’ has a knowledge of that which is “‘unknown to the sons of Adam’” and “‘philosophers affirm it is inhabited’”. So this perspective, which forms part of another perspective, knows who ‘the sons of Adam’ are and what is/not known to them, as well as who ‘philosophers’ are and what they can/not ‘affirm’. I can then read that ‘the sons of Adam’ and ‘philosophers’ are not the same, nor is the perspective either one of ‘the sons of Adam’ or one of these ‘philosophers’; this is all external to them and what is ‘unknown to’ or can be affirmed by, them. This is all, again, what ‘The extensive passage’ that the perspective claims is ‘in’ the ‘main area of the region’, ‘says’ about ‘the area’.

There is a shift now: ‘The Australian terrain is cut off from the northern hemisphere, which the sun’s ecliptic (the red diagonal line that runs across the equator) and two equatorial oceans emphasize’. Where the perspective before was making claims with relation to ‘The right-hand land-mass’ and ‘the north’, here we have ‘The Australian terrain’ and ‘the northern hemisphere’; reading on, the perspective also notes that Lambert of St. Omer ‘depicts a large southern continent on his *mappamundi*’. In any case, this ‘Australian terrain’ is not ‘the northern hemisphere’ as it has been ‘cut off from’ it; which is interesting in the sense of the claim being that it has been ‘cut off from’, where to read a ‘from’ is about a knowledge of it in relation to ‘the northern hemisphere’, which is where the ‘Australian terrain’ is from. Could it be then that this perspective is claiming that the ‘Australian terrain’ formed part of ‘the northern hemisphere’ before it was ‘cut off from’ it? I am and am not reading a prior here,

where there was a before and after with relation to the cutting off from, but in this sense, hierarchy is the issue. If I instate something as prior, that becomes a problem because the perspective then becomes split, or falls into a perspective and a non-perspective. In short, it simply is that the 'Australian terrain is cut off from the northern hemisphere', but in this I can read some problems around the claims to 'cut off from' that are absolutely about perspective, in terms of what is and is not known to be this 'Australian terrain' in relation to 'the northern hemisphere'.

Goldie then claims that Lambert of St. Omer's *mappamundi* is 'somewhat original and different from his contemporaries':

he is unique when, in the lower right of the northern hemisphere in the sea, he depicts and identifies a large island. The island bears the following legend: “Here the antipodes of us live, but they endure a different night and contrary days and summer as well.”⁶² A bold red line encloses the antipodean island. The same line only appears in select other places on the *mappamundi*: it borders the whole earth, it designates the ecliptic, and it encircles earthly paradise at the top of the map in the far east. Black lines outline the remaining islands as well as the edges of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Danielle Lecoq reasons that the line means the antipodes are “inaccessible”, suggesting that Lambert acknowledges tradition, yet he does not follow any authority in showing an antipodean island.

(Goldie, 2011, p.23)

⁶² Here, the perspective references the footnotes of the same text with the following: ‘*Hic antipodes nostri habitant sed noctem diversum deisque contrarios perferunt et estatem*’. In reading the map that the text references, there are a number of claims in what I read to be Latin (I had some assistance reading the Latin text from my CIRCL colleague, Evdokia Michalopoulou, who also provided me with the following translations into English): in the bottom-right of the left hemisphere: ‘*Locus draconum et serpentium et bestiarum crudelium*’; ‘A place of dragons and serpents and cruel beasts’; in a circular shape at the very bottom of the left hemisphere: ‘*Hic antipodes nostri habitant sed noctem diversum deisque contrarios perferunt et estatem*’; ‘Here our antipodes live, but they spend a different night and summer against the gods’, and to the right of the right hemisphere: ‘*Zona australis frigida inhabitabilis inteperata*’. ‘The cold, uninhabitable southern zone is uninhabitable’. I have chosen to read, what I read to be, the claims about the Latin in perspective, however it is interesting to me to also read the differences in perspective, as above.

The perspective claims that ‘in the lower right of the northern hemisphere in the sea, he depicts and identifies a large island’, where ‘a large island’ is that which can be ‘depict[ed]’ and ‘identifie[d]’. I can read that the perspective on the ‘he depicts and identifies’ is the same ‘he’ that ‘is unique’, so then the ‘unique[ness]’ of the ‘he’ is that ‘he depicts and identifies a large island’; the ‘depict[ion]’ and ‘identifi[cation]’ is that which makes the ‘he’ ‘unique’.

The perspective then claims that ‘The island bears the following legend: “Here the antipodes of us live, but they endure a different night and contrary days and summer as well.”’, where, if I read that ‘[t]he island’ is what the ‘depict[ion]’ and ‘identifi[cation]’ of ‘a large island’ is, it then also is what ‘bears’ a ‘legend’, so is part of the ‘depict[ion]’ and ‘identifi[cation]’ by the same ‘he’. What the ‘island bears’ is what I read to be another perspective of another perspective, where the perspective on the “ ” is about a difference; the claim is that ““Here the antipodes of us live [...]””, which is framed as being part of a ‘legend’. To read this ‘legend’, which is all part of the perspective on another perspective, there is a ‘[h]ere’ where there ‘live[s]’ an ‘us’ which has ‘antipodes of’ them; I can then read that ‘antipodes’ here is that which is ‘of us’, it belongs to an ‘us’ that is not the ‘he’ and that if the ‘[h]ere’ is where ‘the antipodes of us live’ then does the ‘us’ not ‘live’ ‘[h]ere’ with ‘the antipodes of us’? Do they ‘live’ not-‘[h]ere’? They are a ‘they’, in perspective, and ‘they’ are all about what

I read as opposition, as *other*, as well: ‘they endure a *different* night and *contrary* days’.⁶³

The perspective then claims that ‘A bold red line encloses the antipodean island’, so in the reading of the other perspective, what was a ‘depict[ion]’ and ‘identifi[cation]’ of ‘a large island’ is here ‘the antipodean island’ — is this the same island? Is the ‘depict[ion]’ and ‘identifi[cation]’ about the ‘bold red line’ that ‘encloses’ it? This is also, according to the text, the ‘same line’ that ‘borders the whole earth, it designates the ecliptic, and it encircles earthly paradise at the top of the map in the far east’. I can read then that this ‘bold red line’ does a number of things: it is that which ‘encloses the antipodean island’, ‘borders the whole earth’, ‘designates the ecliptic’, and ‘encircles earthly paradise’. So in this I am able to read that there is a similarity between ‘the antipodean island’, ‘the whole earth’, ‘the ecliptic’ and ‘earthly paradise’ in that this ‘same line’ ‘appears’ in these ‘places’; ‘same[ness]’ here can then also ‘appear’ and be in ‘other places’.

That ‘Danielle Lecoq reasons that the line means the antipodes are “inaccessible”’, is then already about this idea that ‘the line’ can even ‘mean’ something other than it being ‘the line’, in perspective. In thinking about the perspective on ‘Danielle Lecoq[’s] reason[ing]’ about ‘the line’ being that which ‘means the antipodes are “inaccessible”’; ‘the line’ and what ‘the line means’ are different from each other. In

⁶³ Italics mine.

the case of ‘the line’ it is about an accessibility for the perspective on ‘Danielle Lecoq’; ‘the line’ is not something that comes from anywhere, but what ‘the line means’ is what ‘Danielle Lecoq reasons that’ which has to be something other than what ‘the line means’. The ‘means’ are not the origin, and it does not mean that ‘the line’ or ‘the antipodes’ are in any way original or prior to the perspective on ‘Danielle Lecoq’. Instead, what ‘the line means’ is supplementary to ‘the antipodes’, and so because there is neither ability nor accessibility in the case of what ‘the line means’; they are different from each other. In this way, the idea that ‘the antipodes are “inaccessible”’ is bound up in this paradox of ‘mean[ing]’.⁶⁴ The production of a ‘mean[ing]’, in the perspective of another perspective, highlights the difficulties of, not just what is colloquially and collectively ‘the antipodes’, but of all islands:

⁶⁴ Sue Walsh claims that with the notion of a direct perceivables and reproducibles, ‘certain kinds of meaning-making can be rescued from arbitrariness and conventionality. The ironic possibility of speaking or signing the opposite of what is meant can thus be foreclosed’ (2003, p.29). Critics like Kümmerling-Meibauer (1999) claim there is a notion of a ‘literal meaning’ that is supposed to come first, against which is the challenge of this idea that there is a language or a system that ‘reflects’ a supposed ‘real world’. For readings that also challenge this idea with relation to critical discussions of ‘ideology’ in children’s literature specifically, see: Walsh, Sue. “Child/Animal: It’s the ‘Real’ Thing.” *Yearbook of English Studies* 32 (2002): 151-62; and Walsh, Sue. “‘Irony?’—But Children Don’t Get It, Do They?": The Idea of Appropriate Language in Narratives for Children”. *Children’s Literature Association Quarterly* 28.1 (2003): 26-36.

(physical) isolation, solitude, containment, boundedness and closure [...] symbols of (social) remoteness and exoticism [...] socio-economically and politically quintessentially peripheral [...] backwaters [...] little petri dishes floating in a saltwater medium.

(Boomert & Bright, 2007, pp.4-6).

★ ★ ★

As this chapter ends with a reading of a twelfth century map featuring an island, the next chapter, which will be considering mapping in relation to authority, starts off with a reading of the island of Neverland in *Peter Pan* (Barrie, 1911) as map, and then considers how this raises issues of reality and creates the space for confusion. Following this, I will read some entries from a variety of Captain James Cook's Endeavour Journals where there are further questions about confusion and authority.

Maps: Deserts of the real

[I]n that Empire, the Cartographer's art achieved such a degree of perfection that the Map of a single Province occupied an entire City, and the Map of the Empire, an entire Province. In time, these vast Maps were no longer sufficient. The Guild of Cartographers created a Map of the Empire, which perfectly coincided with the Empire itself. But Succeeding Generations, with diminished interest in the Study of Cartography, believed that this immense Map was of no use, and not Impiously, they abandoned it to the Inclemency of the Sun and of numerous Winters. In the Deserts of the West ruined Fragments of the Map survive, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the Country there is no other Relic of the Geographical Disciplines.

(Borges, 1946, p.325)⁶⁵

* * *

⁶⁵ This is a one-paragraph short story about the map–territory relation, written in the form of a literary forgery; it is credited fictionally as a quotation from ‘Suárez Miranda, *Viajes de varones prudentes*, Libro IV, Cap. XLV, Lérida, 1658’, in which it imagines an empire where the science of cartography becomes so exact that only a map on the same scale as the empire itself will suffice. It is also cited by Umberto Eco in his essay “On the Impossibility of Drawing a Map of the Empire on a Scale of 1 to 1.” *How to Travel with a Salmon and Other Essays*. Translated by William Weaver. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1994. 95–106. First published in 1982.

In the first chapter of J.M. Barrie's text *Peter Pan*, the narrative claims that Mrs. Darling, whilst putting her children to sleep, was 'tidying up her children's minds' (1911, p.6). As well as this claiming that the Darling children have untidy minds (more on this later) there is something of interest here about the relationship between the mind, the child(ren), and Mrs. Darling. The perspective goes on to to make a statement that creates a tension between the mind and a map, claiming:

I don't know whether you have ever seen a map of a person's mind.

Doctors sometimes draw maps of other parts of you, and your own map can become intensely interesting, but catch them trying to draw a map of a child's mind, which is not only confused, but keeps going round all the time.

(Barrie, 1911, p.6)

According to the narrator, people have 'mind[s]' that in turn have 'map[s]', and there is the possibility of 'see[ing]' these 'map[s]'. At the same time, the perspective on the 'I' 'do[es not] know' if the 'you' has seen one of many such maps, leading to the suggestion that in this perspective there is the possibility that 'you' can 'see' multiple 'map[s]' of multiple other people's 'mind[s]'. So if 'a person' then has 'a map' that is other to them and can be 'seen' by others, then can a person see 'a map' of that same person's 'mind'? Because the perspective has no knowledge if the 'you' has ever 'seen a map of a person's mind', there is the idea that the same 'you' could have 'seen'

other maps (not maps ‘of a person’s mind’) but also that ‘map[s]’ have to be seen — or, at least, this particular type of ‘map’ does. The ‘you’ may have seen one, but the perspective has no way of knowing whether or not they ‘have’ (if they ‘may have’ then by definition they also may not have), so this perspective is other to the ‘you’ in the sense that they do not know what it is they ‘have’, or have not, ‘seen’.

Here as well, ‘Doctors’ have the capability to ‘draw’ some kinds of ‘maps’: ‘Doctors sometimes draw maps of other parts of you’ — but this is only some of the time, on occasion. So ‘maps’ are ‘draw[n]’ (‘sometimes’ by ‘Doctors’, sometimes by not-doctors) ‘of other parts of you’. This is different to ‘a map of a person’s mind’ because these ‘maps’ are ‘of other parts of you’; one way to read this is that the not-other part(s) are then constituted as the ‘mind’ — the bits that the ‘Doctors’ do not ‘draw’. But if this is only ‘of a person’ as opposed to ‘you’, where the ‘you’ is other to ‘a person’, then ‘Doctors’ do not necessarily ‘draw maps of other parts’ of ‘a person’, they only do so for ‘other parts of you’. If these are the kinds of ‘maps’ that ‘Doctors [...] draw’, then there is nothing to suggest that ‘Doctors’ can also ‘draw a map of a person’s mind’ — or even if that particular kind ‘map’ is ‘draw[n]’ at all. Needless to say, ‘you’ can be split into parts, of which ‘maps’ can be ‘draw[n]’ by ‘Doctors’ (some of the time) and these parts are ‘other parts’, separate to parts of you that are not ‘other’. These many ‘maps’ are then, as I read it, individualised into something more personal: ‘Doctors sometimes draw maps of other parts of you, and your own map can become intensely interesting’. So the perspective has knowledge

of both the many ‘maps of other parts of you’ as well as ‘your own map’, so at the same time has access to something that is ‘your[s]’ as well as things that are of many ‘other[s]’. However the ‘map’ that is ‘your[s]’, belonging to the ‘you’, is a single ‘map’ as opposed to multiple ‘maps’, like the ‘maps of other parts of you’, so all at once there are ‘maps of other parts of you’ and ‘your own map’ which are all different. I read the difference as being that while ‘Doctors’ are the drawers of the ‘maps of’ your ‘other parts’, ‘your own map’ is in possession of the ‘you’; it is ‘your[s]’ as opposed to something that is owned by not-‘you’. Are these ‘maps’ drawn also? Is ‘your map’ drawn by ‘you’? Are they maybe not drawn at all? This map is also not of anything, where the ‘map of a person’s mind’ and ‘maps of other parts of you’ are all in relation to another thing: ‘mind[s]’ or ‘parts’. So while these ‘maps’ can be read as having a relationship to or with something (in that they can be ‘seen’ and ‘draw[n]’ respectively), this is not the case for all maps.

There is another possibility claimed by the perspective which is that this map (‘your own map’) can transition: ‘your own map can become intensely interesting’, going from a state of being not ‘intensely interesting’ to being so. This is only the case for ‘your own map’, however, and it remains something that it has the potential to do rather than the perspective claiming that either ‘your own map’ or even all ‘your own map[s]’ are ‘intensely interesting’. This ‘map’ is also different in that while the other kinds of maps are more passive in this perspective (they are ‘seen’ and ‘draw[n]’ by others) this ‘map’, ‘your own map’, can actively become something else.

There is a return then to what Mrs. Darling was tidying, ‘her children’s minds’, with somewhat of a claim to what I read as a problematising of what ‘Doctors’ can ‘draw’: ‘but catch them trying to draw a map of a child’s mind, which is not only confused, but keeps going round all the time’. I say problematising by way of the perspective stating that one might have to ‘catch’ them attempting to ‘map’ the ‘mind’ of a ‘child’. Firstly, the perspective is making a claim to a kind of impossibility here in that ‘Doctors’ can only ‘try[...]’ to draw the map of a child’s mind’ rather than actually be able to do so, and secondly there is something transgressive about the idea that they would be caught ‘trying to draw’ this particular ‘map’. I say transgressive in the sense of reading this as a kind of interception and capture; that to attempt, to try, ‘to draw a map of a child’s mind’ is in some way a thing that ‘Doctors’ can be caught doing, as opposed to not caught. In this way one might not be able ‘to catch them’ drawing other kinds of maps, leaving the attempted drawing of this one to be apprehended. Despite this — the fact that ‘a map of a child’s mind’ is not drawn and only attempted to be drawn by ‘Doctors’ — the perspective has knowledge of what ‘a map of a child’s mind’ is, what it should be, and how ‘to draw’ it. In short, the ‘child’s mind’ can be mapped because the perspective is able to identify when there is a ‘trying to draw’ it. As well as this, the claim is that such ‘a map [...]’ is not only confused, but keeps going round all the time’, where ‘confus[ion]’ and ‘going round all the time’ are apparently inherent in this particular ‘map’ where they may not be in other maps. Perhaps this is the ‘trying’ that the

‘Doctors’ are making: not only drawing a map ‘which is [...] confused’ but also one that ‘keeps going round all the time’. These two things that the perspective identifies as what I read to be the problem for the drawing ‘Doctors’ are mutually exclusive — ‘going round all the time’ is not ‘confused’, and vice versa — and further suggest that the difficulty is not drawing something that is ‘confused’ or something that ‘keeps going round all the time’, but drawing something that does (or is) both things simultaneously. In this way, ‘a map’ of a non-‘child’s mind’ may be ‘confused’ or it may ‘keep going round all the time’, but never both — hence why ‘Doctors’ are able to draw other ‘maps’. So then there is something of the ‘child’s mind’ that lends itself to these two things at once, and while one may be able to ‘catch’ ‘Doctors’ in the attempt of drawing ‘a map’ of it, this is also what the perspective identifies Mrs. Darling as tidying up. A ‘child’s mind’ can not be mapped by any of these ‘Doctors’, but it can be tidied by the mother.⁶⁶

The claim to Mrs. Darling’s ‘tidying up’ is indicative of the perspective’s view on the ‘child’s mind’ — or rather, ‘her children’s minds’ — as being in a state of untidiness which then is being tidied by the mother of these children. It is worth noting that here the construction of possession can be read a number of ways: ‘Mrs. Darling [...]

⁶⁶ The claim to ‘mother’ here is not completely my own, as I read it in the following claims: ‘the nightly custom of every good mother after her children are asleep to rummage in their minds’ and ‘[i]f you could keep awake (but of course you can’t) you would see your own mother doing this, and you would find it very interesting to watch her’ (Barrie, 1911, p.6). I do not do a reading of ‘mother’ here, but wanted to acknowledge what might be considered a slip in my reading of perspective.

was tidying up her children's minds' in which the 'minds' are of the 'children', and the 'children' are in turn of 'her'; but this could be read as the 'children's minds' (separate to the 'children') are of 'her'. In this way, with the separation of the 'child' and the 'child's mind' there is the reading that both things are belonging to and of the 'Mrs. Darling'. This follows through with the notion of tidiness, where the perspective claims that the mother is actively re-ordering that which is constituted as being in dis-order; that which is untidy is being tidied because it is 'her[s]'.

As mentioned above, the perspective (and possibly the 'Mrs. Darling' as well) has knowledge of what 'a map of a child's mind' is, what it should be, and how 'to draw' it: it is also something that is 'not only confused but keeps going round all the time':

There are zigzag lines on it, just like your temperature on a card, and these are probably roads in the island; for the Neverland is always more or less an island, with astonishing splashes of colour here and there, and coral reefs and rakish-looking craft in the offing, and savages and lonely lairs, and gnomes who are mostly tailors, and caves through which a river runs, and princes with six elder brothers, and a hut fast going to decay, and one very small old lady with a hooked nose.

(Barrie, 1911, p.7)

So this 'map' is something that has 'zigzag lines on it', separate to the 'map' itself, which are 'just like your temperature on a card'. As far as the 'map' itself is

concerned, these ‘zigzag lines’ do not constitute part of it but are ‘on’ the ‘map of a child’s mind’ in the same way that ‘your temperature is on a card’; ‘a map’ is to ‘a card’ what ‘zigzag lines’ are to ‘your temperature’. The first thing to note here is that the ‘map of a child’s mind’ is something that can have things other to it ‘on’ it; in effect, there is nothing about this ‘map’ that is in any way ‘zigzag lines’ so this is not what is ‘confused’ about the ‘map’. Secondly, the way that something that is of or belonging to ‘you’ (‘your temperature is on a card’) is compared to ‘lines on’ the ‘it’ reads as though ‘a map’ (and ‘a card’) are things on which separate things can be identified — in the sense that the ‘lines’ and ‘temperature’ are not the ‘map’ and ‘card’. In this there is also the perspective’s relation to the ‘you’ with the idea that ‘your temperature on a card’ is the way by which the ‘you’ will grasp the concept of this ‘map of a child’s mind’, where ‘your temperature on a card’ is something that both the perspective and the ‘you’ have knowledge of — almost like something of a common reference point that is known. So while the perspective knows what the ‘map of a child’s mind’ is, the ‘you’ does not — but it does know what all these things are: ‘zigzag lines’, ‘your temperature’, and ‘a card’.

But are the ‘zigzag lines’ zigzag lines? Yes and no. The perspective claims that these are ‘probably roads in the island’, and this is where it gets interesting (for me). In this case, the ‘zigzag lines’ could, but could also could not, be something else: ‘roads in the island’. If what the perspective claims is probable and the ‘zigzag lines’ are ‘roads in the island’, then ‘roads in the island’ becomes what is ‘on’ the ‘map of a child’s

mind'. Bound up in all of this is another construction of what I read to be adjacent-ness, just like how the 'zigzag lines' and 'temperature' are 'on' the 'map' and 'card', where 'road's (or 'probably roads') are 'in the island'. So this 'island' can have things within and separate to it, such as 'roads', that in turn are all 'on', but not part of, this 'map'. The question I suppose might then be whether to read 'zigzag lines' to 'roads' and 'map' to 'island' much like how I read the 'lines' to 'temperature' as 'maps' was to 'card'. In other words, both the 'map' and the 'island' are seen to be something that is other to the 'zigzag lines' and the 'roads' in the sense that they are supplemented by these things ('lines' 'on' a 'map', 'roads' 'in' an 'island'). In this way, the 'map of a child's mind' is not 'the island' — 'probably'. But not definitely.

There is also the question of 'a map of a child's mind' — which could be any 'map' of any 'child's mind', and the likelihood that this is (either in or itself) 'the island' — one 'island', singular. The perspective goes on to explain that 'for the Neverland is always more or less an island', seemingly justifying the chances of the 'zigzag lines' 'probably' being 'roads in the island'. Here there is another unstable certainty for the perspective, in that 'the Neverland is' (or could be) something else, much like the 'zigzag lines' being 'probably roads'. The difference though is that 'the Neverland is always more or less an island', indicating that it is defined by what it is not all of the time: it is either 'more or less an island'. So if the perspective is able to make the (im)precise claim that something is always either one of two things ('more or less') then it would be fair to read that the perspective does and does not know what 'the

Neverland is': in a sort of paradox, it is neither 'more or less an island' yet at the same time it 'is always' this.

If I pursue the reading that the 'map of a child's mind' is 'the Neverland', and this is that which has no fixed state (it is 'always more or less an island'), the perspective then lists a number of things: 'the Neverland is always more or less an island, with astonishing splashes of colour here and there, and coral reefs and rakish-looking craft in the offing, and savages and lonely lairs, and gnomes who are mostly tailors, and caves through which a river runs, and princes with six elder brothers, and a hut fast going to decay, and one very small old lady with a hooked nose'. I read this to be what 'the Neverland is': 'more or less an island, with' each of these things. As such 'an island', 'more or less', without 'astonishing splashes of colour', without 'coral reefs' and without 'savages' (etc.)⁶⁷ would not be what 'the Neverland is'. In effect, an 'island' without all of these things, or even some of these things, would not be 'the Neverland': would not be a 'map of a child's mind'. So while there is an imprecision about what the perspective claims 'the Neverland' to be, the ensuing description of what 'an island' that constitutes 'the Neverland' could be is very much the opposite. In this way, the perspective can be said to know what 'the Neverland is', unambiguously.

⁶⁷ I do not list all of the things that 'the Neverland is always more or less an island, with', as the points I am making are more about the idea of supplementation as opposed to the specific things that, in perspective, constitute 'the Neverland'.

At this point it is worth returning to the notion that this is all something that is either something that ‘Doctors’ can only try to ‘draw’ or that there is something transgressive about the idea that they would be caught ‘trying to draw’ this. It appears not to be that these things are impossible ‘to draw’ or constitute as ‘map’, but rather that what the perspective has so far outlined a ‘map of a child’s mind’ to be is ‘easy’:

It would be an easy map if that were all; but there is also first day at school, religion, fathers, the round pond, needlework, murders, hangings, verbs that take the dative, chocolate pudding day, getting into braces, say ninety-nine, three-pence for pulling out your tooth yourself, and so on.

(Barrie, 1911, p. 7)

In this way, there is something about ‘astonishing splashes of colour here and there, and coral reefs’ (etc.), that is ‘easy’, and something about ‘first day at school, religion, fathers [...] and so on’⁶⁸ that seems to be what the perspective identifies and constitutes as the difficulty for ‘Doctors’ who can only be caught ‘trying to draw a map of the child’s mind’. This is also about an excess with regards to the additions of (‘there is also first day at school, religion, fathers [...] and so on’) which is something more than ‘if that were all’. The would-be ‘easy map’ is also claimed to be a

⁶⁸ As per my previous footnote, with relation to what ‘an easy map’ would be ‘if that were all’.

seemingly finite amount of things, whereas the list that follows ‘if that were all’ ends with ‘and so on’; so here I can read that there is something of the infinite to what makes the ‘easy’ map not-easy, because the ‘all’, if it were simply ‘astonishing splashes of colour here and there, and coral reefs and rakish-looking craft in the offing, and savages and lonely lairs, and gnomes who are mostly tailors, and caves through which a river runs, and princes with six elder brothers, and a hut fast going to decay, and one very small old lady with a hooked nose’ is then followed by an ‘also [...] and so on’. The perspective knows the would-be ‘easy map’ and is able to claim what it is that constitutes it, but it cannot do the same for the not-‘easy map’. So while earlier I was able to read that the perspective knows ‘the Neverland’ and knows how to ‘draw’ ‘a map’ of it, the ‘and so on’ forms part of that ‘map’, rather than it being incomplete; ‘so on’ is not multiple other things that are not part of the perspective’s construction of the ‘map’, it is a part, if you will, of it. On the other hand, the ‘and so on’ could be something of a claim to knowing without sharing in that knowledge. As in: does ‘and so on’ relate to something in excess of the ‘map’ which is known by the perspective but not constituted in this formulation? Throughout, the perspective knows how to ‘draw’ a ‘map of a child’s mind’ and knows how to ‘draw’ ‘the Neverland’, as well as claiming how difficult it is for others (‘Doctors’ especially). While I can read ‘and so on’ to be very much a part of the perspective’s formulation of ‘the Neverland’, the ‘on’ is also a claim to an excess that exists outside of the ‘map’ itself.

Thinking again about the ‘map’ of ‘the Neverland’, I can read that ‘first day at school, religion, fathers, the round pond, needle-work, murders, hangings, verbs that take the dative, chocolate pudding day, getting into braces, say ninety-nine, three-pence for pulling out your tooth yourself’ are very much separate from ‘and so on’ in that the ‘so on’ is both part of the ‘map’ of ‘the Neverland’ in perspective but also in excess of it. The perspective then claims: ‘and either these are part of the island or they are another map showing through, and it is all rather confusing, especially as nothing will stand still’. This supports the reading that the ‘and so on’ both does and does not constitute the ‘map’ itself insofar as ‘either these are part of the island or they are another map showing through’, where the first possibility — the ‘either’ — claims that ‘these are part of the island’; part of being a claim to ‘the island’ itself having ‘part[s]’ of which these things are one. In this as well, these multiple things form one single ‘part of the island’ where there are then other ‘part[s]’ that make up ‘the island’ that are not identified by the perspective, whether it knows what these parts are or not. For ‘the island’ then to have ‘part[s]’, to be made up of things that are of and in excess of it, is to separate ‘the island’ from ‘the map’ that is ‘of’ it.

So while one possibility is that ‘the island’ is made up of different ‘part[s]’, and those ‘part[s]’ are made up of many things, the second possibility — the ‘or’ — is that ‘they are another map showing through, and it is all rather confusing, especially as nothing will stand still’. In this construction, what ‘they are’ is ‘another map’ where I

can read a doubling (or multiplying) of ‘the map’ in which what ‘they are’ is an additional map on top of a prior map that already exists within this perspective. So once again there are multiple things that form a singular (in this case, ‘map’) and here this other map is ‘showing though’ — ‘showing’ what, and ‘through’ what? ‘[S]howing’ is about another excess to itself in which this ‘another map’ is actively ‘showing’ something that is not the ‘another map’, almost like a projection. This also is about an other to which what is being ‘show[n]’ is also ‘show[n]’ — an audience or receiver, if you like — as I read ‘showing’ to be about an additional excess to the shower and the ‘showing’; the receiving of that same ‘showing’. If the ‘another map’ is what is ‘showing’, then this does not necessarily mean that the same ‘map’ is doing the ‘showing’, nor what is on what I am going to loosely call the receiving end of the ‘showing’. This perspective knows that the ‘another map’ is ‘showing’, and in this instance it is ‘showing through’. But, again, ‘through’ what? I read ‘through’-ness to be about an excess as well; that ‘through’ which this ‘map’ is ‘showing’. As well as being about the other, ‘through’-ness is also about continuation and being towards another thing where that which is, in this case, ‘showing through’ is neither here nor there; it is still active in a way, and in the process of. This might be about time, for this present ‘showing’, which can never truly be present,⁶⁹ has not yet completed its ‘showing’ in this perspective in the same way that that which it is ‘showing’ (or will show) ‘through’ is latent.

⁶⁹ As I discuss earlier in my chapter on ‘States’ (in particular, pp.60–61), there is no such thing as present.

What the perspective does know, however, is that this ‘another map’ is (currently) ‘showing through’ and that this ‘is all rather confusing, especially as nothing will stand still’. This is somewhat of a paradox as although the perspective claims this is ‘confusing’, it holds a position from which it can make the claim. So by way of knowing what ‘confusi[on]’ is and being able to identify it here, the perspective is not confused at all. Therefore, is the claim that ‘it is all rather confusing’ about the other to whom it is all ‘confusing’, then?⁷⁰ The problem here is that this is something about not understanding, which links to the crucial issue of reading authority according to that perspective.

So how can perspective not be perspective? It is only if there is a claim to authority in that perspective according to that same perspective that authority emerges as a reading. So, interestingly, if the perspective is claiming itself as authority then in a sense there is a separation because it ends up being a perspective on its own authority.

This is all about the limits, if you like, of mapping. Mapping is a reduction, a forgery, an impossibility: to consider the playful Jorge Luis Borges again, a ‘Relic of

⁷⁰ This kind of narration is extremely prevalent in children’s literature, and is something which I will discuss in my chapter on ‘Trespassers’. For more on the narrative position of assumed knowledge (particularly of ‘the child’) see: Walsh, Sue. ““Irony?—But Children Don’t Get It, Do They?”: The Idea of Appropriate Language in Narratives for Children”. *Children’s Literature Association Quarterly* 28.1 (2003): 26–36; and Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín. “Fantasy, Literature and Childhood: In Pursuit of Wonderlands.” *Writing and Fantasy*. Edited by Ceri Sullivan. London: Routledge, 1999. 197–206.

the Geographical Disciplines' (1946, p.325). This reading of the map continues to destabilise the idea of an underlying 'real'; that what is claimed as the authority is always an effect of the perspective.

* * *

In thinking about ideas of authority, Brian Sanford notes in his review of a chronological account of the British explorer, Captain James Cook's, life, *Captain Cook* (Gould, 1935), that 'almost nothing needed correction in light of [John C.] Beaglehole's outstanding 40 years of study that culminated in the biography "The Life of Captain James Cook"' (1986, p.482), with the line alluding to the New Zealand historian, John Beaglehole's, accurate biography attributed to Gavin Kennedy, the editor of the 1978 publication of Gould's account.

So where is the authority here? Sanford's review? Kennedy's editing? Gould's text? Beaglehole's studies and/or biography? Cook himself? What would it be to identify any of them *as* authority, and how can I read this? To follow on my thinking about authority and where the claim to confusion might lie, I want to consider two different publications of Captain James Cook's journals.

I do also want to note the significance of looking at journals (in general, as I will do so later in this thesis as well), in light of my interests in education as well. Consider the following claim from the BBC's *Bitesize* website, a free online study support resource for school-age pupils in the United Kingdom: 'A non-fiction text is based

on facts. It is really any text which isn't fiction (a made-up story or poetry). [...]

Non-fiction texts include: [...] reviews, letters, diaries and journals' (2024). There is, and has always been, this idea that non-fiction is associated with 'fact' and truth and is categorically not 'made-up'.

The first journal I am going to look at is published as being 'Prepared from the original manuscripts by J. C. Beaglehole' and has also been 'Selected and edited by Philip Edwards'. On 30th November 1769, Captain James Cook makes the following journal entry at the Bay of Islands off the North Island of New Zealand:

After the Ship was moved into deeper water I went with the Pinnace and yawl Man'd and Arm'd, and landed upon the Island accompan'd by M^r Banks and D^r Solander. We had scarce landed before all the Canoes left the Ship and landed at different parts of the Island and before we could well look about us we were surrounded by 2 or 3 hundred people, and notwithstanding that they were all arm'd they came upon us in such a confused, Straggleing manner that we hardly suspected that the[y] meant us any harm, but in this we were very soon undeceived, for upon our indeavouring to draw a line on the sand

between us and them they set up the war dance and immediatly some of them attempted to seize the two Boats.

(Cook[§], 30 November 1769, p.94)⁷¹

This perspective constructs we/us and they/them in a way which is helpful for me in making a reading of confusion. First of all the 'I', after landing upon 'the Island' which is other to the 'I', is 'accompan'd by M^r Banks and D^r Solander' which is then what I read to be the 'we'. In this way, 'we' is about 'accompan[iment]' and although it is a collection or coming-together of multiples, it is also defined here by that which is central ('I') because of those which 'accompan[y]' it ('M^r Banks and D^r Solander'); there is almost a hierarchy within this construction of 'we'. The Island that this we 'landed upon' also 'landed at different parts of the Island' in this perspective where (just like the 'map' of 'the Neverland') it has 'parts', however it is the different 'parts of the Island' that are landed 'at', whereas 'the Island' (parts included?) is landed 'upon'. Something to note here is that it is the 'we' that 'landed upon the Island' but it is 'Canoes' that 'landed at different parts of the Island', so therefore 'we' land 'upon' and 'Canoes' land 'at' when it comes to 'the Island' and its 'parts'. Once landed, the perspective claims 'before we could well look about us we

⁷¹ As noted in my bibliography, I will reference the journal entries as (Cook[§]) from the following source: Cook, James. *The Journals. Prepared from the original manuscripts by J. C. Beaglehole for the Hakluyt Society, 1955-1967*. Selected and edited by Philip Edwards. London: Penguin, 2003.

were surrounded by 2 or 3 hundred people', in which it knows that the 'we were surrounded' 'before we could well look about us'. Despite being able to know this, the same perspective does not know whether or not it was '2 or 3 hundred people' that they were surrounded by, only that it was either '2 or 3 hundred'. In the same way that 'the Neverland is always more or less an island', the perspective here knows that which surrounded the 'we' (im)precisely resulting in a claim that in making a statement to knowing, in a very crude way, it knows it does not know. This narration indicates to me that whether or not it was '2 or 3 hundred people' is of unimportance or consequence. It simply does not matter. These '2 or 3 hundred people', thereafter reduced to simply 'they', 'were all arm'd' and 'came upon us in such a confused, Strageling manner that we hardly suspected that the[y] meant us any harm'. Like the 'I', 'they were all arm'd' and the perspective claims that the manner in which 'they came upon us' was 'confused' and 'Strageling'.

An 1893 transcription of Cook's Journals narrates the entry on the same date as follows: 'they came upon us in such a *confused, straggling* manner that we hardly suspected that they meant us any harm' (Cook[‡], 30 November 1769, p.165).⁷²

⁷² As noted in my bibliography, I will reference the journal entries as (Cook[‡]) from the following source: Cook, James. *Captain Cook's Journal During His First Voyage Round the World, made in H.M. Bark Endeavour, 1768-71: A Literal Transcription of the Original MSS.* Edited by W. J. L. Wharton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. First published in 1893. Italics mine.

What I am going to focus on here is that this transcription of the Journals claims to be ‘A Literal Transcription of the Original MSS’. The paradox that lies in the claim to being a ‘literal transcription of the original’ (for me, ‘literal[ity]’ is about a seductive representation of exactness which can never be realised, and ‘transcri[bing]’ is another kind of representation, like translation, where the re-production splits away from whatever ‘origin’ there was in the perspective) amuses me, as does the idea that this is ‘a literal translation’, of which there are multiple and many other literal translations all of the ‘original’. That is all very clear and not confusing, to me, in the slightest (so confusion is about a lack of clarity in my perspective?). So precisely because it amuses me, and because this will become of particular importance later on, I shall refer to this text as the *Literal Transcription* from hereon in, and the former text as the *Prepared Journals* (as this is how the publisher introduces this text).

So in this way, while neither of these texts that I am reading are the ‘original’, if you like, I can read a difference between the perspectives on this in the following way: the *Prepared Journals* claim that ‘they came upon us in such a confused, Stragleing manner’ (Cook[§], p.94) and the *Literal Transcription* claims that ‘they came upon us in such a confused, straggling manner’ (Cook[‡], p.165). As such, there is something about ‘straggling’ that is ‘literal’ with relating to the ‘original’ as opposed to ‘Stragleing’ which is not. The ‘they’ being ‘confused’ — or, rather, having a confused manner’ — is claimed in both perspectives, but rather than say that this is then what

‘they’ ‘literally’ were, I am interested in what the implication is of the perspective (literal or otherwise) being in a position to make a claim on behalf of the other of ‘confus[ion]’.

This is not so much about no confusion, but more that it is ‘confusing to a stranger’;⁷³ but to a degree as it is ‘very confusing to a stranger’. This may also then be somewhat ‘confusing’ to someone who is not ‘a stranger’ in this perspective which may then potentially include itself in its own knowledge, as it were.

Much like in *Peter Pan*, there is a paradox here of the perspective making a claim to ‘confus[ion]’ while at the same time knowing what ‘confus[ion]’ is and being able to identify it without being confused themselves. The difference, in both the *Prepared Journals* and the *Literal Transcription*, is that while the narrator in *Peter Pan* claims that ‘it is all rather confusing’ (Barrie, 1911, p.7), the narrators on Cook’s perspective here claim that the manner of the ‘they’ is ‘confused’ (Cook[§], 30 November 1769, p.94; Cook[‡], 30 November 1769, p.165). To read this out fully: the ‘they’ as identified by these different perspectives on Cook’s perspective have a ‘manner’ and it is the ‘manner’ that is ‘confused’ (and ‘Strageling’ (Cook[§]) or ‘stragglings’ (Cook[‡]) depending on the perspective), rather than the ‘they’ that are ‘confused’. From this I can read that, because it is the ‘manner’ that is ‘confused’, the perspectives know of other ‘manner[s]’ that the ‘they’ have which are not ‘confused’, so then they are in a

⁷³ As I will read later on.

position of privilege in order to know not only what the difference in manners are that ‘they’ have, but also whether or not those different manners are ‘confused’ or not. To have awareness of that which belongs to the other being ‘confused’, or of ‘confus[ion]’, is significant to me; bound up in being able to make this claim is the idea that to recognise and identify confusion has to come from a position of non-confusion, and in doing so the claim relegates that which has been identified as confused to being inferior, and not the/an authority — ‘they’ are ‘confused’, we are not.

In a subsequent claim in the *Literal Transcription* off the coast of Cape Flattery in Queensland, Australia on 10th August 1770, there is the following claim:

In this Channell had 14 fathoms water; the Northermost point of the Main we had in sight bore from us North-North-West 1/2 West, distant 2 Leagues. 4 or 5 Leagues to the North-East of this head land appeared 3 high Islands,* (*The Direction Islands.) with some smaller ones near them, and the Shoals and Reefs without, as we could see, extending to the Northward as far as these Islands. We directed our Course between them and the above headland, leaving a small Island* (*The Two Isles. Cook had now got among the numerous islands and reefs which lie round Cape Flattery. There are good channels between them, but they are very confusing to a stranger.

Cook's anxiety in his situation can well be imagined, especially with his recent disaster in his mind.)

(Cook[‡], 10 August 1770, p.297)

I can read a separateness and a sameness in the '3 high Islands' and 'The Direction Islands'.⁷⁴ In this way, I want to read this as the perspective seeing an equivalence or link between that which is contained by the parentheses and that which precedes the asterisk; for example, that the '3 high Islands*' are linked to or have a connection with '(*The Direction Islands)'. I'm making the connection by way of the repeated '**' which reads to me to be an elaboration or detailed statement regarding the claim that is '**'. In this case I can read that the '3 high Islands' are also 'The Direction Islands' in this perspective, with 'The Direction Islands' being a more precise naming of the 'Islands' as opposed to any '3 high Islands'. One way of reading the '(')' and the '**' is that the claim is that in this perspective there is another perspective; that what is in '(')' is another perspective. But the problem with this is that this is still within the same perspective and this can never, even in a residual way, be an absolute other perspective and is always according to themselves. So it may well be that reading the '(')' in this way is about a claim that the perspective of that 'other' perspective is less valid than itself in some way. In another way, it may just be different (in its perspective).

⁷⁴ For more on the construction in perspective of separateness and a sameness in the context of both translation and punctuation, see my chapter on 'Metaphors'.

I can read on the one hand that there is a similarity because there is a repetition of 'Islands' and there is a repetition of the '*'. But I can also read the difference: one of these repetitions is in '()' and the other is not. So the '3 high Islands' that 'appeared' are, in this perspective, in another perspective 'The Direction Islands', if I were to read that the '()' are constitutive of a perspective within a perspective. This is not about authority or superiority; there are just two different ways in which the 'Islands' are read. It is worth noting as well that while '3 high' and 'The Direction' Islands are different, there are also 'these Islands' in the same perspective. I can read these as different, however, because what connects '3 high Islands' and 'The Direction Islands' is the repeated '*' and the '()', which are not there for 'these Islands', but then again 'these Islands' can also be read as a claim to both '3 high Islands' and 'The Direction Islands' in terms of 'extending to the Northward as far as these Islands'. But in fact, 'these Islands', are either '3 high Islands' and 'some smaller ones near them', of which the latter are 'with' the former and so can not be 'The Direction Islands'; or they are 'The Direction Islands' which are only constituted as '3 high Islands' in this perspective, not inclusive of 'some smaller ones' because the equivalence is between the '3 high' and 'The Direction' Islands only. This then means that I am also reading 'these Islands' as being a shift in perspective: '3 high Islands,* (*The Direction Islands.)' are also 'these Islands'. The shift comes about through the claim to 'as we could see, extending to the Northward as far as these

Islands', to being about 'extending to the Northward as far as' the 'we could see'. So, in another sense, this is all about what is seen and what appears.

As the perspective continues, 'We directed our Course between them and the above headland' there is another shift to 'them' and it's about directing 'our Course' which is different to 'we could see' and the 'appeared' which is to the perspective. It goes on: 'our Course between them and the above headland, leaving a small Island*' (*The Two Isles. Cook had now got among the numerous islands and reefs which lie round Cape Flattery. There are good channels between them, but they are very confusing to a stranger. Cook's anxiety in his situation can well be imagined, especially with his recent disaster in his mind.)'. All of this is then a perspective on; a perspective on 'Cook' and on 'Cook's anxiety', but at the same time the 'we' is still a perspective in retrospection (so it is still on). There is still the same connection that I can read out between the constitutions of 'Island' again, in much the same way as I did in my previous chapter. This time, however, the similarity that I read as connecting the '*' both in and out of the '()' is about a difference between 'a small Island' and 'The Two Isles'. The split in perspective is about 'Island' and 'Isles', where this perspective (on another perspective) constitutes a single 'small Island' both as 'Two Isles', but also as separate, in a very similar way to the way '3 high' and 'Direction'.

The thing that makes this split interesting to me is very much about the perspective on 'Cook' and the perspective on the we/us/'our', and the relationship between this

and how this text is constituted as being the *Literal Transcription*, as opposed to the *Prepared Journals* which makes the following claim from the same date:

Four or 5 Leagues to the NE of this head land appear'd three high Islands:
we directed our Course between them and the above headland leaving a
small I^d to the Eastw^d of us which lies NBE 4 M. from y^e 3 I^s having all the
while a boat ahead sounding.

(Cook[§], 10 August 1770, p.160)

First of all, I need to reiterate that there can be no 'literal' in perspective. The literal is a claim from elsewhere which inherently splits the literal away from the notion of absolute presence. That being said, the perspective in perspective, in making claims to 'The Direction Islands', 'The Two Isles', 'Cook's anxiety' and what I read to be his 'confusion' as a 'stranger', for me frames the claim to 'literal'. Further to this, the perspective, in making a claim within the '()' from the *Literal Transcription* that there 'are good channels between them, but they are very confusing to a stranger' (Cook[‡], 10 August 1770, p.297), is not 'a stranger' whereas 'Cook' is. There is a big difference then between the perspective that does not regard itself as 'a stranger' (because it knows it is 'confusing to a stranger', and therefore not to itself, in perspective) and 'Cook' who is identified in perspective as being one. In the same way, I can read that the claim to '([...] Cook's anxiety in his situation can well be imagined, especially with his recent disaster in his mind.)' is a claim where this

perspective does not have an anxiety, in the same way it is not a stranger, but it knows about 'Cook's anxiety' and Cook's 'situation', not the anxiety or situation of this perspective. So in all these respects I can read that the split perspective in '()' from the *Literal Transcription* knows more than 'Cook', according to itself, and is therefore not 'Cook's'. The whole *Literal Transcription* is not Cook's perspective in any way. The paradox here is that what makes this 'literal' is the perspective that is not Cook's perspective; it is the least 'literal', to put it loosely.

Cook is the stranger.

Cook is confused.

★ ★ ★

Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory — *precession of simulacra* — that engenders the territory, and if one must return to the [Borges] fable, today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map. It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges persist here and there in the deserts that are no longer those of the Empire, but ours. *The desert of the real itself.*

(Baudrillard, 1981, p.1)⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Baudrillard also cites the Borges short story that I include at the beginning of this chapter as the ‘the most beautiful allegory of simulation’, describing how ‘the double ends by being confused with the real’ (1981, p.1), covering the very thing it was meant to represent. The line ‘the desert of the real’ is referenced in a line from the sci-fi film *The Matrix* (1999) in which virtual reality uses computers to produce powerful simulations of the experience of those who are plugged into its sensory devices. The line from the film, in turn, is used by Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Žižek, as the title to his book: *Welcome to the Desert of the Real* (2002).

Interlude: The anus of the world

In August of 2022 I was lucky and fortunate enough to be able to travel back to New Zealand for the first time in eight years to see my family. While travelling there, I came across a history-based comedy BBC podcast with an episode that was about Captain Cook and the Endeavour voyage to the South Pacific. On it, Katherine Parker, a historian of the European encounter with the Pacific and Pacific exploration, specialising in the production and dissemination of geographic knowledge by European empires in the long eighteenth century, made the following claim with relation to the botanist on board the Endeavour, Joseph Banks:

Banks has this sublime, romantic view of this rock arch that he says is just the most beautiful thing in nature he's ever seen, but the Māori actually call that 'the anus of the world' [...] the Māori actually also call him 'goblin' for doing things like collecting grass from cliffs and for knocking at stones on beaches, so this is just very classic Banks behaviour and the Māori are just kind of confused by whatever he's doing.⁷⁶

(Jenner, 2022)

⁷⁶ There is also a similar claim on the New Zealand Geographic website: 'He was also entranced by a natural rock archway that framed a gorgeous view of the bay. "So much is pure nature superior to art," he declared in the journal. Maori, being less susceptible to the romantic notions of a European sensibility, named the archway Te Kotore o te Whenua, "the anus of the land"' (Hunt, 2024).

Like with so many of my readings, this is all about the perspective on ‘Banks’ in terms of what ‘he says’ and his ‘behaviour’ with relation to ‘the Māori’ and what they ‘actually call’ things. What ‘Banks has’ is this ‘sublime, romantic view of this rock arch’, in which a ‘view’ can indeed be had. So the ‘view’ is separate to ‘Banks’ because is is what he ‘has’ and, in any case, ‘view[ing]’ is ‘is’; ‘has’ would not be the ‘view’ as once ‘view[ed]’ it is that which ‘he says is’. The ‘view[ing]’ and the ‘say[ing]’ are separate, so ‘it’ can be ‘view[ed]’ as other than ‘it’, such as ‘that he says is’. This ‘view’ is also the ‘sublime, romantic view of this rock arch’, where there are then other ‘view[s]’ of ‘this rock arch’ that are not ‘sublime’ and/or ‘romantic’.

Indeed, by way of the perspective on this ‘view’, this is constituted as a ‘but’; so the perspective knows of, and that, the perspective on ‘Māori actually’ is then constituted as being a ‘but’. The claim to ‘the Māori actually’ is significant as it, for me, frames ‘the Māori’ as the authority here.

But in what way am I reading the claim to authority, in how this perspective frames ‘Banks’ and ‘the Māori’? This both is and is not the case, as the perspective knows ‘the Māori’ and what they ‘actually call’ things as well as that they ‘are just kind of confused by whatever [Banks is] doing’; in this way, the perspective is an authority *on* ‘the Māori’, so what is it for me to read ‘the Māori’ *as authority*, in this perspective? I think that it is tied up in the ‘but’ and the ‘actually’. I read this as a kind of contradiction or an alternative to, in the sense that the perspective knows that while ‘Banks has’ and ‘says’ one thing, about ‘this rock arch’, ‘the Māori actually

call that ‘the anus of the world’, where what ‘the Māori actually call that’, is ‘actually’ ‘this rock arch’. But then again this is all claimed as being a ‘this’ and a ‘that’; ‘this’ is not ‘that’ so in some ways where the ‘rock arch’ is ‘*this*’, ‘the Māori actually call *that*’.⁷⁷ And this is all, as well, ‘this sublime, romantic view of’, and it is also what ‘he says is just the most beautiful thing in nature he’s ever seen’, so none of this, really, is the ‘rock arch’ at all, because it is a ‘view of’, and what ‘he says’ about it — there is distance, if you like, between ‘Banks’, the ‘he’, and the ‘rock arch’. In thinking, then, about the ‘actually’, I can still read some form of authority going on here, in the sense of it being a claim to it being *actual*. As I have read, this is a perspective on the perspective on the ‘rock arch’, but because the perspective on what ‘the Māori actually call that’ (if I can read ‘that’, in perspective, as what ‘Banks [...] view[s]’ and ‘he says is’) is “the anus of the world” it is both ‘actually’ and a perspective on another perspective, by way of reading the “”. As I read elsewhere in this thesis with respect to brackets and parentheses and footnotes, reading the “” is about a claim that the perspective of that *other* perspective is different; there is a separateness and a sameness. The authority, for me, comes with the framing of it as ‘actually’ of this idea that because of what the other perspective, in perspective, claims as being actual, is more *real* or more *true*.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Italics mine.

⁷⁸ For more on readings of the real, especially in children’s literature, see: Rose, Jacqueline. *The Case of Peter Pan, or, The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction*. London: Macmillan, 1994. First published in 1984.

The same thing then plays out when reading the claim that ‘the Māori actually also call him ‘goblin’’, where the perspective on ‘Banks’ has established a ‘he’ and a perspective on ‘the Māori’ that ‘actually also call him ‘goblin’’. The ‘actually’ does the work again because it is ‘also’ — in addition to what else ‘the Māori’ are ‘actually’ doing elsewhere.

It is simply that ‘this rock arch that he says is just the most beautiful thing in nature he’s ever seen’ is also ‘the anus of the world’; and Joseph ‘Banks’ is also a ‘goblin’.

The juxtaposition of ‘the most beautiful thing in nature’ and ‘the anus of the world’ is, of course, amusing in the trivial sense that this is ultimately all about the construction of a reality in perspective.⁷⁹ However, it speaks, to me, about the idea of what is real and what is true, what is ‘actually’ the case, in perspective, and how this forms part of the wider narrative. It seems to me that Banks’ inability to see the ‘rock arch’ for what it ‘actually’ is, his blindness, if you will, is trivialised with the crassness of it being known to the locals as ‘the anus of the world’.

⁷⁹ Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann argue that reality itself is a construction too: ‘reality is socially constructed and the sociology of knowledge must analyse the process in which this occurs [...] Sociological interest in questions of ‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’ is thus initially justified by the fact of their social relativity. What is ‘real’ to a Tibetan monk may not be ‘real’ to an American businessman’ (1966, pp.13, 15).

The real issue, what is *actually* at stake here, is that what ‘actually’ is, is not the narrative that is pervasive and publicised. New Zealand is, and always has been, from an external and foreign perspective, about the beauty and the magnificence and the nature;⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Thanks must go to my good friend Andrew Brown, Regional Director at World Travel & Tourism Council, for providing me with the following information about tourism in New Zealand, which fits the narrative that I discuss: New Zealand has recently been ranked the fifth best country in the world by a prestigious travel publication, and also features in a list of the world’s best hotels and luxury resorts (Rutledge, 2023). In a list of top countries viewed as good for tourism by global survey respondents, New Zealand ranks number seven for tourism, and number eight in ‘Best Countries Overall’, claiming also that ‘British and Polynesian influences course through picturesque New Zealand’ (U.S. & World Report News); this same source ranks New Zealand number one for ‘Racial Equality Rankings’. In terms of e/migration, there has been an annual net migration gain of 126,000 in 2023. The net migration gain is claimed as being the largest for a calendar year, in which the net migration gain of non-New Zealand citizens averaged 474 a day in 2023, and the net migration loss of New Zealand citizens averaged 129 a day; in short, New Zealand is losing around 50,000 citizens every year, and gaining over 170,000 immigrants (Stats NZ). Finally, according to the World Happiness Report by the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, New Zealand is the tenth happiest country globally for 2023 (Walsh, 2023). In November 2023, NZ Tourism instated a tourism pledge: ‘Tiaki Promise’. The dedicated website for this initiative reads: ‘New Zealand is precious, and everyone who lives and travels here has a responsibility to look after it. The Tiaki Promise is a commitment to care for New Zealand, for now and for future generations. By following the Tiaki Promise, you are making a commitment to New Zealand. To act as a guardian, protecting and preserving our home. Nau mai, haere mai ki Aotearoa. Welcome to New Zealand’.

Banks, too, as the owner of an order of chivalry, was awarded decorations that anoint him as one who has made substantial contributions to the world of nature and science.⁸¹

‘[A]ctually’, one of these things is associated with faeces and where we pass stool out of the body, and the other is a ‘goblin’.

⁸¹ Sir Joseph Banks was invested as a Knight of the Order of the Bath in 1795 which became Knight Grand Cross when the order was restructured in 1815 (*The London Gazette*, 1795). Since then, an image of Banks was featured on the paper \$5 Australian banknote from its introduction in 1967 (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2024), and in 1986 Banks’ portrait was depicted on a postage stamp issued by Australia Post. The Sir Joseph Banks Conservatory was constructed in 1989 Lincoln, UK, and a plaque was installed in Lincoln Cathedral in his honour. In Boston, Lincolnshire, Banks’ portrait, painted in 1814 by Thomas Phillips, was commissioned by the Corporation of Boston, as a tribute to one whose ‘judicious and active exertions improved and enriched this borough and neighbourhood’. The Sir Joseph Banks Centre, also located in Lincolnshire, is housed in a Grade II listed building, which was recently restored by the Heritage Trust of Lincolnshire to celebrate Banks’ life (Correia, 2020). At the 2011 Chelsea Flower Show, an exhibition garden celebrated the historic link between Banks and the botanical discoveries on his journey on Captain Cook’s ship *Endeavour*. The competition garden was the entry of Melbourne’s Royal Botanic Gardens with an Australian theme: it was based on the metaphorical journey of water through the continent, related to the award-winning Australian Garden at the Royal Botanic Gardens, Cranbourne. The design won a gold medal (Gadd, 2011). In Australia, the Canberra suburb of Banks, the electoral Division of Banks, and the Sydney suburbs of Bankstown, Banksia, and Banksmeadow are all named after him, as is the northern headland of Botany Bay, Cape Banks. A number of schools and colleges are also named after him, including the Sir Joseph Banks High School in the Sydney suburb of Revesby and the Joseph Banks Secondary College opened in Perth, Western Australia in 2015 (Hughes, 2020).

Metaphors: **Pissing at the edge of a path**

BRIAN: Look. You've got it all wrong. You don't need to follow me. You don't need to follow anybody. You've all got to think for yourselves. You're all individuals!

FOLLOWERS: Yes, we're all individuals!

BRIAN: You're all different!

FOLLOWERS: Yes, we are all different!

DENNIS: I'm not.⁸²

(Life of Brian, 1979)

* * *

James Kerr, in writing on the importance of language in leadership, provides a helpful perspective on how 'powerful' metaphors are:

⁸² This line was not scripted and was instead ad-libbed by New Zealand actor Terence Bayler: he 'utter[ed] two of the film's most memorable lines. During the final crucifixion scene, Brian's fellow prisoners try to pass themselves off as him in order to escape death (a subversion of the "I'm Spartacus" moment in Stanley Kubrick's 1960 film). Amid the many cries of "I'm Brian", [Bayler] exclaims "I'm Brian, and so's my wife" — an ad lib by Bayler. Earlier in the film, when the assorted throng worshipping Brian shout in unison "We are all individuals", Bayler interjects "I'm not" — another ad lib' (Hadoke, 2016). The idea, based on the above claim, that the joke was delivered 'ad lib' even more perfectly serves to be representative of the issues with 'irony' and 'metaphor' that I go on to discuss.

[T]hey are the basis for our understanding of life itself. In fact, if we believe Freidrich Neitzsche, all language is a metaphor — ‘what strange simplification and falsification mankind lives on!’ [...] an analogy of reality, a simulacrum.

(Kerr, 2013, p.151)

It is important to me in my current line of work that I consider these ideas seriously; as an educator in English, there is an incessant requirement for students coming through the United Kingdom education system to comprehend and use metaphor at GCSE level. Turning once more to the trusty BBC’s *Bitesize* website, ‘metaphor’ is ‘use[ing] an image or idea to represent something else’ (2024). They are seen as important, *crucial*, even: for Aristotle, ‘the greatest thing by far is to have a genius for metaphor [...] it the mark of a gifted nature, — for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances’ (*Poetics*, XXII, 1459a9). The American Literary theorist, Kenneth Burke, points to their prevalence and importance in everyday life: ‘it is precisely through metaphor that our perspectives, or analogical extensions, are made — a world without metaphor would be a world without purpose’ (1935, p.194).

States are a fantasy. Islands are imagined. Maps are deserts. Joseph Banks is a goblin. Dennis is not an individual, and Brian Cohen is not the son of God (and is a very naughty boy).

In *Metaphors We Live By*, a book that suggests metaphor is a tool that enables people to use what they know about their experiences to understand more 'abstract' things, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson state that 'our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around the world, and how we relate too other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities' (1980, p.1). According to this claim, 'concepts' here are shared by an 'our' to whom they all belong, and these same 'concepts' inform what a 'we' 'perceive[s]' in such a way that they 'structure' the perception. The perception then relies on the 'concepts' but only to structure 'what' the 'we perceive[s]'; perception might then exist for the 'we', but unstructured unless 'our concepts structure' the perception to form a 'what'.

They also 'structure', as I read it, 'how we get around the world, and how we relate to other people'. Much like how the 'we' perceives a 'what' that is structured by 'our concepts', so to is a 'how' 'structure[d]' for the 'we' to 'get around the world', and to 'relate to other people'; but not the same 'how': one 'how' 'structure[s]' 'get[ting] around', and the other 'structure[s]' 'relat[ing] to'. Without 'our concepts', then, the 'we' cannot 'perceive ... get around, [... or] relate to other people' in what this perspective claims is a 'structure[d]' way. 'We could' do all of these things still, but they would lack 'structure'.

Another 'our' is claimed alongside a 'conceptual system', a particular system which is, in this case, 'conceptual', which I read as belonging also to the 'our'; it 'thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities'. It is the 'conceptual system' that 'plays

a central role', but only by way of 'thus'. I read this to be about 'our conceptual system', perhaps something subsequent to 'our concepts structure', in which the 'structur[ing]' that takes place by way of 'our concepts' produces a 'conceptual system' ('thus').

The 'system' is 'conceptual', though, which I read to be about an abstraction and/or idea, in which the 'system' exists within the claim itself. Is this then more like a hypothetical 'system'? Nevertheless, it 'plays a central role in defining our everyday realities', where 'realities' (more than one reality) are of an 'our' and are 'everyday' in their multiplicity. These shared 'everyday realities' (as opposed to other kinds of 'realities' that are perhaps not 'our[s]' or are not 'everyday') are, here, defined in part by 'our conceptual system' in that it 'plays a central role', but a 'role' nonetheless. So there are other 'role[s]', peripheral or marginal perhaps but certainly not 'central', that may also 'play' alongside the 'conceptual system' to 'defin[e] our everyday realities'. As they 'play' a 'role' here, they both are and are not that 'role' – I might read that to 'play' a 'role' in or of something is to assume the nature of such a 'role', whilst being simultaneously not the 'role' in that it is something like a guise; something that is assumed on a temporary basis. Here the 'role' is 'central', and there are, then, other 'role[s]' to be cast, and perhaps other 'system[s]' to 'play' those 'role[s]'.

Because 'our everyday realities' are 'defining', there is a recognition within the claim to a definition but that definition does not yet exist insofar as it is still being defined.

So ‘our everyday realities’, if they are not or have not yet been defined, can be said to be indefinite and without precision. They exist, as the claim has been made, but they have no definition. Here, definition lacks exactness; it is uncertain. Or is there certainty over its indefiniteness? The definition is known though, despite the lack of it. The perspective has knowledge of the outcomes of the defining process. What is the implication of this?

Roberta Seelinger Trites references this argument from Lakoff and Johnson in an article concerning ‘embodied metaphors’ in Mark Twain’s *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (1884), with specific relation to the claim that ‘metaphors structure how speakers think’:

In other words, our brains store language in a cognitive process that proves to shape — and even structure — our perceptions. Lakoff and Johnson also contend that we rely on concepts in a linguistic process that begins in childhood. For example, many speakers of English learn in childhood to equate metaphors of physical vision with metaphors of cognitive understanding, which is demonstrated when they say such things as, “Yes I see that” or “The argument looks different from my point of view”.

(Trites, 2014, p.11)

The claim ‘in other words’ is somewhat undermining of Lakoff and Johnson; is what follows a rephrasing of the former claim, just ‘in other words’? Does the perspective

need to reiterate or clarify in some way the same idea but ‘in other words’; can the same idea even be formulated ‘in other words’?

To the perspective, however, these are not ‘other words’ because it is ‘in’ other words. So there is a shift or a change, which is pertinent to the notion of what translation can be conceived to be, whereas if I ask whether or not it is a translation, I skip the very question of what translation is. Is translation, in ‘other words’? Are translation words into ‘other words’? Is translation all about words? Is it just the otherness of the recognisable words which are still always continuously ‘word’s; is that what translation is?

But into is also different to ‘in’, where I read ‘in’ as something spatial, as in the location of other words — so there is a continuity. It cannot be translation. Into would be a placement into, so there would be an external that would become internal. In this sense, the idea of translation itself is constantly shifting in terms of what is continuous and what is discontinuous; where is the continuity and where is the discontinuity situated according to the perspective which claims to know all of this? In this way, itself is the point of continuity; always.

The same thing applies to the metaphor issue. The perspective knows all of this: this is one kind of metaphor and this is another kind of metaphor, but they are both still ‘metaphors’. So if the perspective knows what is non-metaphorical then what is at

stake? What does the perspective know here about metaphor and non-metaphor; a ‘physical vision’ and a non-‘physical vision’ (maybe)?

Much like Lakoff and Johnson claim an ‘our’ that has ‘concepts’ and a ‘conceptual system’ (1980, p.1), according to Trites ‘our brains store language’ (2014, p.11); the our has multiple brains that all ‘store language’ (for here, ‘brains store’, or at least ‘our[s]’ do) as something like a box where things (like ‘language’, for instance) can be ‘stored’ and stockpiled. So ‘language’ is acquired? Must it not be, in order for ‘our brains’ to ‘store’ it?

The ‘brains’ do the ‘stor[ing]’, and ‘language’ is ‘store[d] in a cognitive process’, where again there is a claim to a going on or happening of process, and here, ‘language’ is ‘store[d]’. All ‘language’? This is part of a ‘process’; a ‘cognitive process’ that has the ability to ‘store’ (thanks to ‘our brains’ collectively, and so perhaps this is not a ‘process’ that can be performed by merely one of ‘our brains’; a collective effort is required), and the process ‘proves to shape’ as well.

‘[O]ur perceptions’ are then being ‘shape[d]’ (again, they have not been ‘shape[d]’, just like ‘our everyday realities have not been defined’) by ‘a cognitive process’, in which ‘our brains store language’. Is ‘language’, in this form, what ‘proves to shape — and even structure — our perceptions’? ‘[E]ven structure’ reads almost as if it is unexpected for them to do so or that ‘structure’ is supplementary to the ‘shap[ing]’ of ‘our perceptions’; a nice, but not crucial, by-product of the ‘prov[ing]’. So ‘our

perceptions' can be 'shape[d]' (and 'structure[d]', although not in quite the same way) by a 'prov[ing]' of 'a cognitive process', all of which is 'our'. Who is excluded from the 'our'? If the process of 'shap[ing ...] our perceptions' is ongoing, then is this a claim to the unfinished nature of these 'perceptions'; either that 'our perceptions' are not fully structured or 'shape[d]', or that 'our perceptions' are deficient in some way because they are still being 'structure[d]' and 'shape[d]'?

How about *their* 'perceptions'?

The perspective knows both 'metaphors of physical vision [... and] metaphors of cognitive understanding' to be 'metaphors'; knows they are different, knows there is something in excess of metaphor; so then what are the differences in the continuity of the perspective which can see all of that, as well as situating its excess?

'For example' is also about the notion of repetition — so 'for example' is that there are other 'example[s]' which are possible, this is one of them, so there is the notion again of a continuity and a discontinuity. This is because of the claim: 'For example, many speakers of English learn in childhood to equate metaphors of physical vision with metaphors of cognitive understanding', where 'for example' is one of other possibilities in which the 'for' has intention and purpose in that claim that it is surplus. In addition, exemplarity is like stereotype, something which is in excess of itself, one of more; it stands for others and is the same as them and yet is different in being the 'example', in this perspective. Because it has to stand for something else, it

splits; in order to be an example of something else there have to be two. I am reading in the 'for' that it is in the service of exemplarity that this is a 'for example', and then the exemplarity I am reading in terms of that multiplicity which is about difference and a continuity nonetheless.

There are 'many speakers of English', which means then not all 'speakers of English learn in childhood'. They are also 'speakers of English', so then there are 'speakers of lots of things, these just happen to be 'speakers of English'. This means that, with relation to the 'many speakers of English [that] learn in childhood', the perspective knows that *they* 'learn in childhood' what is metaphor and what is not-metaphor.

The importance here, for me, is that according to the perspective they already know that; 'in childhood', the 'many speakers of English' know that 'metaphors of physical vision' and 'metaphors of cognitive understanding' are not 'equate[d]'. They have to 'learn' to 'equate'. They know about these 'metaphors'. They know they are different. They know that 'physical vision' has 'metaphors' 'of' it; they know that there are 'metaphors of cognitive understanding', as well; but they have not yet figured out that they 'equate' to/with each other. This is the further step that they have to 'learn'. So 'in childhood' they already have all of this knowledge, or at least the 'many speakers of English' do. There is then the problem: does this mean that the 'many speakers of English who learn in childhood' have 'a cognitive understanding' which is not-metaphorical, and 'a physical vision' which is not-metaphorical? Must they not, to know what 'metaphors' are?

There is, inherently in the claims that Lakoff and Johnson make (according to Trites), a difference between the metaphorical and the non-metaphorical. Do these 'speakers' just have knowledge of the 'metaphors', rather than 'physical vision' and 'cognitive understanding'? The perspective certainly does have knowledge in excess of that, but in its view do the 'speakers' then only know during the 'learn[ing]' in childhood? In that 'learn[ing]', do they only know 'metaphors', or do they not also know, necessarily, the non-metaphorical? And is that then specifically a knowledge, because it is 'equate[d]' to? To know the 'metaphors', they must know the non-metaphors by implication; in which case, if they know the non-metaphorical 'cognitive understanding', that means that prior to 'learn[ing ...] to equate' it to something else, they also have a 'cognitive understanding' which is not innate to themselves. So 'cognitive understanding' is again a secondary process, and 'physical vision' also. These 'speakers' start out knowing the difference, and by knowing the difference they do not have either; they do not have 'physical vision' and they do not have 'cognitive understanding'.

What I am wondering about here is that if they can 'equate [these] metaphors', then they have to know they are 'metaphors' in order to 'equate' them. Or, is it in the 'learn[ing]' that they also 'learn' about the non-metaphorical 'physical vision' and the non-metaphorical 'cognitive understanding'? In this way, the 'learn' would be the moment at which the split that is necessitated in order for 'equat[ing]' to take place, it is not prior to that. To 'learn', I can then read, is to move out of a place of

non-learning, because they are ‘many speakers of English’ before they ‘learn’.

Nonetheless, it does mean that the ‘many speakers of English learn in childhood’ and know, at that point then, that there are ‘metaphors of physical vision’ and ‘physical vision’ (non-metaphorical), as well as ‘metaphors of cognitive understanding’ and ‘cognitive understanding’ (also non-metaphorical), and all of that must then come from a perspective that knows those four things from *another* perspective.

Paradoxically, in these claims, there is something prior to ‘physical vision’ and prior to ‘cognitive understanding’ in order to have the perspective on both of them as the difference which produces the ‘metaphors of’.

This is also the constant problem around physicality: that physicality both collapses everything into something which has no perspective on itself but is just the physical; that the physical is all about the material, the self-evident, and objectness which is not split from itself. However in perspective it is always split from itself, necessarily, because it is known as such. There is then the bizarre notion that ‘cognitive understanding’ is known by something that is prior to ‘cognitive understanding’,⁸³ and the same can be said for ‘understanding’ and ‘vision’.

⁸³ For a reading of John Locke and the problem of cognitivism and understanding, see: Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín. *Criticism and the Fictional Child*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994; in reference to Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. Originally published in 1689.

The idea of ‘understanding’ and retrospection here is to have a perspective on ‘understanding’ that has to come from a perspective where ‘understanding’ is split against itself. This problem is of a ‘cognitive understanding’ which has an ‘understanding’ prior to itself, or at least a ‘cognit[ion]’ prior to itself which is not defined as a ‘cognit[ion]’ or an ‘understanding’, but nevertheless has to be understood from a position other to itself to be understood as ‘metaphor’ and non-metaphor; the same applies with the claim to ‘physical vision’.

The claim that “‘Yes I see that” or “The argument looks different from my point of view””, raises the problem with the claim to a ‘point of view’; for ‘point of view’ is different from perspective (which has its own issues) because, here, the ‘point of view’ is known to belong to the ‘my’.⁸⁴ From which perspective is it known to be a ‘point of view’? From a non-‘point of view’? That conflict is always there, necessarily. And this, here, is all a seeing of a ‘see[ing]’, or it is a claim to a kind of observed or known ‘see[ing]’ and that is different from ‘look[ing]’.

What about ‘demonstrated’; ‘demonstrated’ to whom? Again, this is not one of the ‘speakers of English’, this is a perspective on many of the ‘speakers of English’ (‘they say’), so this is not one of the ‘many speakers of English’ but they are ‘they’. This is a

⁸⁴ For a reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* and the philosophical consequences of retentions of an essentialist reading of ‘the child’ and considerations of ‘point of view’, see: Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín. “The Philosophical Investigations’ Children.” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 35.4 (2003): 381–394.

past in a past; the ‘many speakers of English’ are, anyway, not ‘in childhood’ because that has already passed — they were children previously to being ‘many speakers of English’, or at least ‘many’ of them were, in this claim. Which is a ‘for example’, so there are other situations anyway which fall within this exemplarity, as well as functioning as an ‘example’.

Is the ‘demonstration’ not doing the same things to the ‘for example’? This is not the thing itself either, like how the ‘example’ is split off from the thing that it exemplifies; there is something separate from it. There is representation, ‘demonstrat[ion] when they say’, so ‘they’ are seen to be equivalent or alternate in terms of ‘demonstrat[ing]’ this. And because this is what ‘they say’, it is in the ‘say[ing]’ that they demonstrate, but only when ‘they say’. So actually the ‘say[ing]’ is also not there, it is only ‘when’ (the when-ness of the ‘say[ing]’), and they ‘say such things’. So the ‘many speakers’ are ‘say[ing] such things as’, ‘I’ and ‘my’ because they are all the same in being ‘many speakers of English’, or they are all ‘speakers’ anyway, and ‘of English’. They all ‘see that’, and everything ‘looks different from my point of view’.

‘The argument’ still is not about ‘look[ing] different’, it is still ‘the argument’. I am also wondering if ‘the argument’ is ‘look[ing] different from my point of view’, where I am reading the ‘my’ as ‘many speakers of English’, because the ‘many speakers of English’ are ‘demonstrat[ing] when’. Then ‘the argument’ — for the non-‘speakers of English’, or for the ‘speakers of English’ who do not ‘learn in

childhood' even — will 'look different from my point of view' anyway. But there is an 'argument' still, 'look[ing] different' does not affect that, and it also has to look different 'from my point of view', so the 'look[ing] different' also does not change. And it also does not change that it is 'my point of view'. So how do these constitute the 'equat[ing of] metaphors of physical vision [and] cognitive undersanding'? Is it in the 'see[ing]' or the 'look[ing]' that they are 'equate[d]'? Or is it the 'say[ing]' that constitutes the 'equat[ing]'? The 'learn[ing] in childhood to equate' is 'demonstrated when they say' and because it is that which is 'demonstrated', so the 'equat[ion]' is in the 'when they say' because that is the 'demonstration'. But with the claim to 'such things as', these 'things' are not even the 'things' they are 'say[ing]', because 'as', is other to itself, displaced from itself. This multiple displacement is the problem of 'physical vision' anyway; what is 'physical vision', really? Where is the physicality of vision situated? In the eyes? The eyes certainly do not see anything.⁸⁵

The real problem here is the problem of all these kinds of claims: that this is somehow too loose a formulation, or that Trites does not understand the 'in other words'. This is why the issue of *translation* is so fundamental when considering metaphor; that somehow 'other words' can, or have the ability to, allow or inhibit the perspective from being able to *understand*.

⁸⁵ For more on seeing and identity with relation to the veil and the idea that the veil divides something from itself, see: Thomson, Stephen. "The Instance of the Veil: Bourdieu's Flaubert and the Textuality of Social Science". *Comparative Literature* 55.4 (2003): 275-292.

The claims here to ‘our brains’ and ‘our perceptions’ are extremely problematic, as is the reference to how ‘we rely’, but I want to focus my reading on how ‘seeing’ and ‘understanding’ are formulated in the same passage:

Lakoff and Johnson also contend that we rely on metaphors about the human body to help structure our understanding of abstract concepts in a linguistic process that begins in childhood.

(Trites, 2014, p.11)

Here there is another claim to a collective ‘we’ that ‘rel[ies] on metaphors about the human body to help structure our understanding of abstract concepts’, so the ‘rel[iance]’ of ‘we’ on these ‘metaphors about the human body’ is necessitated to ‘help structure our understanding of abstract concepts’. Without these ‘metaphors’ which, I am reading, are known to the ‘we’, perhaps ‘we’ here is that which/who knows the ‘metaphors’? All of them? Or just ‘these’ ones? In any case it ‘help[s] structure our understanding’, another collective ‘understanding’ of something. Is this the same ‘understanding’? Is the argument that ‘we’ all ‘understand’ the same thing(s) in the same way(s)?

Also, is to know these ‘metaphors about the human body’ to know ‘the human body’? Or is it a claim about the ignorance of ‘know[ing]’ it? The ‘human body’ also suggests (to me) a single ‘human body’ that ‘we’ can rely on ‘metaphors about’; in

which case, are all ‘human bod[ies]’ the same? This is very much multiple ‘metaphors’ about a single ‘human body’.

To ‘help structure our understanding’ is, again, to claim that ‘understanding’ is deficient in that it needs assistance or help to be complete; the ‘understanding of abstract concepts in a linguistic process that begins in childhood’ lacks ‘structure’, which it relies on ‘metaphors’ for, and these only ‘help’ to ‘structure our understanding’. ‘[W]e’ can understand these ‘abstract concepts’, though, even in their abstraction. So, by this token, the ‘understanding’ is not necessarily deficient/lacking, it simply has no ‘structure’. It ‘structure[s] our understanding’ which is ‘of abstract concepts’, so it belongs to, and is ‘of’, these ‘concepts’, which in turn are ‘in a linguistic process that begins in childhood’. Locating ‘a linguistic process’ (one of many other ‘linguistic process[es]’) as beginning ‘in childhood’ is interesting. What ‘childhood’? A(nother) shared one? If it begins ‘in childhood’, it cannot be there now for the ‘we’, so where is the ‘linguistic process’ now? This all ‘begins in childhood’, and is then not there now to claim that this is where it ‘begins’. Can another particular ‘linguistic process’ (not this one) begin outside or in excess of ‘childhood’? What does this mean with respect to the ‘linguistic process’ that it can begin elsewhere? Is this about childhood as location? As source or origin?

This is all, as well, what ‘Lakoff and Johnson [...] contend’, which I read in much the same way to ‘in other words’; this both is and is not what ‘Lakoff and Johnson

[...] contend', much like how I might read a translation, perhaps — it is the perspective's claim to what 'Lakoff and Johnson [...] contend'. Thinking back to my previous readings of the 'for example'; this claim, also, is to do with a kind of equivalence as well, as I read it, not dissimilar to 'in other words' that 'many speakers of English learn in childhood to equate metaphors of physical vision with metaphors of cognitive understanding'; here there are 'speakers of English' of which 'many' but clearly not all 'learn in childhood' to do something. Here, 'childhood' is also somewhere that the narrative locates a process ('learn') much like 'a linguistic process'. This, again, makes a claim to 'learn[ing] in childhood' for 'many speakers of English', and so the few (not-'many') and the non-English 'speakers', and the many English non-speakers do not learn (in childhood) 'to equate metaphors of physical vision with metaphors of cognitive understanding'. Do they 'learn' it elsewhere? Do they 'learn' it at all? This is something that can be 'learn[ed]' though. What is, definitely, 'learn[ed]' by these 'many speakers of English' is 'to equate'. I read this to be about comparison and/or similarity, between two things: 'metaphors of physical vision' and (I can read comparison by way of the 'with' here) 'metaphors of cognitive understanding'.

First of all, 'vision' is 'physical' here, and 'understanding' is 'cognitive'. There are other kinds of 'vision' and 'understanding', but these kinds can be 'equate[d]' by way of their respective 'metaphors'. So, each has numerous 'metaphors' all of which, I read, can be 'equate[d]' with each other. So, is what is 'learn[ed] in childhood' the

ability to ‘equate’ all ‘metaphors of physical vision’ with all ‘metaphors of cognitive understanding’? If so, one of the ‘many speakers of English’ is able to (or ‘learn[s]’ to) have knowledge of all ‘metaphors’ (of ‘physical vision’ and ‘cognitive understanding’) ‘in childhood’. The question might be, here, is the ‘learn[ing]’ that takes place ‘in childhood’ confined to ‘childhood’? Does that ability to ‘equate’ remain with the ‘learn[er]’ when exiting ‘childhood’? Where is the perspective identifying the ‘equat[ing]’? They have knowledge of the ‘many’ and the not-‘many’, evidently; ‘many [...] equate in childhood’, for example, and not-‘many’ do not (either ‘equate’ at all or else not ‘in childhood’). What kind of ‘childhood’ does this set up for the not-‘many’, then?

Weakness? Deficiency? Difference? Lack? Disability?

There is something significant as well about the claim ‘to equate’, and what this may or may not be claiming about the ‘many English speakers’ in how one type of ‘metaphor’ can be drawn up against another type of ‘metaphor’. An ‘understanding’ of metaphor: to read metaphor is to make a claim about an author and a reader at the same time: *the author meant this, not that, or the reader is supposed to understand it this way not that way*. Could this be about how the narration is defining the ‘many’ versus the not-‘many’? Those who ‘get it’ and those who do not?

The perspective (again) constructs another reading within the claim: ‘which is demonstrated when they say such things as, “Yes, I see that” or “The argument looks

different from my point of view”. So all of this is a ‘demonstrat[ion]’ of how ‘metaphors of physical vision’ are ‘equate[d]’ with ‘metaphors of cognitive understanding’, by the ‘many English speakers’ who learnt this ‘skill’ ‘in childhood’. This is, or these are, *equations*, then.

Are the two sayings ‘metaphors’? Are they each equations?

They contain metaphors, though, of ‘vision’ and ‘understanding’, as well as claims to an identified ‘English speaker’, as I read it, who has ‘learn[ed]’ something ‘in childhood’, as this is a ‘demonstrat[ion]’. So perhaps it is not a ‘demonstrat[ion]’ of something else, in fact? As it only ‘demonstrates’, rather than anything else — much like a reproduction.

* * *

In the same text, Trites makes the following claim with reference to ‘Chinese’ and ‘metaphor’:

[...] In Chinese a similar metaphor occurs when the character “ming” (bright) is combined with the character “bai” (white) to indicate the idea of understanding something clearly or with clarity: 明白 míngbái. According to Lakoff and Johnson, the embodied metaphors we use affect our cognition because when we apply one embodied concept to another unrelated, abstract concept, in a process that is called “mapping”, both

concepts become linked in our thought processes — as vision and understanding are for most speakers of English and, as the above example suggests, of Chinese. For many people, then, seeing serves as an embodied metaphor for understanding, in a metaphor that makes it virtually impossible to separate the physical process of vision from the cognitive process of comprehending or understanding a concept.

(Trites, 2014, pp. 11-12)

Is the ‘similar metaphor’, here, ‘similar’ to ‘metaphors of physical vision’ and/or ‘metaphors of cognitive understanding’? Is it ‘similar’ to something else as if it is ‘a similar metaphor’ — singular, and so a particular ‘metaphor’ as opposed to multiple ‘metaphors of cognitive understanding’ or ‘physical vision’?

It occurs, though, ‘in Chinese’; Chinese is place/location here, ‘in’ which a ‘metaphor’ of ‘similar[ity]’ occurs. To claim a ‘similar[ity]’ ‘in Chinese’ is to make it secondary in some way, by way of the nature of ‘similar[ity]’ it has to be in reference to some other kind of ‘metaphor’ that occurs elsewhere; in this case, not ‘in Chinese’. This ‘similar metaphor’ also only occurs ‘when the character “ming” (bright) is combined with the character “bai” (white)’, so here as well the similarity is dependent on a moment (‘when’) of combination — if these ‘characters’ are not ‘combined’, then the ‘similar metaphor’ does not occur. The ‘combin[ation]’ indicates ‘the idea of understanding something clearly or with clarity’, and so the

‘metaphor’ itself is neither the ‘understanding [of] something’ (as it is the ‘idea of it’), nor is it ‘the idea of understanding’, because it only indicates ‘the idea’. Deferrals abound. Even so, the ‘indicat[ion]’ of this ‘idea of understanding’ has options: the ‘understanding’ can be conducted in other ways as well, even if this is an indication of the idea of it. In addition to this, ‘understanding something [...] with clarity’ is about an ‘understanding’ that is supplemented by another thing: ‘clarity’. Here, ‘understanding something’ can be done ‘with’ the aid of ‘clarity’, which again is about some kind of help or aid — the indicated ‘idea’ of which can be brought about by ‘combin[ing]’ ‘characters’.

But only ‘in Chinese’.

To whom is the ‘understanding [...] clear’ or achieved ‘with clarity’? Is the ‘or’ an option? Something can either be understood ‘clearly’ or understood ‘with clarity’? They are not the same ‘understanding[s]’, in any case. So is it then that something about ‘the character “ming” (bright) [...] combined with the character “bai” (white)’ produces this ‘clarity’ of ‘understanding’? What is ‘the character’ in each instance? Is “ming” a ‘character’? What about ‘(bright)’?

What is ‘character’? I read it to be about a substitution of some kind or a creation — a replication? That “ming” (bright)’ is something else; that this is representative of something else? Or is it that “bai” is ‘the character’ and that this is representative in some way? Is ‘(white)’ ‘the character’? This is all ‘in Chinese’, remember, so I want to

say that there is something about translation here that I cannot quite put my finger on. What I can say is that there is a separateness (and, actually, a sameness) in the “ming” and the “bai” that I can also read in the ‘(white)’ and the ‘(bright)’. So I am wondering: are these ‘the characters’? In their separateness, is this how they they ‘indicate the idea of understanding’ for this perspective, and is this how the sameness comes about?

So how about ‘明白 míngbái’: is this the ‘similar metaphor’? Is this ‘in Chinese’? What is the significance, if any, of the claim here being about a ‘similar metaphor’, that occurs ‘in Chinese’ and then my own reading of it in English? Or am I reading something in Chinese? I think I might be. ‘[S]imilar metaphor’ is an indication of the idea of understanding.

But only ‘in Chinese’.

Is this perhaps that in its similarness, and as such its difference, the ‘metaphor’ that this is ‘similar’ to either indicates ‘understanding’ (rather than just the idea of it) or that it is ‘understanding’ of some sort; clear or otherwise? Do these claims construct the idea of deferral, and by doing so indicate that something that is ‘in Chinese’ does not possess the exactness and fullness of a ‘metaphor’ that, say, ‘speakers of English learn’? Could it be that “ming” (bright)’ is a ‘character’? And that “bai” (white)’ is also a ‘character’? I read a duality in this construction of ‘the character’ in each instance, which is about a singularity; ‘the character’, one. So, if a singular ‘character’


is made up of what I read as two things, as I read “‘ming (bright)’ to be (as “‘ming” and ‘(bright)’), then ‘character’ can have or can be made up of multiple things.

Unless “‘ming” is a kind of ‘(bright)’, and “‘bai” is a kind of ‘(white)’?

Is this “ ” and ‘()’, ‘Chinese’? Where I read “‘ming”, “‘bai”, ‘(bright)’ and ‘(white)’ to be the ‘similar metaphor’ that contains them; are they ‘in’ it?

* * *

In the 1935 text, *The Blue Lotus*, there is the following sequence of images:



(Hergé, 1935, p.43)

I am first going to read these images, and then reflect on issues in my own readings to highlight some of the problems with reading pictures.

The way I read the claim ‘What’s your name? ... I’m Tintin’ in the first panel is so that the character ‘speaking’ these lines is Tintin, and then from the second panel, the perspective makes a claim to the other character: ‘I am Chang Chong-chien’. In

this second panel, according to the perspective on Tintin and what I am going to call his ‘speech’, is ‘?’; which has previously been that which appends a query: from Tintin, ‘What is your name?’ and from Chang Chong-chen, ‘Why did you save my life?’. Where I can read a similarity between all of these claims in that they are all questions, and I can also read what I read as the answer to each of them as so: to ‘What is your name?’, ‘I am Chang Chong-chen’; to ‘Why did you save my life?’, ‘?’; and to ‘?’, ‘I thought all white devils were wicked, like those who killed my grandfather and grandmother long ago’. In this way, ‘?’ can be read as both an answer and a question in and of itself in the way that I can read Tintin and Chang Chong-chen in this perspective.

First of all, wicked or not, I can read that Tintin is a ‘white devil’ here; it is only Chang Chong-chen’s ‘thought’ that is known by the narrative, according to the perspective on him. In thinking about my readings here, the problem is that there is no claim to saying. In my reading of trying to address how it *is* a saying, and that ‘speech belongs’, I have paradoxically undermined the reading. This is not a speaking; there is no claim to speaking other than what I read as a speech bubble, as it is conventionally called in comics — but even the speech bubble, as I read it, can not make this a speaking. This is why I am stuck on the ‘?’. This is also the problem, always, with reading pictures and maintaining a reading in perspective.

I need to read this as being a question about another question; according to the perspective: in the second panel it is ‘I am Chang Chong-chen... But... Why did

you save my life?’ as one question and then the answer to that, in the perspective, is another question, which is ‘?’. This is different to the other question, however, in the sense that it is only ‘?’ as opposed to ‘I am Chang Chong-chen... But... Why did you save my life?’, or even the answer to the ‘?’ which is ‘I thought all white devils were wicked, like those who killed my grandfather and grandmother long ago’. This is not the difference that is known, though, because that is not appending a query, because this would be all about intention. The problem with claiming to know the difference is then that I am talking about an author and intentionality; an author who is saying that is one question, that is another question, and they are different. In my perspective on this, I am reading both a similarity and a difference, between one ‘?’ and another ‘?’. This is all about the ‘I thought all white devils were wicked, like those who killed my grandfather and grandmother long ago’ but then the ‘?’ is about a question about the question: ‘I am Chang Chong-chen... But... Why did you save my life?’. The answer which is and is not a response,⁸⁶ ‘I thought all white devils were wicked, like those who killed my grandfather and grandmother long ago’ is then, according to the perspective, for Chang Chong-chen, there would not be a ‘sav[ing of] my life’ if ‘all white devils were wicked’. According to the perspective, Chang Chong-chen’s perspective is that his life would not have been saved by Tintin, or should not have been saved, because Tintin was a ‘white devil’. I can now


⁸⁶ Also not an answer in the sense that, for the perspective, this is not a speaking, this is not an answer, and this is not a dialogue. It is all there at the same time.

read the ‘?’ to be the difference between the perspective on Chang Chong-chen’s perspective on Tintin, and Tintin’s perspective on himself, according to the perspective. So according to the perspective on Tintin’s perspective on himself, there cannot be the possibility of himself (Tintin) being a ‘white devil’ who would not save Chang Chong-chen.

So, in this perspective, what I am reading here is that Tintin cannot conceive of himself as a ‘wicked’ ‘white devil’, and that is the ‘?’.

After claiming that he thinks all white devils were wicked, Chang Chong-chen ‘says’: ‘During the War of Righteous and Harmonious Fists, my father said’, to which Tintin replies: ‘The Boxer Rebellion, yes’. The thing with this claim is that ‘the War of Righteous and Harmonious Fists’ both is and is not ‘The Boxer Rebellion’, however the way it is presented by the narration is such that the latter reads to be as a correction of the former; where Chang Chong-chen knows the ‘War’ only, whereas Tintin knows the ‘War’ as ‘Rebellion’. Much like the perspective, Tintin has knowledge of both of these but rather than answer with ‘yes’, the answer is ‘The Boxer Rebellion, yes’. So if Tintin knows of the event by both names but, as I read it, corrects Chang Chong-chen because ‘War’ and ‘Rebellion’ are not the same: for Chang Chong-chen, and his father, ‘War’ is between the ‘Righteous and Harmonious’ and ‘wicked’ ‘white devils’, whereas ‘Rebellion’, for Tintin, is about ‘War’. They are the same, but they are also different. I am leaning towards a reading of Tintin ‘correcting’ Chang Chong-chen in this sequence and

reading him as the authority in this perspective, by way of the following sequence, after Tintin claims that ‘But Chang, all white men aren’t wicked. You see, different peoples don’t know enough about each other. Lots of Europeans still believe...’



(Hergé, 1935, p.43)

Where Chang Chong-chen claims ‘white devils’, Tintin corrects to ‘white men’, and assures him ‘But Chang, all white men aren’t wicked’. The perspective on Tintin then goes on to claim that he also knows ‘Europeans’ and what they ‘still believe’, yet this comes from an external perspective because they also, for Tintin, ‘still believe that all Chinese are cunning and cruel’, and ‘The same stupid Europeans are quite convinced that all Chinese have tiny feet’ and ‘They’re even convinced that Chinese rivers are full of unwanted babies’. The similarities here are in that with each example given, ‘Europeans’, as claimed by the non-European, ‘still believe that...’,

‘are quite *convinced* that...’ and are ‘even *convinced* that...’.⁸⁷ There is something here about ‘all Chinese are cunning and cruel’, ‘all Chinese have tiny feet’, and ‘Chinese rivers are full of unwanted babies’ being all about a belief in or a convincing of, both of which are a foil to knowing. Where Tintin knows about the ‘Chinese’ (‘all Chinese’, in some cases), Europeans do not know, they only ‘believe that’ or are ‘convinced that’ either some or ‘all Chinese’ are or do.

Tintin asserts this in the final panel: ‘So you see, Chang. That’s what lots of people believe about China!’. The narrative has changed; where the perspective previously was making claims about some/all ‘Chinese’, the claim here is still with respect to Europeans and what they ‘believe’, but this time is in relation to ‘China’, not ‘Chinese’. This is also framed as ‘So you see, Chang’, where the claims about what the Europeans believe and are convinced by is in reference to a seeing; these are things that were previously unseen, not by Tintin or the perspective on Tintin but certainly by Chang Chong-chen, who has been enlightened by Tintin’s claims by way of the ‘so’. In this way, belief and convincing are things that can be seen, they are visible, but these can only be seen by Chang Chong-chen as a consequence of what the perspective on Tintin claims about the ‘Chinese’, despite being not-Chinese (and not-European) themselves. Throughout the sequence of events here, I want to say that this is about the non-Chinese (Tintin) informing and

⁸⁷ Italics mine.

educating the Chinese (Chang Chong-chen) about previously unknown (unseen, specifically) conceptions about culture; but on what grounds? Gemma Lisa Small makes the following claims about the two characters and the sequence in the text:

The most important Chinese character to be discussed in this paper is the young boy, Chang Chong-Chen. [...] Chang's role in this story serves as a liaison between the world of Tintin (the "West") and himself (China). In the first scene, Chang and Tintin unbox cultural stereotypes about one another. "Les diables blancs" ("white devils") are how Chang refers to white men. Hergé's purpose in including this scene is to portray his cultural awakening to the readers and hope that they receive the same satisfaction that he did. By bringing together Tintin and Chang, the Western reader's misconceptions about Chinese culture are defeated in a wholesome and childlike format. Tintin calls out the absurd assumptions about foot binding, drowning babies, and other inaccurate beliefs that many Europeans believed were rampant throughout China.

(Small, 2021, p.18)

The interesting and obvious, to me, claim is about the relationship between 'Tintin (the "West") and himself (China)' (in which I read 'himself' to be in reference to 'Chang') and 'By bringing together Tintin and Chang, the Western reader's misconceptions about Chinese culture are defeated in a wholesome and childlike

format'; for this perspective on *The Blue Lotus*, this is about 'the "West"', 'the Western reader' and 'China', 'Chinese culture'. The main difference, for me, is that in reading a dynamic between 'European' and 'Chinese' in *The Blue Lotus*, the perspective on *The Blue Lotus* claims 'West(ern)' and 'Chinese'; where 'Chinese' is constant, and 'European'/'West(ern)' are then what I read as different. But then, in this, there is similarity, by way of reading consistency in 'Chinese' in the claims and a relationship between 'Chinese' and something else (something other). I can say that 'European'/'West(ern)' both share something in that they are both not-Chinese in this relationship that I can read, but then there are also differences. The 'Western' has a 'reader' — only one, take note — that has 'misconceptions about Chinese culture'. In considering my own readings of *The Blue Lotus*, this plays out interestingly with regard to the character of Tintin. As I read it, the Tintin in *The Blue Lotus* is not-Chinese by way of the claims they make being about the 'Chinese', knowing them, coming from a perspective that is other to them; they are also not-European by the same logic, and so Tintin occupies this space where they are neither Chinese or European, despite knowing both, but are still part of this relationship with Chang Chong-chen.

Now although I do not make this reading of *The Blue Lotus*, the claim in Small's text is that Chang Chong-chen is a 'Chinese character' (the 'most important' one, at that). By the same token, I can read that 'Chang Chong-chen' is also not Chinese, but a 'Chinese character'; the difference being that the 'character' is something other

to Chang Chong-chen and that the 'Chinese' is of the 'character', not of Chang Chong-chen. How this figures in the following claim is where things start to get interesting: 'Chang's role in this story serves as a liaison between the world of Tintin (the "West") and himself (China)'. One way to read this is that Chang Chong-chen is a 'Chinese character', whereas 'Chang' is that which has a 'role in this story', that of being 'himself (China)' in the 'liaison between the world of Tintin (the "West") and himself (China)'.

Another way to read this is that 'Chang Chong-chen' is also 'Chang', from a different perspective. I can read this in *The Blue Lotus*, in that Chang Chong-chen makes a claim to identify themselves as 'I' (in perspective, of course) as 'I am Chang Chong-chen', whereas Tintin identifies them as 'Chang'; the perspective on the 'I' identifies them as 'Chang Chong-chen', and the perspective on 'Chang Chong-chen' (as it is communicated by the 'I') identifies them as 'Chang'. Similarly, in Small's perspective on *The Blue Lotus*, one perspective identifies 'Chang Chong-chen' as a 'Chinese character'; and another perspective identifies 'Chang' as 'himself (China)'. In some respects, 'Chang Chong-chen' and 'Chang' can not be the same, but at the same time I can also read that they are different names in reference to something consistent and by way of this reading I can identify different perspectives. The one constant in all of this, however, is that Chang (Chong-chen) and Tintin are neither Chinese nor European/West(ern).

In thinking about the ‘()’, again,⁸⁸ there are some further significant interpretations I can make about these two. If I consider how I previously read ‘()’ — that in this perspective there is another perspective (that which is in another perspective) yet this is all still within the same perspective — then reading ‘()’ is about a claim that the perspective of that ‘other’ perspective is different; there is a separateness and a sameness. Considering Small’s claim about *The Blue Lotus* once again:

Chang’s role in this story serves as a liaison between the world of Tintin
(the “West”) and himself (China).

(Small, 2021, p.18)

In this way, I can read the ‘()’ in the claims made about *The Blue Lotus* in such a way that there is something separate and similar about ‘himself’ and ‘(China)’ as well as between ‘Tintin’ and ‘(“the West”)’. Now whilst I can acknowledge as well, in much the same way that I can read the difference between ‘Chang Chong-chen’ and ‘Chang’ and ‘I’ in my own readings of *The Blue Lotus*, I am also able to read a similarity between them as I am also able to do here with the ‘himself’ and ‘Chang’. The formulation of this in perspective is interesting as well: ‘Chang’ (not ‘Chang Chong-chen’, who is a ‘Chinese character’) has possession of a ‘role in this story’ and

⁸⁸ I discuss this same problem with reading ‘()’ in my earlier chapter on ‘maps’, where I read the perspective seeing an equivalence or link between that which is contained by parentheses in relation to a revised/edited volume of Captain James Cook’s Endeavour Journals; here, the text is framed as a ‘Literal Transcription’.

it is this 'role' which 'serves as a liaison between the world of Tintin (the "West") and himself (China)'. Reading the idea of a 'role' is also of note, especially given the previous claim by the perspective that 'the young boy, Chang Chong-chen' is a 'Chinese character'. The formulation of 'Chang' has a 'role' and 'Chang Chong-chen' is a 'character' is similar in the sense that both 'role' and 'character' are separate to 'Chang' and 'Chang Chong-chen' but are both of them, in some respect; the difference, of course, being that one 'has a role' and the other 'is a character'. Perhaps this is how I can read the perspective on *The Blue Lotus*' means of identification: when there is a claim to what it 'is' (a 'character', 'Chang Chong-chen') and when there is a claim to what it 'has' (a 'role', 'Chang'). So 'Chang Chong-chen' is not that which has a 'role' in the story; that belongs to 'Chang' alone.

In thinking about this 'role', it 'serves as a liaison between the world of Tintin (the "West") and himself (China)'. There are a few ways in which I can read this: one is that there is a 'liaison between' two worlds ('the world of Tintin (the "West") and [the world of Chang] (China)', and another is to read that there is a 'the world of Tintin (the "West")' and the 'liaison' is between this and 'himself (China)', which 'Chang's role' ('in the story' only, mind you) 'serves'. With the two worlds reading, the claim is that there is 'the world of Tintin (the "West")' where I can read the brackets as being that which, in perspective, is claiming a separateness and a sameness between 'the world of Tintin' and '(the "West")'; to put it another way,

Tintin's 'world' is known in perspective as 'the "West"'. If I then read the brackets to be serving in this way — to be acknowledging the sameness in reference to the 'world of Tintin' — then '(China)' would be Chang's world (because it is 'Chang's role' that is doing the serving, so 'Chang' can be read as (and as not) 'himself' in perspective). This then creates another sameness between 'the "West"' and '(China)' in that they are both 'world', yet there is still a separateness in that the claim to "West" is 'the' and is different to '(China)'. With the one world reading, there is only 'the world of Tintin (the "West")' in this perspective where 'the world' belongs to or is 'of Tintin (the "West")' and therefore the 'liaison' is not between different worlds, as above, but between 'the world of Tintin' and the 'himself (China)'. I can still read the 'himself' as 'Chang', in a similar way making the reading about the two worlds, because it is 'Chang's role' that is doing the serving once more, so 'Chang' can be read as (and, again, as not) 'himself' in perspective. This is especially interesting as this is very much about the perspective on 'Chang' and the perspective on the 'himself', and the relationship between this and how the claim is constituted as being about '(China)', as opposed to a 'Chinese Character'.

I consider the final panel of the sequence between Tintin and Chang Chong-chen again, in the context of this reading, from *The Blue Lotus*:



(Hergé, 1935, p. 43)

What is significant to me about this now, is that for the perspective on Tintin's claim, 'Chang' is very much separate(d) from 'China' as Tintin is framing what was not previously seen ('so you see') as being about 'what lots of people *believe* about China'.⁸⁹ The equivocation between 'Chang' and 'China', by reading the 'himself (China)', is contextualised in Small's reading of *The Blue Lotus*, which is titled: 'A Look At 'The Blue Lotus''. So I can then say that there is something about the perspective making the claim that there is a separateness (and a sameness) between 'Chang' and 'China', and, similarly, between 'the world of Tintin (the "West")', that is then all about 'A Look At 'The Blue Lotus''. This is all about 'A Look'. I can then read that the difference, for me, is that in terms of 'A Look', it is between 'Chang' and 'China' (also 'Tintin' and 'the "West"') that there is this connection; and

⁸⁹ Italics mine.

therefore in terms of ‘so you see’, it is very much the case that ‘Chang’ is not ‘China’ — they are separate.

For Chang Chong-chen in this panel from *The Blue Lotus*, ‘They must be crazy people in your country!’, where, for the perspective on Chang Chong-chen, ‘Europeans’ are then from a ‘country’ which both does and does not have a relationship with Tintin. The ‘crazy people’ are a they, which excludes Tintin in this claim, but then at the same time the ‘your country’ is that which belongs to, or is of, Tintin; I can then read that Tintin has a ‘country’ where there ‘must be crazy people’ who have these beliefs about ‘China’: these are ‘Europeans’. In considering the perspective which takes ‘A Look At ‘The Blue Lotus’’, I can read that there is a connection between my reading of the ‘country’ that ‘Tintin’ has in *The Blue Lotus* and ‘the world of Tintin (the “West”)’ that is then framed as the ‘Look At ‘The Blue Lotus’; the difference being that, in the ‘Look At’, that which belongs to ‘Tintin’ is ‘the world’. Now the brackets can be read as either being about claiming a sameness/separateness between ‘the “West”’ and ‘Tintin’ or ‘the world’ that is of them. In either case, the shift in perspective to ‘A Look at ‘The Blue Lotus’’ deals in the currency of ‘world’ and ‘West’ as opposed to ‘country’ and ‘Europeans’. The consistency of ‘Tintin’, and to an extent ‘Chang’ (Chong-chen), is indicative to me that they ‘exist’ irrespective of the ‘Look At ‘The Blue Lotus’’, whereas only with this ‘Look’ do the shifts take place. The reading I can make here then is that if one does not ‘Look At ‘The Blue Lotus’ then one would mistake ‘Chang’ as being

enlightened about what ‘Europeans’ believe about ‘China’; whereas if one did ‘Look At’ this text then one would be aware that ‘Chang’ is ‘China’.

The amusing paradigm here is that where I can read a European-Chinese/China dynamic in one text and a ‘the “West”’-China dynamic in another, there is a colloquial disparity between the geographical specificity of China and Europe/West which flips the narrative on the classical argument of Orientalism which was all about the the imitation or depiction of aspects of the Orient/East from the perspective of Europe/West.⁹⁰ The farce here is that this is still from the perspective of Europe/West if I am to read Hergé as Europe/West (a Belgian),⁹¹ or even my own narrative as Europe/West (a New Zealander).⁹²

⁹⁰ For a reading of ‘the West’, not in perspective, but also not in the ‘traditional’ or ‘classic’ sense that many contemporary writers do, see: McNeill, William H.. “What We Mean by the West.” *Orbis* 41.4 (1997): 513-524. I find it helpful in support of my own readings, in particular the claim is that ‘[t]he meaning of the West is a function of who is using the word. Those who feel themselves to be part of the West — who think of the West as “we” — will surely have flattering things to say about their civilization. Those who think of the West as the “other” are likely to define it in less flattering terms. The basic meaning of the word is “where the sun sets” — one of the cardinal directions. Chinese geomancers drafted elaborate and codified rule about what that direction meant as opposed to the East, North, or South, but we in the West have nothing so precise as the Chinese: to us the West connotes all sorts of characteristics desired by some, eschewed by others’ (p.513).

⁹¹ For bibliographical information about Georges Prosper Remi (‘Hergé’, from the French pronunciation of his reversed initials RG), see: Peeters, 1983, 2002, and Assouline, 1996.

⁹² It is also fairly amusing to me that countries such as New Zealand are, in many perspectives, despite being ‘located’ in the Eastern Hemisphere, included in claims to the Western world; no doubt due to it having been significantly influenced by British colonisation and European immigration.

Gregory Forth, in his award-winning text about the anthropological study of metaphor,⁹³ makes the following claim with respect to the language of an indigenous people living on the eastern Indonesian island of Flores and Timor:

both in English and in the language of a small eastern Indonesian island, muscles are referred to with words that ultimately mean “mouse”; that duplicity is conveyed by an animal (the monitor lizard) with a forked tongue; that the straight tail of a civet stands for honesty; and that the dog metaphor from which this book takes its title is closely comparable to the anglophone expression “to piss about”.

(Forth, 2019, p.xii)

So there is a similarity between ‘English’ and ‘the language of a small eastern Indonesian island’ in that they are ‘both’ something that ‘muscles are referred to’ ‘in’. So ‘muscles’ are that which can be ‘referred to with words’, where this perspective on ‘muscles’ knows that they are ‘referred to’ ‘both *in* English and *in* the language of a small eastern Indonesian island’.⁹⁴ ‘English’ and ‘the language’ are ‘both’ that which a

⁹³ Alison Flood, writing in *The Guardian*, reported in November 2020 that: Gregory Forth’s ‘*A Dog Pissing at the Edge of a Path* has beaten *Introducing the Medieval Ass* to win the Diagram prize for oddest book title of the year [...] The title itself is an idiom for someone who begins a task but is then distracted by other matters’.

⁹⁴ Italics mine.

‘refer[ence] to’ can take place ‘in’, and this takes place, for ‘both’, ‘with words that ultimately mean “mouse”’. In this way, ‘words that ultimately mean “mouse”’ exist in ‘both in English and in the language of a small eastern Indonesian island’. These are ‘words’, so there is more than one word ‘that ultimately mean[s] “mouse”’, but these ‘words’ are in ‘both’: ‘in English’ there are ‘words that ultimately mean “mouse”’ and in the language of a small eastern Indonesian island’ there are ‘words that ultimately mean “mouse”’. The perspective knows that there are these ‘words’ and that they can ‘ultimately mean’ something other than ‘words’ themselves; in this case, the ‘ultimate mean[ing]’ is “mouse”. As with previous readings in this chapter, in reading the “ ” the claim is that in this perspective there is another perspective; that what is in quotemarks is another perspective and that the perspective of that ‘other’ perspective is different. So in this way, there is something about “mouse” that is about a separateness and a sameness, to the perspective. If the ‘that’ which the ‘words [...] ultimately mean’ is “mouse”, then I read the three ‘that’s which follow the semi-colon as the different ‘words’ that are all to do with the ‘ultimate mean[ing]’. These are then: ‘that duplicity is conveyed by an animal (the monitor lizard) with a forked tongue; that the straight tail of a civet stands for honesty; and that the dog metaphor from which this book takes its title is closely comparable to the anglophone expression “to piss about”’. The point here is that the claim that ‘words’ can ‘mean’ — ‘ultimately’ or otherwise — that which is other to themselves and that the perspective knows this and that, here, there are multiple ‘words’, as I read them

to be, that all ‘ultimately mean “mouse”’. For example, the third example that the perspective gives is ‘that the dog metaphor, from which this book takes its title, is closely comparable to the anglophone expression “to piss about”’; where these are ‘words that ultimately mean “mouse”’ and are also ‘referr[ing] to’ ‘muscles’. The question for me then is, is this ‘both in English *and* in the language of a small eastern Indonesian island’,⁹⁵ or is this either ‘in English’ *or* ‘in the language of a small eastern Indonesian island’?

I can read a similarity with the claims to “mouse” and ‘the anglophone expression “to piss about”’ by reading the “ ” where, as I have read, ‘words that ultimately mean “mouse”’ is what ‘muscles are referred to with’ whereas “to piss about” is ‘the anglophone expression’ and is ‘closely comparable to’ ‘the dog metaphor from which this book takes its title’. The similarity is both in the claims to “mouse” and “to piss about”’ being something to do with the perspective being of/on another perspective, but also this idea of a relationship that exists elsewhere: ‘refer[ence] with’, ‘comparable to’, and ‘from which’. I am also wondering, then, about ‘the anglophone expression’, which I read to be “to piss about”’; if so, then can I also read that this is the case for “mouse” and, in doing so, read that the perspective on ‘the anglophone expression’ is also about that which ‘muscles are referred to’ as, then “to piss about”’ also exists ‘both in English and in the language of a small eastern Indonesian island’.

⁹⁵ Italics mine.

One of the issues here, for me, are the claims to people/place in the text, which are about: ‘Nage people of *eastern Indonesia*’;⁹⁶ ‘people in this *small-scale eastern Indonesian community*’⁹⁷ which is then the context for ‘the language of a *small eastern Indonesian island*’.⁹⁸ None of these are the same, although I can also read that ‘people in’ and ‘people of’ and ‘language of’ constitute different relationships between ‘people’ and ‘language’, although I can also say that the ‘Nage people of eastern Indonesia’ are not all ‘people in this small-scale eastern Indonesian community’, so then if this is the case (not all ‘people’ are ‘Nage people’) then ‘eastern Indonesia’ is not all ‘this small-scale eastern Indonesian community’.⁹⁹ A similar problem with the perspective on ‘people’ and ‘language’ then comes up with a claim later in the text which goes on to say, with relation to animals and children, that:

⁹⁶ Italics mine.

⁹⁷ Italics mine.

⁹⁸ Italics mine.

⁹⁹ The ‘Nage people’ are an indigenous people living on *two different eastern Indonesian islands*: Flores and Timor, both of which are constitutive of The Lesser Sunda Islands, also known as Nusa Tenggara Islands — an archipelago in what is known as Maritime Southeast Asia. Kéo or Nagé-Kéo is a Malayo-Polynesian dialect cluster spoken by the Kéo and Nage people who reside here; Kéo is sometimes referred to as Nage-Kéo, Nage being the name of a neighbouring ethnic group that is generally considered culturally distinct from Kéo; however, whether or not the two languages are separate entities is not agreed on (Baird, 2002; Grimes, 1988).

The Nage word for “animal”, *ana wa* deserves further attention partly because the term itself has metaphorical uses. Besides serving as a higher-order folk taxon encompassing all non-human animals, Nage also applies *ana wa* to small children. According to their own view, the usage is motivated by the fact that young children lack powers of understanding and communication, making them comparable to non-human creatures.

(Forth, 2019, p.36)

Where my readings of Trites were all about metaphors occurring as a result of ‘combination’, for Forth this is about what, according to the perspective is, ‘the Nage word for’, “animal”, and ‘*ana wa*’, and ‘the term itself’ which ‘has metaphorical uses’, this being the reason that it ‘deserves further attention’, according to the perspective. The key, for me, in reading this is the perspective on ‘*ana wa*’ which is framed as both that which ‘deserves further attention’ (the perspective claims this is ‘partly because the term itself has metaphorical uses’ so then is, in addition to this, ‘partly because’ of something else) as well as that which ‘Nage also apply [...] to small children’. It is, according to the perspective, a ‘word’ as well as a ‘term’; the perspective on ‘*ana wa*’ as a ‘word’ is that it is ‘for’ (“animal”), and the perspective on ‘*ana wa*’ as a ‘term’ is that it ‘has’ (‘metaphorical uses’) — the latter of which is why the perspective claims that it ‘deserves further attention’.

The perspective then claims that ‘[b]esides serving as a higher-order folk taxon encompassing all non-human animals, Nage also apply *ana wa* to small children’, in

which I find the relationship between ‘serving’ and ‘apply’ of interest, which I read to be in relation to the ‘*ana wa*’; not only does it ‘serve as a higher-order folk taxon encompassing all non-human animals’, the ‘Nage also apply *ana wa* to small children’. The difference here is that there is the perspective on ‘*ana wa*’ and then the perspective on how ‘Nage also apply *ana wa*’, where the ‘also’ is about an addition to the ‘serving’ that perspective claims in relation to the ‘higher-order folk taxon encompassing all non-human animals’. For the perspective, ‘small children’ are not ‘higher-order folk taxon’ nor are they ‘non-human animals’, for the claim is that ‘*ana wa*’ ‘serv[es]’ them, in perspective, but that ‘Nage also apply’, where others do not, ‘*ana wa* to small children’. In this way, I can read that the perspective claims that ‘*ana wa*’ is ‘the Nage word for “animal”’ and also that ‘non-human animals’ are not ‘small children’. In this way, I can read that as well as being ‘the Nage word for “animal”’, ‘Nage also apply *ana wa* to small children’ (‘small children’ are also that which a ‘word’ or a ‘term’ can be ‘appl[ied]’ to); so then, for the perspective on the ‘Nage’, the ‘word for “animal” [...] also appl[ies] to small children’.

So in that perspective, children are children: not ‘*ana wa*’, not ‘animal[s]’. In the same way, I can then read that Forth is setting up ‘children’ and ‘animal[s]’ as distinct, whereas if one is to read ‘the Nage word’ another way (that it also ‘appl[ies ...] to small children’), perhaps ‘the Nage’ are not making the same distinction. As such, there is an absolute distinction between animals and children for Forth, and this is, again, about the authority that is setting up the hierarchy: they are different from

each other; ‘children’ are not ‘non-human’ yet animals are. Forth’s reading of ‘*ana wa*’ imposes this categorisation or distinction, if you like, onto the ‘Nage’ language. In doing so, it sets up Forth as the authority on the ‘Nage’ language.

Although the claim that follows this is framed as ‘[a]ccording to their own view’, because this is a perspective on ‘their own view’, ‘the fact [is] that young children lack powers of understanding and communication’. Because it is ‘the usage’ that ‘is motivated by the fact’, it is the perspective that claims ‘the fact that young children lack powers of understanding and communication’. Now ‘young children’ are not ‘small children’, so while ‘the ‘word for “animal” [...] also appl[ies] to small children’ according to the perspective on the ‘Nage’, for the perspective on ‘young children’, it is ‘the fact that’ they ‘lack powers of understanding and communication’. So where ‘understanding and communication’ are ‘powers’ that ‘young children lack’, this is what ‘mak[es] them comparable to non-human creatures’. I can read that there is a difference, as well, between the claim to ‘non-human creatures’ that is ‘comparable to’ ‘young children’, as opposed to ‘non-human animals’ who are ‘encompass[ed]’ by a ‘higher-order folk taxon’. As I read it, the difference is about ‘creatures’ and ‘animals’ on the one hand, but also about ‘understanding and communication’ and the claim that in addition to it being about ‘all non-human animals’ (which does not

include ‘small children’), ‘the usage’ of the ‘appl[ication]’ of ‘*ana wa*’ is that which ‘mak[es] them comparable to non-human creatures’.¹⁰⁰

This is all about this idea that a ‘word’ that is ‘for “animal”’ bears some relation, in perspective, to the ‘term itself has metaphorical uses’; in a ‘metaphorical’ way involving ‘children’ (‘small’ and/or ‘young’) it can be ‘appl[ied]’ and ‘use[d]’. Yet ‘the fact’ remains: ‘young children lack powers of understanding and communication’.

BRIAN: Look. You’ve got it all wrong.

¹⁰⁰ For more about the relationship between children/childhood and animals, see my chapter on ‘games’; for readings of the ‘animal’ specifically in relation to the child (and children’s literature), see: Walsh, Sue. “Child/Animal: It’s the ‘Real’ Thing.” *Yearbook of English Studies* 32 (2002): 151–62; Walsh, Sue. *Kipling’s Children’s Literature: Language, Identity and Constructions of Childhood*. London: Routledge, 2010; and Walsh, Sue. “The Child in Wolf’s Clothing: The Meanings of the ‘Wolf’ and Questions of Identity in Jack London’s *White Fang*.” *European Journal of American Culture* 32.1 (2013): 55–77.

Strangers: Historical facts and normative dimensions

What follows in this chapter are some considerations of how strangeness is constructed in perspective around the framework of ‘relationality’ which, as Judith Butler claims, is ‘not only [a] descriptive or historical fact of our formation, but also an ongoing normative dimension of our social and political lives, one in which we are compelled to take stock of our interdependence’ (Butler, 2004, p.27). I will first read this in the encounter between Lucy and a/the Faun in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe* (1950), and then a series of journal entries by Joseph Banks from on board the same Endeavour that Captain James Cook sailed. I finish by considering the importance of names in two different children’s books: *The Adventures of Tupaia* (2019) and *Winnie-the-Pooh* (1926).

* * *

At the end of the opening chapter from the first (published) of C.S. Lewis’ *Chronicles of Narnia*, the narrative introduces ‘a very strange person’ following a ‘pitter patter of feet’, which turned out to be ‘a Faun’:

In about ten minutes she reached it and found that it was a lamp-post. As she stood looking at it, wondering why there was a lamp-post in the middle of a wood and wondering what to do next, she heard a pitter patter of feet coming towards her. And soon after that a very strange person

stepped out from among the trees into the light of the lamp-post. He was only a little taller than Lucy herself and he carried over his head an umbrella, white with snow. From the waist upwards he was like a man, but his legs were shaped like a goat's (the hair on them was glossy black) and instead of feet he had goat's hoofs. He also had a tail, but Lucy did not notice this at first because it was neatly caught up over the arm that held the umbrella so as to keep it from trailing in the snow. He had a red woollen muffler round his neck and his skin was rather reddish too. He had a strange, but pleasant little face with a short pointed beard and curly hair, and out of the hair there stuck two horns, one on each side of his forehead. One of his hands, as I have said, held the umbrella: in the other arm he carried several brown paper parcels. What with the parcels and the snow it looked just as if he had been doing his Christmas shopping. He was a Faun. And when he saw Lucy he gave such a start of surprise that he dropped all his parcels.

(Lewis, 1950, pp.14-16)

I can read in this passage instances of what I am going to call abnormality for the narrator: 'From the waist upwards he was like a man, but his legs were shaped like a goat's', and 'instead of feet he had goat's hoofs'. Here, 'man' is self-explanatory and self-sufficient, it needs no explanation, it just is; but because he was 'like a man', the narrator details exactly how this 'very strange person' is not a man (although he is

still a person). The 'but' suggests to me that in this perspective the 'legs' that were 'shaped like a goat's' is about something that is not 'man'; the legs are shaped not like a man's, but like a goat's. The feet are also not manly, but unlike the legs, feet are not shaped like a goat's but rather they are a goat's: 'he had goat's hoofs'. Because the 'hoofs' — that are a goat's, and so maybe not even of 'a Faun' — are 'instead of feet', the notion of 'hoofs' and 'feet' being interchangeable can be read on the one hand, but also the idea that feet are equivalent to normal (instead of reads to me to be about the normal and the expected) and hoofs are equivocal to abnormal for the 'very strange person'. Is this what is 'very strange'? '[H]oofs' instead of 'feet'?¹⁰¹

The 'tail' that 'Lucy did not notice' ('at first' — meaning that she did 'notice' the 'tail', but only after noticing something else, which the narrator knows of) may also be read as an abnormality in that he had a 'tail' — a 'tail' is something to be 'had', and is constructed here as separate and other to the 'Faun'. These claims are also concerned with what 'Lucy' does and does not 'notice' (and at what point she may notice these); just because the perspective is making a claim to the 'legs' and the 'hoofs', and their abnormality, is not to say that 'Lucy' either 'notice[s]' them or even considers them to be abnormal, in terms of how the perspective constructs her 'notic[ing]'. I read the 'also' as well as about something supplementary, something extra, and it is this extra thing: 'Lucy' does 'not notice this at first'. In addition, she did not 'notice'

¹⁰¹ For more on the idea of 'relationality' in terms of constructions of the real, see: Jackson, Rosemary. *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion*. London: Methuen, 1981.

the ‘tail’ ‘at first’ because it was ‘neatly caught up over the arm that held the umbrella’, so then I can read that the not ‘notic[ing]’ (‘at first’, initially) has something to do with the ‘neatly caught up over the arm’. Perhaps the arm and the umbrella are constituted as normal here by the perspective so as to be ‘notice[d]’ as not to be ‘notice[d]’? This is relying on a claim that to ‘notice’ or to not ‘notice’ is about the normal and the abnormal — ‘Lucy’ will only ‘notice’ that which is abnormal as she would not expect it to be part of her normal, and ‘Lucy’ will then not ‘notice’ what is, to her, normal and ordinary. But because the ‘tail’ is not ‘trailing’ along behind him ‘in the snow’; ‘Lucy did not notice this at first because it was neatly caught up over the arm that held the umbrella’, this is not something that Lucy ‘notice[s]’ (‘at first’). Does this normalise ‘neat[ness]’, for ‘Lucy’? What *does* she notice? She wonders ‘why there was a lamp-post in the middle of the woods’ and wonders ‘what to do next’ — so is the claim about Lucy’s ‘wondering’ here then about her struggle to make sense of what is outside of her expectations? It is normal for ‘Lucy’ to behave logically and sensibly; she leaves the door of the wardrobe ajar: ‘she knew it is a very silly thing to shut oneself in a wardrobe’ (Lewis, 1950, p.14), and she does not ‘notice’ the ‘Faun’ holding his tail away from the snow, because it makes sense to do so. What does not make sense is the ‘lamp-post in the middle of a wood’ and ‘what to do next’, which is why the narrator claims that she is ‘wondering’ why it was there; she would not do this if she knew why it was there, or if this did not seem out of the ordinary for ‘Lucy’.

The 'little face' of the 'Faun' is 'strange, but pleasant [...] with a short pointed beard and curly hair, and out of the hair there stuck two horns', so again the perspective makes another claim to abnormality: being 'strange'. In this case, there is an admission that in spite of the 'strange[ness]', it is 'pleasant' — the 'but' indicates that 'strange[ness]' and 'pleasant[ness]' do not go together, and it is 'strange' in itself to have a 'strange, but pleasant' 'face'; 'strange' 'face[s]' are not normally 'pleasant' 'face[s]'. But this one is. Within this claim there is the idea also that 'strange[ness]' is not inherently 'pleasant', it is not a good or nice thing. To be 'strange' is to not be 'pleasant'. There are what I read to be deficiencies here too: the 'face' is a 'little face' and the 'beard' is 'short'; is this what constitutes the 'pleasant[ness]' for the narrator? If the 'face' were not-'little' and the 'beard' not-'short', would the 'face' still be 'pleasant'? Would it still be 'strange'? Might it be *more* 'strange', and *less* 'pleasant', and in being so be even less normal? '[O]ut of the hair', so externally to the 'hair', 'stuck two horns'. This, too, I read as an abnormality to/for the perspective, as they 'st[i]ck out' of the 'hair', the idea here being that if something 'st[i]ck[s] out' of another thing it does not belong there or is an oddity. '[O]ne on each side of his forehead' is also about the narrator making a precise claim about the whereabouts of the 'horns', suggesting that 'on each side of his forehead' may not be normal or expected hence the requirement to make the assertion about their specific location. Cumulatively, the claims that the 'Faun' 'has a tail', a 'strange, but pleasant little face', and 'horns that stick out of his hair', generate this notion of the 'Faun' as abnormal to

the narrator. Despite this, they know what all of these peculiarities amount to, so there is an assertion from the perspective that he was ‘a Faun’ — and so he is also one of multiple known others who also have these ‘strange’ things and likenesses, and the narrator knows of them.

There is then the following exchange between ‘Lucy’ and this ‘Faun’:

“Goodness gracious me!” exclaimed the Faun.

“Good evening,” said Lucy.

But the Faun was so busy picking up his parcels that at first he did not reply. When he had finished he made her a little bow.

“Good evening, good evening,” said the Faun. “Excuse me — I don’t want to be inquisitive — but should I be right in thinking that you are a Daughter of Eve?”

“My name’s Lucy,” said she, not quite understanding him.

“But you are — forgive me — you are what they call a girl?” asked the Faun.

“Of course I’m a girl,” said Lucy.

“You are in fact Human?”

“Of course I’m human,” said Lucy, still a little puzzled.

“To be sure, to be sure,” said the Faun. “How stupid of me! But I’ve never seen a Son of Adam or a Daughter of Eve before.”

(Lewis, 1950, pp.15-16)

‘Lucy’ does not question the strange things, in that it is indeed ‘the Faun’ (now no longer ‘a Faun’) who expresses surprise upon seeing Lucy: “Goodness gracious me!” exclaimed the Faun’. ‘[E]xclam[ation]’ and the dropping of the parcels, as well as giving ‘a start of surprise’, are about the expectations of the ‘Faun’ — it is not normal for him to see ‘Lucy’, and indeed the perspective on what he says is indicative of this: “You are a daughter of Eve [...] you are what they call a girl? [...] you are in fact Human? [...] I’ve never seen a Son of Adam or a Daughter of Eve before”. The not knowing is in relation to ‘see[ing]’; because ‘the Faun’ has never ‘never seen a Son of Adam or a Daughter of Eve before’, or indeed a ‘Human’ or ‘what they call a girl’ before, because this is abnormal to him, there is the ‘surprise’ and the ‘exclam[ation]’.

This raises a number of questions for me: what is the equivalence, as I read it, about ‘Daughter of Eve’, ‘what they call a girl’, and ‘Human’; are all ‘daughters of Eve’ ‘what they call a girl’; are all ‘girl[s]’ ‘Human’? None of these are understood by ‘Lucy’ — the perspective on her is that she is ‘not quite understanding him’, so she understands him to an extent, but ‘not quite’. Also, the narrator knows what she does (and does not) ‘understand’. Despite the ‘surprise’, the perspective does not seem to

narrate that ‘Lucy’ is dealing with any abnormalities — the exchange between herself and ‘the Faun’ uses the same language, and after some misunderstanding, they share common knowledge of what ‘Human’ is. Safe to say, in reading this I can claim ‘the Faun’ is not ‘human’, not ‘girl’ and not ‘Daughter of Eve’.

* * *

Almost two-hundred years before Lewis wrote about ‘Lucy’ and Narnia, Joseph Banks, the botanist, kept a journal whilst undertaking an exploration of the South Pacific on board a ship captained by James Cook that I discussed in my ‘Interlude’. Much like Lucy’s first encounter with the Faun, where I can read claims to understanding and knowledge of that which is known, in perspective, to be other, Banks’ journal recounts a comparable encounter as the Endeavour approached Botany Bay. This ‘moment’ is of interest to me both because of its status as ‘journal’¹⁰² and also because, historically, it punctuates Britain’s engagement in Australia and in the eventual colonisation of this new ‘southern continent’. On the 27th April, 1770, after spying only ‘barren’ land the journal entry states that:

¹⁰² See my previous chapter ‘Maps’, in particular p.122 where I discuss the significance of reading journals in this thesis.

After dinner the Captn proposd to hoist out boats and attempt to land, which gave me no small satisfaction; [...] Four men were at this time observd walking briskly along the shore, two of which carried on their shoulders a small canoe; they did not however attempt to put her in the water so we soon lost all hopes of their intending to come off to us, a thought with which we once had flatterd ourselves. To see something of them however we resolvd and the Yawl, a boat just capable of carrying the Captn, Dr Solander, myself and 4 rowers was accordingly prepar'd. They sat on the rocks expecting us but when we came within about a quarter of a mile they ran away hastily into the countrey; they appeard to us as well as we could judge at that distance exceedingly black. Near the place were four small canoes which they left behind.

(Banks, 27 April 1770, II.53)¹⁰³

Something about ‘their intending to come off to us’ is linked with/related to ‘they did not however attempt to put her in the water’, in which the intention of the ‘they’ is known to the perspective — and actually this non-‘attempt’ results with ‘so we soon lost all hopes’, in which the ‘hopes’ of their intention are ‘lost’ by the ‘we’ as a consequence of the ‘they’ not ‘attempt[ing]’ to put a small canoe in water. The

¹⁰³ As stated in my bibliography, and much like the entries from Cook’s journals, in-text citations will reference the volume followed by the page number of that volume, as well as the date of entry: e.g. (Banks, 27 April 1770, II.69).

perspective knows their intentions — or does it? What the ‘we’ loses is the ‘hopes of their intending’, so in fact there is a collective ‘hopes’ that is concerned with ‘their intending to come off to us’, rather than an intention (or non-intention) that is known to the narrator. The ‘hopes’ (of which ‘all’ are lost, thereby splitting ‘hopes’ to pieces, whereby there can be ‘all’, and so then some, or not-‘all’, of them) are somewhat reliant on that ‘however attempt’, where I read the ‘however’ to be about a claim, like before, to abnormality — much like the ‘Faun’ and its ‘hoofs’. As they ‘did not however attempt to put her in the water’, I can read that the ‘hopes’ are ‘soon lost’ by the ‘we’ because of the ‘however’; upon the perspective being able to claim the ‘canoe’ not being ‘put [...] in the water’, all expectation is removed and the ‘attempt’ is a ‘did not’ by way of the ‘however’; the expectation being that they would ‘attempt to put her in the water’.

There are a couple of things of note here: firstly, that the ‘put[ting]’ of the ‘small canoe [...] in the water’ (which I am reading to be the ‘her’ here) would have been an ‘attempt’ if the ‘however’ did not exist in perspective; this is then a claim to the idea of knowing how to ‘put her in the water’ — the perspective knows also that had ‘they’ done so, it would have been an ‘attempt’. This reads to me to be about an authority that has understanding insofar that it can project and anticipate an ‘attempt’ to do something by another, less knowledgeable, and less understanding ‘they’. This is amusing, as the first entry on this date claims that ‘the Capt’n propos’d to hoist out boats and attempt to land’ where I can read the same thing here; the

perspective claims that it is the ‘propos[al]’ of the ‘Captn’ in an ‘attempt to land’ — not ‘to land’, necessarily, but to ‘attempt to’. This ‘attempt[ed]’ landing suggests a lack of proficiency at the task, given the status that a ‘Captn’ might have in relation to what ‘landing’ may or may not be, in perspective.

Secondly, I am reading here that the ‘hopes’ are linked with the non-‘attempt’. This is interesting because as I read it, ‘hopes’ are a claim to want or wish for something that might exist outside of the perspective’s control. The peculiarity comes as a result of my reading that the narrator knows that to ‘put her in the water’ requires an attempt from the ‘they’, which ‘they’ do not do. So what the ‘hopes’ are for, in my reading, is that ‘they’ do make the ‘attempt’ — the desire that is of or for the ‘intention[s]’ of ‘the[y]’ is an ‘attempt’ to do something, rather than a successful execution of the ‘put[ting]’ (which the perspective knows can be done), yet even in the wishful state of the ‘hopes’, this success does not exist.

This is all ‘a thought with which we once had flattered ourselves’, and if I read the thought to be these ‘hopes of their intending to come off at us’ then the ‘we’s ‘flatter[y]’ is to do with them ‘coming off at us’, or at least having the ‘intention’ to do so. ‘To come off at us’; to ‘come off’ what? ‘[A]t us’? Towards the ‘us’; the ‘we’? If so, how does the ‘flatter[ing]’ of the ‘ourselves’ (that comes with ‘the thought’) motivate the reading of ‘hopes’?

So the 'they' then 'sat on the rocks expecting us but when we came within about a quarter of a mile they ran away hastily into the countrey'. Here again I can read a claim to expectation, this time of the 'they'. The narrator knows that 'they sat expecting us'; so is the expectation to do with the sitting? Is it the sitting on rocks? Or the fact that they are even a 'they' to begin with, and in the 'prepar[ation]' of the 'Yawl' 'they' must therefore 'expect' the 'us'? 'They sat', though (almost obedient) and 'they' do 'expect', and this is known. This 'expect[ation]' is stifled once more: 'but when we came within about a quarter of a mile they ran away' where the narration's perception is queried with the 'but'; the perspective does not anticipate or expect the running away. I can also read a link between the 'come off at us' and the 'we came within a quarter of a mile'; of their 'intending to come', which are 'hopes', and 'lost hopes'. As a result the 'we came', as opposed to an 'intending to come', and as opposed to 'hopes'. When the 'we came' the 'they ran away hastily' (away from the 'we'; away from the coming) which in turn can we read as a rejection or repelling of the coming of the 'we', specifically.

As such, what 'they ran away' from is raises questions, but according to the narrative, 'they ran away' from something (and do so hastily) and in doing so run 'into the countrey'. Running 'away' and 'into' are reliant on one-another here in my readings: 'away' *is* 'into'. Or, is 'the countrey' 'away', and in running 'away' the 'away'-ness is about moving 'into the countrey'? To be 'sat on the rocks'; 'they' are not 'away', and 'they' are not 'into the countrey', as I read it; 'they' only move 'into the countrey'

because of the ‘ran away hastily’. If so, ‘away’-ness and this ‘countrey’ — ‘the countrey’ to be precise, and so known to be ‘the countrey’ by the narrator — share a sameness. That which can be run ‘into’, which has been identified as ‘countrey’, is thereby constituted as a place ‘into’ which others can run ‘away’. It is not, however, the expectation of the narrator here for them to have ‘ran away hastily into the countrey’, and so I can read then that this perspective does not associate the ‘they’ with ‘the countrey’. The ‘expectat[ion]’ of the ‘us’ by the ‘they’ is all about the ‘ran away hastily’, in which the ‘but’ problematises the very notion of ‘expectat[ion]’, for the perspective. If ‘expecting us’ was constituted by ‘they ran away hastily’ then it would not be framed as a ‘but’ in the narration. This is all about expectation.

They left behind the canoes ‘near the place’. The narrator knows that they were ‘left’, and indeed ‘left behind’, in which position can be read in that the ‘four small canoes’ are ‘behind’ the ‘them’ and not, say, in front of them. Also, ‘the countrey’ ‘into’ which ‘they ran’ is then not behind them. And the ‘canoes’ that are ‘left behind’: have they been ‘left’ by the ‘they’ for the ‘we’?

An entry on the following day in the Banks journal has me thinking about these similarities all the more:

At 1 we came to an anchor abreast of a small village consisting of about 6 or 8 houses. Soon after this an old woman followed by three children came out of the wood; she carried several peice[s] of stick and the children also

had their little burthens; when she came to the houses 3 more younger children came out of one of them to meet her. She often looked at the ship but expressed neither surprize nor concern. Soon after this she lighted a fire and the four Canoes came in from fishing; the people landed, hauled up their boats and began to dress their dinner to all appearance totally unmovd at us, tho we were within little more than ½ a mile of them. Of all these people we had seen so distinctly through our glasses we had not been able to observe the least signs of Cloathing: myself to the best of my judgement plainly discerned that the woman did not copy our mother Eve even in the fig leaf.

(Banks, 28 April 1770, II.54)

Both of these entries from Banks fascinate me because I know it is a 'journal' and I know it is a kind of 'diary', of sorts, so I am wondering why I, and many others, give it a certain *status* that might not be given to another text. I, like many, feel like something like this is fascinating because it is almost like a lens through which I can retrieve something of particular importance or significance; although not necessarily in such a way as to read it as 'real' or 'true'.

To read the entry, I want to say something here about how the noticing of the ship by this woman is not weird or abnormal because, for instance, this is not the first time that a ship has been seen: 'She often looked at the ship but expressed neither

surprise nor concern'. The 'we' are not the first people to sail here, this 'old woman' has seen 'the ship' before, and this instance is not surprising. This seems to me to be about relationality because, relatively, we get a perspective on 'an old woman', 'three children' and 'the people' where, for instance, the perspective on the 'look[ing]', as I read it, is not one that is expected; 'the old woman [...] expressed neither surprise nor concern'. In this, there is a stating of something known and prior here, that there is a known normal and a known abnormal, and this knowing is somewhat compromised by the perspective's claims to what is and is not expected upon the 'we' arriving at Botany Bay.

There are a myriad of problems with this, though.

First of all, there always is a prior as all texts are retrospective anyway, so again where I am saying that I am giving this kind of text a 'status' of sorts, it is because I am reading texts against each other; thinking about later readings that I have made against which I read this as being itself a prior which does not know about the latter which I am reading from. But in itself that is just a repetition again of what all reading is; that in a sense one is always reading retrospectively of a text which is itself a retrospection. Secondly, 'our mother Eve' exemplifies the problem at hand to an extent. Even these other people who are 'of all these people' and are different from the 'we' who had seen them 'so distinctly' share a 'mother' who is 'our'; this is a joint 'mother'. So again there is something about a difference which nevertheless is overcome by a joint ancestry, which is already in place, even prior to the whole

discussion of recognition or a difference which has already been known to them according to this text in turn.

But why is the 'our mother' a joint 'mother'? There is always an 'our' which necessarily is a perspective which is inclusive of the group, and thereby exclusive of a their; so in what way do 'the children' with 'their little burthens', or 'the people' hauling 'up their boats' and dressing 'their dinner', constitute part of the 'our'? I read a split with a claim to 'their', as separate and distinct from the 'we' which 'were within little more than $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile of them', and the 'these people' that 'we had seen so distinctly through our glasses'. Is this 'our' excluding 'the woman' from being part of the 'our mother Eve', from part of the having of the joint 'mother'? In fact previously the 'woman' is part of the 'these people', but that does not necessarily then hold, as it were, as an absolute distinction. This is not, then, about a question of subsuming it to a kind of general sense of *if they are those women then they are different in all respects*, and the generality of the perspective is always going to keep excluding them as the our is a certain group of people. I can still, though, read that notion of the 'our' being inclusive and being about a communal mother because 'the woman did not copy our mother Eve, even in the fig leaf'; why would she 'copy' something which has no relevance to her?

In any case, still, somehow, in this perspective the claim is made that the 'woman' could potentially 'copy our mother Eve'. So, again, I am not reading (to put it very crudely) 'our mother Eve' as an 'Eve' that I know from the Bible, and that the Bible

belongs to ‘these people’, and so this ‘woman’ is part of something *other* and *native*, and would therefore not know about Bibles and is therefore *not Christian*. I am just reading the claim that in this perspective there is the potential for the ‘woman’ to ‘copy’ from ‘our mother Eve’, but she does not. Not ‘even in the fig leaf’. In order to ‘not copy’, she potentially could, and therefore ‘our mother Eve’ already bears a relationship to the ‘woman’, according to this perspective; this perspective cannot exclude her completely from the ability to ‘copy’ from ‘our mother Eve’. This is why I read the ‘our’ as not being able to exclude completely ‘the woman’ in her copying from the ‘our mother Eve’.

So again, in other senses, there is more of this prior, in ‘all these people’; although they are ‘these people’ and they have been seen, they are ‘people’ and seen as ‘people’ so the notion of ‘people’ is already prior here, necessarily. People are something which can be seen ‘distinctly’, and less distinctly, ‘through our glasses’.

There is a difference here as well between ‘observ[ation]’ and ‘see[ing]’. Something about the degree of ‘see[ing]’ something ‘distinctly’ in this claim has to do with what produces ‘observ[ation]’; so seeing and the ‘distinct[ness]’ of that ‘see[ing]’ produces ‘observ[ation]’ when it is of a sufficient degree. But here it is not. And again, clothes are ‘signs’; it is not that what is ‘observe[d]’ is ‘Cloathing’, it is ‘signs’. So there is ‘observ[ation]’ which is enabled, in turn, by the ‘distinct[ness]’ of ‘see[ing]’ but fails, in this sense, to be achieved; but there are ‘signs’, and degrees of ‘signs’. So ‘Cloathing’ itself is also prior, because it is prior to being a sign (‘signs of Cloathing’);

the ‘signs’ are not the ‘Cloathing’ itself. There are priors in the claim: ‘Cloathing’ and ‘people’ are prior to any of these claims in order for what is ‘observe[d]’ to be observed; indeed ‘see[ing]’ is also prior to the ‘observ[ation]’, because the degree of ‘see[ing]’ enables or produces ‘observ[ation]’, or not if it is not sufficient. I can read, retrospectively, that all these things need to be in place in order for any of this to be claimed in turn.

In the perspective: ‘she often looked at the ship but expressed neither surprise nor concern’, looking is not an ‘express[ion]’ of ‘surprise’ or ‘concern’ but also ‘surprise nor concern’ are both subject to ‘express[ion]’. So in the perspective ‘surprise’ and ‘concern’ are things that have to be, in a sense, ‘expressed’ subject to the perspective judging them to be ‘expressed’ to it. And they are not. The ‘often looked’ does not constitute ‘expression’ here, there is known to be a distinction between them. But with also ‘look[ed] at the ship’, the perspective does know what it is that ‘she often looked at’. ‘[T]he ship’ is constituted in this perspective through a knowledge of what it is that ‘she often looked at’; it is a ‘looking’ at a ‘looking’ ‘at’, or a perspective on a ‘looked at’. So again, my thinking is that there is something or some sort of expectation of surprise or concern that hinges on the notion of ‘expressed’. The ‘express[ion]’ is about the relationality between the perspective and what it judges to be an ‘express[ion]’ for, and to, it from that other.

It is ‘expressed neither’, rather than just the ‘express[ion]’ though; because if it were ‘expressed’ then that would be a fulfilment of expectation according to the

perspective, but nevertheless the absence of ‘express[ion]’ is the absence of ‘surprise’ or ‘concern’ so the ‘express[ion]’ itself is actually prior too, it is potentially a possibility, but what is lacking from ‘express[ion]’ is ‘surprise’ or ‘concern’. It is the lack of ‘express[ion]’ here which is where I am reading the relationality, because it has to be read and claimed in the perspective. The relationality is in the ‘she looked at the ship’, and the claim then diagnoses within itself a presence and a lack, which is the ‘express[ion]’. But that is all seen within the perspective, it is seeing that is not there. This is where I am reading the notion of *expectation*, the fact that it is a lack, rather than completely not there.

This is all, again, about the idea of not belonging; to not belong is about a rejection of some sort where there is a claim to discomfort in the perspective. In these examples, however, I do not think that we get that (or perhaps we do, in that there is a lack of expectation that is expected), which links back to the idea of what belongs and what does not belong; what is expected and what is not expected. This can be read again in the claim: ‘to dress their dinner to all appearance totally unmoved’; it is not that they are ‘totally unmoved’, it is ‘to all appearance’. Again, all the time this is about the perspective and what it *expects*, what it *judges*, what it *sees*, what would fulfil the *expectations*, the *ideas*, the *demands*. But that, of course, is necessarily the case.

* * *

The reading is about the perspective, even if the implications are not read out initially. Much of the time, I can come back with the problematising of reading, and claiming to have knowledge of, perspective. Another example can be seen here in the following passage from *The Wind in the Willows*; this is especially relevant with regard to my (de)thinking of criticism (especially in a postcolonial sense) which claims the authority/definition/knowledge of the other, when at the same time critiquing representations of the other.

The old grey horse, dreaming, as he plodded along, of his quiet paddock, in a new raw situation such as this, simply abandoned himself to his natural emotions. Rearing, plunging, backing steadily, in spite of all the Mole's efforts at his head, and all the Mole's lively language directed at his better feelings, he drove the cart backwards towards the deep ditch at the side of the road.

(Grahame, 1908, p.33)

I might say something like: *but of course, the perspective cannot have any idea about what the old grey horse is actually feeling*. That idea, again, that the perspective is imposing itself on something which is prior, which is actually just there out of perspective. What you get then is this quite bizarre hallucinated narrative of all these fictional characters which are apparently not fictional at all but are total reality, a reality which is beyond fictionality, characters who really do have all these attributes and

feelings. But of course, everyone knows this, and it is just the silly books for children which get it wrong.¹⁰⁴

This is the implication, though. This is exactly what contemporary postcolonialists do; in effect, this is the problem. The problem with the retrieval of something beyond, which can be guaranteed as a real, is that it cannot be anything else; it cannot ever be anything else than the perspective going: *that is not happening*, or, *I expected that*, but *oh, look at this*, and, *oh look, it is happening in that way*, and so on, and so forth. This is about how a certain kind of objection, that the perspective cannot know about the actual feelings of the other, instates a known ‘real’ other to the narration and in so doing, in turn claims an authority over that other.

* * *

In the picturebook, *The Adventures of Tupaia*,¹⁰⁵ the following claim is made:

[O]ne day, a pahī the size of an island sailed into Matavai Bay. As his eyes locked on to the ship’s billowing sails and shining cannons, Tupaia felt a thrill of excitement and also fear. He wondered what the ship’s arrival

¹⁰⁴ To be ironic, of course.

¹⁰⁵ According to the back cover, this is ‘[T]he incredible story of Tupaia, Tahitian priest navigator, who sailed on board the *Endeavour* with Captain Cook on his first voyage to Aotearoa’.

would bring. The men from the giant pahī came ashore, and soon Tupaia became friendly with them. He learned that the ship was called the Endeavour, and that it had sailed all the way from a far-off place called Britain in search of a legendary Great Southern Continent. The men on board believed that this land must exist in order to balance the land in the Northern Hemisphere. The idea was so popular that the British government had given the chief of the Endeavour, James Cook, special order to try and find this continent.

(Meredith & Tait, 2019, pp. 11-12)

What interests me with the above claim is the relationship that I can read between ‘pahī’ and ‘ship’. On the one hand, I can quite easily say that they are different and separate but at the same time this is also about a similarity and a sameness; a replication or substitution of some kind.¹⁰⁶ I read it to be that ‘pahī’ both is and is not ‘ship’, but the perspective on ‘pahī’ and ‘ship’ then knows something of them in order to differentiate in the claims made. There are shifts that are worth taking into account: ‘a pahī the size of an island sailed into Matavai Bay’ and then subsequently ‘The men from the giant pahī came ashore’. The ‘a pahī’ and the ‘the giant pahī’ are not the same because the first is one of many and this one in particular is ‘the size of

¹⁰⁶ Once again, this is something that I read out in more detail earlier in this thesis in my chapter on ‘metaphors’.

an island', whereas the second is unique in this perspective as it is 'the giant pahī'.

There are clearly other, known, 'pahī' that are neither 'the size of an island' nor 'giant'. Another interesting point to make in terms of thinking about what separates these two claims to the 'pahī' is that one perspective is on it as it 'sailed into Matavai Bay' and another is on 'the men' from it as they 'came ashore'. In this, I can say that there is something about 'the size of an island' (again, just any old island will do, it does not need to be specific) and sailing that is to 'giant' and men coming ashore.¹⁰⁷

On the other hand 'the ship' is a 'the ship' throughout the claims made in this perspective: 'his eyes locked on to the ship's billowing sails and shining cannons', 'He wondered what the ship's arrival would bring', and 'He learned that the ship was called the Endeavour'. The connection between these claims is rather different; 'the ship' is repeatedly framed as being about what 'he wondered', 'he learned' and what 'his eyes locked on to'.¹⁰⁸ So for the perspective on the 'he' and the 'him', I can read that there is an association with 'the ship' where the 'pahī' are not; in this way the 'pahī' are to the narration what 'the ship' is to the 'he' and the 'him', all in perspective, of course.

¹⁰⁷ The word 'pahī' in te reo Māori has two meanings: it can refer to a large ocean canoe or ship, or it can be in reference to a travelling party or expedition. This could then also be a play on the ambiguity of the language in relation to English, in that the 'pahī' in relation to sailing and the 'pahī' in relation to men coming ashore as part of an expedition can actually be different but the same at once.

¹⁰⁸ Italics mine.

In addition to all of this, ‘the ship was called the Endeavour’ which presents the issue of naming and, here, the changing of names are an important issue as they are closely linked with questions of identity.

I want to think, now, about the ‘Introduction’ to *Winnie-the-Pooh*, where similar issues can be read:

If you happen to have read another book about Christopher Robin, you may remember that he once had a swan (or the swan had Christopher Robin, I don’t know which) and that he used to call this swan Pooh. That was a long time ago, and when we said good-bye, we took the name with us, as we didn’t think the swan would want it any more. Well, when Edward Bear said that he would like an exciting name all to himself, Christopher Robin said at once, without stopping to think, that he was Winnie-the-Pooh. And he was. So, as I have explained the Pooh part, I will now explain the rest of it.

(Milne, 1926, pp.ix–x)

Names are treated as possessions here; indeed, the entire claim is about possession. ‘Christopher Robin [...] had a swan (or the swan had Christopher Robin, I don’t know which)’ establishes that, for this perspective on the ‘I’, what is had and by whom is both not known (‘I don’t know’) and is framed as a speculation and

possibility: *'If you happen to have read [...] you may remember'*.^{109 110} It does not matter, in this perspective, whether or not the 'you' has 'read' or can 'remember', nor does it matter whether or not the 'swan' or 'Christopher Robin' 'had' each other. The brackets in this claim can be read, like others in my readings, as being about a sameness and a separateness', with a difference in this case being that the perspective on the 'you' is about Christopher Robin 'had a swan' and the perspective on the 'I' is about 'the swan had Christopher Robin' and, again, one being a possible remembering with the other being about a not knowing — in both cases whether or not the thing is remembered or known is immaterial to the point that Christopher Robin 'used to call this swan Pooh' (which is also a part of the 'If you [...] you may' framing, but not the 'I don't know'). So 'Pooh' is what 'this swan' used to be called, so it is not called this any longer as, in this perspective, this 'used to' has taken place and so 'this swan' is no longer called 'Pooh'. This is elaborated upon: 'when we said good-bye, we took the name with us, as we didn't think the swan would want it any more'. What is interesting about this claim is that 'the name' is that which the 'we

¹⁰⁹ Italics mine.

¹¹⁰ For a reading of this passage in relation to discussions around this kind of word-play as being about a lack of knowledge or control of language itself, and is a common trait associated with 'fantasy' and/or 'childhood', see: Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín. "Fantasy, Literature and Childhood: In Pursuit of Wonderlands." *Writing and Fantasy*. Edited by Ceri Sullivan. London: Routledge, 1999. 197-206. In particular, the idea that '[t]he tradition of nonsense associated with Lewis Carroll and Edward Lear is classified as part of 'children's literature' too. *Winnie-the-Pooh's* nonsense seriously reveals the inherent instabilities of language while depending on the drive to make sense that is language' (p. 200).

didn't think the swan would want [...] any more'; so in this perspective names can be that which are and are not wanted, as well as taken from someone/thing based on a thought. It is the 'we' that thinks, 'the swan' does not think in this perspective, and this is a thinking about what 'the swan would want' by the 'we'; the 'we' does the thinking on behalf of 'the swan' who cannot think. Names are then also something that, if not wanted, can be taken as well as called; 'you may remember that [...] he used to call this swan Pooh' but 'when we said good-bye, we took the name with us'. In this formulation, 'the name' is given by the 'he' in perspective, and taken by the 'we'; there is something about naming then that is about the individual and the de-naming, or taking of what was given, that is about the collective.

Names are like possessions, to be discarded or taken away when no longer needed: the end of identity and the end of the story ('when we said good-bye').

(Lesnik-Oberstein, 1999, p.201)

But why *Pooh*? What would it mean to do a reading of *Winnie-the-Pooh* in this context, in a thesis about islands and island theory? It is all still about reading out questions of hierarchy and authority, what is claimed as being *true*. What I have found, in my research and reading, is that it seems not possible to read texts in the

way I am attempting to do other than in relation to children and what children might think of it (or perhaps with some ideas of nostalgia and sentimentality).¹¹¹

* * *

There is something of a kinship between the island and the child, I find, and I will explore this in my next chapter, I will continue to read *Winnie-the-Pooh*, and think about the claims to ‘trespass’. I then consider what might be at stake in a reading of ‘trespass’ with relation to ‘The Representation and Conceptualisation of Islands’ (Nimfür & Meloni, 2021); in particular the framing of ‘tropical beach’ and ‘paradise’ alongside dynamics between ‘host’ and ‘guest’, ‘visitors’ and ‘locals’. I finish the chapter with a reading of exploitation — beaten seals and transgressive desire in *The House That Jack Built* (1999) and *The Queen of Hearts* (1881).

¹¹¹ See also: Cocks, Neil. “On the Tolerance of Children’s Literature Criticism: Psychoanalysis, Neighborliness, and *Pooh*.” *Humanities* (2023) 12.3; which is a response to: Rudd, David. “The Theory Wars Revisited: Rose and the Reading Critics vs. the Liberal Humanists.” *The Lion and the Unicorn* 44 (2020): 89–109. What Lesnik-Oberstein and, more recently in response to a David Rudd article, Neil Cocks are doing is not what I am doing, necessarily, as I am concerned with different issues; although not utterly different because Cocks, in particular, is reading perspective, as I am, although in the context of *psychoanalysis* rather than children’s literature. Although, I would argue, children’s literature is about psychoanalysis and psychoanalysis is about children’s literature. Cocks also uses Rudd’s article to write a consideration of interpretations of Jacques Lacan, using Rudd’s reading(s) of *Winnie-the-Pooh*. In it, Cocks reads through how Rudd is claiming to have read Lacan, but then uses Rudd’s problems in reading Lacan to illuminate why there are problems around reading Lacan.

Trespassers: The Rules of the Beach¹¹²

CHAPTER III

IN WHICH POOH AND PIGLET GO HUNTING AND NEARLY CATCH A WOOZLE

The Piglet lived in a very grand house in the middle of a beech-tree, and the beech-tree was in the middle of the forest, and the Piglet lived in the middle of the house. Next to his house was a piece of broken board which had: “TRESPASSERS W” on it. When Christopher Robin asked the Piglet what it meant, he said it was his grandfather’s name, and had been in the family for a long time. Christopher Robin said you couldn’t be called Trespassers W, and Piglet said yes, you could, because his grandfather was, and it was short for Trespassers Will, which was short for Trespassers William. And his grandfather had had two names in case he lost one — Trespassers after an uncle, and William after Trespassers.

¹¹² According to ‘Limmershin’. For more, see: Kipling, Rudyard. “The White Seal.” *The Jungle Books*. Edited by Kaori Nagai. London: Penguin, 2014. 68–86. First published in *The Jungle Book* in 1894; in particular the reference to beaten seals: ‘Yet Sea Catch never chased a beaten seal, for that was against the Rules of the Beach. He only wanted room by the sea for his nursery; but as there were forty or fifty thousand other seals hunting for the same thing each spring, the whistling, bellowing, roaring, and blowing on the beach were something frightful’ (p.68).



(Milne, 1926, pp.32-33)

I think, again, what is at stake is how do we not make *this* a reading and then *that* a reading, so that then *this thing* becomes prior or *that thing* becomes prior. The issue is that I am neither saying *no, this is just a picture and it is not like that*, but nor am I saying that, having read this, I now know what that is. In this sense, hierarchy is always a problem in reading. When I start reading where something is prior, that becomes a problem because the perspective then becomes split, or falls into a perspective and a non-perspective.

The difficulty is being able to say I do not know what this is, but having read this I now know that it is 'a very grand house'. Now I could say that this is the 'obvious' thing to read, or that it is at least a starting point from which I can formulate a hypothetical process in which I am going to work the problem though, but why ever claim that that is 'a very grand house'? If I make a decision to *not read* this, but *I read* this, on what grounds am I claiming that it is 'a very grand house'? What kind of perspective is making a claim to 'very grand house' here? Why not make the claim true? What would the difference be?

This is where I am thinking about the notion of priority. This is where I think that, in my hypothetical example, I am still reading that that requires a kind of idea that this knows what that is, or that knows what this is. But in terms of the perspective, is, for instance, 'a very grand house' not 'the beech-tree'? It is neither one nor the other, but by saying that it is the 'very grand house', it is the one and not the other, even as a starting point or as something *obvious*. Why that starting point? And this 'why' is where I am seeing the potential question for the notion of priority; that this somehow becomes prior. It relegates one thing to being subjugated to another.

In what I am reading also, there is a shifting between the claims to piglets: 'POOH AND PIGLET' (a known 'POOH' and a known 'PIGLET'), a 'the Piglet', which is different again to this 'Piglet'; in the same way that we have 'a beech-tree' and 'the beech-tree'. The problem with getting too caught up with the issue of 'the' or 'a' and knowing 'the' or 'a' in the abstract is that it will not go anywhere. So what is it

about here? What I am thinking about with regards to ‘the’ is that it constitutes not the routine reading of specificity rather than ‘a’ which is one of many, but that actually ‘the’ is always already about a supplement; that it is not just about specificity, which it is (here is this ‘Piglet’ rather than another ‘Piglet’; the ‘the Piglet’ out of other possible ‘Piglet[s]’ as it is singled out in the perspective), but actually it is about the notion that ‘the’ is already about the idea of a kind of object-hood, making it a supplement because the object is never autonomous; there can never be a self-constituted object. The notion of the object is constantly invoked as being a self-sustaining autonomous thing, but that ‘the’ already splits it in the perspective. So, here, there is never a piglet which is there, which is modified.

We also have, here, ‘POOH’ which is not ‘Winnie-the-Pooh’¹¹³ — so the notion of becoming becomes a problem; that ‘PIGLET’ becoming ‘the Piglet’, or ‘the Piglet’ becoming ‘Piglet’ is a problem because that presumes, again, a sameness. In what sense is that sameness in the reading? That is where, in the reading, the ‘Piglet[s]’ are neither the same, nor are they different; that is to say, they are both the same and different, but according to the claims in the perspective what is it that constitutes that ‘Piglet’ or that ‘the Piglet’ so that it does not become hung up on a kind of abstract notion of what ‘the’ or ‘a’ does or what the lack of ‘the’ or ‘a’ does, but returns it into the reading?

¹¹³ In reference to the ‘Introduction’ from earlier (Milne, 1926, p.ix), or even the book cover.

So, 'IN WHICH POOH AND PIGLET GO HUNTING AND NEARLY CATCH A WOZZLE' for instance, I can start to think about an already known 'POOH' and 'PIGLET' but I can think also about the 'IN WHICH'. For me this is a claim about retrospection, where the 'IN WHICH' is a claim about what is to follow, a knowing about what will be read or what 'CHAPTER III' will contain, about what 'POOH AND PIGLET' are going to do before (although it is after) they do it. But again there is the very notion of what are the 'POOH AND PIGLET', who are known as 'POOH AND PIGLET' here. 'I think' becomes, as it were, deferred under the retrospection; although I can also question my own reading of the claim to reading — there is a claim to 'CHAPTER' where I can read it being the third of any number, but it is not constituted as something which a reader is claimed to have a knowledge of or involvement in. It is something 'IN WHICH', so 'POOH AND PIGLET' are only subject to the 'IN WHICH', so a 'CHAPTER' here is something which is other to itself; 'POOH AND PIGLET' are not anything other than that which is 'IN' a 'CHAPTER' which is itself already not something because there is an 'IN WHICH'.

There is a past future in the claim: 'POOH AND PIGLET GO HUNTING AND NEARLY CATCH A WOZZLE', so it is retrospective — futures are never absolute futures in a reading, they are always retrospective — but what their future *is*, is therefore necessarily retrospective because it is already known: 'GO HUNTING

AND NEARLY CATCH A WOOZLE'. But all of this is subject to the 'IN WHICH'.

The Piglet lived in a very grand house in the middle of a beech-tree, and the beech-tree was in the middle of the forest, and the Piglet lived in the middle of the house.

(Milne, 1926, p.32)

Here, there is a claim to 'The Piglet' and 'the Piglet', and in this perspective I do not read this 'Piglet' as being subjected to the 'IN WHICH'. So in that respect, the 'PIGLET' that is subject to the 'IN WHICH' here is a different perspective to that on 'The' and 'the Piglet'; the perspective changes in claiming now that this is not subject to the 'CHAPTER III IN WHICH', but is about 'The Piglet lived'. There is something here again about 'middle[ness]' and 'beech-tree[s]' and 'very grand house[s]', where this 'very grand house' is 'in the middle of a beech-tree'.

So if I then read what I am going to call the illustration, I might ask: where is the 'middle of a beech-tree'? In that respect, again, the notion of 'middle[ness]' is almost like the 'CHAPTER III IN WHICH', in the sense that it is not seen, and of course it never is; the claims to seeing are never about a seeing. We have these claims to 'middle[ness]' going on here: 'in a very grand house in the middle of a beech-tree [...] in the middle of the forest'; so 'middle[ness]' here is sort of not there, but it is all about the 'in'. The perspective has a knowledge of 'middle[ness]' which is there, but

what is ‘middle’? What would ‘middle’ be constituted as? Where is, for instance, ‘in the middle of a beech-tree’; I can see a tree but I cannot see ‘the middle’ of it and I cannot see ‘in the middle’, and I cannot see ‘the very grand house’, or ‘the forest’, which this ‘beech-tree’ is ‘in the middle of’.

‘[H]ouse’ is ‘middle’, but ‘next to’ is not ‘middle’; so where I might see ‘a beech-tree’ as being ‘in the middle’ (of ‘the forest’) if this ‘broken board’ is ‘next to’ then can the ‘broken board’ be in the ‘middle’, or if it is then what kind of ‘middle’ is it that can be seen, and what is this thing that it is ‘next to’? In this respect, is ‘a piece of broken board which had: “TRESPASSERS W” on it’ — and I can read ‘TRESPASSERS W’ in the illustration — but in what way is that ‘on it’? This is interesting that the claim is to it being ‘on a piece of broken board’; what is the claim to ‘on’? What I read the claim to ‘on’ to be about is something about a supplement, where the ‘broken board’ is supplemented by “TRESPASSERS W”, that “TRESPASSERS W” is not inherent to the ‘broken board’ for it is something that is ‘on’ it, separate and in addition to it.

‘When’ the perspective claims, ‘Christopher Robin asked the Piglet what it meant’, there is a claim that ‘Christopher Robin’ does not know ‘what it meant’, but he does know that ‘it mean[s]’. There is also the question of what the ‘it’ is here? I cannot say that it is anything else, but it has ‘mean[ing]’, and the ‘mean[ing]’, for me, is in the ‘what’ (‘mean[ing]’ is about ‘what’, which is different to ‘IN WHICH’).

When Christopher Robin asked the Piglet what it meant, he said it was his grandfather's name, and had been in the family for a long time.

(Milne, 1926, p.32)

There is a shift again: 'the Piglet' is now a 'he' (not a 'the he', either), and 'he said it was his grandfather's name' (so therefore no longer 'his grandfather's name'), 'and had been in the family for a long time'; so, like the swan, the name is the 'grandfather's', it belongs to the grandfather, but at the same time it is also 'in the family' (or at least it 'had been') so it is also not the grandfather's in that sense. Names here are also something which are communally owned and are to do with being there for a long time, it can be seen or known throughout that time; there is something about names which is removable or supplementable here.

Reading on, I can now read 'Piglet' here as about a saying rather than a living: 'The Piglet' is about a living ('The Piglet lived ...'); 'PIGLET' is about an 'IN WHICH'; and here 'the Piglet' is being asked about, and a different 'Piglet said' — this 'Piglet' is about a saying. I am not saying that 'Piglet' is changing here, that the same 'Piglet' has a number of names, or that it is similar in that respect, because that recalls it. Here, the claims are all about the 'call[ing]':

Christopher Robin said you couldn't be called Trespassers W, and Piglet said yes, you could, because his grandfather was, and it was short for Trespassers Will, which was short for Trespassers William. And his grandfather had had two names in case he lost one — Trespassers after an uncle, and William after Trespassers.

(Milne, 1926, p.32)

Again, there is the idea that 'Trespassers W' is something 'short[er]' than 'Trespassers Will' that in turn is 'short for Trespassers William', which, also, is all something that 'his grandfather was'; the idea here being in each case that one is more complete than the other. '[N]ames', here, can and are being 'had': 'his grandfather had had two names', which are not what he was called.¹¹⁴ '[N]ames' can also be lost: he 'had two names in case he lost one', and it can be known that they can be lost ('in case', just like 'IN WHICH'), so that which comes prior to the 'grandfather' can know that the 'names' are usable. So even perspective on the 'name' that can be 'lost' knows not only that it can be 'lost' but also that it can be always something that has belonged previously elsewhere (or, rather, that it 'had been in the family for a long time'); so 'names', in this respect are constantly supplementary and constantly in communal

¹¹⁴ Again, this is just like the reading I made of 'the/a swan' and that names can be taken in my previous chapter on 'Strangers'.

ownership or can be circulated and are subject to calling and are subject to deferral and are subject to removal or transferral.

* * *

I will now consider ideas of priority, hierarchy and names as constantly supplementary and constantly in communal ownership with relation to some recent writing on island studies. Sarah Nimführ and Greca Meloni, in their journal article entitled ‘Decolonial Thinking: A Critical Perspective on Positionality and Representations in Island Studies’, pose the following question after a subheading: ‘The representation and conceptualization of islands’:

Who has not imagined themselves suddenly settling down alone on a tropical beach made of shimmering white sand, surrounded by palm trees that hide a nearby native village?

(Nimfür & Meloni, 2021, p.3)

Here, there is a known ‘who’ that ‘has not imagined’, so in this case the perspective on what this ‘who’ has imagined in order for it to also know what it ‘has not imagined’. Another way to read this is that the same perspective is asking/framing this all as a question, so there is also no knowledge of what ‘who’ ‘has not imagined’. In this instance, the perspective is claiming that the not-‘who’ has ‘imagined’, and

has no knowledge of the ‘who’ — but is also able to make the claim about the ‘who’ so knows of them (in relation to the not-‘who’).

The ‘who’ is/‘has not imagined themselves’ whereby the ‘themselves’ is separate to the ‘who’ and is also ‘imagined’, or, rather, can be ‘imagined’ because this is all framed as ‘has not’. So it is the ‘themselves’ (‘imagined’) that has not ‘suddenly settl[ed] down alone on a tropical beach made of shimmering white sand, surrounded by palm trees that hide a nearby native village’; ‘themselves’ is ‘suddenly settling’, and the ‘tropical beach’ is ‘made of’ and ‘surrounded by’, which then hides ‘a nearby native village’. In this case, because this is all framed as ‘imagined’, the ‘tropical beach’ is constituted as part of this ‘imagin[ing]’, but is also separate to it, and known to be so by the perspective because it is a ‘not imagined’ by the ‘who’. This is also ‘a tropical beach’ (one of many, in this perspective) which ‘themselves’ can imagine ‘suddenly settling down alone on’ (but not ‘who’); there are then other ‘tropical beaches’ that can be settled down ‘on’, but not ‘suddenly’ or even ‘alone on’, or either — these may not even be the ‘tropical’ ones — in this perspective there are many others. But ‘tropical beach[es]’, it is claimed, are ‘made of shimmering white sand, surrounded by [...] and hide [...]’.

The idea of ‘palm trees that hide a nearby native village’ is interesting to me. Because this is ‘a nearby native village’ there are then more/other villages that are not ‘hidden by palm trees’ and not ‘nearby’. There are also other villages which are not ‘native villages’ but these are not ones that the ‘palm trees [...] hide’, so there is something

that I can read here about the nature of ‘native’ being that which is ‘nearby’ yet is being ‘hid[den]’ at the same time. Also, there is the idea that what is ‘imagined’ is the ‘hid[den ...] native village’; if to ‘imagine’ something that is ‘hid[den]’ is to then ‘imagine’ other things that are not ‘hid[den]’, what is the difference? Is it about seeing? A presence that is not a presence? About that ‘themselves’ imagine to be on or surrounded by? The ‘imagin[ing]’ of something to be ‘hid[den]’ is to, in a sense, acknowledge its presence for the ‘imagine[r]’, but not for the ‘imagine[r]’ only. This is the paradox of psychoanalysis: when you read in perspective the perspective always has to know the ‘hid[den]’ as that which is ‘hid[den]’. So in this sense there is no ‘hid[den]’, in perspective, that is an absolute ‘hid[den]’; it is impossible. Here, it is an ‘imagined’ ‘hid[ing]’ and that this ‘hid[den]’ is of ‘a nearby native village’; this is what the ‘palm trees [...] hide’. It is known what is ‘hid[den]’, and in this sense the ‘hid[den]’ always has to declare itself as ‘hid[den]’ and then alongside this, whatever is known about what is being ‘hid[den]’ is part of that which is already known as the self-declared ‘hid[den]’.¹¹⁵ I am then also reading, in this, about a deficiency or a lack

¹¹⁵ This is commonly the case in psychoanalysis with the concepts of secret, mystery, silence, and privacy; that the unconscious has to be read in the perspective of the conscious *as* the unconscious which means that, at that point, it cannot be the unconscious any longer. For readings of this in relation to the child, see: Rose, Jacqueline. *The Case of Peter Pan, or, The Impossibility of Children's Fiction*. London: Macmillan, 1994. First published in 1984; where Rose makes the argument that there is no child other than that which is claimed from the position of the not-child, and is then fundamental to psychoanalysis because this is about the *retrospection*. For readings of this in relation to the unconscious, see: Freud, Sigmund. *The Unconscious*. Translated by Graham Frankland. London: Penguin, 2005. First published in German as *Das Unbewußte* in 1915; where Freud makes the point that in the claims made

or an absence: that an absence always has to be a present absence — it cannot be absolute — as the absence (that which is ‘hid[den]’) is present as ‘a nearby native village’ which is ‘hid[den]’ by the ‘surrounding palm trees’.

As this claim, or question, rather, is framed by/as ‘The representation and conceptualization of islands’, there are a few readings I can make. Firstly, that ‘islands’ are ‘represent[ed]’ and ‘conceptualiz[ed]’ — deferring the ‘island’ in a way to that which is a version of itself (re-‘presented’) and also a ‘concept’; something of a thought or notion; yes, of an ‘island’, but also then a version of the ‘island’. There is a degree of separation where ‘islands’ is only re-‘presented’. Secondly, in light of the question that follows this statement, ‘islands’ are those which not-‘who’ can imagine, and ‘who’ can not — they are constituted as that which is ‘alone’ and ‘hides’; solitariness and concealment (not seen but known about). If this is also the case, then ‘islands’ are not those which are constituted by ‘tropical beaches’, ‘white sand’, ‘palm trees’ and ‘native villages’ because these all form part of the ‘conceptualization’ or the ‘representation’ — not the island(s). The ‘native village’ here, of course, being that which, obviously, no-one wants to see when ‘settling down alone on a tropical beach made of shimmering white sand, surrounded by palm trees’.

about the unconscious it has to be conscious, by definition; it is the implications of this very paradox that psychoanalysis is interested in.

These are the classical structures of colonialism, imperialism and capitalism; you move the hidden ghetto¹¹⁶ overseas, preferably, so you really do not know that it is happening. Worryingly, however, this is a twenty-first century claim where the perspective is still that we do not need to see the nearby ‘native[s]’ but we do still want them to be there, just ‘hid[den]’ away (or, at least, not in their ‘village’ — this might not be up to par with this paradise).¹¹⁷

This passage from Adam Grydehøj is referenced by Nimfür & Meloni (2021, p.4), so follows on from, and is in reference to, the claims about the hidden ‘nearby native village’:

[I]slands have inhabited dreams and desires, and they have been associated with utopian attributes both by mainlanders and by islanders mostly living in noninsular areas. It is therefore impossible to consider island epistemologies without perspectives from the mainland.

(Grydehøj, 2018, p.5)

¹¹⁶ For more, see: Tabb, William. *The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto*. New York: Norton, 1970; Clark, Kenneth. *Dark Ghetto*. New York: Harper & Row, 1965; Carmichael, Stokely, and Charles Hamilton. *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America*. New York: Random House, 1967; and Alien, Robert. *Black Awakening in Capitalist America: An Analytic History*. New York: Doubleday, 1965.

¹¹⁷ See also: Cocks, Neil. “Letting Go, Coming Out, and Working Through: Queer *Frozen*.” *Humanities* (2022) 11.6; this article is in relation to the idea of coming out being the known thing in relation to the popular narratives around the song ‘Let It Go’ from the Disney film *Frozen* (2013); this is similar in many respects to the hiding that I read here.

Here, 'islands' have done two things (but then may not be presently): 'inhabited dreams and desires' and 'been associated with utopian attributes'. So, in this perspective, 'dreams and desires' are separate from one another but are common in the sense that they have been 'inhabited' by 'islands' — or that 'islands inhabit' them (or have done). This positions the 'islands' as that which 'inhabit[s]' the 'dreams and desires', where the 'dreams and desires' exist as that/those which can be 'inhabited' by things separate to them on a temporary basis (by way of 'have been'). So that which is 'represented and conceptualized' can also 'inhabit' 'dreams and desires'. This is also separate to what is 'imagined' (by not-'who').

In addition to this, 'they have been' (so are not any longer) 'associated with utopian attributes', where 'attributes' can be 'utopian' and are no longer 'associated' with 'islands' — perhaps they are not 'associated' with non-'utopian' attributes, or are not 'associated' with any 'attributes' at all. So what are these 'utopian attributes'? '[T]ropical beaches'? '[W]hite sand'? '[P]alm trees'? '[H]idd[en] native villages'? Both 'mainlanders' and 'islanders' know what 'utopian attributes' are and these are the same 'utopian' as all 'islanders' and all 'mainlanders': they are known to all, as well as the perspective who is neither a 'mainlander' nor an 'islander'. So in reading that 'islands [...] inhabit', they 'have been associated [...] by mainlanders and islanders'; the 'association' is done by that which is other to the 'islands' and the perspective. Here, the perspective identifies two 'attributes': 'islanders' and 'mainlanders', and they share the association of 'islands' as well as the 'attributes' of 'utopian'-ness.

The following claim from Godfrey Baldacchino's 'The Lure of the Island: A Spatial Analysis of Power Relations' is also referenced by Nimfür & Meloni (2021, p.4), so then forms part of the narrative around the 'representation and conceptualization of islands':

Some islanders are even confused by how they are seen as "paradises" by mainlanders, while they may struggle at home against un- and under-employment, aid dependency, brain and skill drain, waste management, water shortages, drug running or money laundering.

(Baldacchino, 2012, p.58)

Here, only 'some' islanders are confused by 'how they are seen as "paradises" by mainlanders', so there are other 'islanders' who are not 'confused'. The perspective claims they are 'even confused', so there are also other types of 'confus[ion]' and only 'some islanders' are 'even confused' where there then might be other 'islanders' who are not only not-'confused' but others still who are 'confused' in a different way. They are 'even confused' by 'how they are seen as "paradises"' by mainlanders'; not that they are "paradises" or even that they 'seen as "paradises"', but 'how' they are 'seen'. So in this perspective, 'some islanders' are able to know 'how they are seen' by 'mainlanders' and also so does the perspective who (as before) is neither an 'islander' (some) or a 'mainlander'.

So in spite of ‘some islanders’ knowing the ‘how’ of that ‘they are seen by mainlanders’, they are still ‘even confused’. The ‘confus[ion]’ is done by the ‘how’ so it is not perhaps that the ‘some islanders’ are ‘confused’ that ‘they are seen as “paradises” by mainlanders’ — this is not ‘confus[ing]’ to them — but rather ‘how’ they are ‘seen’. Also, is it that all ‘islanders are seen as “paradises” by mainlanders’ and that only ‘some’ of them are ‘even confused’ by how they are ‘seen’; or is it that only the ‘some islanders are seen as “paradises”’, and this ‘they’ is what is ‘seen as “paradises”’? In either case, all or ‘some islanders’ ‘are seen as “paradises” by mainlanders’; the ‘islander’ itself is ‘seen as “paradise”’.

The ‘they may struggle’, which I read in reference to the ‘some islanders’ — because of the previous ‘they’ (‘how they are seen’) — is in addition to the ‘confused’; this perspective knows that these ‘islanders’ are ‘confused’ and ‘may struggle’, all from a position of non-‘confusion’ and non-‘struggle’; they are, again, not an ‘islander’. In this way, the perspective also knows that these ‘some islanders’ ‘may’ not ‘struggle’. These possible ‘struggle[s]’ are all ‘at home’, so then there are not things that ‘some islanders’ might ‘struggle’ with when not ‘at home’ (but then also ‘some islanders’ who might not ‘struggle’) and the ‘struggle[s]’ are all ‘against’: ‘un- and under-employment, aid dependency, brain and skill drain, waste management, water shortages, drug running or money laundering’. In this, I am reading a claim to deficiency (un/der, ‘dependency’, ‘drain’, ‘shortage’) against which I can read a position of surplus/profit (for instance: an over, independency, fullness, excess). To

me, this is all about adequacy, plenty and sufficiency. It does not sound, to me, like the ‘islanders’ need to be ‘confused’ about this, but according to this perspective, they are. This is not their ‘confusion’ seen from our perspective.

So the ‘confus[ion]’ (‘even confus[ion]’) is because of ‘while’ that the ‘they may struggle at home’; so there is something about the how they are ‘seen’, while ‘struggl[ing]’, that constitutes the ‘even confus[ion]’. I wonder if this is to do with the ‘see[ing]’ again, if ‘un- and under-employment, aid dependency, brain and skill drain, waste management, water shortages, drug running or money laundering’ are all not ‘seen’ by ‘mainlanders’, or not seen ‘as “paradises”’ in spite of these things, to ‘islanders’. In essence, they are seen ‘as “paradises”’ and so (for ‘mainlanders’) ‘un- and under-employment, aid dependency, brain and skill drain, waste management, water shortages, drug running or money laundering’ are part of these “paradises”. It is worth noting that “paradises”, for the ‘mainlanders’, are not necessarily ‘un- and under-employment, aid dependency, brain and skill drain, waste management, water shortages, drug running or money laundering’, but rather the ‘struggle against’ these things. So is there something about the not-“paradises” (for them) which involves ‘the[m]’ but without the ‘struggle against’? What would this be? Does the ‘confus[ion]’ of the ‘islanders’ come back to their “paradises” not being about the ‘struggle against’ these things? This is also interesting in the sense that “paradises” are claimed as different in the perspective because of the “ ” with

respect to other words, in a way that the perspective is making a claim to “‘paradises’” that is separate and/or different to its own.

In thinking further about the tensions between ‘islander’ and ‘mainlander’ that Grydehøj and Baldacchino raise, Gaspare Messana references Sylvia Barberani (2006, p.90) with reference to a similar tension; this time between ‘host’ and guest’, ‘visitors’ and ‘locals’:

The encounter between host and guest appears as an opposition between visitors’ desire to penetrate the intimacy of back regions, and the desire of locals to protect their privacy trying to limit the tourists’ gaze to the surface of the front regions.

(Messana, 2021, p.107)¹¹⁸

This is, first of all, a ‘the encounter’, whereby the perspective knows that there are no others, and it is an ‘encounter’ that ‘appears as an opposition’ as opposed to it being an ‘opposition’. So this perspective knows and can differentiate between ‘host’ and ‘guest’ (whilst being neither) and how their ‘encounter’ ‘appears’ (to whom?) as an ‘opposition’. This then takes place ‘between visitors’ desire to penetrate the intimacy of back regions, and the desire of locals to protect their privacy trying to limit the tourists’ gaze’; here we have ‘visitors’ desire’ and ‘the desire of locals’. The

¹¹⁸ The reference to Barberani (2006) is in translation by Messana, rather than a direct quote.

‘appear[ing]’ ‘opposition’ is all about visitors’ and locals’ ‘desire’, which is also then about ‘penetrat[ion]’ and ‘protect[ion]’. I can then read the ‘encounter between’ and ‘opposition between’ (the latter is an ‘appear[ance]’) in similar ways as there is a tension ‘between’ ‘host’/‘guest’ and ‘visitors’/‘locals’, in that this perspective knows their difference and can identify this as that which takes place ‘between’ them.

Desire reads as a fantasy, of sorts, to do a thing — there is an interest/focus there, that is unfulfilled. The ‘visitors’ desire’ is to ‘penetrate the intimacy of *back* regions’,¹¹⁹ where there are multiple ‘regions’, some of which are ‘back’, and there is an ‘intimacy’ that belongs to these that can be ‘penetrate[d]’ and is the object of the ‘visitors’ desire’, but is not (‘penetrate[d]’). The ‘locals’ desire’ is ‘to protect their privacy trying to limit the tourists’ gaze to the surface of the *front* regions’.¹²⁰ Here, there is one ‘front region’ (of which there is a ‘surface’) as opposed to multiple ‘back regions’ where the ‘back’ had ‘intimacy’ that belongs to it. Where the desire of the ‘visitors’ is to ‘penetrate’ the ‘intimacy’, there is an opposition when the desire of the ‘locals’ is to ‘protect their privacy’ where ‘privacy’ is ‘their’ — belonging to the ‘locals’; moreover ‘the intimacy’ is not of the ‘visitors’, but rather the ‘back region’. The tourists’ ‘gaze’ is also ‘limit[ed]’ to ‘the surface of the front regions’ — or, rather, this is a ‘trying’ by the ‘locals’ ‘to limit the tourists’ gaze’. So in this perspective the

¹¹⁹ Italics mine.

¹²⁰ Italics mine.

‘locals’ can try to ‘limit’ the ‘gaze’ of the tourist, where the ‘gaze’ exists as that which can be ‘limit[ed]’ as well as known to be so. ‘[L]imit[ing]’, as I read it here, is about ‘surface’ and ‘front regions’; so if I am to read what ‘limit[ing]’ might be about, what ‘surface’ and ‘front’ are is also ‘limit[ed]’; not total and not complete.

This makes me think about covers, front-matter, as that which is claimed to be part of, but not entirely, a thing; something of the ‘surface’ of which there is also then a not-surface, and inside, that is all about not-‘limit’s; about access and privilege that ‘allows’ one to reach it. Because this is also about the ‘gaze’ being what is ‘limit[ed]’, it is all about the framing itself that is making an appeal to an absence that is never recoverable; to something in perspective that the perspective cannot contain. This is then more about a complete balance in symmetry (surface/beyond, ‘front’/‘back’); it does not include things.

There is also then the idea that this idea of the unlimited is precisely about not-gazing, or limiting the gaze. This in itself throws up the idea of: what does it mean to gaze and what does it mean to not-gaze? This seems to all be about audience and not-audience, so what constitutes an audience? And what of ‘tourist’ and ‘local’ — how might they figure in this?

* * *

I consider this notion of audience and the gaze with relation to the 2012 picturebook, *The House That Jack Built*, by Gavin Bishop; in particular, the following image:



(Bishop, 1999)¹²¹

In reading audience here, what is it that differentiates what I will call the front audience ('the man all tattered and torn', 'the maiden all forlorn', and 'the cow with the crumpled horn'), the back audience (the seal and sealers), and, potentially, the sky audience? For one, they (man, maiden, cow) are closer to the perspective in a sense, they are larger. The problem with saying that the seals/sealers are obscured or 'limited' and in the background is: can the same be said of what I read to be the man, maiden and cow? Are they free from obscurity? In this sense, the audience that is

¹²¹ There are no page numbers in this edition, although this image is '[s]et in the book's exact centre' (Van Rij, 2017, p.17).

constituted as being in the background, so to speak, is in fact the background. The pictures ‘give us’ the man, maiden and cow as the ‘main course’ (something also claimed by the ‘words’ perspective: ‘this is the man all tattered and torn that kissed the maiden all forlorn that milked the cow with the crumpled horn’), but actually the real meaning resides elsewhere,¹²² and therefore is a relationship between these two bits. So if I go with this idea that the sidelined or marginal is the most important, it is the force of the text, then I need to take on the burden of that and read something that seems utterly marginal and utterly unimportant; and how do I read the text as framing this?

For example, the maiden. If the man is not looking at the maiden then what can I say about the maiden? She is not being looked at by the man — she isn’t being ‘seen’ — and so his perspective is a replication of this idea of obscurity/limitation. But in what way is the man not-looking? In these terms, not looking is from another perspective that reads a gaze caught up in another gaze. It can’t ever achieve that gaze or show that gaze in any sense; it is something that cannot be accessed at all.,

¹²² For more on the idea of the supplement/marginal, see: Derrida, Jacques. *Of Grammatology*. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. First published in German as *De la grammatologie* in 1967; here, Derrida argues that it is the thing that is supplementary, or not seen, or marginal, is the force of the text; that in reading anything there always has to be the supplement that comes in to support what the reading is claiming; there always has to be an *other* to the reading.

and in that sense this is also something that is true of all gazes and all lookings.¹²³

The gaze always comes from somewhere else from somewhere of authority. In this picture, there is a lack of 'return' and so the vernacular of the gaze is in a sense between the eyes; that the eyes are about something else or something other, and there are then two ways in which there is a bar or limit on gaining access to sight. In a way, then, this is precisely not about seeing. One of these is that we can never access what is being seen and the other is that all we are getting is a mark with no sense of alignment. What marks a gaze here is actually something that has not got an object. The key here is to understand this as an aid offering up an always elusive vision that we can never align ourselves to; but surely there is a difference between eyes that are closed ('the man all tattered and torn') — which is a construction of a relational not-seeing — and eyes open ('the maiden all forlorn') — which is a construction of seeing. What we have there is the idea that the man and the maiden are caught up in a kind of loop in that sense; that there is an inability for them to see and access anything beyond this. With these two people, then, one of the things worth noting or noticing in a sense is their difference. What the reading of 'maiden' does is it produces one of those people as different that the not-looking is about a lack or absence of something; much the same as reading that male and female is


¹²³ For more on the gaze, see: Mulvey, Laura. "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema." *Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings*. Edited by Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 833–44.

constituted through beards and tattered clothes, rather than no beards and skirts.

There are similarities and differences to be read across the image in this case.

* * *

Consider the similarities between the ‘maiden’ and the ‘man’ in *The House That Jack Built* and the following illustration from Randolph Caldecott’s *The Queen of Hearts* from over a century earlier:



(Caldecott, 1881, p.23)¹²⁴

Certainly there are issues of gender and gaze but here there is also something about one relationship that is between Clubs and Hearts, where another is about Hearts and Hearts. This is about the exclusions, in a way, of the Queen of Hearts from the Heart-Heart relationship as it were. Also, in one sense, I cannot see the Knave's face.

¹²⁴ The text on the opposite page reads: 'And beat the Knave full sore:' (Caldecott, 1881, p.22).

The challenge of this is that there is something here where the ‘main scene’ is subverted by a ‘smaller scene’ (much like the man/maiden/cow and the seal/ers in the illustration from *The House That Jack Built*), and these two scenes have got something in common; but what is that relationship? Is this saying, to speculate rather than read, that the King of Hearts is taking it out on and beating his Knave and he is an authoritative man in this sense, which actually leads the wily King of Clubs to have this kind of lovely dance with Queen of Hearts? So maybe the politics of this are that the totalitarian King hooked on violence is missing out on sex, for example. Or is instead, that the beating of the Knave precisely replicates this — is it saying that there is something about the heterosexual dancing of the King of Clubs and Queen of Hearts that is replicated in the faceless beating of the Knave? After all, there is something here about the idea that the Knave has no face and the Queen cannot see. Or is it about something to do with the idea that the King of Hearts is sublimating his desire because this, in some way, is a substitution for romance with the Queen. All of these things are wild speculation, and it is not in fact analysis, but you can see that actually the relationship between these two things is not obvious. It could lead to a very homophobic reading of this scene or it could lead to a reading that refuses to acknowledge the difference between heterosexuality and gay structures. Or it could be saying that there is something about heterosexuality that is violent, or that there is something about male-on-male class violence that is actually replicating the structures of heterosexuality. All of these loose readings are wildly

different, and on the most basic level, are political. You end up finding perhaps that you are saying heterosexuality is gay violence, or that you end up saying that gay violence is perhaps what people do when they can't get their 'proper' heterosexuality. These are also very difficult things, as well as being very different things — reading the relationship and reading what makes it not a relationship is something to be taken very seriously and needs to be worked through in more detail, because there are always fundamental political problems. Even when we're looking at this, it's almost comforting because it is from the nineteenth century and because it's celebrated and because there's a national children's award that goes to the person whose work most replicates this. There is a sense that in reading nineteenth century literature we are not necessarily shocked by misogyny and racism, that we can counter it, to a degree, and safely package it as a part of Victorian British 'weirdness', in a way. But then do the issues that are prevalent, for me, in reading Caldecott as Victorian British 'weirdness' become any less so in Bishop's illustrations from the late twentieth century?

This is especially the case when I consider the following claim from Vivien Van Rij that '[s]et in the book's exact centre, this courtship scene is the first moment that Pākehā and Māori actually touch' (2019, p.17). What I'm interested in here is the kissing between the 'man all tattered and torn' and 'the maiden all forlorn', as well as the beating of the seals:

Placed within a frame of rope, as though captured in a portrait, he steps out to travel from a natural landscape on the left to an Anglicised pastoral scene on the right in order to practise the art of seduction on the maiden milking the cow. A transient worker, he forms a contrast with the maiden who, like the two gin mothers, is entrenched in an oppressive situation within her own land.

(Van Rij, 2017, p.16)

The ‘maiden’, who is known to be a ‘maiden’ is also ‘entrenched within her own land’, where the perspective knows that this land is ‘her own land’; this is then not the case for the cow or seals who are not ‘entrenched in an oppressive situation’ by way of ‘contrast[ing]’ with the ‘transient worker’. I am interested in how contrast is framed here: the perspective ‘constrast[s]’, but then also connects, the ‘transient worker’ with ‘the maiden’, where the latter is ‘entrenched in an oppressive situation within her own land’; so the ‘transient worker’ forms a ‘contrast’ to this. He is not ‘entrenched’, nor in ‘an oppressive situation’ and I can also then read that he is not ‘within [his] own land’ in the same way. Indeed, he has been ‘[p]laced within a frame of rope’ so there is this idea that he is separate to, and other to, this in the sense that he has been ‘placed within’ and so was not part of this before the ‘plac[ing]’; he is very much other. Also, this ‘transient worker’ is ‘frame[d]’ by, but also exceeds the ‘frame’ of the ‘frame of rope’, which is presumably the ‘this is the man all tattered and torn’, but as a deferral because it is not ‘this’ (and ‘this’ cannot make a deferral to itself

as it is always a retrospection), but at the same time the other frame is that with the seals being ‘bludgeoned’. After the ‘transient worker’ ‘steps out to travel’, he comes to ‘an Anglicised pastoral scene’ and the claim is that he does this ‘in order to practise the art of seduction on the maiden milking the cow’.

When the man leans over the maiden who sits, legs apart, with her bucket beneath the cow, this ritual in the theatre of love therefore seems exploitative, as the depiction in the background of seals being bludgeoned ironically confirms.

(Van Rij, 2017, pp.16–17)

But all of this only ‘seems exploitative’, so the ‘confirm[ation]’ is of what ‘seems’; it is the ‘ritual of love’ and it is not ‘exploitative’, because it only ‘seems exploitative’, and that lack is what is ‘confirm[ed]’ by the ‘bludgeon[ing]’ of the ‘seals’. So there is a repetition between natives and seals: this is the ‘hid[den ...] native village’ (Nimfür & Meloni, 2021, p.3) all over again, which is also a ‘bludgeoned’ ‘seal’ (Van Rij, 2017, p.17). Not the ‘cow’; it is being milked and is fine. So what is it that ‘seems exploitative’ here? For one, ‘the depiction in the background of seals being bludgeoned ironically confirms’ that this ‘seems exploitative’, so there is certainly something about that which is ‘in the background’ and ‘seals being bludgeoned’ which ‘confirms’ this, although much like ‘seems exploitative’, it is also not what is ‘in the background’ — it is a ‘depiction’ of this — and this is what is ‘ironically’

‘confirm[ing]’, and again it is known to the perspective that this is a ‘depiction’ and ‘iron[y]’. So it is neither ‘seals’ being ‘exploit[ed]’, nor does it ‘confirm’ what is seemingly ‘exploitative’, as it does so ‘ironically’. Nevertheless, there is then also something about this ‘depiction in the background of seals being bludgeoned’ which is ‘confirm[ing]’ the ‘exploitative’ ‘ritual in the theatre of love’ in an ‘ironic’ way. I can now read this to be about the perspective having knowledge of the ‘ritual in the theatre of love’ and then this both is and is not ‘confirm[ed]’ by ‘depiction in the background of ‘seals’ being bludgeoned’ by way of it being an ‘ironic’ ‘conform[ation]’, which begs the question: according to this perspective, to whom is this ‘ironic’?¹²⁵

The stakes here are that, to speculate slightly, there is something in and of this text that can/is not known or clear; that this perspective, in taking this position, is able to provide something additional or supplementary to the text which is all about confirming something or providing an understanding that was not otherwise

¹²⁵ For more on the problem of reading irony, in children’s literature especially, see: Walsh, Sue. “‘Irony?’—But Children Don’t Get It, Do They?": The Idea of Appropriate Language in Narratives for Children”. *Children’s Literature Association Quarterly* 28.1 (2003): 26–36; in particular, the following: ‘The assumption of a critical position that implies “appropriateness” or “suitability” necessarily involves the critic in bringing to bear an assumed knowledge of the “child”: of its needs, its likes, and its linguistic or narrative competence. Frequently this “knowledge” is based on an appeal to memory — which, somehow in such accounts, becomes certain, immutable, generalizable and unmediated — either of “my own experience as a child” or of experiences gained as a professional who has worked with “real” children’ (quoting Barbara Wall, 1991, p.88).

present. This, again, is the crucial issue of reading authority according to that perspective and, interestingly, if the perspective is claiming itself as authority — in being able to make the claim to what something ‘ironically confirms’ — then once more we have a kind of separation because it becomes a perspective on its own authority.

Be that as it may, the ‘bludgeoning’ of the ‘seals’ in the background of this image has something to do with what this perspective constitutes as ‘this ritual in the theatre of love’, the ‘this’ that is being referenced I read to be ‘when the man leans over the maiden who sits, legs apart, with her bucket beneath the cow’. So I can read that here ‘the theatre of love’ has many ‘rituals’ that are ‘in’ it, of which ‘this’ one is ‘when the man leans over the maiden who sits, legs apart, with her bucket beneath the cow’. The ‘when’ raises questions for me here, as I read this to be all about what ‘seems exploitative’; only ‘when the man leans over the maiden’ it ‘therefore seems exploitative’, with the ‘therefore’ serving to reason or give consequence for the perspective — ‘when’ x ‘therefore’ y . So ‘when the man leans over the maiden who sits, legs apart, with her bucket beneath the cow’ is that which, ‘therefore seems exploitative’. Is it the ‘man’ ‘seemingly exploit[ing]’ the ‘maiden’, or the ‘maiden’ ‘seem[ingly] exploit[ing]’ the ‘cow’? We have ‘man leans over’, ‘maiden who sits, legs apart’, and ‘her bucket beneath the cow’ that all can be read as complicit in the ‘seem[ingly] exploit[ative]’ relationships between ‘man’/‘maiden’/‘cow’, but nothing of the ‘seals’. What I am reading here is that there is scope to read the ‘exploitati[on]’

of 'maiden' by 'man' by way of his 'lean[ing] over' her, 'legs apart', and 'cow' by 'maiden' by way of her 'milking' it with the 'bucket beneath' in this perspective's claims, whereas the 'seals' are being 'exploit[ed]' — it is 'ironally confirm[ed]' — by way of being 'bludgeoned'; but by whom or by what? They just are. It is not that it is not known, rather that in there being this almost nameless or blameless act, unlike the 'leaning' or the 'milking', there is a lack of trace or cause. The 'cow' might not have been 'milk[ed]' if it were not for the 'maiden', however the 'seals' are being 'bludgeoned' irrespective of this. But it is 'in the background' so the importance of the 'bludgeoned' 'seals' is eclipsed by the 'milking' of the 'cow' and the 'rituals of love' and, because the perspective does not attribute the act of 'bludgeoning' to anything or anyone, we cannot be cross about it because it does not matter in the grand scheme of things.

This is somewhat echoed in the text where, again, there is mention of 'man', 'maiden', 'milk[ing]', and 'cow':

This is the man all tattered and torn
that kissed the maiden all forlorn
that milked the cow with the crumpled horn
that tossed the dog
that worried the cat
that killed the rat
that ate the malt
that lay in the house that Jack built.

(Bishop, 1999)

In this relationship, there is: ‘man [...] that kissed the maiden [...] that milked the cow [...] that tossed the dog that worried the cat that killed the rat that ate the malt that lay in the house that Jack built’. Based on my previous reading about the ‘exploitati[on]’ of the ‘maiden’ by the ‘man’ by way of the ‘kissing’, I can then read that the similar formulations of ‘exploitati[on]’ in the ‘milk[ing]’, ‘toss[ing]’, ‘worry[ing]’, ‘kill[ing]’, eating, ‘lay[ing]’ and ‘buil[din]g’ by the ‘maiden’, ‘cow’, ‘dog’, ‘cat’, ‘rat’, ‘malt’ and ‘Jack’. This is then a text that is all about the (seeming) ‘exploitati[on]’ of one thing by way of another, but then it is also about something else — something supplemental and entirely not the obvious thing — that ‘confirm[s]’ this, ‘ironically’ or otherwise. This line from *The House That Jack Built* interests me in that regard: that the ‘exploit[ed]’ (‘maiden’ in this sense) is ‘entrenched in an oppressive situation within her own land’. In this claim, I can then

read that there is a correlation between that which ‘seems exploitative’ and that which is an ‘oppressive situation’. Interestingly as well, by the very nature of the text being about consequential ‘exploitati[on]’, as I read it, the ‘malt’ only ‘lay[s] in the house that Jack built’ and the ‘rat’ only eats ‘the malt’ because it ‘lay in the house that Jack built’, the ‘cat’ only ‘kill[s] the rat’ because it eats ‘the malt’, and so on, because of the ‘that’ — the ‘that’ is used by the perspective to identify a specific thing that is known and understood prior. In this way, if I look at the sequence of events that lead up to the ‘man [...] that kissed the maiden’, because all of these exploitations are taking place in reverse (i.e. I read that the ‘cat’ ‘kill[s] ... the rat’ after it eats ‘the malt’ because of the ‘that’) then ‘the house that Jack built’ is the catalyst for all of the subsequent ‘exploitati[ons]’ in the ensuing sequence; with no ‘built’ ‘house’ there is no ‘malt’ ‘lay[ing]’, no ‘rat’ eating, no ‘cat’ ‘kill[ing]’, no ‘dog’ ‘worry[ing]’, no ‘cow’ ‘toss[ing]’, no ‘maiden’ ‘milk[ing]’, and no ‘man’ ‘kiss[ing]’.

Unlike the depictions of the ‘bludgeoned’ ‘seal’s, the reference to ‘the house that Jack built’ at the end of each formulation throughout the book, as well as it being the title, this is not subtle or supplemental in anyway; it is not so much in the background as fundamentally part of every claim in the text. Thinking about this with regard to my earlier readings on the ‘seem[ing]’ ‘exploitati[on]’ and the supplemental, Vivien van Rij references Jean Webb in relation to *The House That Jack Built*, who makes the following claims about qualities and characteristics of postcolonial children’s books:

1. Suppressed cultures establish separation and identity by reflecting on landscape and a sense of cultural relief.
2. Suppressed cultures force through the dominant culture by constructing and reconstructing myth.
3. Suppressed cultures realize identity by the re-writing of history.

(Webb, 2000, pp.71-72)

In each claim, it is ‘Suppressed cultures’ who ‘establish separation and identity’, ‘force through the dominant culture’, and ‘realize identity’ by way of various things (‘reflecting on landscape and and a sense of cultural relief’, ‘constructing and reconstructing myth’, and ‘the re-writing of history’). For me, in knowing that cultures are ‘Suppressed’, the perspective makes two specific claims to ‘identity’: that they both ‘establish [...] identity’ and ‘realize identity’ by doing different things. For all of this, as well, it is the case that ‘Suppressed cultures’ have ‘identity’ and the perspective knows this, and in addition to this, the ‘identity’ of ‘Suppressed cultures’ is not ‘establish[ed]’ and it is not ‘realiz[ed]’. So that which is known can also be not ‘establish[ed]’ and not ‘realiz[ed]’, and the way that they are ‘establish[ed]’ and ‘realiz[ed]’ is by ‘reflecting on landscape and and a sense of cultural relief’ and ‘the re-writing of history’ respectively. These claims are both significant in that they rest on the ‘Suppressed cultures’ themselves, in perspective mind you, ‘reflecting’ and ‘re-writing’; there is very much a sense of iteration in which the ‘Suppressed

cultures' are required to do something in response to something that already exists in order for their identity to be realised. For example, the way that 'Suppressed cultures' can 'realize identity' is 'by the re-writing of history', where 'history' has already been written, according to the perspective, but it has not been written by the 'Suppressed cultures'. Only in the 're-writing' of it, by the 'Suppressed cultures' can they 'realize identity'; so it is, again, not that the 'identity' does not exist or has not been 'establish[ed]' (this, remember, is '1' in the sequence; 'realiz[ation]' is '3') but more that it cannot be 'realize[d]' until 'history' has been 're-written'.

What is interesting to me about all of this is that, with respect to the readings in relation to *The House That Jack Built*, if this is then about suppressed cultures and the 'establish[ment]' or 'realiz[ation]' of their 'identity' then what is at stake? As I have read again and again in this thesis, this is about the claims about that which is known to be 'suppressed' and other, and the knowledge of their 'identity' by that which is not them. As is the case with the beaten Knave and the bludgeoned seals, the importance of this action or that which is suppressed is trivialised very much because it is 'in the background' or, by the nature of the claim, it is 'suppressed'; because it does not matter in the grand scheme of things.

* * *

My final chapter will contain a reading from Affrica Taylor and Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw's *The Common Worlds of Children and Animals: Relational Ethics*

for *Entangled Lives* (2019) in which they reference a joke attributed to Ursula Le Guin about ‘how to clear a room of Derrideans’. This joke, I place in the context of ‘games’ and (word) ‘play’ in a subsequent reading of Jacques Derrida’s *The Beast and the Sovereign* (2010), and I read part of this seminar alongside a piece of island theory by Elizabeth McMahon: *Islands, Identity and the Literary Imagination* (2016).

Games: How to clear a room of derrideans

Sometimes Winnie-the-Pooh likes a game of some sort when he comes downstairs, and sometimes he likes to sit quietly in front of the fire and listen to a story.

(Milne, 1926, p.2)

* * *

I began this thesis by considering the argument that Jacques Derrida's seminar puts forward from *The Beast at the Sovereign*: that deconstruction is demonstrated as a method or approach for challenging the metaphysical claims of modern philosophy. I want, now, to address what is said about 'my world, the 'my world,' what I call 'my world' — and there is no other for me, as any other world is part of it' (2010, p.9). As I elucidate in the previous chapter, the island and the child are not so different, in my reading, and in light of Derrida's challenge above I will now turn to a text that rests on the well-trodden parallel drawn between children and animals, that also 'sparks a fascinating interdisciplinary conversation about child–animal relations, calling for a radical shift in how we understand our relationship with other animals and our place in the world':

Like Ursula Le Guin [...] we take defiant pride in paying serious attention to the common worlds of children and animals that are shunned by the 'team players' and in writing about the 'obscure matter' of these worlds.

(Taylor & Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2019, p.12)

Who is this 'we'? The 'we' takes 'defiant pride' (not pride solely) in a way that is similar to, 'like', Ursula Le Guin; 'take [...] in' suggesting that pride can be both taken and also taken in something. In this 'paying serious attention to the common worlds of children and animals'. So the taking of the pride is situated in the paying of serious attention, where the 'paying' in turn is 'of' the attention which (much like the pride) has been qualified as 'serious'; this is all according to the perspective on what the 'we' takes (present, currently on-going). Only in the 'paying' of 'serious attention' can the 'we take defiant pride', all in relation to the 'common worlds of children and animals', in which there are known and absolute 'common worlds' that are of both 'children and animals'. The question here is: are these worlds 'common' to 'children' and 'common' to 'animals'; or 'common' to 'children and animals'?

In any case, the claim is that 'common worlds' exist, so other 'worlds' also exist which are not 'common', and indeed others too that are not of 'children and animals' (or of 'children' and of 'animals'). In the sense that the 'common worlds' (multiple, so more than one 'world') are 'of' 'children and animals' there is the notion that 'children and animals' are in possession or ownership of the 'the common worlds';

that they belong to them. These same ‘common worlds’ are ‘shunned by the ‘team players’” according to the claim, in which the perspective is aware of the fact that these ‘common worlds’ are what the ‘we’ is ‘paying serious attention’ to. It knows what is paid ‘attention’ to (seriously) and what is ‘shunned’ from a position that is not the ‘we’ and is not one of the “team players”. There is something, too, about these “team players”; a knowing of the “team players” in that there is a claim to ‘play[ing]’ but also of ‘team’, as opposed to ‘players’, who are not-‘team’ (and even a ‘team’ that is not-‘players’). I can read that these are different ‘worlds’, because they are plural (‘common worlds’); that ‘children’ have a ‘world’ and ‘animals’ have a ‘world’, or ‘children and animals’ (together) have multiple ‘worlds’. The perspective knows that, although they are different, they are ‘common’ and in order for them to be ‘common’ they need to be apart. As such because the ‘worlds’ are ‘common’ they could also be not ‘common’; something about this plurality is about an inherent difference, which has to be overcome by the claim to ‘common’.

The “team players”, as well as the ‘we’, are also conscious of the ‘common worlds of children and animals’ (they must be in order to either ‘pay[...] attention to’ or ‘shun’ them); as such the ‘common worlds’ are passive: they are either ‘shunned by’ or ‘pa[id] attention to’. ‘Ursula Le Guin’ is then also identified by the perspective, as the ‘we’ is ‘like’ her.

‘[S]hunned by the ‘team players’” and also ‘in writing about the ‘obscure matter’ of these worlds’; the claim being that ‘these worlds’ (the same ‘worlds’; of ‘children and

animals' that are 'common worlds?') have "obscure matter" that is 'of' them in which the 'writing' that is 'about' the "obscure matter" 'shun[s]' the 'common worlds of children and animals'. In this claim there is at once a 'shunn[ing]' of 'the common worlds' that exists in the 'writing about' their "obscure matter". In 'writing about' an aspect of these 'worlds', they are 'shunned'.

They are the same 'worlds', and known to be the same 'worlds' in this perspective. So where is the position on the "obscure matter"? It is already known (the 'common worlds' and the 'worlds'), so is "obscure matter" the attribution of the view of the 'team players'? What perspective is "obscure matter"? Is the 'writing about the 'obscure matter' of these worlds' part of what the we is taking 'defiant pride' in? The 'we' take 'defiant pride' in 'writing about the 'obscure matter' of these 'worlds', but in 'writing' they attribute another perspective (how I read the " "); these 'worlds' have "obscure matter". So then what, or who, are the "team players"? In this way, the 'shunn[ing]' is about the "team players" not even 'writing about' it; the 'we' takes 'defiant pride' in 'writing about these worlds'. So actually the "obscure matter" is the attribution by the perspective to the perspective of the "team players" because in a sense it reads the "team players" to not 'write[...] about these worlds' because they view them as "obscure matter", as if they are saying that the "team players" regard this as not worth writing about because it is just 'obscure' stuff.

Reading further, the ‘we’ enjoys:

hanging out with children and animals in our empirical research and reading children’s animal texts, precisely because the material/semiotic menageries that constitute children’s and animals’ mixed-up common worlds confound the rules of the main game — the hermetically sealed dualist formula of ‘Man vs Nature’.

(Taylor & Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2019, p.12)

So ‘taking defiant pride’ and ‘paying serious attention’ and, here, ‘hanging out’ are all about the ‘pride’ of the ‘we’ in engaging with all of this and loving all of this and wanting to do this. On the other hand, the “team players” are all just ‘shunn[ing]’ it because they simply dismiss it as “obscure matter”; it is not enjoyable, it is just ‘obscure’. The ‘we’, that enjoys ‘hanging out’, is all the time about not ‘children and animals’, as well as not “team players”, which also presents an interesting idea as to how can ‘we’ not be a ‘team’? Because the ‘we’ is separate to the “team players”, the ‘players’ are necessarily not-‘we’ and ‘team’ is not-‘we’ in the sense that the perspective knows that the ‘we take[s ...] pride’ in ‘these worlds’ and also that the ‘players’ are “team players” and that they ‘shun’ the ‘common worlds’. They know about them but they ‘shun’ them. I can also read then that they ‘shun’ them because the ‘worlds’ they know about, according to the perspective, are “obscure matter”; “obscure matter” is also to be, in this respect, something that is ‘shunned’ (although

not ‘in writing’, because that is still part of the taking ‘defiant pride in’). If the “obscure matter” relates to the view of the “team players” and is the reason for the ‘shunn[ing]’, the ‘we’ must see the team players’ view of it as ‘obscure’ and so the ‘we’ needs to know there is another view. In this way I read the “ ” as being about a perspective claiming to be other to themselves; a claim that is not the perspective’s own, but that *of* another, as before. In that sense then “team players” is also not the perspective’s own claim. Here there is a shift, potentially, that is about something to do with not really what “team players” are, because for them to be “team players” means that this is not what they are *actually* thought to be by the perspective. It is still a claim from elsewhere, but the elusiveness is about an otherness in the claim which is not about a view that is not their own, but a view that is not their own in not being what the perspective actually thinks the “team players” *are*; the “team players” are actually something else to this perspective. Once again, in this perspective, I read a shift here in what it means to claim that there is an otherness; that this is not an invocation of its own view in its view. This then carries over to how one might read “obscure matter” in the same way.

The ‘like Ursula Le Guin’ becomes interesting too in relation to this reading because in the above passage, Taylor and Pacini-Ketchabaw make reference to Jody Emel and Jessica Wolch citing ‘Ursula Le Guin’ (1990, p.10):

If you want to clear a room of derrideans, mention Beatrix Potter without sneering. ... In literature as in real life, women, children and animals are the obscure matter upon which Civilization erects itself, phallogically. ... If Man vs Nature is the name of the game, no wonder the team players kick out all these non-men who won't learn the rules and run around the cricket pitch squeaking and barking and chirping!

(Emel & Wolch, 1998, pp.16-17)¹²⁶

The notion of 'sneering' here I can also read in relation to the 'shunning', and in that sense the "team players" are in some way about 'clearing a room of derrideans' (not equating them, one to one) as well as who is given, in this perspective, a frame of status. The "obscure matter" is then their claim about the claim of 'Ursula Le Guin'; because Taylor and Pacini-Ketchbaw claim that 'in writing about the 'obscure matter' is a claim about the claim attributed to 'Ursula Le Guin' in the Emel and Wolch text. It is also 'like', so then 'in writing about' is part of the 'defiant pride', much like 'Ursula Le Guin' in her claim according to Emel and Wolch. The joke here ('in literature as in real life') implicates the 'derrideans' as male; I can read that they then occupy the position of the 'men' towards the 'non-men' in the perspective (the view of their view of non-men). Although it does claim 'in literature *as in* real

¹²⁶ This Russian doll is somewhat confusing, but Ursula Le Guin (1990, p.10) is referenced by Emel & Wolch (1998, pp.16-17) which I am reading in Taylor & Pacini-Ketchabaw (2019, p.12). This is, in effect, the perspective on Emel & Wolch's perspective on Le Guin.

life’,¹²⁷ so the situation of the genderedness of ‘literature’ and ‘real life’, which is somehow other to ‘women, children, and animals’ but is also somehow other to ‘derrideans’ and men as well (and, of course, ‘Beatrix Potter’), is at stake. It is, after all, ‘in literature as in real life’, so funnily enough there is still acknowledgement of ‘literature’ and ‘real life’, they are just unaffected by being separate from ‘women, children, and animals’. The ‘we’ is also the ‘non-men’ (if it is ‘like’ ‘Ursula Le Guin’), so this reading presents a problem: there are ‘these non-men’ who ‘won’t learn the rules’ but do have ‘rules’ because they ‘run around the cricket pitch squeaking and barking and chirping’. These are both not ‘rules’ (they will not learn ‘the rules’) and at the same time ‘these non-men’ are still ‘run[ning] around the cricket pitch’.

In this shift, there is something about the perspective on Emel and Wolch’s perspective on Ursula Le Guin that ‘women, children and animals’ are the “obscure matter” in relation to the claim that ‘we take defiant pride in paying serious attention to the common worlds of children and animals’ in which the claim on ‘children and animals’ is constant (they are the “obscure matter” and they have ‘common worlds’). Despite this, the ‘women’ are only constitutive of the “obscure matter” and not the ‘common worlds’, so maybe the ‘we’ here is the ‘women’, separated out, because ‘the common worlds of children and animals’ are not the ‘common worlds’ of ‘women, children and animals’; ‘children and animals’ frame, in turn, something which then makes a claim to ‘women children and animals’. Is that what the ‘like’ is? Is that, in a

¹²⁷ *Italics mine.*

sense, the difference between the ‘we’ and their perspective on Le Guin; the ‘we’ are the ‘non-men’? This creates further problems in relation to the/a binary; that ‘non-men’ are constructed in relation to ‘men’ in that they are the lack. This could be read also as a claim in the perspective on Emel and Wolsh’s perspective on Le Guin about the “team players”; that the ‘team players’ are the ones who view the ‘women’ as ‘non-men’. There is ‘no wonder the team players kick out all these non-men’, in which the ‘non-men’ are ‘these’ (‘women, children and animals’). This also accounts for the ‘squeaking and barking and chirping’ which ‘women, children and animals’ then do according to the view of the “team players”. So maybe in this way, the team players’ view is that none of them (women, children and animals) have language in a sense, for they are all different (‘squeaking and barking and chirping’) but they are not about ‘literature’, and they are about “obscure matter”.

What is it, then, to say that all of these things that are other (women, children and animals) do not have language? That they squeak, or bark, or chirp; that these, in their own right, are *not* language? In what way(s) are they ‘obscure’? Ultimately, what does this mean for women, children and animals? What does this mean for real life?

The ‘name of the game’ here is about learning the ‘rules’, and if this is the ‘name of the game’ and those are the ‘rules’ they ‘won’t learn’ then there is no wonder that this is their view — just like ‘if you want to clear a room of derrideans, mention Beatrix Potter without sneering’. The idea here being that there would be wonder if

they would accept those who ‘won’t learn the rules’ because ‘the name of the game’ is ‘Man vs Nature’.

Further to this, who is this ‘we’ not? There is the (crude) possibility that the ‘we’ is the ‘women’ and therefore the ‘non-men’ is in the view of the perspective on the perspective, so that the ‘non-men’ is not its own view but those of the “team players” in its view. But the perspective is not any of those things because of the retrospection; so even if the ‘we’ is the ‘women’, it is split regardless. This perspective is not ‘children’, not ‘animals’, not ‘derrideans’, not ‘Beatrix Potter’ — it knows all of them, but it is none of them, and so in this respect the reading about the ‘women’ here is an interesting one because in the ‘women’ not being in the reading about these claims (because it is only about ‘children and animals’, and the ‘we enjoy hanging out’ with them) there is a further step that the we is a perspective on the ‘we’; if this is a perspective that, in one sense, defines itself as the ‘we’/‘women’ (although it is also ‘we’/not-‘women’) it is also a perspective on the ‘we’. This then becomes a problem in that the perspective cannot sustain the self-presence of the female or ‘women’ as that which is enjoying or participating in the ‘common worlds of children and animals’ even as it is neither ‘children’ nor ‘animals’; it is not even women in that sense because of the perspective *on*.

So the ‘we’ enjoys ‘hanging out with children and animals’; this is known by the perspective on the we but knows we is separate from ‘children and animals’ and also knows about the we and that they ‘enjoy hanging out with children and animals’.

This is where the ‘with’ comes into play. The ‘we’ has a perspective on ‘our empirical research’, so it knows that ‘our’ ‘research’ is ‘empirical’. The ‘and’ here is of interest as well: ‘[w]e enjoy hanging out with children and animals in our empirical research and reading children’s animal texts’. In reading, retrospectively, the ‘we’ ‘reading children’s animals texts’ (which is not ‘empirical research’), ‘animals texts’ are ‘children’s’ and that is where the we ‘hang[s] out with’ not only ‘children’ but also ‘animals’ in the ‘empirical research’ of the ‘our’, where ‘empirical research’ is constituted as having within itself the ‘hanging out with’ both ‘children and animals’. This, once more, is recalling ideas of ‘games’, of “team players”, in that the ‘we’ is ‘hanging out’; the whole idea here is that they are not the “team players” and they do not play the ‘game’ but they do ‘hang[...] out’, even if the ‘hanging out’ is in the ‘empirical research’. It is not the ‘empirical research’ of the ‘children’ and ‘animals’ either because it is ‘our empirical research’, so ‘children’ and ‘animals’ are also not ‘run[ning] about the cricket pitch squeaking and barking and chirping!’ and ‘hanging out’.

So something is remarkable here about ‘games’: ‘games’ which are ‘play[ed]’ or ‘games’ which are not ‘play[ed]’, and what properly belongs to ‘games’ and (‘team’) ‘players’ which, on the one hand, is something they are absolutely not and they are excluded from and they are retrieving and they are defiant. But the name of the ‘game’ is an ‘if’, regardless of whether or not this is the ‘name of the game’. There are conditions, too, in the claim ‘if you want to clear a room of derrideans’, however ‘in

literature as in real life, women, children and animals are the ‘obscure matter’. There is a difference between real life and the name of the game, in that respect.

‘[D]efiance’, too, is of interest; why position yourself in relation to, to think about the notion of ‘defiance’, in terms of oppression? Why position yourself as being absolutely defined by that view of the other that you have? The ‘pay[ing] serious attention to’ something is ‘defiant’, ‘def[y]ing’ something, as is the ‘pride’; ‘tak[ing ...] pride’ in ‘pay[ing ...] attention to’ something can be ‘defiant’.

The ‘we’ does the ‘writing’ and the ‘hanging out’ and ‘reading children’s animal texts’, precisely because the ‘material/semiotic menageries that constitute children’s and animals’ mixed-up common worlds confound the rules of the main game — the hermetically sealed dualist formula of ‘Man vs Nature’ — this is all for me about ‘writing’, the ‘enjoy[ment]’, and the engagement.

The formulation itself undermines its very claims.

It is all a ‘game’.

★ ★ ★

Referencing Jacques Derrida's 'First Session' that opens with the line: 'I am alone.

Says he or says she. I am alone',¹²⁸ Elizabeth McMahon in a text called *Islands, Identity and the Literary Imagination*, states that:

In a seminar on *Robinson Crusoe*, Jacques Derrida asked repeatedly: 'What is an island?' [...] heeding Derrida's attention to the basic terms of an inquiry we will begin the subject of Donne's metaphor to ask 'What is ("No) man?"'? For this (No) man is not universal, though he appears to be so by dint of his centrality in a statement of natural law and embedded in the certainty of its syntax and cadence. Rather, (No) man is culturally specific.

(McMahon, 2016, p.24)

The claim here is that the perspective on 'Jacques Derrida' is that the question that is asked 'repeatedly: 'What is an island?' is 'Derrida's attention to the basic terms of an inquiry', and that 'we will begin the subject of Donne's metaphor' by 'heeding' this. Firstly, I want to consider what these 'basic terms' are, from which the perspective then knows of other 'terms' that are not 'basic', and that are also 'of an inquiry',

¹²⁸ These 'sessions' were delivered at The École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences) in 2002–2003 devoted in part to Martin Heidegger's 1929–1930 lecture course *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, that is, the meticulous but utter reformulation, revaluation, in other words, deconstruction of each of the terms of its subtitle: *World, Finitude, Solitude*; Derrida's 'First Session', which I read from the second volume of *The Beast and the Sovereign* (2010), is dated December 11, 2002.

where ‘an inquiry’ can have ‘terms’ that are ‘of’ it. The perspective on ‘Derrida’, too, is that his question, “What is an island?”, is the ‘heeding’. Before reading the perspective on Derrida’s perspective, I want to first think about the following passage from the Derrida’s ‘First Seminar’:

What is an island? [*Qu’est une île?*]. If you hear [*entendez*] this sentence, or these sentences come to you borne by the wind or an echo: “Qu’est-ce qu’une île? Qu’est une île”,¹²⁹ if you hear them in French, if you hear them without reading them, you think you understand them, but you are not sure.

(Derrida, 2010, p.3)

The perspective knows the ‘you’ here as that which could ‘hear’ but also could not by way of the ‘[i]f’ that frames these claims. There are also multiples ways in which the perspective knows that the ‘you’ could hear: ‘in French’ and ‘without reading them’, for which the latter is about a ‘hear[ing]’ that is also about a ‘reading’, so then the perspective on the ‘you’ knows about a ‘hear[ing]’ that relies on a ‘reading’, but here the ‘you’ can also ‘hear [...] without reading’. As an alternative to the ‘you ‘hear[ing] this sentence’, ‘these sentences come to you borne by the wind or an

¹²⁹ In the text, the footnote here reads: ‘[Translator’s note:] Both of these are standard question forms in French (the second a little dated and more formal); both would be translated as “What is an island?”’

echo', where the 'or' sets up a 'these' (multiple) as opposed to a 'this' (singular) that 'come to' the 'you'. Now, interestingly, I read the 'this sentence' as being 'What is an island? [*Qu'est une île?*]' and the 'these sentences' and the 'them' that the 'you hear[s]' (possibly) as being "Qu'est-ce qu'une île? Qu'est une île". So then 'What is an island? [*Qu'est une île?*]' is the 'this sentence' which the perspective claims that '[i]f you hear', but then can not be the 'these sentences' that 'come to you' or the 'them' that 'you hear' (also possibly). I read that the claim resolves the 'if' that 'you hear' or that 'come[s] to you', being that 'you think you understand them, but you are not sure'. So here, the 'if' is bound up in whether or not the 'you think[s] you understand them', where the 'understand[ing]' of the 'them' — the 'these sentences' that 'come to you' or the 'them' that 'you hear' — not the 'this sentence'. For me, I can read this either in the sense that 'What is an island? [*Qu'est une île?*]' is both the 'this sentence' and also the 'them' that 'you think you understand' where perhaps a reading of the 'them' could retrospectively be about a reading of the [] — the perspective on Derrida is, of course, a perspective in translation¹³⁰ — where the '[*Qu'est une île?*]' is a duplication, not because of the translation as such but because of the 'them', of the 'sentence' in question which is, in turn, a claim by the

¹³⁰ The claims to 'translation' are part of the footnotes on the same page, as '[Translator's note:]', as well as on the very first page of the 'Foreword' by the text's translator, Geoffrey Bennington: 'When the decision was made to edit and publish Jacques Derrida's teaching lectures, there was little question that they would and should be translated into English' (p. vii). I do not do a reading of the translation or the claims to translation, here, however in terms of the claim to the 'these', it aids my reading.

perspective to a multiple. I can also read this is the sense that the ‘or’ which is all about the duplication of the sentence (from a ‘this’ to a ‘these’) which ‘come to’ the ‘you’ by way of ‘the wind or an echo’; not both, but one or the other. I then read that either ‘the wind’ or ‘an echo’ is “‘Qu’est-ce qu’une île? Qu’est une île’”, although this presents a problem in that I can read “‘Qu’est-ce qu’une île? [...]’” as a sentence — much like the earlier claim, “‘What is an island? [*Qu’est une île?*]’” there is the ‘?’ — however on what grounds am I reading “‘[...] Qu’est une île’” as being a sentence, in perspective? It is the framing of “‘Qu’est-ce qu’une île? Qu’est une île’” as ‘these sentences’ that does this, not the ‘?’; if that were so, then the two ‘?’ that I can read in the claim “‘What is an island? [*Qu’est une île?*]’” would be about more than one sentence, but it is framed as being ‘this sentence’, only.

In any case, the claim ‘you think you understand’ is all about what knowing what the ‘you understand[s]’; but the question is where is this perspective on the ‘you’ that knows the ‘you’ as ‘you’, no less what the ‘you’ does or does not ‘understand’ in that same perspective? This is the problem, again, of identification that is in excess of itself. To claim that the ‘you understand[s]’ there is a perspective on the ‘you’ because it is retrospective, so ‘you’ has got a perspective on a different ‘you’ that is known to ‘understand’; ‘understand[ing]’ is known to be ‘understand[ing]’, so then what is that ‘understand[ing]’ in perspective?

Thinking about reading and ‘understand[ing]’ in this way then makes me think about the question that I brought up at the beginning of this thesis: what does it

mean to *belong*? Here: where is the perspective *not* ‘understand[ing]’; what does it mean to (not) ‘understand’? In this case, ‘you think you understand them, but you are not sure’.

For the final time in this thesis, I want to reference *Winnie-the-Pooh* where, like earlier, the ‘you are not sure’, and this is not dissimilar to the ‘Introduction’ which I read earlier. As Lesnik-Oberstein states: this is all a game of language: ‘an immediate engagement with word-*play*: who possesses whom’ and ‘[w]ord-*play* of this kind, [...] is a trait characteristically associated with fantasies of childhood’ (1999, p.200):¹³¹

If you happen to have read another book about Christopher Robin, you may remember that he once had a swan (or the swan had Christopher Robin, I don't know which) and that he used to call this swan Pooh.

(Milne, 1926, p.ix)¹³²

¹³¹ Italics mine.

¹³² Italics mine.

For me, the fantasy of the child is very much the fantasy of the island.¹³³ In much the same way to the ‘you are not sure’, this is precisely where the perspective on the ‘you’ is not ‘understand[ing]’, or, rather, at least creates a space for the perspective to be without knowledge of what the ‘you’ does not ‘understand’. It seems to me, irrespective of whether or not ‘you hear them in French’, ‘you hear them without reading them’ or ‘you think you understand them’, the uncertainty is there, because this is all a perspective on the ‘you’ who is ‘not sure’. This then makes me wonder what it is about the perspective on being able to ‘hear’ and ‘think’ that *is* about certainty, because this is all a ‘but’.

So: ‘*Qu’est une île?*’

I am not sure.

¹³³ As mentioned at the end of my chapter on ‘Strangers’ (in particular pp.210–211) as well as my chapter on ‘Trespassers’ in more detail. This is about the construction of the identity of child/hood and island in perspective; both the child and the island are products of a perspective on/of them and, as such, are *fantasies*.

Post-script: **No man is an island**

No man is an island,
Entire of itself,
Every man is a piece of the continent,
A part of the main.
If a clod be washed away by the sea,
Europe is the less.
As well as if a promontory were.
As well as if a manor of thy friend's
Or of thine own were:
Any man's death diminishes me,
Because I am involved in mankind,
And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls;
It tolls for thee.

(Donne, 1624, p.108)

* * *

In September 2020, the United Kingdom was emerging from a lengthy period of limitation and separation. At this time, I was fortunate enough to visit Almine Rech, a contemporary art gallery in London, to see a group exhibition. I found that it

resonated with me in a way that was helpful for my work here. At the show, I became aware of a book, published by NASA in 1985, called *Living Aloft: Human Requirements for Extended Spaceflight*; its purpose was ‘ease the Earth/space transition’ as it explored how humans adjusted psychologically and socially to living in outer space.

There are allegedly three stages of human reaction to prolonged isolation, confinement, and stress: ‘the first stage is a period of heightened anxiety produced by the perceived dangers in the situation; the second stage involved establishing a day to day routine, peppered with moments of depression; and the third, and final stage is a dangerous period of anticipation, leading to emotional outbursts, aggressiveness, and rowdy behaviour’.¹³⁴ At the time, both nationally and globally, there was a palpable shift from what many sources claimed as being ‘normal’, and the artwork at the exhibition claimed that this led to fantasies about simple social experiences. Without these quotidian experiences, the narrative of the exhibition was that ‘humanity’ moved through the stages of isolation distress that *Living Aloft* highlighted, almost thirty-five years prior to the pandemic. The installations of the exhibit were of images and objects that depicted physicality and connection; the ‘theme’ being that of how humans need love and desire, despite circumstance, and how the art suggested an antidote to the ‘collective’ anxiety.

¹³⁴ These claims are taken from a leaflet obtained at the exhibition and are a combination of direct quotes and paraphrase from *Living Aloft* (1985).

The title of this exhibition was *No Man is an Island*.¹³⁵

All of these things keep reverberating through my readings about islandness: this idea that *humanity* is simply that, and that *we are all individuals* yet absolutely all share *collective* anxieties that totally disrupt the known *normal* that is somehow known and apparent to everybody. That *No Man is an Island*.

I think again, here, about Neo in *The Matrix*, and Morpheus' line, echoing Jean Baudrillard, about the illusion of reality: 'welcome to the desert of the real'.

Variations on/of constructions of isolation, solitariness, and islanding, in what have colloquially been referred to as 'the new normal' in the wake of the pandemic is precisely what this is a critique and a rejection of: that *real*, that *normal*.

John Donne's famous pronouncement 'No man is an island' has proven to be a key coordinate in the map of modernity, particularly regarding the relationship between geography and identity. [...] This understanding of man as located and dislocated between cosmographical and cartographical understandings of the world is augmented by contemporary theories of the late modern era to which Donne's metaphor clearly resonates.

(McMahon, 2016, p.19, 24)

¹³⁵ Dillion, Rhea, Madelynn Green, Li Qing, George Rouy, Sally Saul, and Francesco Vezzoli. "No Man is an Island." Exhibition at Almine Rech, London, UK, 1-26 September 2020.

I recall a seminar as an undergraduate in which Donne's poem was understood by the tutor as an expression of the idea that human beings do badly when isolated from others and need to be part of a community in order to thrive: indeed, as McMahon claims, it is 'a key coordinate in the map of modernity'. *The island is a metaphor*, we learned, for isolation and remoteness; without contact to the social world; a space where one can be free of the rules of the continent; a private land of tranquility. The narrative goes on: human beings are different; *they are connected to each other* and connection is important for the wellbeing and the survival of humankind. No one stands alone like an island that is surrounded only by the sea; *we need one another to survive*.

This is, of course, the whole point of my dethinking. The very idea that *yes, we're all individuals!* and also *yes, we are all different!*, so beautifully satirised by Monty Python, is the problem of island theory. Donne's poem, if one is to *read* it, is making claims about belonging.

'No man' is 'an island' and '[e]very man is a piece of the continent', where 'continent' is that which has 'piece[s]' of it where 'an island' does not. The 'piece[s]' are 'of the continent', and this is what '[e]very man is'. Where '[e]very man is a piece', and '[n]o man is an island', there is also this idea of 'entire of itself' and 'piece of the continent, [a] part of the main' where I can also read the '[n]o man' is 'entire of itself' and '[e]very man' is 'a piece [...] a part'. The while notion that '[e]very man' is 'a piece [and/or ...] a part' of something else: 'continent' or 'main'; in doing

so, '[n]o man', in spite of it being 'entire of itself' is also not 'main'. 'No man' is marginalised; it is not 'part of the main', which is instead the realm of '[e]very man'.

Donne's poem leaves no room for any man to be anything other than 'a part of the main' because this is what '[e]very man is'.

It leaves no room for being an individual.

It leaves no room for being different.

BRIAN: Look. You've got it all wrong.

Acknowledgements

I have put off writing this until the very end, as I have not known, really, where to begin. I have come this far, though, so I will give it a shot. This thesis has taken me almost eight years to complete, all alongside a full-time job, so there are an awful lot of people that I need to express my thanks to. While I confirmed earlier that this is all my own work, which it is, there have been some people who, without their critical help, I would not be writing this now.

I need to start with Karín. From when I emailed you in 2014 to ask about joining your prestigious masters course at Reading from my little village in New Zealand, I have had nothing but admiration for the work that you do with and for CIRCL, and can only think and speak of you in superlatives. You have been unendingly patient with me as I have bungled my way through this process and I will forever be grateful for the opportunities that you have given me. Thank you, too, to some of my fellow CIRCL colleagues, in particular: Bonnie McGill, Chris Milson and Rebecca Lindsay who, especially at the beginning of my studies, helped me with a number of the readings that have ended up as part of this thesis. I must also thank the Wilkie Calvert co-supported Ph.D. studentship, without which I would not have been able to fund this research.

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