And the first runner-up is...: comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests

Chowdhury, S. M., Mukherjee, A. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7566-6526 and Turocy, T. L. (2025) And the first runner-up is...: comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests. Review of Economic Design, 29. pp. 447-477. ISSN 1434-4742 doi: 10.1007/s10058-022-00315-5

Abstract/Summary

We characterise the strategic equivalence among k-winner contests using simultaneous and sequential winner selection. We test this prediction of strategic equivalence using a series of laboratory experiments, contrasting 1-winner contests with 2-winner contests, varying in the latter whether the outcome is revealed sequentially or in a single stage. We find that in the long run, average bidding levels are similar across strategically-equivalent contests. However, adaptation in 2-winner contests is slower and less systematic, which is consistent with the property that simultaneous winner selection results in outcomes that are more random than in the 1-winner case.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-pure-test.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/111448
Identification Number/DOI	10.1007/s10058-022-00315-5
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
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